Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and City Of Bunbury
[2009] WASAT 142
•28 JULY 2009
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCES
ACT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1995 (WA)
CITATION: CITYGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD and CITY OF BUNBURY [2009] WASAT 142
MEMBER: JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT)
HEARD: 16 MARCH 2009
DELIVERED : 28 JULY 2009
FILE NO/S: DR 350 of 2008
BETWEEN: CITYGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
CITY OF BUNBURY
Respondent
FILE NO/S :DR 384 of 2008
BETWEEN :PROSSER MANAGMENT PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
CITY OF BUNBURY
Respondent
Catchwords:
Local Government - Imposition of special area rate - Original application challenging only most recent year's rates - Applicants seeking in statement of issues to expand challenge to rates imposed in earlier years - Whether challenge to rates in earlier years statute barred - Whether permissible to expand scope of original application - Whether form of application precludes expansion of issues
Legislation:
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 32(1), s 32(2), s 37(1)
Land Valuation Tribunals Act 1978 (WA), s 20
Local Government Act 1995 (WA), Pt 6, s 6.37, s 6.39, s 6.76, s 6.77 s 6.82
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 5, s 9, s 15, s 17(1), s 20(1), s 27, s 29, s 29(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9, r 10
Result:
New applications and extensions of time required for challenges relating to earlier years
Category: A
Representation:
DR 350 of 2008
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr J Skinner
Respondent: Mr P Wittkuhn
Solicitors:
Applicant: Jackson McDonald
Respondent: McLeods
DR 384 of 2008
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr J Skinner
Respondent: Mr P Wittkuhn
Solicitors:
Applicant: Jackson McDonald
Respondent: McLeods
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of Tribunal's decision
Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and Prosser Management Pty Ltd sought to challenge a special area rate imposed in relation to properties owned by them in the City of Bunbury. Their initial application to the Tribunal sought only to challenge the special area rate imposed for the financial year 2008/2009.
After lodging their applications, Citygate and Prosser Management filed a statement of issues, facts and contentions which sought to challenge the special area rates imposed on their properties each year since 2001/2002. The City objected to the expansion of the challenges. It argued that any right to challenge rates imposed in earlier years had been extinguished by the passage of time, and in any event it argued that it was not open to the applicants to extend the scope of the proceedings beyond that identified in their original application form. The Tribunal determined that those questions should be dealt with as preliminary issues.
The Tribunal concluded that, although the right to challenge special area rates imposed in earlier years was not extinguished, the applicants required an extension of time to make those challenges, the relevant time limits having expired. In those circumstances, and because the challenge to each year involved a review of a separate decision taken in respect of each year, separate proceedings were required in respect of each year the imposition of rates was to be challenged. Accordingly, it concluded that the present proceedings were limited only to the financial year 2008/2009.
The proceedings
Citygate Properties Pty Ltd (Citygate) and Prosser Management Pty Ltd (Prosser Management) each own land within the local government area of the City of Bunbury (City). For each year since 2001/2002, the City has resolved to impose a specified area rate over an area which includes the properties owned by Citygate and Prosser Management.
Specified area rates can be imposed by a local government under s 6.37 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) (LG Act). That section reads:
6.37. Specified area rates
(1)A local government may impose a specified area rate on rateable land within a portion of its district for the purpose of meeting the cost of the provision by it of a specific work, service or facility if the local government considers that the ratepayers or residents within that area -
(a)have benefited or will benefit from;
(b)have access to or will have access to; or
(c)have contributed or will contribute to the need for,
that work, service or facility.
(2)A local government is required to -
(a)use the money from a specified area rate for the purpose for which the rate is imposed in the financial year in which the rate is imposed; or
(b)to place it in a reserve account established under section 6.11 for that purpose.
(3)Where money has been placed in a reserve account under subsection (2)(b), the local government is not to -
(a)change the purpose of the reserve account; or
(b)use the money in the reserve account for a purpose other than the service for which the specified area rate was imposed,
and section 6.11(2), (3) and (4) do not apply to such a reserve account.
(4)A local government may only use the money raised from a specified area rate -
(a)to meet the cost of providing the specific work, service or facility for which the rate was imposed; or
(b)to repay money borrowed for anything referred to in paragraph (a) and interest on that money.
