Clarke and Robinson

[2016] FCCA 527

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLARKE & ROBINSON [2016] FCCA 527

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Unilateral interstate relocation by Mother – earlier Orders by consent determined at dispute resolution conference (FDRC) – Mother confirmed consent to the Orders during FDRC but did not formalise the Orders – after the FDRC the Mother did not engage with ICL or the Court in relation to the proceeding or the Orders agreed at FDRC – Order for the Mother and child to return to the area of their original residence failing which a recovery Order would issue – consideration of public resources of the Court.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.60CA, 60CC(2) & (3)

AON Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Dobbs v Brayson (No.2) (2008) 38 Fam LR 95
Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303
Goode v Goode (2006) 206 FLR 212; (2007) 36 Fam LR 422
Morgan v Miles (2008) 38 Fam LR 275
U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238

Applicant: MR CLARKE

Respondent: MS ROBINSON

File Number: CAC 937 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Neville

Hearing date: 9 February 2016

Date of Last Submission: 9 February 2016

Delivered at: Canberra

Oral reasons delivered on: 9 February 2016

Written reasons delivered on: 17 March 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor/Advocate for the Applicant: Mrs K Mistry

Solicitors for the Applicant: Claire Naidu & Co, Canberra

Solicitor/Advocate for the Respondent: Ms K Fox (Farrar Gesini Dunn as agent)

Solicitors for the Respondent: Saines Lucas Solicitors

Solicitor/Advocate for the Independent Children’s Lawyer Ms J Lloyd

Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Jeanine Lloyd & Associates, Canberra

THE COURT NOTES THAT

A.The Applicant Mother was provided with a copy of the document entitled “Final Parenting Orders” as outlined in the Orders dated 25 November 2015, with a request from the Independent Children’s Lawyer to sign and return this document in the provided stamped, self-addressed envelope;

B.The Applicant Mother failed to sign the settlement terms;

C. The Mother then relocated unilaterally to Victoria in December 2015; accordingly

ORDERS

UNTIL FURTHER ORDER, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Applicant Mother and the child, X (born (omitted) 2009), are to return to the Canberra or (omitted) region by no later than 12:00pm on 19 February 2016.

2. Should the Mother comply with Order 1, the Orders made by this Court on 25 November 2015 will apply.

3. Should the Mother fail to comply with Order 1, the Applicant solicitor should notify Chambers by way of email and a Recovery Order will issue immediately without further notice to the parties.

4. If a Recovery Order issues, the child will live with the Father on an interim basis and spend time with the Mother as agreed in writing between the parties until the matter is revisited by the Court.

5. The matter be adjourned to 16 March 2016 at 2:00pm in Canberra.

THE COURT FURTHER NOTES THAT

D. The solicitor for the Respondent is granted leave to attend by telephone on the next occasion if the matter is not contested, and unless advised no later than 48 hours prior to the next Court event, Ms McCardle will be contacted on [phone].

E. If the matter is contested, all parties must attend in person.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Clarke & Robinson is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAC 937 of 2014

MR CLARKE

Applicant

And

MS ROBINSON

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. On 9^th February 2016, the Court made Orders and delivered abbreviated reasons ex tempore in relation to an Initiating Application filed by the Father on 24^th December 2015, and a Response filed by the Mother on 12^th February 2016.[1]

   [1] Unsealed copies of the Mother’s Response and Affidavit were scanned and emailed to the Court on the morning of 9^th February 2016.

2. In short, without the consent of the Father or Order of the Court, the Mother and child (5½ year old X – born (omitted) 2009) relocated to (omitted) in country Victoria from (omitted) NSW sometime between the Orders that were made on 25^th November 2015 and the date of filing of the Father’s 24^th December 2015 Application.  (omitted) is approximately a two hour drive from Canberra; (omitted) is a drive in excess of nine hours from the national capital.

3. On 9^th February 2016, the Court Ordered the Mother and child to return to the (omitted) region, or to Canberra (where the Father resides), by noon on Friday, 19^th February 2016, failing which a recovery Order would issue and the child, on an interim basis, would live with the Father and spend time with the Mother as agreed in writing between the parties.  Other Orders were made at the time, also on an interim basis, contingent on what course the Mother ultimately took but which need not be set out in detail here.

4. What follows are the reasons for the Orders that were made on 9^th February revised from the transcript.[2]

   [2] The written reasons would have been provided earlier but for the large lists before the Court, the fact that the Court was on circuit in Wagga Wagga and Junee in late February and early March, and the monthly week of “duty matters.”

General Background & Chronology

1. Before one gets to the Orders of 9^th February 2016, and indeed before one gets to consider the circumstances and terms of Orders that were made on 21^st October and 25^th November 2015, some brief background to the parenting dispute is important.  The following background is taken essentially from the Orders and notations on the Court file, which were sent to the parties on or about the dates recorded on them. 

2. Throughout the proceedings, the Father has been legally represented.  The Mother has sometimes had legal representation (and not always the same legal representation); at other times she has been self-represented.  Her various legal representatives withdrew from acting for her on 23^rd February 2015, and then on 14^th May 2015.  Since May 2015 (until 1^st February 2016), the only address for service for the Mother (there was no email address provided for her) was (omitted) NSW.

3. The parties have been litigating, on and off, since mid-July 2014 when the Father filed an Initiating Application in which he sought Orders for X to live with the Mother and to spend regular time with him, each alternate weekend and half of each school holidays.  As he does now, at the time of that Application, the Father lived in Canberra.

4. On the Father’s account, the parties commenced a relationship when they were both very young – 16 years old.[3]  But it was not until quite some years later that they started to live together: cohabitation commenced in 2008; the parties separated in 2012.  Since separation, the Father has deposed of his difficulties in spending regular time with X.  Among other issues the Father has encountered (he says) is the Mother’s somewhat peripatetic life-style.

   [3] The Father is now 36 years of age; the Mother is 33.  The Mother has two older children, A, who is 14½ and B, who is soon to turn 10, and one younger child, C, aged coming up to 2 years.

5. For example, he said (affidavit filed 10^th July 2014) that he learnt of the Mother’s and child’s residence at (omitted), which is approximately 90 kilometres north east of (omitted) and some 4½ hours’ drive from Canberra in 2014.

