CIUPRYK v Thorp

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   CIUPRYK -v- THORP [2001] WADC 274

CORAM:   DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN

HEARD:   18 JULY 2001

DELIVERED          :   5 DECEMBER 2001

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2901 of 1999

BETWEEN:   STEVEN DALE CIUPRYK

Plaintiff

AND

DOUGLAS HENRY ALBERT THORP
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice - Western Australia - Practice under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia - Application to set aside default judgment - Judgment entered in default of the defendant filing discovery by the due date - Delay in making application - Delay in proceeding with application

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr T M Hobday

Defendant:     Mr G J Archer

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Lewis Blyth & Hooper

Defendant:     Garrick Archer

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Alpine Bulk Transport Co Incorporated v Saudi Eagle Shipping Co Incorporated [1986] 2 LloydsRep 221

Birkett v James (1977) 2 AllER 801

Chesson v Green [2001] WASC 13

Rollond & Anor v Bank of Western Australia, unreported, FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980498; 3 September 1998

Rollond & Anor v Bank of Western Australia, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980026; 2 February 1998

  1. DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN:  By the application before the court the first defendant seeks to set aside the judgment entered by default on 1 September 2000.  It was filed on 6 December 2000.

  2. The default upon which the judgment turned was the applicant's non-compliance with the order of 13 July 2000.  That order drew upon the order of 9 June 2000 for sworn discovery in the usual terms.  In short the applicant failed to comply with the terms of a springing order.  

  3. The application was heard on three occasions commencing in mid July 2001.  By that time the judgment creditor had sought to execute upon the judgment.  It is significant that at the date of the last hearing the applicant had not complied with the terms of the order for discovery other than to the extent that an unsworn list had been filed shortly after judgment was entered.

  4. At the conclusion of the submissions on 30 August 2001 the applicant submitted that the list could satisfy the order it being the applicant's list of discoverable documents and a Justice of the Peace/Commissioner having endorsed it. 

  5. There is no evidence that the list is the defendant's list of discoverable documents accordingly I can make no judgment as the defendant proposes.  The list is not endorsed by anyone other than the applicant. 

  6. There is no jurisdiction provided by the rules for the court to make either a determination as to the form in which discovery is to be provided or to dispense with the requirement that discovery be sworn.  Even if there was some broader jurisdictional basis, there would appear to be no good reason to have resort to it simply to assist the applicant. 

  7. Ultimately the applicant undertook to comply with the order of 13 July 2000 no later than 2.30pm on 6 September…

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Details
Case
[2001] WADC 274
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves an application by the defendant, Douglas Henry Albert Thorp, to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff, Steven Dale Ciupryk. The judgment was entered due to the defendant's failure to comply with an order for discovery. The application was heard on three occasions, with the last hearing occurring on 30 August 2001. The primary legal issue was whether the court should set aside the judgment based on the defendant's application. The court considered several factors, including the delay in bringing the application, the reason for the delay, the merits of the substantive evidence, and the prejudice to the parties.

Deputy Registrar Harman concluded that the defendant had not discharged the onus of proving a meritorious defence. The court found that the defendant's evidence was largely speculative and lacked credibility, particularly in relation to the claims regarding the sale of a motor vehicle, unpaid wages, and the running account between the parties. The defendant's failure to provide useful evidence and reconcile his pleadings with his evidence further undermined his case. Consequently, the application to set aside the judgment was dismissed.

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Evidence Before The Court

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