(5)If a local government receives more money than it requires from a specified area rate on any land or if the money received from the rate is no longer required for the work, service or facility the local government -
(a)may, and if so requested by the owner of the land is required to, make a refund to that owner which is proportionate to the contributions received by the local government; or
(b)is required to allow a credit of an amount proportionate to the contribution received by the local government in relation to the land on which the rate was imposed against future liabilities for rates or service charges in respect of that land.
Section s 6.82 of the LG Act provides:
6.82. General review of imposition of rate or service charge
(1)Where there is a question of general interest as to whether a rate or service charge was imposed in accordance with this Act, the local government or any person may refer the question to the State Administrative Tribunal to have it resolved.
(2)Subsection (1) does not enable a person to have a question relating to that person’s own individual case resolved under this section if it could be, or could have been, resolved under section 6.76.
(3)The State Administrative Tribunal dealing with a matter referred to it under this section may make an order quashing a rate or service charge which in its opinion has been improperly made or imposed.
Citygate and Prosser Management assert that the specified area rate that has been imposed in relation to their properties for each year since 2001/2002 was not imposed in accordance with the LG Act, and accordingly they seek an order under s 6.82(3) quashing the specified area rate for each year.
In response to the application, the respondent raised a number of issues, and the Tribunal determined that some of those issues should be determined as preliminary issues.
The preliminary issues
The issues which were identified for preliminary determination are as follows:
1.Is the challenge (including in respect of 2008 - 2009 specified area rate) statute barred?
2.Alternatively, in so far as the applicant purports to challenge specified area rates from previous years, is such a challenge outside the scope of the application to the Tribunal?
3.Insofar as the applicant purports to raise any question of general interest other than the questions referred to the Tribunal in the applicants initiating application to the Tribunal, are such questions outside the scope of the application to the Tribunal?
History of the applications
The application by Citygate was lodged with the Tribunal on 17 September 2008. At that time, Citygate was not represented by solicitors, and it is apparent that the application was prepared by the director of that company, Mr Prosser.
The application sought an order in the following terms:
Dismiss the Central Traffic Area rate imposed on Lot 107, 42 Strickland Street Bunbury as charged on council rate notice 5258 an amount of $26,460.36.
Rate notice 5258 was attached to the application. It was a notice issued on 22 August 2008 and apparently received by Citygate on 29 August 2008. The notice related to rates for the financial year ending 30 June 2009.
The grounds on which the orders were sought read as follows:
Preamble, the specified area rate (CTA) was first imposed as a result of amendment # 70 to T.P.S #6 for the Provision of Parking Within the Central Business District, it was extended to include 42 Strickland Street in the 2000/2001 rate notice, it should be noted 42 Strickland Street is not in the Central Business District and has parking on the site for some 870 cars. The Council have failed to meet the criteria of Section 6.37 of the act which states at: 6.37(1)(a) have benefited or will benefit from; Response: the site and its businesses or customers will not benefit from parking or traffic management in the central area. 6.37(1)(b) have access to or will have access to; Response: council have not provided public car parking in the locality of 42 Strickland Street, to the east of Blair Street where the staff and customers of 42 Strickland Street will have access to parking. 6.37(1)(c) Have contributed or will contribute to the need for, that work or facility; Response: 42 Strickland Street has not contributed to the need for parking or other works as the site has provided its own parking facility of some 873 car bays and road traffic infrastructure.
The application came on for initial directions on 3 October 2008, and the parties were directed to file and serve statements of issues, facts and contentions.
On 7 October 2008, Prosser Management made its application. The order sought in that application was:
Dismiss the Central Traffic Area rate imposed on Lot 851 Hawkins Street and Lots 13 & 15 Brashaw Street on rate notice 9725, 50411 & 14245.
The rate notices were again attached to the application, and it is apparent that the reference to rate notice 9725 should have been rate notice 3725. Each of the rates notices attached to the application related to the financial year ending 30 June 2009.