6. In 2014, the Father sought a Commonwealth Information Order because of the difficulties he was having in keeping up regular contact with X (and her Mother).

7. The Mother filed a Response and affidavit on 15^th September 2014, in which she confirmed her then residence as (omitted).  In general terms, the Mother sought Orders for X to live with her, and for the Father’s time with the child initially to be supervised for six months, then subject to various other checks and balances, for the Father’s time with X to be each alternate weekend.  At that stage in the proceeding, the Mother was legally represented by a firm in (omitted).

8. On 17^th September 2014, an Order was made for a report pursuant to s.62G of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”); at the same time, an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) was also appointed.

9. In general terms, Orders were made in September 2014 which provided for a regime of supervised time of the Father with the child, for that time ultimately to progress to unsupervised time, and for the Father to undergo random drug screens as requested by the ICL.

10. In December 2014, the Father filed an Application in a Case seeking that his time with the child progress to unsupervised.  Again in general terms, he averred that the Mother had been tardy if not somewhat obstructive in facilitating his time with the child.

11. Orders were made in December 2014 which record in detail, among other things, that the Mother’s legal representation changed and that Legal Aid ACT now represented her, although that Office had indicated having some difficulty in contacting the Mother to obtain instructions.  The Orders of December 2014 provided for a regime of regular time between the Father and X, and pointedly (in the current circumstances) required that both parties keep each other informed of their current residential address, and other contact details (mobile telephone number and the like).

12. On 25^th March 2015, Orders were made, with the Mother attending on her own behalf, which noted that (a) the Mother had a grant of legal aid (although no solicitor appeared on her behalf), and (b) the Mother was supportive of a regime of regular, alternate weekend time between the Father and X.  Orders were made which reflected this arrangement.  There was no challenge to these Orders.

13. The next occasion the matter was before the Court was on 22^nd July 2015.  The Mother did not attend.  Orders were made in accordance with recommendations in the family report that was released on 15^th June 2015 (Exhibit A: discussed briefly later in these reasons), which provided that the Father pick up X from after school on the weekend she spends time with him, and the Mother would collect the child at the conclusion of the Father’s time.  There was no challenge by the Mother to the Orders made on this occasion.

14. At or about this time (July 2015) the Father was doing most if not all of the driving, among other things, because the Mother had lost her licence.

15. On 21^st October 2015, with the matter being mentioned by consent and on behalf of the Mother and the ICL by the Father’s lawyer, it was noted that the matter had settled in principle, with an Order that final consent terms were to be filed within 14 days.  A copy of the terms agreed at a dispute resolution conference (“FDRC”), signed by the Father and the ICL but not by the Mother because she had attended by telephone, were handed up in Court and placed on the Court file.  There was no challenge to these Orders.

16. On 12^th November, the Court contacted the ICL (copied to the Father’s solicitors – but not to the Mother because of her lack of email address) to inquire about the filing of the consent orders that had been agreed at the FDRC on 20^th October and which were the subject of Orders on 21^st October.

17. The ICL responded on 17^th November 2015 by email (likewise copied to the Father’s lawyer but not to the Mother for the reason already given).  She said, in short, that (a) the matter had resolved at the FDRC, (b) the Mother had attended that conference by telephone, (c) the ICL had sent the Orders to the Mother (with a self-addressed envelope enclosed) but (d) the ICL had heard nothing from the Mother since the FDRC.  In such circumstances, the ICL requested the Court to make the Orders that had been agreed at the FDRC.  That occurred, in Chambers, on 25^th November 2015.  The Orders made reflected those that were handed up in Court on 21^st October 2015.

18. No Application was made by the Mother to set aside, or otherwise to challenge, the Orders dated 21^st October or 25^th November 2015.  The Mother’s address on those Orders was, as per the Court file, (omitted), NSW.[4]  During the Mother’s last Court attendance on 25^th March 2015, she was asked to confirm her address; she did so stating it to be (omitted) as the relevant address for the service of documents.

    [4] For completeness, (omitted) is some 30 kilometres north of (omitted).

19. Before moving to other matters, again for background and context, I note the following from the Family Report, dated 2^nd June 2015 (Exhibit A).

The Family Report: June 2015 (Exhibit A)

1. In pars.2, 3, 4 and 6, the Report writer set out the [then] current parenting arrangements between the parties and their respective proposals.  It was there confirmed that the arrangements were for the child’s time with the Father for each alternate weekend.  As recorded in that Report, the Mother proposed that the Father should move to (omitted) so that it would be easier, among other things, for X to spend time with him, and that there would be less travel for the child.  In the light of recent events, this suggestion or reason for the Mother is rather, but strangely, poignant.

2. Pointedly, at par.5 of the Report, there is recorded the Father’s concern about the Mother’s compliance with adhering to current Orders and that he will be consigned to irregular time with X.  It was because of his disbelief in the Mother complying with Orders that the Father sought that X should live primarily with him.

3. It might also be noted that for the purposes of that Report (par.7) the Mother attended the interview with a Mr C, who was then described (i.e. approximately mid-2015) as “her partner.”  She told the Family Consultant (par.14) that she met him “online”.  He is not the Father of any of the Mother’s children, including her youngest child, C; the Father of that child is a Mr H, with whom the Mother had previously been in a relationship for some six months or thereabouts. 

4. It would appear, therefore, that the Mother had (for the purposes of the matters canvassed in the Report) a number of partners within a relatively short time frame, which the Court may assume did not provide much in the way of stability for the children in the Mother’s household.

5. The Report also records, at par.11, that for a time, Mr Clarke was X’s primary carer when the Mother went back to work.  The Report further records (par.14) Mr C as being C’s “psychological Father”.  There is no mention of whether he was also X’s “psychological Father” for the time that Mr C was “on the scene”, so to speak.   

6. The Report notes (par.17) (contrary to what the Mother seems to allege in her affidavit filed on 12^th February 2016 in relation to issues concerning the Father’s parenting capacity) that X “looks forward to seeing her Father and comes back happy.” 

