TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Citigroup Inc to registration of trade mark application 1138173(36) - CF CITY FINANCE LOANS & CASH SOLUTIONS - filed in the name of Lou Pozzebon.
Delegate: | Jock McDonagh |
Representation: | Opponent: Trevor Stevens, Davies Collison Cave Patent & Trade Marks Attorneys Applicant: Lou Pozzebon, applicant in person |
Decision: | 2009 ATMO 04 Section 52 opposition: sections 43, 44 and 60 not established, registration proceeding. Costs awarded against opponent |
Background
Mr Lou Pozzebon (‘the applicant’) filed an application to register a trade mark, current details of which appear below:
Application number: 1138173
Filing date: 26 September 2006
Specifications: Class: 36 Monetary affairs
Trade mark:
The trade mark was accepted for possible registration, under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’), and advertised for opposition purposes. Citigroup Inc (‘the opponent’) filed a Notice of Opposition under section 52 of the Act, objecting to the registration of the trade mark. The opponent served and filed evidence in accordance with the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 after which the matter was set down before me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, for a hearing on 16 October 2008, in Sydney.
Evidence
The following evidence was filed and served pursuant to the Act:
| Declarant | Status | Date, Known as | Exhibits |
| Evidence in Support | |||
| Sara Blotner | Assistant Secretary of opponent | 4 March 2008, Blotner | A to H |
The Hearing
The applicant appeared in person, assisted by his wife. The opponent was represented by Trevor Stevens of Davies Collison Cave Patent and Trade Marks Attorneys.
The Notice of Opposition cited most grounds of opposition available to the opponent under the Act; however, in his submissions Mr Stevens, for the opponent, only relied upon the grounds of opposition under sections 43, 44 and 60. For the sake of completeness, my reading of the evidence indicates that none of the other grounds of opposition are supported and I find that they have not been established.
Discussion
The opponent argued its case in the order of sections 44, 60 and 43 of the Act, so I shall follow that order in this decision.
Section 44
Section 44(2) of the Act states:
(2)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of services (applicant’s services) must be rejected if:
(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i)a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or
(ii)a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark in respect of the applicant’s services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.
Note 1:For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2:For
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- Case
- [2009] ATMO 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the statutory demand should be set aside. This required the Court to determine if there was a genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt claimed by Citigroup. The Court also considered whether the respondent had established grounds to set aside the statutory demand, such as the existence of a counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand.
Justice McDonagh found that the respondent had raised a genuine dispute regarding the debt. The Court noted that the respondent had provided evidence suggesting that the debt was not yet due and payable, and that there were ongoing negotiations and potential offsets that cast doubt on the applicant's claim. The Court applied the principle that a statutory demand should not be used as a debt-collecting mechanism where a genuine dispute exists, and that the applicant had not discharged its onus to demonstrate the absence of such a dispute.
Consequently, the Court ordered that the application to wind up the respondent be dismissed, and that the statutory demand be set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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