City of Burnside v Build-Tec Services

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

CITY OF BURNSIDE v BUILD-TEC SERVICES

Reasons for Ruling of The Honourable Justice Besanko

10 February 2005

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WITH ENVIRONMENT JURISDICTION - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SUPREME COURT - RIGHT OF APPEAL

Application for extension of time to institute appeal from Environment, Resources and Development Court - where applicant filed notice of appeal six days late - where applicant gave a reasonable explanation for the delay - where appeal is arguable - where applicant will suffer detriment if time is not extended - where respondent will suffer some financial detriment if time is extended but that detriment will be offset by applicant's undertaking not to seek costs if successful on the appeal - application granted.

Development Act 1993; Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 s 30, referred to.

CITY OF BURNSIDE v BUILD-TEC SERVICES
[2005] SASC 50

Application for Extension of Time

  1. BESANKO J: This is an application pursuant to r 3.04(d) of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 for an extension of time within which to institute an appeal.

  2. On 8th February 2004, Build-Tec Services made an application to the City of Burnside (“the council”) for provisional development plan consent under the provisions of the Development Act 1993.  The application related to land at 470 The Parade, Rosslyn Park in the State of South Australia (“the subject land”).  The existing use of the subject land was as a motor repair station, a workshop and a storage area for vehicle bodies.  The application sought approval for development involving the demolition of the existing buildings on the subject land and the erection of three, part two-storey detached dwellings together with integrated garaging, landscaping and fencing.  On 22nd June 2004, the council refused to grant provisional development plan consent.  Build-Tec Services appealed against the council’s decision to the Environment, Resources and Development Court (“ERD Court”) established under the Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (“the ERD Court Act)”.  The appeal was heard by a Commissioner of that Court.  On 10th September 2004, the Commissioner issued a memorandum indicating that he would uphold the appeal.  On 30th September 2004, the Commissioner delivered reasons and made orders upholding the appeal and granting provisional development plan consent to an amended proposal subject to seven conditions.

  3. An appeal against a decision of a Commissioner of the ERD Court lies to a single judge of this Court pursuant to s 30(1) of the ERD Court Act. The appeal is as of right on a question of law, and by leave on a question of fact. An appeal or an application for leave to appeal is to be heard by a Judge of the Land and Valuation Division of this Court (Practice Direction 38). Appeals from the ERD Court are governed by r 96AA of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (“the Rules”). By reason of r 96AA.03 an appeal under s 30 of the ERD Court Act is…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia heard an application from the City of Burnside to extend the time to appeal a decision made by the Environment, Resources and Development Court. The City of Burnside had filed its notice of appeal six days after the statutory deadline, seeking an extension on the basis of a reasonable explanation for the delay, the arguability of the appeal, and the potential detriment to the council if the extension was not granted.

The court considered several factors, including the short length of the delay, the explanation provided by the City of Burnside for the delay, the arguability of the appeal, and the potential detriment to both parties if the extension was granted or denied. The court noted that the appeal was indeed arguable, and that if the extension was not granted, the City of Burnside would lose its ability to challenge the Commissioner’s decision. The court also acknowledged that there would be some financial detriment to the respondent if the extension was granted, although it was difficult to quantify the exact nature of that detriment. The court concluded that, in all circumstances, it was appropriate to grant the extension.

The court ordered that the time for instituting the appeal be extended up to and including 21 October 2004, on the condition that the City of Burnside undertook not to seek costs against the respondent if successful on the appeal. The court also noted that the financial detriment to the respondent would be offset by this undertaking. The court's decision was thus made in favour of the City of Burnside, granting the extension requested and setting out the terms and conditions for the appeal to proceed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this case, the length of the delay is short and there is an explanation for the delay. I think that the appeal is arguable and if I do not grant an extension of time the council will lose its ability to challenge the Commissioner’s decision. There will be some financial detriment to the respondent if I grant an extension of time, although on the evidence the exact nature of that is difficult to quantify. In essence, the prejudice is the liability incurred by the applicant to Aspex Building Designers in relation to work carried out between 18th October and 21st October 2004. To some extent at least that prejudice will be offset by the undertaking proffered by the council which I will include in the order which I propose to make. In all the circumstances, I think it is appropriate to extend the time for instituting the appeal.Conclusion I propose to make an order in the following terms: Upon the City of Burnside undertaking not to seek against the respondent the costs of the appeal should it be successful on the appeal, I order pursuant to r 3.04(d) of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 that the time for instituting the appeal be extended up to and including 21st October 2004.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established