7. Finally, for current purposes, at par.34 the Report notes that “a significant issue in this matter is the distance the parents live from each other ….”  The issue of “distance between the parties” may now be an even more “significant issue” with the Mother having moved unilaterally to the western districts of Victoria.[5]

   [5] According to Google Maps, and as earlier noted, the distance between (omitted) and (omitted) is well over 800 kilometres and a drive of more than 9 hours.  According to the same source, the distance between Canberra and (omitted) is approximately 190 kilometres and a drive (via the shortest route) of about 2 hours or thereabouts.  Given the Mother’s proposal for the child to fly to Canberra from (omitted), unfortunately there is no information before the Court regarding flight availability and frequency between (omitted) and Canberra, or relevant return details.  It may be that, as with many country towns, flights are very few and far between, and otherwise require, for example, a flight from (omitted) to Melbourne or Adelaide before taking a flight to Canberra.  But to state again, there is simply no information provided.  And as Boland J said in Morgan v Miles, at [91], it is not distance per se which should be the determinative criteria.  “In many cases what is relevant is the consequences of the move ….”

Substantive Issues: The Mother’s Relocation

1. On 25^th November 2015, in general terms, the Court made Orders in relation to parenting matters on a final basis that provided for the child X to live with the Mother, for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility, and for X to spend regular time with her Father each alternate weekend.  Various other Orders were also made that need not be recalled here. 

2. As already observed, those Orders, in large measure, were procedurally and substantively, predicated upon earlier Orders of 21^st October 2015.  Those Orders (as also earlier noted) recorded, amongst other things, that the matter was settled in principle and that consent terms were to be filed by all the parties within 14 days.

3. The Court now knows that the Mother relocated unilaterally to a residence in Victoria on an unknown date in December 2015.

The Father’s December 2015 Application

1. On 24^th December 2015, the Father filed an Initiating Application in which he sought orders that (a) the matter be dealt with ex parte, (b) a recovery Order issue for “the return of the child to the Father”, and (c) a restraint on the Mother approaching the Father or the child.  The Notice of Risk filed at the same time noted the Father’s concerns about the child being “abused in the Mother’s care” as outlined in his affidavit, also filed on 24^th December 2015.  Summarised, the concerns set out in the Father’s affidavit are as follows.

2. The Father said that he is concerned about the welfare of X, that the Mother will not tell him where she and X are, and that he suspects that the Mother has unilaterally relocated.

3. At par.11 and following, the Father set out his concerns about the risk of abuse of X, and or her exposure to inappropriate sexual behaviour.  Such risks, it is alleged, relate to the Mother’s brother, Mr J.  As well, the Father says that the Mother exposes the child to danger by her association with members of the (omitted) motor cycle gang.  Annexure B1 of the Father’s affidavit is a photograph of the Mother embracing a person wearing a “(omitted)” T shirt.

4. The Father further contends that the Mother and child (a) live in squalor (photographs are at annexure C to his affidavit), (b) do not have “basic nutrition”, and (c) the child is not regularly attending school (X’s school report is annexure D; it records that her attendance at school (she was in kindergarten) has been “poor” in 2015, with X having missed 50 days of school).[6]  The Father said that X “may have to repeat kindergarten for the 3^rd time.”

   [6] Annexure E is a letter from (omitted) Public School to the Mother, dated 29^th October 2015, asking her to explain the large number of X’s absences from school, and the risk of fines issued by the Department of Education for the child’s failure to attend school.

5. At par.13 and following, the Father deposed that the (NSW) Department of Family and Community Services had recently been involved because one of X’s siblings had been [allegedly] “molested” by the Mother’s brother, Mr J.  Mr J is currently in prison.  The Father said that Mr J had been nominated by the Mother to be a supervisor for the Father’s previously supervised time with the child.

6. At pars.18 and 19, the Father deposed to the Mother threatening him in the past with “sending someone” from the (omitted) to harm him.  He also said that the Mother has had members of that cycle gang stay at her residence with X.

7. At pars.20 – 22, the Father set out his concerns about X’s diet and living conditions.  The photographs at annexure C were of the Mother’s residence as at 18^th December 2015.

8. The Father referred to the Mother’s alleged drug use, and to her being investigated by the RSPCA for alleged cruelty to animals.

1. At par.36, the Father quoted a number of SMS messages from the Mother in December 2015) which included one that said: “I’m actually in melb”, which the Father took to be an indication that the Mother had relocated.  The Father said that he replied stating specifically that the Mother did not have his permission to relocate to Melbourne.  The Father asked for the Mother’s address, and contact details of her lawyer (if she had one); he said the Mother refused.

2. The Father further said that the Mother claimed not to have a copy of the Orders; he said he sent a copy of them via SMS.  He also said that the Mother has moved residence at least 6 times in the past few years.

3. The Father also filed (on 18^th January 2016) an affidavit by Mr I, who is the Father of the Mother’s two older children, A and B.  In this affidavit, Mr I deposed to the difficulties he has had with the Mother to make arrangements to see and spend time with his daughters.  Among other things, he said that when he remarried in 2010, it took him 3½ years before he was able to see his daughters.  He also said that the Mother “repeatedly relocated throughout the years” since he and the Mother broke up in 2007.

4. Mr I also confirmed that in January 2016 he saw on the Mother’s Facebook page that she had joined Facebook groups in (omitted) in Victoria.  He passed this information to Mr Clarke.  He noted the Mother’s address to be (omitted), which (he said) is some 5 minutes from (omitted).

5. Mr I further deposed his concern that the Mother is exposing his daughters to a Mr D, a person with whom the Mother was previously in a relationship.  He deposed that in 2007 there was a violent altercation (that involved a gun) between the Mother and Mr D, to which A and B were exposed.

6. Mr I said that from his knowledge and experience of the Mother she has relocated more than 15 times in three different States over the past few years.  He also said that the Mother had recently changed her Facebook name to “Mr D”.

The Mother’s February 2016 Response

1. On 12^th February 2016, the Mother filed a Response (and affidavit and Notice of Risk).  No interim Orders were sought.  Summarily stated, among the Final Orders sought are that the child live with the Mother, that X spend time with the Father each fourth weekend (times specified), that changeover be at Canberra Airport unless otherwise agreed, the parties are to share equally the cost of airfares for X to travel to and from Canberra, and on a without admissions basis, the Mother shall ensure that X is not come into unsupervised time with Mr J.