The grounds upon which the order was sought read:
Preamble, the specified area rate (CTA) was first imposed as a result of amendment # 70 to the City of Bunbury T.P.S 6, to fund the requirements of Clause 7.3 of T.P.S 6 which states "The provision of parking within the Central Business District will be the responsibility of the Council and shall be provided in accordance with a central area parking strategy endorsed by the State Planning Commission." It was extended beyond the CBD in 2000/2001 even though no parking concession applied to the mixed business zone. The council have failed to meet the requirement under section 6.37 of the local Government Act to lawfully allow it to impose the specified area rate in that; 6.37(1)(a) states; have benefited from or will benefit from; Response the lots in question have no access to public parking or road improvements or other traffic measures, indeed the 3 lots in question don't even have a constructed road to service the lots. 6.37(1)(b), have access to or will have access to; Response these (sic) is no car parking or indeed constructed roads to have access to anything. 6.37(1)(c) Have contributed or will contribute to the need for, that work or facility; Response the lots have not contributed to the need for car parking as the scheme requires developments within the mixed business zone to provide parking in accordance with table 2 of the councils T.P.S # 7 we believe on the above grounds the specified area rate is invalid.
The Prosser Management application also appears to have been drawn by Mr Prosser without legal representation.
On 24 October 2008, both matters came before the Tribunal for directions, and orders were made that the two matters be dealt with together. Further directions were made for the filing of statements of issues, facts and contentions.
On 31 October 2008, notices of representation of Citygate and Prosser Management were filed by solicitors Jackson McDonald.
On 21 November 2008, the applicants' solicitors filed statements of issues, facts and contentions in each matter. Those documents recited the imposition of specified area rates in relation to the relevant properties each year since 2001/2002. They expressed the issue as being whether the specified area rates identified had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the LG Act, thus seeking, in effect, to quash the special area rate in relation to each of those years. In those documents, the applicants contend that the City did not identify any specific work, service or facility in respect of which the specified area rates were imposed. Having failed to do so, the City could not have been satisfied that the rate payers and residents within the area would benefit from, have access to, or contribute to the need for, any such specific work service or facility. They also argued that the City could not have used the funds raised only to meet the cost of providing this specific work service or facility since none had been identified.
In response to the applicants' statements of issues, facts and contentions, the City, through its solicitors, raised the preliminary issues referred to above. I turn now to those issues.
Is the challenge statute barred?
The respondent contends that:
iany rights to challenge specified area rates for the financial years prior to and including 2004 - 2005 were extinguished at the expiry of the time limited for appeal to the Land Valuation Tribunal, or alternatively when the Land Valuation Tribunal's Act 1978 (WA) was repealed;
iithe challenge to the specified area rates for financial years 2005 - 2006 and subsequent years are precluded because, (except in the case of the application by Citygate properties relating to the 2008 - 2009 year) the applications were not brought within the 28 days of the advice by the City required by s 20(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) contrary to the requirements of r 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) (SAT Rules).
The applicants contend that the City's submissions are based upon an incorrect premise that references to the Tribunal under s 6.82 of the LG Act are within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. Rather, they contend, the references fall within the Tribunal's original jurisdiction. The point is particularly significant to the respondent's argument concerning r 9 of the SAT Rules because that rule deals only with time limits for applications within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. The rules make no provision in relation to time limits for the commencement of proceedings in the Tribunals original jurisdiction.
Section 17(1) of the SAT Act identifies what comes within review jurisdiction. By that section, a matter comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction if it is 'a matter that expressly or necessarily involves a review of a decision'. On the other hand, s 15 of the SAT Act provides that a matter comes within the Tribunal's original jurisdiction if it 'does not involve a review of a decision'.
The applicants argue that s 6.82 of the LG Act simply permits the reference of a question to the Tribunal for resolution. It is not necessary that the question has been the subject of a decision of the local authority. They contrast the language of s 6.82 with the language of s 6.77 which enables a person dissatisfied with an objection under s 6.76 to apply to the Tribunal 'for a review of the decision'.
The applicants point out, correctly, that the heading to s 6.82, which reads 'General review of imposition of rate or service charge' is not to be taken as part of the LG Act: See s 32(2) of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act).
