Clark v Eadie - [2000] TASSC 32

[2000] TASSC 32

CITATION: Clark v Eadie [2000] TASSC 32

PARTIES:  CLARK, Alan Graeme
  v
  EADIE, Roger William
  EADIE, Sylvia

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 1/2000
DELIVERED ON:  4 April 2000
DELIVERED AT:  Burnie
HEARING DATES:  4 April 2000
JUDGMENT OF:  Evans J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure - Inferior courts - Tasmania - Local courts - Appeal and new trial - Appeal to Supreme Court - Generally - Principles applicable to appeal from civil division of Magistrates Court.

Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 (Tas), s28.
Local Courts Act,(1896) (Tas), s123.
Foster v Simpson 21/1965; Wiggins v Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd 45/1975; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, followed.
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (1999) 160 ALR 588, considered.
Aust Dig Procedure [424]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Appellant:  M J Verney
           Respondents:  T K Jago
Solicitors:
           Appellant:  G J Nevin
           Respondents:  Crisp Hudson & Mann

Judgment Number: [2000] TASSC 32
Number of Paragraphs: 15

Serial No 32/2000
File No LCA 1/2000

ALAN GRAEME CLARK v ROGER WILLIAM EADIE
and SYLVIA EADIE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT EVANS J
(DELIVERED ORALLY) 4 April 2000

The appellant appeals against a judgment entered against him in the Magistrates Court upon a finding that the appellant's negligent driving caused damage of $4,480 to the respondents' motor vehicle.

The appeal is pursuant to the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992, s28, which provides that on the hearing of an appeal a judge of this Court, "may make such orders as are appropriate in the circumstances". That Act establishes a civil division of the Magistrates Court to replace the Court of Requests as constituted by the Local Courts Act, 1896. As with an appeal from the Court of Requests pursuant to the Local Courts Act, s123, the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992, s28, confers a right of appeal without expressly confining its ambit. There is no reason to conclude other than that Parliament intended that the ambit of an appeal from the Magistrates Court would be the same as the ambit of an appeal from that Court's predecessor, the Court of Requests.

It is an appeal stricto sensu, Foster v Simpson 21/1965. I derive the following propositions from that decision and Wiggins v Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd 45/1975.

I must determine this appeal in accordance with the facts and the law as they exist at the date of the hearing, but my jurisdiction in relation to findings of fact which are challenged is not otherwise circumscribed.

It is my duty upon the hearing of the appeal to form my own judgment on the facts so far as I am able to do so, however, this is subject to the well known limitation that an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the court of first instance, by reason of having seen…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] TASSC 32
Decision Date: 4 April 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania heard an appeal by Alan Graeme Clark against a judgment entered in the Magistrates Court against him. The judgment arose from a finding that Clark's negligent driving caused $4,480 worth of damage to the motor vehicle of Roger William Eadie and Sylvia Eadie. Clark appealed the decision under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992, section 28. The central legal issue was whether the learned magistrate provided adequate reasons for accepting the evidence of the respondents' witnesses and rejecting Clark's evidence. The court held that the magistrate had provided sufficient reasons in accepting the witnesses' broadly consistent evidence and rejecting Clark's evidence as reconstructed. The court found that the magistrate's reasoning process was understandable and that Clark's version of events was implausible in the face of contrary evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court emphasised that an appellate court must form its own judgment on the facts but is bound by the advantage enjoyed by the court of first instance. However, the appellate court must not shrink from giving effect to its own conclusion if it comes to a different decision. The court found that Clark's evidence was inconsistent with the damage observed on the respondents' vehicle and that the preponderance of the evidence supported the respondents' case. Therefore, the magistrate's rejection of Clark's evidence and acceptance of the respondents' witnesses' evidence was justified. The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, including the ground asserting that the magistrate erred in finding that the driver of the respondents' vehicle was not negligent.

Orders