Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia (Costs)

Case [2023] FCA 79


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia (Costs) [2023] FCA 79  

File number(s): TAD 25 of 2018
TAD 27 of 2018
Judgment of: O’CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2023
Cases cited:

Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304

Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1721

Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1492

Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2022] HCA 5; (2022) 96 ALJR 234

Division: General Division
Registry: Tasmania
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 12
Date of last submission/s: 25 January 2023
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicants:  K Cuthbertson SC
Solicitors for the Applicants: Simmons Wolfhagen Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondents/Cross-Respondents: C Lenehan SC with N Wooton
Solicitor for the First Respondents/Cross-Respondents: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Dr K Stern SC with L Coleman
Solicitor for the Second Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

TAD 25 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

HOBART INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PTY LTD

Second Respondent

TAD 27 of 2018
AND BETWEEN:

NORTHERN MIDLANDS COUNCIL

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

AUSTRALIAN PACIFIC AIRPORTS (LAUNCESTON) PTY LTD

Second Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN PACIFIC AIRPORTS (LAUNCESTON) PTY LTD

Cross-Claimant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Cross-Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O’CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.In each proceeding, the applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the proceeding, including the costs of the second respondent’s cross-claim against the first respondent.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. On 13 December 2022, I made orders dismissing both proceedings.  See Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1492 (Judgment).

  2. The issue of costs now arises.  The parties agreed that the issue may be decided on the papers.

  3. The Commonwealth seeks no order for costs.  The only issue that arises is in respect of the costs as between the councils and the lessees in respect of both the claims brought by the councils’ and the lessees’ cross-claims.

  4. The councils submit that they should pay two-thirds of the costs of the lessees in each proceeding because:

    (1)The issues of standing, justiciable controversy and matter, as demonstrated by the reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court, were readily identifiable as separate issues upon which the lessees failed;

    (2)The lessees were unsuccessful in their contention that cl 26.2(a) of the leases only created an obligation to use reasonable endeavours to enter into an agreement with the respective council;

    (3)The lessees failed in respect of their accord and satisfaction cross-claims against the Commonwealth; and

    (4)In the Launceston proceeding, the lessees failed in their estoppel cross-claim against the Commonwealth.

  5. The one-third carve out was said to be appropriate because it reflected an apportionment by reference to the number of pages of transcript occupied by each relevant issue.

  6. The lessees in both proceedings submit that there should be no carve out.

  7. They point to the fact that an order was made that the councils’ claims for relief in respect of the construction and application of the leases be dismissed, because the “trading operations” to which cl 26.2(a)(ii) of the leases referred were “objectively speaking, intended to refer to trading operations which do not involve the provision of relevant aeronautical services and facilities” and which were instead “contestable” (Judgment at [223]); that the areas identified in the councils’ pleading were not areas on which “trading or financial operations” were undertaken within the meaning of cl 26.2(a)(ii) to the extent that those areas identified parts of the Airport Sites on which aeronautical services and facilities are provided (Judgment at [245]-[246]); and that, contrary to the councils’ contention, the lessees were not required by cl 26.2(a) to make payments in accordance with the valuations of the Airport Site made by the Valuer- General (Judgment at [278], [280]-[281], [286], [288], [291]-[292]).

  8. The lessees submitted that “[e]ach of those findings reflected an acceptance of the submissions advanced by [them] in defence of the [c]ouncil’s claim, and a concomitant rejection of the [c]ouncil’s case. For the purposes of awarding costs, the ‘event’ is therefore properly characterised as [the lessees’] success in defeating the claim for relief brought against it by the [c]ouncil[s]”.

  9. They submitted that it is irrelevant for costs purposes that they failed in respect of the matters identified at [4] above. As the lessees submitted, I have previously accepted their argument that the cross-claims against the Commonwealth was at all times advanced solely to support its defence to the councils’ claims. Accordingly, the cross-claims ought not be treated as separate events and warrants no reduction in costs. See Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1721 at [7]-[16].

  10. The lessees further submitted, correctly in my view, that the decision in Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2022] HCA 5; (2022) 96 ALJR 234 does not warrant any reduction in costs. This is because the lessees relied upon the same matters in support of their contentions as to the discretion to grant relief, in circumstances where findings in favour of the lessees vis-à-vis the proper construction of the leases meant that discretion was not enlivened.

  11. In my view, there is no sufficient basis for making an order of the type contended for by the councils. The overarching issue in the proceedings was the proper construction of cl 26.2(a) of the leases. None of the other matters identified at [4] were clearly dominant or separable so as to warrant an apportionment of costs (cf Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 at [38] (Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA)); nor could those issues be said to have substantially increased the time or cost associated with the proceedings so as to render it fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances for the lessees to be denied a portion of their costs.