2. There is no express Order sought to permit the Mother to relocate the child’s residence to Victoria.

3. In her affidavit, filed 12^th February 2016, the Mother deposed (summarised) as follows.

4. She said that she was unaware of the 25^th November 2015 Orders until she had relocated to Victoria and they were sent to her via SMS message by the Father.  Such an assertion, in the absence of relevant detail, might lead the Court to assume that the Mother may have already relocated by 25^th November to (omitted).  It certainly is a tad curious that the Mother does not specify the actual date that she left (omitted) and moved to (omitted).

5. She also said that she had spoken to “Family Dispute Resolution” about the matter during the mediation but otherwise did not have legal representation at the time.  She said that she felt “very bullied and intimidated” at the FDRC.  She said (par.4): “I was not aware of any negotiations about relocation until at the very end and when I queried this I was told that I would just need to write a letter to the Court.  That is now obviously not the case at all.”

6. I simply observe here that such advice, either by any family lawyer, or even by “Family Dispute Resolution” (without knowing whoever or whatever this actually refers to), is quite implausible.  And, in any event, the Mother did not write the letter to the Court she said she was advised to write to obtain the Court’s approval.

7. The Mother deposed (par.5) that her relocation was “for personal family reasons.”  She said that she has no family support in (omitted); and that she has a range of medical issues, which I need not detail here save that, in my view, such “medical issues” that she generally refers to (par.5 – “gall bladder problems, appendix problems and ectopic pregnancy”) cannot of themselves account for the extremely large number of days X missed at school last year, and the Mother’s failure to respond to the school’s letter to her about this issue.

8. The Mother said that there were Orders in place for the Father’s time with X, but which were not really practical for each second weekend; she said that she “never went to Court”, that she applied for but was refused legal aid, that she had no money, and that she was on a pension.  Some of these statements, in the light of Orders made with the Mother present, may be “problematic”; in fact, her statements affirmed and filed with the Court may (I stress “may”) open the Mother to claims at least of inconsistency, but also much more serious contentions.

9. At par.8, the Mother said that she was now living with her fiancé, Mr D, with whom she has been in an on/off relationship for 10 years.  She said that she moved to (omitted) in December 2015 – but no date is given.  Contrary to her earlier statement (par.5) where the Mother said that she moved to (omitted) for personal family reasons, in par.8, the Mother deposed that she “moved to (omitted) in Victoria in December 2015 to live with my fiancé Mr D.” 

10. The couple’s rental property, she said, was well maintained (she annexed photographs of it: “R1”).  She said that X was at school and had made friends, was doing dance lessons and playing netball.

11. The Mother alleged an incident (and other similar allegations more generally) of family violence when she and the Father were in a relationship.  She contends that the Father is a risk to X and that he needs to undertake and complete “a men’s behavioural change program and anger management course.”  She acknowledged that the Father had provided a clear drug screen result, but did not know if it had been supervised or not.  She says that because of an incident when she was young, A (14½) is worried about X spending time with the Father.  Despite all this, X had been spending unsupervised time with the Father on a regular basis throughout 2015 without apparent incident.  The Family Report recorded (as earlier noted) that X’s relationship with her Father was progressing well.

12. Again by way of comment only: if the Mother is so concerned about X spending time with the Father for the reasons that she gives, one might ask, not unreasonably I hope, in her Orders sought why she is (and has done since late 2014, without objection to no supervision requirement) proposing regular and unsupervised time for X with her Father?  And why did she not oppose much earlier Orders of the Court that provided for regular alternate weekend time between X and her Father?  And why did the Mother advise the family consultant (noted earlier in these reasons) that X looked forward to her time with her Father and that she returned from that time “happy”? 

13. Yet at par.14 of the Mother’s February 2016 affidavit she deposed that the last time X went to spend time with her Father she was in tears and did not want to go.

14. The Mother deposed (par.15) that (a) the Father was due to have X with him for Christmas, but (b) she went to see Legal Aid Victoria who advised her that she should retain X “until this all went to Court.”

15. Again I observe that in relation to the Mother’s account of advice from “Family Dispute Resolution” (par.4), and again from Legal Aid Victoria (par.15), there is an unfortunate lack of detail.

16. The remainder of the Mother’s affidavit responds to various matters in each of the affidavits of the Father and of Mr I.

17. In relation to the former, the Mother avers that she “advised” the Father of her “location” by a telephone call on 21^st December 2015.  Again details are lacking.

18. The Mother annexes, at R2 of her affidavit, a number of SMS messages between her and the Father.  The dates of these “txt” messages are unclear, but they include the message from the Father reminding the Mother that she cannot move without his consent which, he confirmed in the message: “you do not have.”

19. The Mother denies the Father’s allegations about the risks to X in living with her Mother in relation to sexual abuse, living in squalor, and poor nutrition.  She says that her brother, Mr J, has been in and out of prison from April 2015 until January 2016 for motor vehicle offences.  The Mother has an AVO against her brother; the child is a protected person on that Order.  She said that, in any event, Mr J lives in Sydney.  The Mother says that she obtained the AVO simply “to protect the children just in case, but for no other reason.”  Again, unfortunately, details are scarce.  Why would the children need protecting from someone – “just in case”?  And no less curious, if not concerning, is why the Mother has an AVO against her brother when she was proposing that he be a “supervisor” of the Father’s time with X.

20. The Mother also says that X is not repeating Kindergarten, but otherwise does not address the large number of the child’s absences from her previous school save to say that X missed school when the Mother had surgery.  Again, important detail is lacking.

21. Contrary to the Father’s claim, the Mother says that his lawyer has not tried to call her.  She also says that the police have done a welfare check and have confirmed the cleanliness of the residence in (omitted).  She says that the Father is generally abusive to her, and that she feels intimidated by him.

22. In response to Mr I’s affidavit, the Mother denies ever making it difficult for him to spend time with A and B.  She also says (pars.69 and 76) that in 15 years she has moved residence on average every 3 years.  I need not outline other contentions made by the Mother in response.

The Hearing on 9^th February 2016

1. On 9^th February 2016, the Father was legally represented, as was the Mother by an agent who acted on behalf of the Mother’s lawyers who are in (omitted).  The ICL was also in attendance.

