[2009] TASSC 57
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Illingworth [2009] TASSC 57
PARTIES: CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
v
ILLINGWORTH, Roger
FILE NO/S: 673/2009
DELIVERED ON: 31 July 2009
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 24 July 2009
JUDGMENT OF: Blow J
CATCHWORDS:
Appeal and New Trial – Appeal – Practice and procedure – Tasmania – Appeal costs fund – Definitions – "Appeal" – Application to quash decision of justice to issue witness summons.
Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968 (Tas), s2.
Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41, referred to.
Aust Dig Appeal and New Trial [393]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: B J Morgan
Respondent: No appearance
P M Edwards and S Sarunic: C Gunson
Solicitors:
Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Respondent: No appearance
P M Edwards and S Sarunic: Deacons
Judgment Number: [2009] TASSC 57
Number of paragraphs: 13
Serial No 57/2009
File No 673/2009
CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY v ROGER ILLINGWORTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BLOW J
31 July 2009
This is an application for an order granting an indemnity certificate under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8.
Mr Edwards and Mr Sarunic ("the accused") have been indicted on charges under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth). Although they were committed for trial some time ago, arrangements were made for a justice of the peace to take the depositions of further witnesses pursuant to the Justices Act 1959, s69A, as continued in force by s147 of that Act. Those proceedings were listed to commence on 27 July 2009. Earlier in July, the solicitors for the accused procured the issue of two witness summonses by a justice of the peace. They were addressed to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ("the DPP") and the proper officer of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority ("CASA"). They commanded the production of a quantity of documents. The DPP and CASA applied for orders quashing the decisions to issue the witness summonses, and orders setting the summonses aside. I dealt with those applications as matters of urgency. The applicants and the accused were represented by counsel but the respondent had not been served. I took the view that, in the context of s69A proceedings, the Justices Act, s44, did not empower a justice to issue a witness summons for the production of documents by a custodian of documents who was not otherwise a witness or potential witness in the proceedings in his or her own right. I made orders quashing the determinations, setting aside the witness summonses, and ordering the accused to pay CASA's costs. As a result of the costs order, counsel for the accused applied for an indemnity certificate under the Appeal Costs Fund Act.
Under s8(1)(a)(ii) of that Act, an indemnity certificate may be granted where an "appeal" to the Supreme Court from a decision of a "person from whose decision there is an appeal to a superior court" succeeds.
The word "appeal" is defined in s2 of that Act as…
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- Case
- [2009] TASSC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the application to quash the decision of a justice to issue a witness summons qualified as an "appeal" under the regulations. The term "appeal" was defined in the regulations as including a review by the court of a decision of a justice made in the course of an appeal. The court examined the legislative framework, the purpose behind the appeal costs fund, and the nature of the application in question. The court had to determine if the application to quash was part of the appellate process or a separate procedural step.
Upon analysis, the Full Court concluded that the application to quash the decision of a justice did not constitute an "appeal" as defined in the regulations. The court found that the application was a distinct procedural step, separate from the appeal itself. Consequently, the application to quash was not subject to the provisions concerning costs in the appeal costs fund. The court's reasoning focused on the distinction between the review of a justice's decision within the appellate process and an application to quash such a decision. This interpretation aligned with the legislative intent to regulate costs specifically related to appeals.
The court's decision resulted in the respondent's application being dismissed, with the court confirming that the application to quash the decision did not fall within the scope of an "appeal" under the regulations. The orders of the court included a declaration to that effect, affirming that the application to quash was not part of the appeal process for the purposes of the appeal costs fund.
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