Clarence City Council v Howlin (No 2)

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[2019] TASSC 16

COURT:        SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)

CITATION:                  Clarence City Council v Howlin (No 2) [2019] TASSC 16

PARTIES:  CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL
  v
  HOWLIN, Darryl Robert

QIN, Lihua
SHI, Xiaomin

FILE NO:  823/2014
DELIVERED ON:  18 April 2019
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  15 April 2019
JUDGMENT OF:  Pearce J

CATCHWORDS:

Real Property – Easements – Particular easements and rights – Rights of way – Obstruction – Injunction to restrain interference with exercise of right.

Aust Dig Real Property [1494]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  S B McElwaine SC
             Defendants:  No appearance

Solicitors:
             Plaintiff:  Shaun McElwaine + Associates

Judgment Number:  [2019] TASSC 16
Number of paragraphs:  10

Serial No 16/2019

File No 823/2014

CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL v DARRYL ROBERT HOWLIN,
LIHUA QIN and XIAOMIN SHI

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  PEARCE J

18 April 2019

  1. On 30 January 2019 the Full Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and set aside my order dismissing its action against the defendants: Clarence City Council v Howlin [2019] TASFC 1. The Full Court found, contrary to my original determination, that the title of the second and third defendants, Lihua Qin and Xiaomin Shi, as the present registered proprietors of the land comprised in folio of the register volume 219376 folio 6, called Lot A, is not indefeasible because s 40(3)(e)(ii) of the Land Titles Act 1980 applies. That is, the title to Lot A is subject to equitable easements, in the nature of rights of carriageway, appurtenant to the titles of eight adjoining lots. The rights of way give access from the adjoining lots over Lot A to a public road, Spitfarm Road.

  2. The action was remitted to me for further hearing and determination according to law, and in accordance with the findings of fact made upon the determination of the appeal. These reasons should be read in conjunction with the reasons of the Full Court and with my original reasons: Clarence City Council v Howlin [2016] TASSC 61. The principal issue for determination is the terms of the declaratory and injunctive relief to be granted to the plaintiff. The terms of the declaratory relief follow from the result of the appeal. The plaintiff also seeks prohibitory and mandatory injunctions:

    ·     restraining the defendants from interrupting the rights of way now and in the future;

    ·     requiring the defendants to remove a fence constructed over part of the frontage of Lot A to Spitfarm Road, and restraining the defendants from erecting a fence in the future; and

    ·     restraining the defendants from erecting signage to the effect that persons must keep out of Lot A.

  3. Ms Qin is the wife of the first defendant, Darryl Howlin. Ms Shi is Ms Qin's daughter. Ms Qin and Ms Shi, took no part in the appeal or the remittal. The first defendant, Mr Howlin, participated in the directions hearings leading up to the further hearing of the action but did not adduce evidence and, although he was present in…

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Details
Case
[2019] TASSC 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Clarence City Council versus Howlin, the dispute centred around the obstruction of a right of way by the defendant, Howlin. The matter was heard and determined by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Clarence City Council sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the exercise of the right of way, which the Council had previously established over the defendant's property.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Council had established a right of way over the defendant's land and whether the defendant had obstructed the exercise of this right. The court was also required to determine whether an injunction should be granted to prevent further obstruction. The Council argued that the easement was clearly defined and that the defendant had erected barriers that obstructed the use of the right of way.

The court found that the Council had indeed established a valid right of way over the defendant's property. It was determined that the easement was sufficiently defined and that the defendant's actions constituted an obstruction. The court further held that the Council was entitled to an injunction to prevent the defendant from interfering with the right of way. The judge emphasised the importance of maintaining the established easement for the benefit of the community and the necessity of preventing unilateral actions that could impede the use of the right of way. The court granted the injunction sought by the Council, ordering the defendant to remove any barriers that obstructed the right of way and to refrain from any future actions that could interfere with its exercise.

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