Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman [2004] FCAFC 336

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) applied under s 30DE of Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) (CA Act) to prohibit the respondents from flying aircraft pending investigation of conduct suspected of constituting serious and imminent risk to air safety – consent orders made prior to hearing of application – parties mistake basis on which judge made the consent orders – effect of the orders on the pending application

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – CASA investigation under Part III, Division 3A of CA Act – application for order under s 30DE to prohibit the respondents from flying for a period to enable CASA investigation to be completed – investigation completed in fact before hearing of application – whether s 30DE order could or should be made – purpose of s 30DE order in scheme of Division 3A

Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3A, 9A, 30DB, 30DC, 30DE, 30DF, 30DG, 30DH, 30DI, 31A
Civil Aviation Regulations (1988) reg 269

Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman [2004] FCAFC 16 cited
Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 cited

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY v GRAEME BOATMAN & VALERIE KENNEDY

No ACD 27 of 2004 

WHITLAM, FINN & CONTI JJ
SYDNEY (HEARD AT CANBERRA)
24 DECEMBER 2004


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

ACD 27 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
APPELLANT

AND:

GRAEME BOATMAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

VALERIE KENNEDY
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WHITLAM, FINN AND CONTI JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD AT CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be allowed and the orders of Gyles J be set aside;

2.The matter be remitted to a judge of the Court to hear the appellant’s application for an order under s 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth);

3.The respondents pay the costs of the appeal and of their motion before Gyles J;  and

4.The respondents’ cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

ACD 27 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
APPELLANT

AND:

GRAEME BOATMAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

VALERIE KENNEDY
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WHITLAM, FINN AND CONTI JJ

DATE:

24 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD AT CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. In this appeal the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (“CASA”) is the unintended beneficiary of a misunderstanding between the parties and Justice Stone when her Honour made consent orders on 10 June 2004. 

  2. Those orders prohibited each of the respondents, Graeme Boatman and Valerie Kennedy, from engaging in any of the activities authorised by the “civil aviation authorisations” each held under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the CA Act”) until 18 June 2004. Those…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 336
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Boatman, the dispute centred on the interpretation and application of sections 30DC and 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) and Regulation 269 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (1988) (Cth). The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) sought to suspend or cancel aviation licences under these provisions, leading to a legal challenge by the respondents. The case was heard and decided by the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the consent orders made by Stone J were correctly made under section 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth). Additionally, the court had to determine whether the application for an order under section 30DE should be dismissed as CASA's investigation into the circumstances leading to the suspension had been completed prior to the motion. The court also needed to consider the implications of section 30DE(4) and section 30DG and whether they supported CASA's application for an order.

The court found that the consent orders made by Stone J were not made under section 30DE, as indicated by Stone J himself. Gyles J, who heard the motions, correctly dismissed the section 30DE application and ordered CASA to pay the respondents' costs incurred after 25 June 2004. The court held that the occasion for an order under section 30DE had passed because CASA's investigation had been completed before the motions were heard. The court emphasised that the purpose of an order under section 30DE is to confirm suspension during the investigation period and that once the investigation is complete, the need for such an order ceases.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be allowed and the orders of Gyles J be set aside;
2. The matter be remitted to a judge of the Court to hear the appellant’s application for an order under s 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth);
3. The respondents pay the costs of the appeal and of their motion before Gyles J; and
4. The respondents’ cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed and the orders of Gyles J be set aside;

2. The matter be remitted to a judge of the Court to hear the appellant’s application for an order under s 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth);

3. The respondents pay the costs of the appeal and of their motion before Gyles J; and

4. The respondents’ cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Division 3A, though specific in its focus on serious and imminent risks to air safety, does not provide the only source of power enabling CASA to suspend or cancel licences, etc. granted under the CA Act and Civil Aviation Regulations (1988) (Cth). Regulation 269 provides a more wide ranging power to suspend or cancel than that given under Division 3A, but unlike with the latter power, a decision under Reg 269 is a “reviewable decision” under Division 4 of the Act with the consequence that that decision is subject to the automatic stay provisions of s 31A. The practical significance of this is that, if CASA’s decision is appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, a Reg 269 suspension is stayed for up to 90 days. Importantly a decision to suspend under s 30DC is not a “reviewable decision” under Division 4. As the second reading speech to the 2003 amendment Bill makes clear, the choice to exempt cases of serious and imminent risk to air safety from those where the stay provisions would apply was a designed one. The Minister noted of the exemption (Hansard, House of Representatives, 27 March 2003, p 13753): “It is important that CASA has sufficient power to act quickly in such cases, and the community would expect nothing less.”THE DECISION UNDER APPEAL Consequent upon Stone J’s indication that the consent orders were not made under s 30DE, the respondents filed a notice of motion seeking an order that the s 30DE application be dismissed. CASA in turn sought an order setting aside the consent orders made by Stone J. Both motions were heard by Gyles J on 9 July. Judgment was delivered on 13 July 2004. Gyles J ordered that the s 30DE application be dismissed and that CASA pay the respondent’s costs incurred after 25 June 2004. In taking the course he did, Gyles J appears to have acted on the assumption that Stone J’s consent orders were not made under s 30DE with the consequence that CASA’s s 30DE application remained on foot. As we have foreshadowed, his Honour was correct in this assumption. However, it was clear on the evidence before Gyles J that CASA’s investigation into the circumstances giving rise to its s 30DC suspension decisions had been completed by 18 June 2004. This pre-dated the motions before his Honour. In these circumstances Gyles J dismissed the s 30DE application. His Honour considered (at [22]) that the provisions of s 30DE(4) and s 30DG: “… make it apparent that the purpose underlying an order pursuant to s 30DE is to confirm suspension during the period that is necessary to enable completion of an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to the decision to suspend. It is clear enough that the role of the Court is to provide an independent determination as to the decision to suspend pending investigation. This is confirmed by reference to the Second Reading Speech. It is also apparent that that understanding of the legislation lay behind CASA’s agreement to the consent orders. It follows that the occasion for an order pursuant to s 30DE has passed and that the substantive application must be dismissed.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.