2. As already noted, on the morning of the urgently listed interim hearing (on 9^th February 2016), the Mother’s solicitors kindly emailed copies of the Mother’s Response, affidavit and Notice of Risk, all of which were formally filed on 12^th February.  The email was copied to the Father’s solicitors.

3. In the course of that hearing, the Court was provided with a copy of a letter sent by the ICL to the Mother, dated 22^nd October 2015.  Under cover of that letter the Mother was provided with a copy of the Orders (referred to as “agreed Orders”, and which are those that were agreed at the FDRC); she was requested to sign those documents and return them to the ICL.  A stamped, self-addressed envelope was provided to the Mother.  The letter from the ICL to the Mother, dated 22^nd October 2015, was admitted and became Exhibit B.

4. In the course of the hearing on 9^th February, the Court was also advised that the Mother was sent correspondence from the Father’s solicitors, apparently to similar effect as that sent by the ICL.

5. The primary matter considered at that hearing was less the issue of the Mother not having signed the Orders agreed to by the parties (and the ICL) at the FDRC, and which were handed up in Court on 21^st October 2015 (with the matter being mentioned by consent on behalf of the Mother by the Father’s solicitor), and more the question of the Mother’s relocation with the child X to Victoria without the Father’s consent or Order of the Court.  The point of reference here was, of course, the decision in Morgan v Miles where Boland J (sitting as the Full Court) stated in a number of different ways the importance for parenting matters that involve relocation to be dealt with, except in cases of emergency, not in an abridged interim hearing but at a final hearing where the “careful exercise of a structured discretion to determine the appropriate order” can be made.[7] 

   [7] Morgan v Miles (2008) 38 Fam LR 275 at [74] and [88]. The difficulties that attend interim hearings have been long recognised. See for example the regularly cited comments by the Full Court in Goode v Goode (2006) 206 FLR 212; (2007) 36 Fam LR 422 at [74] and [82].

6. In the course of her Honour’s judgment, she noted (among other things), at [55] (emphasis added):

   … There is nothing in the legislation which provides that a parent who has existing order which provides that the child spends fifty per cent or more of his or her time with that parent has a unilateral right to move the child, (on the basis that this is in the child’s best interests).  Whilst such a move may, after exploring all relevant factors, be found to be in the child’s best interests, those interests can only be determined by examination of the relevant factors in the structured exercise of discretion required by the legislation.  It is illogical to suggest it is appropriate for an unauthorised unilateral move to occur, and that a court’s discretion in determining a child’s best interests, including time to be spent with the other parent, be inappropriately fettered by a move which has already occurred.

7. Her Honour made clear, at [75] and [77], the burden a unilateral relocation makes on the “left behind” parent, and the operation of s.65DAC of the Act, when applicable, which “clearly precludes a unilateral move by one parent without notice and consultation with the other parent.”[8]

   [8] See also the detailed matters set out by Boland J in Morgan v Miles at [79] and [81].

Submissions

1. Summarised, the arguments put to the Court on 9^th February by the parties, and the ICL, may be summarised as follows.

2. The Mother’s primary position, if it may be so described, was that there should be an adjournment so that further material might be filed.  It was submitted that there was an anomaly with the final Orders of November 2015 because of the Mother’s lack of signature.  At the same time, the Mother’s experienced solicitor (acting as agent for the Mother’s Victorian lawyers) very fairly and candidly acknowledged that the Mother had unilaterally relocated to Victoria and that there was nothing that could be said against the fact that the Mother had not obtained the Father’s consent or an Order from the Court.[9]

   [9] See Transcript (9^th February 2016) p.6.  Hereafter “T” followed by page number.

3. The Mother’s lawyer also noted various allegations of violence involving the parties, and the utility that an adjournment would allow to obtain relevant independent evidence in relation to these and other allegations.

4. It was also submitted on behalf of the Mother that she was of the understanding that there were no final Orders until she had signed the consent terms that were agreed at the FDRC.  There were no submissions (or evidence provided by the Mother) regarding

   (a) the Mother’s failure to inquire about the status or otherwise of Orders that had been agreed at the FDRC,

   (b) the Mother’s failure to inquire, either of the Court or the ICL, to obtain a copy of the Orders that had been agreed at the FDRC and which had been noted by the Court on 21^st October 2015 when they were handed up,

   (c) the Mother never having challenged that the Father’s solicitor advised the Court on 21^st October 2015 that she was mentioning the matter on behalf of the ICL, and on behalf of the Mother, when the Orders agreed at the FDRC were handed up in Court;

   (d) the Mother has never challenged the Father’s solicitor’s authority to mention the matter on 21^st October 2015 on behalf of the Mother, or to advise the Court that the matter was resolved at the FDRC, and

   (e) the Mother has never said that she took the advice she says she was given by “Family Dispute Resolution” to write to the Court to seek the Court’s approval about her relocation.

5. Further, it was noted that the Mother had a medical emergency the day after the mediation, although no details were put in submissions.[10]  It was also noted in submissions that the Mother has been X’s primary carer.

   [10] T 8.

6. Again, very fairly, the Mother’s advocate recorded the extremely difficult position in which the Mother’s unilateral relocation had placed everyone, not least in effect holding the Court to a form of ransom.[11]

   [11] T 9.

7. The Father’s submissions noted:[12]

   (a) the history of the matter before this Court and the litany of Applications brought by the Father to secure time with X,

   (b) the Mother’s Response sought to reduce the child’s time with the Father,

   (c) a history and frequency of unilateral relocations,

   (d) the difficulty, including for the Court, to maintain reliable contact and communication with the Mother,

   (e) recommendations by the family consultant to ensure the Mother’s compliance with Orders for the child’s time with the Father,

   (f) issues regarding X’s non-attendance at school.

   [12] Among other places, see T 11 ff.  Here the transcript is clearly in error because it records the submissions as being made by Ms Fox, who was the Mother’s advocate on 9^th February, while the Father’s advocate was Mrs Mistry.

8. The ICL’s submissions were as follows.  It is as well to set them out at some length because of the history they provide of relevant events, and the substantive issues addressed.