The applicants also point to the provisions of s 27 and s 29 of the SAT Act. Section 27 of the SAT Act provides that the review of a reviewable decision is by way of a hearing de novo. Section 29 sets out the powers of the Tribunal on review, giving it all the functions and directions exercisable by the original decision-maker, and the power to affirm vary or set aside the decision being reviewed. Where the Tribunal sets aside the decision being reviewed, it may substitute its own decision or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration: See s 29(3) the SAT Act. By contrast, the applicants argue, s 6.82 of the LG Act empowers the Tribunal only to quash a rate 'which in its opinion has been improperly made or imposed'.
In my view, the reference of a question under s 6.82 of the LG Act falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. The decision the subject of the review is the decision to impose a rate or service charge. What is referred is a question as to whether the rate was imposed in accordance with the requirements of the Act. The Tribunal's power to quash the rate or service charge arises where the Tribunal forms an opinion that the rate or charge has been improperly made or imposed. That involves a focus upon the decision made to impose the rate, and the reasons for it.
The fact that the hearing under s 6.82 of the LG Act is a hearing de novo does not, in my view, call for a different conclusion. It is true that the subject matter of proceedings under s 6.82 of the LG Act are limited to a consideration of the question of general interest that is referred. The section is designed to provide an additional basis for review from those specified in s 6.76. There is no reason that, in determining the resolution of the question referred, the Tribunal could not approach its task as a hearing de novo on that question.
It is not necessary for me, at this stage of these proceedings, to determine if s 6.82(3) should be construed as the only power the Tribunal has in relation to an application under s 6.82(1). Even if it is, and in that sense is inconsistent with the wider array of powers found in s 29 of the SAT Act, that does not lead to the conclusion that the proceedings are not within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. Inconsistencies between enabling acts and the SAT Act are anticipated by s 5 of the SAT Act, which provides that an enabling act prevails in the case of inconsistencies.
While the heading of a section does not form part of a written law, the headings of divisions do form part of the written law: See s 32(1) of the Interpretation Act. Section 6.82 of the LG Act forms part of subdivision 7 of Pt 6 of the LG Act. That subdivision is headed 'Objections and Review'. That heading tends to support the construction of s 6.82 as providing a right of review.
As the respondent observed, s 6.82 of the LG Act was amended at the time that the Tribunal was established. Prior to the amendment of the section to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal, it provided that a question of general interest as to whether a rate was imposed in accordance with the act could be made the subject of appeal to the Land Valuation Tribunal to have the question resolved. The words 'appeal to a Land Valuation Tribunal' were (in effect) deleted by the amendment, and in their place, the words 'may refer the question to the State Administrative Tribunal' were substituted. Corresponding changes were made to s 6.82(3) of the LG Act.
The concept of 'appeal' connotes a challenge to some earlier decision. There is no reason to consider that the use of the word 'appeal' in s 6.82 of the LG Act prior to its amendment meant anything other than an appeal against the decision to impose the rate or service charge. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the legislature intended to alter the nature of the proceedings when s 6.82 of the LG Act was amended as part of the suite of legislation passed in order to establish the State Administrative Tribunal.
The absence of the use of the expression 'review the decision' in s 6.82 is explicable. The section is designed to provide a capacity for review of a limited aspect of the decision to impose a rate, namely any question of general interest as to whether the rate was imposed in accordance with the LG Act. It is an alternative method of challenging the decision to impose a rate from those more specific grounds identified in s 6.76 for which the different procedure of objection is provided. Because the right of review relates only to the role of the question of general interest in the imposition of the rate, the words chosen more appropriately described the process. The process involves a review of the decision to impose the rates albeit on a limited basis.
It is for those reasons that I consider that the application falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction, and r 9 of the SAT Rules has application.
Extension of time
Rule 10 of the SAT Rules allows the Tribunal to extend time fixed under the SAT Act, an enabling act or the SAT Rules for the commencement of a proceeding. Extensions of time can be granted after the relevant time has expired. On the basis of their submission that the time limit under r 9 did not apply, the applicants made no application to extend time, but foreshadowed that, if it was necessary, such an application would be made.
My conclusion that r 9 of the SAT Rules does apply means that the requirements of r 9 were complied with, only in respect to the original application made in DR 350 of 2008 by Citygate, in relation to the rates imposed for the 2008 - 2009 financial year.
