JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: CITY OF GOSNELLS -v- HEYDON [2010] WASC 344
CORAM: JENKINS J
HEARD: 23 AUGUST 2010
DELIVERED : 30 NOVEMBER 2010
FILE NO/S: SJA 1026 of 2010
BETWEEN: CITY OF GOSNELLS
Appellant
AND
TREVOR HEYDON
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MAGISTRATE E K LANGDON
File No :AR 9806 of 2009
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Leaving vehicles on a verge - Prosecution appeal - Repugnancy between general provision of local law relating to things placed on a verge and specific provisions of the local law dealing with vehicles
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 132
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 32(2)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA), cl 1.2, cl 2.2, cl 3.1, cl 3.5(1), cl 8.3(2)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 5(1)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr D P Gillett
Respondent: Mr M E Herron
Solicitors:
Appellant: McLeods
Respondent: R J Kerferd & Co
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (No 2) (1980) 29 ALR 333
JENKINS J: The City of Gosnells (the City) appeals against a magistrate's decision to acquit Trevor Heydon of a charge of placing vehicles on a verge without a permit.
Grounds of appeal
On 3 June 2010 I granted leave to appeal on each of the following grounds:
1.The learned Magistrate erred in law in finding clauses 2.2(1)(b) and 3.1(1) of the Local Law could both apply to the wrecked and damaged vehicles and vehicle bodies placed on a verge the subject of the charge but that as clause 3.1(1) was more specific, in that it applied to vehicles and parts of vehicles, clause 2.2(1)(b) was invalid to the extent that it applied to the items the subject of the charge whereas the learned Magistrate should have found the charge could validly have been brought under either of those provisions.
2.Alternatively, the learned Magistrate erred in law in finding that both clauses 2.2(1)(b) and 3.1(1) of the Local Law could apply to the wrecked and damaged vehicles and vehicle bodies placed on a verge the subject of the charge whereas the learned Magistrate should have found only clause 2.2(1)(b) could so apply on the basis that:
(a)clauses 2.2(1)(b) and 3.1(1) of the Local Law had different applications, whereby clause 3.1(1) was intended to prevent vehicles and parts of vehicles from obstructing public places or local government property and clause 2.2(1)(b) was intended to protect the amenity of a locality which included preventing the placing of damaged vehicles and vehicle bodies on a verge without permission from the Appellant; and
(b)clause 3.1(1) could not have applied because the wrecked and damaged vehicles and vehicle bodies the subject of the charge had not been left on the verge for a period exceeding 24 hours and,…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read City of Gosnells v Heydon and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] WASC 344
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court considered the principles of statutory interpretation, particularly the rule that specific provisions should prevail over general ones when there is a conflict. The Court held that there was indeed a conflict between the two clauses, as clause 2.2(1)(b) prohibited the placement of any items on a verge without specifying that the placement must be permanent, while clause 3.1 provided exemptions for certain vehicles. The Court found that the specific exemptions in clause 3.1 were intended to govern their particular subject matter exhaustively, and applying the general prohibition of clause 2.2(1)(b) to the same subject matter would result in a departure from that intention. Therefore, the specific provision (clause 3.1) must prevail over the general provision (clause 2.2(1)(b)).
Based on this reasoning, the High Court quashed the respondent's conviction, finding that the specific exemptions in clause 3.1 should have applied to his situation, and that the general prohibition in clause 2.2(1)(b) did not apply to the temporary placement of vehicles on a verge for reasons such as maintenance or repair. The Court's decision underscores the importance of interpreting legislative provisions in a manner that gives effect to their intended purpose and avoids unnecessary conflicts between general and specific provisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles of statutory interpretation, which also apply to the interpretation of delegated legislation such as the local law, provide that a general provision gives way should it be applicable to the same subject‑matter as is dealt with in a specific provision. In Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (No 2) (1980) 29 ALR 333 Deane J expressed the principle in the following manner:As a matter of general construction, where there is repugnancy between the general provision of a statute and provisions dealing with a particular subject matter, the latter must prevail and, to the extent of any such repugnancy, the general provisions will be inapplicable to the subject matter of the special provisions. 'The rule is, that wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be taken to be operative …' (per Romilly MR: Pretty v Solly (1859) 26 Beav 606 at 610). Repugnancy can be present in cases where there is no direct contradiction between the relevant legislative provisions. It is present where it appears, as a matter of construction, that special provisions were intended exhaustively to govern their particular subject matter and where general provisions, if held to be applicable to the particular subject matter, would constitute a departure from that intention by encroaching on that subject matter. A more fundamental example of such repugnancy is where the particular provisions prescribe or encourage conduct which the general provisions would render prima facie, though not irremediably, unlawful or where the particular provisions assume to be lawful conduct which the general provisions would render prima facie unlawful. I have already indicated my view that the latter, more fundamental, example of repugnancy is present in the instant matter. I consider that the former example of repugnancy is likewise present (347). The majority of the High Court in Smith v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 338 [21] approved Deane J's dicta. The first issue to determine is whether both cl 2.2(1)(b) and cl 3.1 can be given their full meaning without a resulting conflict. If conflict is apparent, both provisions cannot receive their full meaning and they must be reconciled, usually by the application of the above principle. I am satisfied that there is an apparent conflict between the two provisions. Clause 2.2(1)(b) states that a person shall not, except in specific circumstances which are not relevant, place any thing on a verge except for removal by a local government under a bulk rubbish collection. The respondent submits that the provision only applies to the permanent disposal of things on a verge. I do not perceive that there is any valid reason to limit the application of the provision in that manner. The relevant phrase used in the clause is 'throw, place or deposit' a thing on a verge. The ordinary meanings of those three words do not require, as opposed to permit, the permanent disposal of an item. If it had been intended to limit the application of the clause to permanent disposal of an item, then the words permanently dispose or others denoting the same meaning could easily have been used. Further, the exception for placing items on a verge for removal by the local government under a bulk rubbish collection would not be necessary if the clause's general application was only to prohibit the permanent disposal of items on a verge, as leaving items for collection on a verge would not meet that general meaning of the clause, in any event.