9. First, after earlier noting the delicacy of speaking about matters discussed during the mediation, in relation to the issue of “the consent orders”, and more generally, the ICL said (emphasis added):[13]

   So on 20 October there was a lengthy conference.  Certainly there was no discussions about relocation at all in respect of that.  The only real issue is whether the mother was going to move from (omitted) to (omitted).  That – but that was it.  In relation to what happened then, the mother indicated that she was happy with the terms of settlement.  They were read out to her and she indicated that she understood them.  And that was the mediator’s job, although in any discussion I had with the mother, it was on a phone link with the mediator. I indicated that I would send the orders to the court the next day, which is what I did.

   But, at the same time, I did send a copy of the orders to the mother at her address that she provided in (omitted), and asked her – and a self – signed, self-addressed envelope for her to send back.  And I lodged the orders as everybody instructed me to do the next day, which was agreed.  Nothing happened from the mother in relation to anything.  We chased her up; there was no response.  So she didn’t indicate that there had been a big mistake or there was something amiss or anything like that.  She didn’t indicate that she had withdrawn her consent.  She just ignored everybody and eventually the orders issued on the – even though they were lodged the next day, I think they came about on 21 November or thereabouts.

   [13] T 3 - 4.

10. The ICL continued (emphasis added):[14]

    MS LLOYD:   So that’s the situation.  So the mother was unresponsive either as to consent being withdrawn or otherwise for a month.  And then apparently there’s no indication of a proposed move.  So my application would be to support an order today that the mother be required to relocate back – or at least the child be required to relocate back to the area involved.  Because, even if there was a miscarriage of justice in relation to the orders being made, it still doesn’t overcome the problem of unilateral relocation.  And the mother can’t simply ignore the process.  I mean, had she been, in my view, upfront about things in October/November/December – her credibility is, in my view, at issue because she didn’t do anything.  She simply relocated.

    She didn’t put on an application to say to your Honour and the father, more importantly, “Look, there has been an error here and I am going to Victoria”, which is a different state, different jurisdiction, different education system, different proposals for contact, housing, education, everything.  So I really think it’s disingenuous and lacks credibility in relation to the history.  We know that X herself has had some instability in relation to her past care, and her biggest concern, I think, last year was her school attendance.  And that was something that was hoped to be addressed through the mother obtaining – either relocating the child’s school to – back to where – you know, where she lived, or the mother relocating herself into town.

    And that was the big problem.  But there was never a discussion of relocating to a different state.  So that – it seems to me that there’s enough risk factors and issues in the history of the matter to require an order that the child be – relocate back to the area and attend the school that she was attending.  And that if the mother can do that and relocate herself, fine, but if not the child should stay with the father until it’s all sorted out, in my view.

    [14] T 4.

1. In later submissions, primarily in answer to questions from the Bench, the ICL said (emphasis added):[15]

   MS LLOYD:   I was just having a look at the family report that was done in July.  And I would draw your attention to – your Honour, to paragraph 28.  And in that paragraph the father indicated to the family consultant that:

   He was aware that the mother wanted him to move to (omitted) to see more of X, however, he believed that if he did move she will move again.  The other girls have been in five or six schools and X is in her second school already. 

   So in that respect I think it is quite pertinent that the father’s apprehension about the mother simply moving if he was to go to (omitted), it’s a relevant factor because in this case he’s seeking that Canberra be the area or the relocation back to, rather than (omitted).  But certainly, in my view, the fact that he’s in Canberra and not (omitted) shouldn’t be an issue for the court. 

   It’s such a long distance to go to Victoria that it would be better, in my view, for the child to come back to Canberra with the father.  There will be some stability in the interim.  The mother may well be able to convince your Honour long-term that she is justified in what she has done but, at this stage, I fear that if she’s permitted to do what she has done without the slightest effort in letter either the father know or anybody else know that she was to do that – despite being aware that orders were sent to her and not taking any action – that that would send a very poor message for the future, and any contact or any sort of relationship that the father might have would be in jeopardy.

   [15] T 9 – 10.

2. In relation to the Mother’s claim about duress at the mediation, The ICL said:[16]

   MS LLOYD:   No.  Not that I – and I was certainly with the mediator, I think, at least 90 per cent of the time that she was discussing things with the mother.  It was a joint telephone hook-up.  And the other issue, of course, was that the orders – one of the orders was that the mother continue to keep the father informed.  That the parties inform each other of their – their whereabouts, and that was understood as well.  And that’s a significant order that hasn’t been complied with either, your Honour, or even – as a matter of the interests of the child, given the history of this case, it’s something that the mother knew about and chose to ignore as well.

   [16] T 10.

Consideration & Disposition

1. There are three issues to consider: (a) the Mother’s oral application to put on further evidence; (b) the Mother’s relocation; and (c) the Orders dated 21^st October and 25^th November 2015.

Further Evidence Application

1. First, I accept Ms Fox’s submissions that the Mother should have an opportunity, if she wishes, to put on evidence to contest whatever issues that she says should be put before the Court.  That is so, notwithstanding that she has filed a Response which seeks Orders that will reduce the time between X and her Father.  The Mother sets out various contentions in relation to what she says was her feeling very bullied and intimidated in the course of the FDRC.  She notes also, again not unreasonably, that she was not legally represented in the course of that conference.

2. In the light of the Orders to be made (including when the matter next comes back before the Court), which will give the Mother not insignificant time to return either to the (omitted) or Canberra regions, that same time should more than adequately allow her to put on any other evidence she thinks is warranted.  No specific Orders need be made in relation to the filing of material by the Mother.

Unilateral Relocation

1. In relation to the unilateral relocation I note the following, all of which should be understood or considered in the light of the comments by Boland J in Morgan v Miles to which I have referred earlier in these reasons.

2. The singular difficulty is always, as practitioners in particular know, in unilateral relocations, or unilateral actions of any kind, is that it places both the Court and the “left behind parent” in the completely invidious and usually untenable position of not being able to respond adequately to those unilateral actions.  It risks compromising everything – both as to the determination of substantive, and no less in relation to procedural, matters.  While it may be that the Court’s final determination is that the Mother should be permitted to relocate to (omitted), a properly ordered assessment of the evidence for such a course and whether it is in X’s best interests cannot be undertaken at a very abridged interim hearing.

