FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CKG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 362
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508 File number: NSD 467 of 2017 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 27 February 2018 Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 3
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, ss 5, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473GA, 473GB
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 r 44.12
Cases cited: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225
CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405
SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317
Date of hearing: 27 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 467 of 2017 BETWEEN: CKG16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court that summarily dismissed, under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, the applicant’s application for Constitutional writ relief from the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority given on 2 August 2016 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa: CKG16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 508.
Background
On 24 November 2016, at the first court date, the proceeding below was set down for a show cause hearing under r 44.12 on 17 March 2017. The applicant who is a citizen of Sri Lanka was represented by counsel before the trial judge. Three days before the show cause hearing, the applicant filed an amended application that his counsel had drafted that raised two grounds.
The second ground is now no longer arguable, following the decision of the High Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405 that affirmed the decision of the Full Court (SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556). It concerned the Authority’s dismissal of the claim that the applicant would suffer significant harm were he to return to Sri Lanka because of the prison conditions in which he would be held, prior to his being admitted…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 362
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine if the applicant had demonstrated that the decision was attended with sufficient doubt and that substantial injustice would result from the refusal of leave. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and the notification of potential summary dismissal were valid. The applicant's solicitor contended that the decision-maker did not consider the information on fraudulent documentation and that the applicant had not been properly notified of the potential for summary dismissal at the show cause hearing.
The court found that the application lacked merit. It concluded that the applicant had not shown sufficient doubt in the decision or substantial injustice from the refusal of leave. The court noted that the applicant's counsel had provided written submissions and addressed the court orally at the show cause hearing. The applicant's solicitor had not seen the submissions made by the applicant's counsel and had no evidence that any difficulties were encountered in justifying the amendment. Furthermore, the court held that the applicant had not provided any evidence of the proceedings at the show cause hearing, nor was there any basis to argue that the judge did not adequately summarise the applicant's arguments.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision was in line with the established principles for granting leave to appeal, where both conditions of sufficient doubt and substantial injustice must be met.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s solicitor argued that the information in relation to fraudulent documentation on which the Authority relied had not been considered by the delegate and that somehow, accordingly, the Authority had not accorded the applicant procedural fairness. The solicitor argued that this contention had not been answered by his Honour’s reasoning that the delegate had referred to the same DFAT report, albeit in a different context. The argument proceeded that, although the applicant had been notified about the DFAT report, he had not been directed to the specific part of it that referred to fraud. He also argued that by failing to notify him about the potential that the amended application could be summarily dismissed at the show cause hearing, his Honour denied him procedural fairness on what was effectively the first court date following that amendment. The solicitor cited SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317 in support of the proposition that the summary dismissal of a judicial review proceeding on the first court date, on the Court’s own motion and without prior notice, where both parties appeared, amounted to a lack of procedural fairness. The applicant’s solicitor argued that the applicant’s then counsel had not been put on notice either by the Court or the Minister’s lawyers that his case might be dismissed summarily at the show cause hearing.Consideration In my opinion, the application is entirely without merit. First, the matter had been set down some months beforehand for a show cause hearing for the purposes of the applicant demonstrating that he could satisfy the requirements of r 44.12, namely:(1) At a hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court may:(a)if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed – dismiss the application. Here, the applicant, with the benefit of counsel, sought to rely upon an amended application for which counsel provided written submissions and addressed his Honour orally. Counsel for the Minister today briefly read out that part of the written submissions dealing with ground 1. The solicitor for the applicant not only had not seen the submissions that the applicant’s counsel had relied on before his Honour, but had no evidence that that counsel had experienced or raised any difficulty in seeking to justify the amendment, based on his own supporting submissions for it, when the show cause hearing occurred. Nor did the applicant put in evidence before me any transcript or other account of the hearing. The affidavit of the applicant affirmed 28 March 2017 in support of his application for leave to appeal showed that he was present in court before his Honour. I am unable to discern any basis in the material before me on which it could be arguable that his Honour did not sufficiently summarise, in [34] of his judgment quoted above, the nature of the argument which the applicant wished to make in respect of ground 1.