  12. Accordingly, I will order in each proceeding that the council pay the lessee’s costs of the proceeding, including their costs of their cross-claims against the Commonwealth.

I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Callaghan.

Associate:

Dated:       10 February 2023

Details
AGLC
Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia (Costs) [2023] FCA 79
Case
[2023] FCA 79
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves Clarence City Council and another council (collectively referred to as "the councils") against the Commonwealth of Australia and two lessees. The councils had initially brought proceedings against the Commonwealth and the lessees, who had in turn filed cross-claims against both the councils and the Commonwealth. The Federal Court dismissed both sets of claims and cross-claims, and the matter now before the court concerns the costs of the proceedings. The Commonwealth does not seek any costs, so the primary issue is the allocation of costs between the councils and the lessees.

The councils argue that they should pay two-thirds of the lessees' costs due to the lessees' failure on specific issues, including standing, the interpretation of lease clauses, and certain cross-claims against the Commonwealth. They propose this apportionment based on the number of pages of transcript each issue occupied. The lessees, on the other hand, contend that they should not bear any costs because they successfully defended against the councils' primary claims. They argue that the dismissal of the councils' claims in their entirety indicates their overall success, and therefore, the unsuccessful cross-claims should not affect the costs award.

The court found that the lessees' successful defence against the councils' primary claims was the central event in these proceedings, and the unsuccessful cross-claims against the Commonwealth were secondary to this defence. Given that the dismissal of the councils' claims constituted a comprehensive victory for the lessees, the court ruled that the lessees should not bear any costs. Consequently, the councils were ordered to pay all costs associated with the lessees' cross-claims and the overall proceedings.

The court's final order was that in each proceeding, the councils must pay the lessees' costs, including the costs related to the lessees' cross-claims against the councils. The entry of these orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. In each proceeding, the applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the proceeding, including the costs of the second respondent’s cross-claim against the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 December 2022, I made orders dismissing both proceedings. See Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1492 (Judgment). The issue of costs now arises. The parties agreed that the issue may be decided on the papers. The Commonwealth seeks no order for costs. The only issue that arises is in respect of the costs as between the councils and the lessees in respect of both the claims brought by the councils’ and the lessees’ cross-claims. The councils submit that they should pay two-thirds of the costs of the lessees in each proceeding because: (1)The issues of standing, justiciable controversy and matter, as demonstrated by the reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court, were readily identifiable as separate issues upon which the lessees failed;(2)The lessees were unsuccessful in their contention that cl 26.2(a) of the leases only created an obligation to use reasonable endeavours to enter into an agreement with the respective council; (3)The lessees failed in respect of their accord and satisfaction cross-claims against the Commonwealth; and (4)In the Launceston proceeding, the lessees failed in their estoppel cross-claim against the Commonwealth. The one-third carve out was said to be appropriate because it reflected an apportionment by reference to the number of pages of transcript occupied by each relevant issue. The lessees in both proceedings submit that there should be no carve out. They point to the fact that an order was made that the councils’ claims for relief in respect of the construction and application of the leases be dismissed, because the “trading operations” to which cl 26.2(a)(ii) of the leases referred were “objectively speaking, intended to refer to trading operations which do not involve the provision of relevant aeronautical services and facilities” and which were instead “contestable” (Judgment at [223]); that the areas identified in the councils’ pleading were not areas on which “trading or financial operations” were undertaken within the meaning of cl 26.2(a)(ii) to the extent that those areas identified parts of the Airport Sites on which aeronautical services and facilities are provided (Judgment at [245]-[246]); and that, contrary to the councils’ contention, the lessees were not required by cl 26.2(a) to make payments in accordance with the valuations of the Airport Site made by the Valuer- General (Judgment at [278], [280]-[281], [286], [288], [291]-[292]). The lessees submitted that “[e]ach of those findings reflected an acceptance of the submissions advanced by [them] in defence of the [c]ouncil’s claim, and a concomitant rejection of the [c]ouncil’s case. For the purposes of awarding costs, the ‘event’ is therefore properly characterised as [the lessees’] success in defeating the claim for relief brought against it by the [c]ouncil[s]”. They submitted that it is irrelevant for costs purposes that they failed in respect of the matters identified at [4] above. As the lessees submitted, I have previously accepted their argument that the cross-claims against the Commonwealth was at all times advanced solely to support its defence to the councils’ claims. Accordingly, the cross-claims ought not be treated as separate events and warrants no reduction in costs. See Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] FCA 1721 at [7]-[16].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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