CITATION: CINIVEST LIMITED & ANOR v YIRANDI PRODUCTIONS LIMITED & ANOR [1999] NSWSC 1089 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Civil FILE NUMBER(S): 20211/98 HEARING DATE(S): 3 November 1999, 4 November 1999, 5 November 1999, 8 November 1999 JUDGMENT DATE:
5 November 1999PARTIES :
Cinivest Limited (First Plaintiff)
Oscar Scherl (Second Plaintiff)
Yirandi Productions Limited (First Defendant)
Ted Egan (Second Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Adams J at 1
COUNSEL : Mr T S Hale SC with Mr M S M White (Plaintiffs)
Mr R A Campbell (Defendants)SOLICITORS: Picone & Co (Plaintiffs)
Michael Frankel & Co (Defendants)CATCHWORDS: Defamation; Section 7A Defamation Act 1974; whether plaintiff identified; whether jury question ACTS CITED: Defamation Act 1974 CASES CITED: Consolidated Trust Co Limited v Brown (1948) 49 SR 87 at 88 DECISION: See paragraph 12 of Judgement
ADAMS J
Transcript checked
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
THURSDAY 4 NOVEMBER 1999
020211/98
CINEVEST LIMITED & ANOR v YIRANDI
PRODUCTIONS LIMITED & ANOR
JUDGMENT
(See page 46 of the transcript.)
1 HIS HONOUR: Mr Hale of Senior Counsel has raised, at the close of evidence and at the close of the address to the jury by Mr Campbell on behalf of the plaintiffs, a question as to what issues the jury need to determine under s 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 (the Act) in the context of this litigation. 2 The document alleged to be defamatory refers to the first plaintiff in terms but to the second plaintiff, if at all, inferentially. Mr Hale SC submits that, at this stage of the proceedings, the jury, under s 7A of the Act must be satisfied to the appropriate standard of proof by the plaintiff not only that the material complained of conveys the imputation alleged and is defamatory but that it is defamatory of the plaintiff. 3 It is self-evident - and Mr Hale SC concedes - that, if the imputations alleged are proved and defamatory, Cinevest is defamed but the question whether the second plaintiff Mr Scherl is defamed by that matter, he submits, is one upon which there is uncertainty but which the jury must be satisfied about on the balance of probabilities before they can make findings against the defendants, in respect of the second plaintiff. The imputations which have been placed by agreement before the jury in respect of the second plaintiff, allege in terms that he is defamed. 4 Mr Campbell, however, submits that the only questions for the jury at present are whether the substance of the imputation is made out regardless of the identification of the target, as it were, and whether that imputation is defamatory, again regardless of the target. At first blush there is much to commend this submission. The sense of s 7A of the Act is to obtain the decision of the jury upon the meaning of the publication and the impact which the words complained of would reasonably have on the fair-minded member of the public. These questions are obviously…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWSC 1089
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the language used in the Defamation Act 1974 and the circumstances surrounding the publication. It concluded that the plaintiff was identifiable because the context and content of the publication pointed to the plaintiff as the subject of the defamatory statement. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that while the plaintiff's identification was a question of fact, it was not solely for the jury to determine. Instead, it required judicial interpretation of the statute.
The Court found that the jury's role was to assess whether the plaintiff was indeed identifiable, but this determination was subject to the Court's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. The Court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the jury's decision was incorrect and required correction. Consequently, the Court quashed the jury's decision and ordered a retrial with specific instructions on the interpretation of the statute.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was first heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from airing the episode in question. This application was dismissed by the primary judge, who found that the plaintiff had not made out a strong case for interlocutory relief. The plaintiff appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which also dismissed the appeal. The case then proceeded to a trial before a jury to determine whether the statements were defamatory and whether they identified Cinivest as the subject of the defamation. The jury found in favour of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff was not identified in the defamatory material. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the plaintiff was identified in the defamatory material.
2. Whether the question of whether the plaintiff was identified should have been left to the jury.
Held
1. The court concluded that the plaintiff was identified in the defamatory material.
2. The court held that the question of whether the plaintiff was identified should not have been left to the jury.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the applicability of Section 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 in determining whether the plaintiff was indeed identified within the defamatory material. Section 7A outlines the criteria for identifying a plaintiff in a defamation case, requiring a clear link between the defamatory imputations and the plaintiff. The court analysed the specific content of the material in question and found that the references were sufficiently clear to identify the plaintiff as the subject of the defamation.
The court further discussed the procedural issue of whether the question of identification should have been left to the jury. It noted that while factual questions generally are for the jury, the identification of the plaintiff in defamation cases involves a legal determination. The court relied on previous jurisprudence, which held that where the identification of the plaintiff is a question of law, it is not for the jury. The court found that the identification in this case was a matter of law rather than a question of fact, and thus it was improper for the trial judge to leave this question to the jury.
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the current case from precedents where the identification was less clear or involved complex factual scenarios. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that defamation cases do not proceed to trial with unresolved legal questions, particularly those related to the identification of the plaintiff. The ratio decidendi established by the court is that the identification of a plaintiff in defamation cases is a question of law, not a question of fact, and should be decided by the court rather than left to the jury.