This decision concerns an application by Ms Claire Hardgrove (Ms Hardgrove) for the Fair Work Commission (Commission) to deal with a dismissal dispute pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) (SecondGP Application).

Ms Hardgrove states that her employment with Google Australia Pty Ltd (Google) was terminated with effect from 18 April 2024. The Second GP Application was made on 15 October 2024.

An application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute must be made ‘within 21 days after the dismissal took effect’, or within such further period as the Commission allows.[1] The period of 21 days ended at midnight on 9 May 2024. Therefore, the Second GP Application was made 159 days outside the 21-day period. Ms Hargrove asks the Commission to allow a further period for the Second GP Application to be made.

Upon the allocation of the matter to my Chambers, I directed the parties to file materials in support of, or in opposition to, the application for an extension of time.

The matter was heard on 30 January 2025. Although Ms Hardgrove was granted permission to be represented by a lawyer on the basis that I was satisfied as to the matter set out in s.596(2)(a) of the FW Act, Ms Hardgrove was self-represented at the hearing. Google was represented by Mr S Marriott of Australian Industry Group.

Evidence and Materials

The following witness statements and documents were admitted into evidence:
·     Witness statement of Ms Hardgrove dated, 20 November 2024 (Exhibit A1);
·     Witness statement of Ms Hardgrove dated, 17 December 2024 (Exhibit A2);
·     Ms Hardgrove’s Bundle of Documents (Exhibit A3); and
·     Google’s Bundle of Documents (Exhibit R1).
Ms Hardgrove also gave evidence at the hearing.

For the reasons that follow, the Application is dismissed as there is no basis to allow an extension of time under s.366(2).

Relevant Background

Ms Hardgrove was employed by Google as a software engineer from 4 January 2021.

On 8 November 2023, Ms Hardgrove made two complaints about alleged psychosocial hazards in the workplace at Google. One complaint was made internally to Google, and the second complaint was made as a request for service lodged with Safework NSW.[2]

On 12 November 2023, Ms Hargrove attended a Google conference overseas.[3]

On 20 November 2023, Ms Hardgrove returned to Australia and was offered, and accepted, a transfer of employment to Google DeepMind.[4]

On 21 November 2023, Google directed Ms Hardgrove to attend an independent medical examination (IME), alleging that she had suffered psychological shock at the overseas conference. Ms Hardgrove refused to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Claire Hardgrove v Google Australia Pty Ltd

Details

AGLC: Claire Hardgrove v Google Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1714
Case: [2025] FWC 1714
Decision Date: 18 JUNE 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Claire Hardgrove sought to lodge a general protections application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) out of time. Ms Hardgrove was employed by Google Australia Pty Ltd and was dismissed on 18 April 2024. The application was lodged on 15 October 2024, 159 days after the dismissal. Google argued that Ms Hardgrove was out of time and the application should be dismissed. The central issue for the Commission to determine was whether there were exceptional circumstances to allow an extension of time for Ms Hardgrove to lodge the application. The Commission found that there were no exceptional circumstances. Ms Hardgrove's claims of representative error and medical incapacity were not supported by evidence. The delay between discontinuing the unfair dismissal application and lodging the general protections application suggested that Google could reasonably have believed the matter was concluded. There was no evidence of prejudice to Google, and the merits of the application could not be assessed. Fairness to other persons in a similar position did not weigh in Ms Hardgrove's favour. The Commission found that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify extending the time limit, and dismissed the application.

Orders