Rates up to year 2004 - 2005
The respondent contends that any right of review of the imposition of the special area rates for the years up to and including 2004 - 2005 are extinguished and no right of review remains. The basis for that contention is that, prior to the establishment of the Tribunal, any appeal to the Land Valuation Tribunal was required to be instituted within 42 days after the date of the relevant act or decision: s 20 of the Land Valuation Tribunals Act 1978 (WA) (LVT Act). The LVT Act was repealed with effect from 31 December 2004. The respondent argues that, the applicants, not having appealed to the Land Valuation Tribunal in relation to the assessments related to the years prior to and including 2004 - 2005 within 42 days of the imposition of the rate, lost their right to appeal when the time for appealing passed. Counsel relied on the decision in Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 (Maxwell). There is, however, an important distinction between the legislation considered in Maxwell, and the legislation relevant to this matter. Maxwell involved consideration of legislation which conferred on a deceased person's family a right to damages. As Dixon CJ observed (at 268), the effect of the statutory provisions was to confer a right of action which was to endure for 12 months from the death, after which the right of action was terminated or defeated.
By contrast, the time limit in relation to appeals to the Land Valuation Tribunal was not found in s 6.82 of the LG Act, or in the LG Act generally. Rather, it was found in s 20 of the LVT Act which provided:
(1)Where, pursuant to an act, a person has a right of appeal directly to a tribunal against an act or a decision of an authority, that person may commence the appeal by lodging a notice of appeal with the registrar within 42 days (or such further period as the Tribunal shall, for reasonable cause shown by the person, allow) after the date of the relevant act or decision.
The time limit did not form part of the right conferred by s 6.82 of the LG Act. The provision in s 20 of the LVT Act permitted an extension of time for commencement of an appeal. After the expiry of 42 days, a potential appellant retained a right to seek an extension of time. It cannot be said that, as in Maxwell, the right of appeal under s 6.82 of the LG Act was a right which only existed for a period of 42 days.
When the LVT Act was repealed and the Tribunal was substituted as the body in respect to which references under s 6.82 of the LG Act were made, a different procedural requirement applied in relation to the commencement of proceedings, being that prescribed in r 9 of the SAT Rules. There remained a capacity of the Tribunal, under r 10, to extend the time for commencement of proceedings. I do not accept the respondent's alternative submission that, if the right under s 6.82 of the LG Act was not extinguished 42 days after the rates were imposed, it expired upon the repeal of the LVT Act. The accrued right to seek an extension of time within which to refer a requestion under s 6.82 of the LG Act is not affected by the repeal of the LVT Act: See s 37(1) of the Interpretation Act.
The existence of the time limit under the LVT Act, and the length of time since expiry of that time limit, are obviously considerations relevant to the question of whether or not any extension of time might be granted. However, that is a matter to be dealt with if and when any application for an extension of time to commence proceedings in relation to the years prior to 2008 - 2009 year. Similarly, s 6.39 of the LG Act will be relevant to any question of extension of time for commencement of a challenge to the special area rates imposed more than five years before the application is made. That section enables a local government to amend its rate record, but only for the five years preceding the current financial year. There would seem little point in quashing rates imposed more than five years earlier, and counsel for the applicants virtually conceded that a question in relation to rates imposed more than five years earlier could not amount to 'a question of general interest'.
Are challenges for previous years outside the scope of the application?
As discussed above, the initial applications lodged with the Tribunal sought only to challenge the rates notices in respect of the financial year 2008 - 2009. The challenges in relation to earlier years were added at the time that the applicants filed their statements of issues, facts and contentions. The respondent contends that it is not open to the applicants to expand the proceedings to include challenges to special area rates imposed in earlier years, but rather the scope of the proceedings is limited by the original application.
Section 9 of the SAT Act identifies as an objective of the Tribunal the requirement to act with as little formality and technicality as practicable, and to achieve resolution of disputes according to the substantial merits of the case. Section 32(2)(b) requires the Tribunal to act without regard to technicalities and legal forms.