3. In accordance with the instruction given by Boland J in Morgan v Miles to which I have earlier referred, there is no doubt that it is important, to the degree that it ultimately becomes necessary, that the exercise of the Court’s discretion in relation to parenting Orders that are in a child’s best interests, in the absence of agreement, should take place in accordance with the structured exercise of the Court’s discretion, pursuant to the prescriptions in Part VII of the Act. As already noted, that is rarely able to occur on an interim basis in most matters; it is even less possible where, as here, the matter has to be dealt with on an urgent [interim] basis where the Mother indisputably has relocated unilaterally and the Father has not spent any time with the child for a significant period of time (since December 2015).

4. What is also problematic is that the Mother proposes that (a) the Father’s time with X be reduced to once per month, and (b) X travel, apparently unaccompanied other than by “an airline hostess or other adult during any air flights”, by plane each month for these visits with her Father.[17]  The Mother’s proposals, and her evidence, seem to be somewhat hastily put together with a view to bolstering, ex post facto, her unsanctioned move to country Victoria.[18]  There is certainly no detail about how X would be able to spend time with her Father from “Saturday 9:30am”; that is, how would she get from (omitted) to Canberra by that time on a Saturday morning.  Accepting that general travel websites confirm that there is an airport at (omitted), there is no detail about whether there are direct flights from that town to Canberra, or whether X would have to travel to Melbourne or elsewhere to get a flight that would get her to the national capital by the time specified by the Mother in her Response.

   [17] See Order 5 in the Mother’s Response.

   [18] (omitted) is approximately 300 kilometres north-west of Melbourne.

5. It seems to me that only when there is some degree of restoration of the Orders that were agreed between the parties and made by the Court last November can there be a proper and orderly consideration of the matters that are now rushed to be determined by the Court.  What has happened, certainly on the Mother’s side, is the very antithesis of what Boland J directed should happen in Morgan v Miles.

6. Further to this, as the ICL noted, the alarming precedent that would be set if the Mother was permitted to remain in (omitted), cannot be countenanced.  If she were allowed to remain there (or at least X to remain there), it would undermine completely the authority of Boland J’s clearly articulated and now (I suggest) well-settled principle regarding the methodical and systematic determination of parenting Orders that are in the child’s best interests.

The Orders of October and November 2015

1. The final issue to consider relates to the standing and provenance of the Orders made on 21^st October and 25^th November 2015.

2. Among many places, the Full Court in Dobbs v Brayson (No.2) discussed what did and did not constitute “consent”, albeit in the context of practice and procedure and the conduct of a trial.[19]

   [19] Dobbs v Brayson (No.2) (2008) 38 Fam LR 95 (Warnick, Boland & Carmody JJ). Among other places, see the discussion commencing at [30] ff.

3. Respectfully, the following uncontested facts, in my view, put any challenge to the Orders made on 25^th November 2015, into a particular and different context to those discussed in Dobbs v Bryson (No.2).  The relevant undisputed facts are:

   (a)On 21^st October 2015, the matter was mentioned by consent on behalf of the Mother (and the ICL) by the Father’s lawyer.  There has been no challenge to the Orders made on that date, or to the authority of the Father’s lawyer mentioning the matter on the Mother’s behalf;

   (b)Since the making of the Orders on 21^st October, and on 25^th November 2015, the Mother has made no Application to the Court to challenge or to set them aside;

   (c)The Mother made no Application to the Court in relation to her unilateral relocation until documents were sent to the Court on 9^th February 2016, being a Response to the Father’s Application – not an Initiating Application by the Mother;

   (d)At the hearing on 9^th February, the Mother’s lawyer confirmed that the Mother had unilaterally relocated, without the Father’s consent, and without sanction of the Court.  Up until that time, the Mother had done nothing to seek either the Father’s approval or sanction of the Court.  Indeed, she annexed to her affidavit (formally filed on 12^th February 2016) a copy of a SMS message from the Father in which he confirmed that she did not have his permission to relocate;

   (e)The Mother has never addressed, other than in a quite cursory manner, the very large amount of time that X missed of school last year.

Conclusion

1. All of the matters to which I have referred, and much more besides, require diligent and careful consideration in accordance with the authorities to which I have referred as well as in accordance with the considerations set out in the legislative scaffold in Part VII of the Act.

2. Summarily stated, the issues (at this abridged, interim stage) from s.60CC(2) and (3) that arise in the current matter on the material filed are (accepting that the Mother has been X’s primary carer):

   (a)the relationship between X and her Father (based on the Mother’s comments, the Family Report says [par.16] that it is good, that X looks forward to spending time with her Dad and that she returns home “happy”);

   (b)the relationship between X and her siblings;

   (c)the practical difficulty and expense of the Mother’s unilateral move to (omitted).  The Court may assume that the cost – e.g. (i) airfares (as proposed by the Mother), (ii) less time between X and her Father (also as proposed by the Mother), and (iii) the emotional and psychological “cost” to everyone (including X travelling by plane accompanied only by airline staff or some other adult as agreed between the parties) – is and will be high, and certainly much higher than a drive between Canberra and (omitted) or (omitted).  In my view, this is a very significant factor;

   (d)the failure of the Mother to consult or communicate with the Father about her relocation;

   (e)the risk that the lengthy travel, and the diminished time between them as proposed by the Mother, will likely have on both X and on her relationship with the Father;

   (f)The Court (and the Father) knows very little about the Mother’s “new” fiancé.  He has not filed any material.  Although the Mother says that she has been in an on again/off again relationship with him for a decade, during the same period she also deposes to being in various relationships with other gentlemen, about whom we know very little, apart from Mr I.  According to the Family Report, one of them, Mr C, had become C’s “psychological Father.”  The Mother does not address whether any of the other men in her recent past have become “psychological Fathers” to any of her children; the same question or issue arises in relation to Mr D and the children of the Mother.

   (g)The Mother’s “issues” in relation to “family violence” regarding X's Father (i) seem to be historical, (ii) there is no allegation that they involve X directly, and (iii) in the light of the Mother previously agreeing to X spending regular weekend time with her Father, certainly throughout 2015, and even under her proposed Orders, without the need for any supervision, issues of family violence seem not to figure too large as a consideration under the Court’s protective responsibilities to the child.

3. In short, the unilateral relocation to country Victoria by the Mother has made, and will continue to make, the child spending time with her Father extremely difficult.  The reduction in the Father’s time will likely, or at least may, impact adversely on the child having a meaningful relationship with her Father, or at least as meaningful a relationship as she should, and be entitled to, have. 

