CKG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2018] FCA 362 

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:  CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508
File number: NSD 467 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2018
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 3

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 5, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473GA, 473GB

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 r 44.12

Cases cited:

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225

CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405

SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

Date of hearing: 27 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 467 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CKG16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court that summarily dismissed, under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, the applicant’s application for Constitutional writ relief from the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority given on 2 August 2016 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa:  CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508.

    Background

  2. On 24 November 2016, at the first court date, the proceeding below was set down for a show cause hearing under r 44.12 on 17 March 2017. The applicant who is a citizen of Sri Lanka was represented by counsel before the trial judge. Three days before the show cause hearing, the applicant filed an amended application that his counsel had drafted that raised two grounds.

  3. The second ground is now no longer arguable, following the decision of the High Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405 that affirmed the decision of the Full Court (SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556). It concerned the Authority’s dismissal of the claim that the applicant would suffer significant harm were he to return to Sri Lanka because of the prison conditions in which he would be held, prior to his being admitted…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 362
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, CKG16, applied for leave to appeal a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which was the subject of a judicial review in the Federal Court. The central issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for leave to appeal was sufficiently meritorious to warrant the granting of leave. The applicant contended that the decision under review was fraught with doubt and that there was substantial injustice if the application was refused.

The court needed to determine if the applicant had demonstrated that the decision was attended with sufficient doubt and that substantial injustice would result from the refusal of leave. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and the notification of potential summary dismissal were valid. The applicant's solicitor contended that the decision-maker did not consider the information on fraudulent documentation and that the applicant had not been properly notified of the potential for summary dismissal at the show cause hearing.

The court found that the application lacked merit. It concluded that the applicant had not shown sufficient doubt in the decision or substantial injustice from the refusal of leave. The court noted that the applicant's counsel had provided written submissions and addressed the court orally at the show cause hearing. The applicant's solicitor had not seen the submissions made by the applicant's counsel and had no evidence that any difficulties were encountered in justifying the amendment. Furthermore, the court held that the applicant had not provided any evidence of the proceedings at the show cause hearing, nor was there any basis to argue that the judge did not adequately summarise the applicant's arguments.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision was in line with the established principles for granting leave to appeal, where both conditions of sufficient doubt and substantial injustice must be met.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

An applicant for leave to appeal must show that, first, the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and, secondly, substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. In my opinion, neither of those conditions has been remotely made out on the material before me.Conclusion For these reasons, I am of opinion that the application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant’s solicitor argued that the information in relation to fraudulent documentation on which the Authority relied had not been considered by the delegate and that somehow, accordingly, the Authority had not accorded the applicant procedural fairness. The solicitor argued that this contention had not been answered by his Honour’s reasoning that the delegate had referred to the same DFAT report, albeit in a different context. The argument proceeded that, although the applicant had been notified about the DFAT report, he had not been directed to the specific part of it that referred to fraud. He also argued that by failing to notify him about the potential that the amended application could be summarily dismissed at the show cause hearing, his Honour denied him procedural fairness on what was effectively the first court date following that amendment. The solicitor cited SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317 in support of the proposition that the summary dismissal of a judicial review proceeding on the first court date, on the Court’s own motion and without prior notice, where both parties appeared, amounted to a lack of procedural fairness. The applicant’s solicitor argued that the applicant’s then counsel had not been put on notice either by the Court or the Minister’s lawyers that his case might be dismissed summarily at the show cause hearing.Consideration In my opinion, the application is entirely without merit. First, the matter had been set down some months beforehand for a show cause hearing for the purposes of the applicant demonstrating that he could satisfy the requirements of r 44.12, namely:(1) At a hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court may:(a)if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed – dismiss the application. Here, the applicant, with the benefit of counsel, sought to rely upon an amended application for which counsel provided written submissions and addressed his Honour orally. Counsel for the Minister today briefly read out that part of the written submissions dealing with ground 1. The solicitor for the applicant not only had not seen the submissions that the applicant’s counsel had relied on before his Honour, but had no evidence that that counsel had experienced or raised any difficulty in seeking to justify the amendment, based on his own supporting submissions for it, when the show cause hearing occurred. Nor did the applicant put in evidence before me any transcript or other account of the hearing. The affidavit of the applicant affirmed 28 March 2017 in support of his application for leave to appeal showed that he was present in court before his Honour. I am unable to discern any basis in the material before me on which it could be arguable that his Honour did not sufficiently summarise, in [34] of his judgment quoted above, the nature of the argument which the applicant wished to make in respect of ground 1.