The Tribunal is careful to observe those statutory objectives. The approved forms of application to the Tribunal are designed in a way which requires provision of minimal information concerning applications so as to facilitate access to the Tribunal by unrepresented parties. Full identification of the issues generally takes place following an initial directions hearing, and usually, but by no means always, by way of a statement of issues facts and contentions. It is not uncommon that the statement of issues, facts and contentions might go beyond the issues which might be apparent on the face of the application form itself. The Tribunal generally seeks to avoid technical arguments arising from the way in which an application is drafted, but rather to focus on the issues as they emerge, and are clarified, through the case management process.
The applicants rely on this general approach of the Tribunal in answer to the City's contention that the statement of issues facts and contentions goes beyond the scope of the original application. Because of the conclusion which I have reached in relation to the need for an extension of time to seek review of the rates imposed in all cases referred to in the statement of issues, facts and contentions (other than the Citygate challenge to the 2008 - 2009 special area rate), it follows that the applicants cannot, in the absence of the extension of time being granted, pursue their contentions in relation to the earlier years in these proceedings.
The appropriate course is that the application by Citygate in DR 350 of 2008 should be confined, as it was in the original application form, to a challenge to the special area rate imposed for the financial year 2008 - 2009. If Citygate wishes to challenge special area rates in earlier years, then, in my view, the appropriate course is for a separate application to be made for an extension of time in relation to each year. While there will undoubtedly be common issues to be determined in relation to each year, each challenge amounts to a review of a separate decision taken to impose the special area rate in the year in which it was imposed.
Similarly, the application by Prosser Management in DR 384 of 2008, for which an extension of time is required, should be confined to the challenge to the imposition of the rated 2008 - 2009 financial year, as the application originally provided. Separate applications should be brought in relation to each year in respect of which the decision to impose the specified area rate is sought to be challenged, and in respect of which an extension of time is sought. The matters will, if they proceed, no doubt be dealt with together, but a separate analysis of the facts surrounding the position of rates on each year will necessarily be undertaken.
Should questions be limited to questions referred to in the initiating application?
This issue arises because the respondent observes that, in the statement of issues, facts and contentions filed by the applicants, objections were taken to the imposition of the rate on the basis that 'a specific work service or facility' had not been identified. The City observes that, in the grounds contained in the application, the objection was based upon the question of benefit from, access to, or contribution to the need for, the provision of parking within the central business district. In other words, the original application did not complain that the provision of parking within the central business district did not amount to a 'specific work, service or facility'.
I would not preclude the applicants from expanding the issues in the manner described above. As I have observed above, the original applications were prepared without the benefit of legal advice. It is apparent that, on being instructed, the solicitors examined the circumstances of the imposition of the special area rate, and considered whether any question of general interest as to whether the rate as being composed in accordance with the LG Act arose. I consider that it would not be in accordance with the objectives of the Tribunal if determining matters according to the substantial merits of the case, to now deprive the applicants of the ability to assert a different form of non-compliance with the Act from that originally asserted in the application.
Counsel for the City submitted that the consequences of quashing the rate are so serious, and the need for certainty in relation to the City's financial position so important, that the extension of the scope of the application should not be permitted. However, once the question of compliance with the LG Act is raised, as it was in the original application, there is no prejudice to the City if the precise formulation of the alleged non-compliance is changed by the filing of a statement of issues, facts and contentions. That step is taken early in the proceedings before the Tribunal, and is directed towards the precise identification of the issues. That is all that has occurred in this case, and the extension of the issues by the addition of what is said to be a different question of general interest is not prevented by virtue of the contents of the application in its original form.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the proceedings in DR 350 of 2008 are limited to a challenge to the special area rate imposed for the financial year 2008/2009. The proceedings by Prosser Management in DR 384 of 2008 will require an application for an extension of time to be made, and if an extension of time is granted, will be limited to a challenge to the rates imposed for the financial year 2008/2009. If the applicants wish to proceed with challenges to special area rates imposed in earlier years, separate applications will be required in relation to each year, and an extension of time for the commencement of those proceedings will be required.
The matter should be listed for further directions in the light of these reasons.
Order
The matter is listed for directions at 10.30 am on 4 August 2009.
I certify that this and the preceding [54] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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JUSTICE J A CHANEY, PRESIDENT
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