4. The matters I have noted can only properly be considered at a final hearing.  They cannot be considered properly or fairly to all parties in an urgent, abridged interim hearing.  To the degree that it is relevant, not only is such a hearing unfair on the parties (and the ICL); it is also unfair on the Court having regard to the matters noted further below.

5. In my view, any issue regarding the provenance of the October and November 2015 Orders is of no relevance in relation to the Mother’s unilateral relocation because

   (a)     there were existing Orders in place in any event for X to spend regular and unsupervised time with her Father;

   (b)     of the effluxion of time, and the Mother “sitting on her hands” (so to speak) for a number of months without seeking to set aside or otherwise to challenge (i) the Orders of 21^st October, and (ii) those agreed at the FDRC and ultimately made, at the ICL’s request, on 25^th November 2015.  Any challenge came only after she had unilaterally relocated;

   (c)     the Mother has never challenged the authority of the Father’s solicitor to mention the matter on her behalf on 21^st October 2015 to advise the Court that the matter had been resolved, on a final basis, in accordance with terms that were handed up in Court on that date.

6. In sum: the provenance of the November 2015 Orders (and even less so those made on 21^st October 2015) is of no relevance to the Mother’s unilateral relocation.

7. One final comment is apposite.  In my view, the art and craft of good parenting is most often characterised by “sacrifice.”  The High Court has said as much, indeed in the context of relocation.  In the joint judgment of Gummow and Callinan JJ in U v U, at [92], their Honours said (emphasis added):[20]

   The reality is that maternity and paternity always have an impact upon the wishes and mobility of parents: obligations both legal and moral, the latter sometimes lasting a lifetime, restrictive of personal choice and movement have been incurred.

   [20] U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238.

8. Just so here: the Orders of the Court clearly impact on both parties, but especially the Mother (and X) and will necessitate some “sacrifice”, at least in the short term.  However, the Orders have arisen precisely because of the Mother’s precipitate action. 

9. To enable the Court now to consider and determine, in a methodical and systematic way, Orders that are in X’s best, it will require the Mother and child to return to either the Canberra or (omitted) regions, or in the absence of that occurring in a timely manner, X will live with her Father and spend time with her Mother as agreed between the parties in writing.  This arrangement must prevail until the parties and the Court have the proper opportunity to consider all the evidence, including likely obtaining yet another Report – the Report of Mr B from June 2015 (Exhibit A) not having been required to address any issue of “relocation.”  So, alas, more public resources must be used because of the failure of the Mother to follow proper process and for everyone to have the opportunity properly and reasonably to consider her apparently very recent but undisclosed wish to relocate.

10. In this regard I simply note the following comments by the High Court in relation to the due consideration by courts of the use of public resources.[21]  For example, in Armstrong at [51] and [52], by reference to AON, the High Court referred to the now well-recognised need to have regard to the problems of delay and cost in the litigation process, and that “speed and efficiency” were essential to the just resolution of proceedings. Also in Armstrong the Court said, at [51]:

    The achievement of a just but timely and cost-effective resolution of a dispute has effects not only upon the parties to the dispute but upon the court and other litigants.

    [21] See the well-known decisions in AON Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 (“AON”); Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303 (“Armstrong”).

11. While the comments of the High Court were directed to the specific context of the matters before it, notably in commercial litigation, and in relation to case-management considerations (among other things), the Court was nonetheless conscious, as it said at [51] in Armstrong, of “the wider objects of the administration of justice.”

12. Just so in family law litigation.  It is common knowledge how stretched [the public] resources of the Court(s) are, not least in this extremely busy trial Court.  It is also common knowledge how scarce the resources (public and private) are that are provided by family consultants. 

13. The Mother’s unannounced and unexpected actions thus far have necessitated one urgent hearing – with more urgent hearings now in train elsewhere – and the likelihood, as I have already noted, of more resources being required including another family report when one was provided not so long ago.  An orderly and methodical approach would have obviated so much “expenditure” and consumption of resources, and so hastily organised.  Such needless urgency will also necessarily deprive other matters of much needed resources.

14. Finally, in Goode v Goode, the Full Court observed, at [81] and [82](d):

    [81] In making interim decisions the Court will still often be faced with conflicting facts, little helpful evidence and disputes between the parents as to what constitutes the best interests of the child…

    [82](d) … in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence to enable more than a limited consideration of these matters to take place…

15. These comments, together with those by Boland J in Morgan v Miles to which I have referred, aptly describe what faced the Court on 9^th February 2016.   The Court is in the usual but impossible “he said – she said” situation, although here it is actually “he [Mr Clarke] said/he [Mr I] said (on the one hand)/ she said (on the other hand)”. 

16. The few undisputed facts appear to be that (a) X had been spending regular time with her Father each alternate weekend, (b) the Mother had not responded to the concern expressed by X’s school last year regarding the child’s significant non-attendance at school, and (c) the Mother has unilaterally relocated to country Victoria, knowing that the Father opposed such a move, and without the sanction of the Court.  The Mother does not seek, formally at least by way of Orders set out in her Response, any retrospective approval of her relocation.  Nor did the Mother follow the advice which she said she was given by Family Dispute Resolution – to write to the Court to obtain the Court’s approval for her to move to country Victoria.

17. In my view, there is little before the Court that could warrant anything that approaches what Boland J referred to in Morgan v Miles, at [88], as “a case of emergency”. A parent’s “desire” does not, without more, warrant such a description. Respectfully, this is an archetypical interim parenting matter that involves a unilateral relocation. Also in my view, the number of the Mother’s partners in recent times, reference to one of them (who is now not “on the scene”) as a “psychological Father” of one of the Mother’s children but no information about such a “Father” on the Mother’s other children, and the lack of information regarding Mr D, are not insignificant matters, among many, which warrant proper and orderly investigation and consideration.

1. It is in X’s best interests (s.60CA of the Act) for the Mother and child to return to an area (as specified in the Orders) that will enable the existing arrangements for X and her Father to spend regular time together to resume and thereafter to continue – pending the further, and more methodical and orderly consideration of the issues that each parent may wish to raise.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighteen (118) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Neville

Date:     17 March 2016