FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1452
Citation: Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1452 Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clapham [2012] FCA 1068 Parties: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM and ELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA File number: NSD 1456 of 2012 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 19 December 2012 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondent for security for costs of appeal – appeal against sequestration order pursuant to which appellants made bankrupt – where order for security would terminate appeal without determination of its merits – whether order for security for costs should be made – application dismissed. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g) Cases cited: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clapham [2012] NSWSC 41
Clapham & Anor v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FMCA 498
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hood Barrs v Heriot [1896] 2 QB 375Date of hearing: 12 December 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Appellants: The first appellant appeared in person and on behalf of the second appellant Counsel for the Respondent: D Sulan Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1456 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM
First AppellantELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM
Second AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed 2 November 2012 is dismissed.
2.There be no order as to the costs of the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1456 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: IAN ROBERT CLAPHAM
First AppellantELLEN PATRICIA CLAPHAM
Second AppellantAND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE:
19 DECEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
This is an application for security for costs in an appeal brought by the appellants, Mr and Mrs Clapham, against orders made by the primary judge on 28 August 2012. On that date his Honour made sequestration orders against the estates of Mr and Mrs Clapham and appointed the official trustee as trustee of their estates.
The respondent (the Bank) obtained a judgment against Mr and Mrs Clapham on 31 January 2012 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for $1,396,115.16: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clapham [2012] NSWSC 41. The Judge who entered judgment against them did so in the following circumstances. Mr and Mrs Clapham were being sued by the Bank under guarantees given by them in relation to advances made to a company with which they were associated and (in the alternative) under a written agreement of…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1452
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the Court was whether the Claphams should be required to provide security for the costs of their appeal, given that the principal order appealed from was a sequestration order that resulted in a change of legal status and affected the Claphams in various ways. The Court also had to consider whether the appeal was bona fide and had prospects of success, as well as whether the Claphams could comply with an order for security for costs if one was made.
The Court found that the appeal was bona fide, and that there were other factors relevant to the question whether the Claphams should be required to provide security for costs. The Court considered that the principal order appealed from was a sequestration order that resulted in a change of legal status, which should be taken into account when determining whether to require an appellant wishing to appeal such an order to provide security for costs. The Court also noted that it was not in issue that the Claphams could not comply with an order for security for costs if one was made, as it would bring their appeal to an end before there had been any determination of its merits. The Court concluded that the appeal was not brought de novo without identifying any error in the primary judge's reasoning, and that the Claphams had given evidence by affidavit that they would be able to meet all of their debts in full if they were successful in their cross-claim against the Bank.
The Court dismissed the interlocutory application filed by the Bank for security for costs of the appeal, and made no order as to the costs of the interlocutory application. The Claphams' appeal against the sequestration order was allowed to proceed without the requirement for security for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed 2 November 2012 is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to the costs of the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is not suggested by the Bank that the written agreement included a release of any description or any other term that impacted upon the rights of Mr and Mrs Clapham to commence or maintain their cross-claim. As I have mentioned, the primary judge noted that there was no reservation in the written agreement of any right to claim that the transactions in question had been entered into as a result of misrepresentations or negligent advice on the part of the Bank. Of course, it does not follow that the written agreement precluded a claim for monetary remedies under either the general law or one or more of the statutory provisions relied upon by Mr and Mrs Clapham for negligent advice or misrepresentation. CONSIDERATION It must be accepted that Mr and Mrs Clapham’s appeal concerns orders made as a result of an exercise of discretion to which the principles discussed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 apply. The difficulties involved in challenging orders that involve the exercise of such a discretion are not to be underestimated. On the other hand, Mr Clapham suggests that the primary judge’s exercise of discretion was predicated upon a particular view of the facts which Mr Clapham says was in turn based upon a mistaken view of the evidence. It is not possible, on the material before me, to express a view as to the correctness of this contention or, more generally, as to the strength of Mr and Mrs Clapham’s appeal. The Bank submitted (by reference to the notice of appeal) that Mr Clapham was doing no more than inviting the Full Court to consider the question determined by the primary judge de novo without identifying any error in his Honour’s reasoning. There is considerable force in this criticism. However, the Bank stopped short of submitting that the appeal was not brought bona fide or that it lacked any prospects of success. I am satisfied that the appeal is bona fide. I am not satisfied that it has no prospects of success. Aside from the matters just discussed, there are a number of other factors which are relevant to the question whether Mr and Mrs Clapham should be required to provide security for costs of their appeal. There are three considerations that I think are of particular significance in this context. First, the principal order appealed from is a sequestration order. Such an order results in a change of legal status that affects the person against whom it is made in various ways. This is an important matter that should be taken into account when determining whether to require an appellant wishing to appeal such an order to provide security for costs: Hood Barrs v Heriot [1896] 2 QB 375. Secondly, it is not in issue that Mr and Mrs Clapham could not comply with an order for security for costs if one was made. Counsel for the Bank accepted (quite properly) that, one way or another, an order for security for costs will bring Mr and Mrs Clapham’s appeal to an end before there has been any determination of its merits. Thirdly, Mr Clapham has given evidence by affidavit (not the subject of cross-examination) that he and his wife’s present financial situation is the result of the Bank’s wrongdoing, and that if they are successful in their cross-claim against the Bank they will be able to meet all of their debts in full. The evidence relied upon by the Bank indicates that Mr and Mrs Clapham’s other creditors are owed about $145,000. About a third of this amount appears to be owed to a family member. In substance, Mr Clapham says that, but for the wrongdoing of the Bank, he and his wife would never have become insolvent.