Cib16 v Minister for Immigration

[2018] FCCA 2987

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CIB16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2987

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for remedy under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision not to grant protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider evidence consistent with the applicant’s claims for protection – whether by not accepting particular asserted facts the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal failed to consider certain matters when relying on inconsistencies in applicant’s evidence – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 36(2A), 91R, 476

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33

Applicant: CIB16

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 2274 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis

Hearing date: 14 September 2017

Date of Last Submission: 14 September 2017

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 26 October 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Swan

Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2274 of 2016

CIB16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant, a citizen of Iran, applies for a remedy under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in relation to a decision made by the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).

Claims for protection

1. The applicant stated his claims for protection on a number of occasions. These were at an “Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview” held on 31 July 2012,[1] in a statutory declaration the applicant made on 31 October 2012 (Statutory Declaration)[2] that formed part of the application for a Protection visa the applicant made on 8 November 2012,[3] at an interview before the delegate on 26 March 2013,[4] at a hearing before the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) on 6 May 2015,[5] and at a hearing before the Tribunal on 8 April 2016.[6] In addition the applicant, through his representative, provided submissions to the Tribunal together with documents.[7]

   [1] CB1-20

   [2] CB56-59

   [3] CB23-55

   [4] CB116-118

   [5] CB135

   [6] CB162

   [7] CB167-183

2. It would be convenient, however, if I begin with the claims as stated in the Statutory Declaration; and these may be summarised as follows:

   a)The applicant has tattoos on his arms and right leg. A close friend of the applicant tattooed them in 2011.

   b)While walking along a street, members of the Basij stopped the applicant and, seeing the applicant’s tattoos, started yelling at him. After having pushed him into a car, and leaving him there for an hour, the Basij took the applicant to the Basij headquarters where they beat, kicked, and slapped the applicant; they accused the applicant of being against Islam; they called him “Mahareb”, which meant they wanted to kill the applicant for being against the main religious power in Iran; they questioned the applicant about from where he obtained his tattoos, but, to protect his friend, the applicant said he obtained the tattoos from Karaj; they stripped the applicant and took photos of his tattoos; after covering the applicant’s face with a mask, they proceeded to remove the applicant’s tattoos by using acid; after they removed the mask the applicant realised he was “badly burnt to the extent” he “could see [his] bones”. The applicant was then taken and left at a cemetery, and the Basij told him they had his sim card and would continue to follow him, and they would be aware of any anti-Islamic acts the applicant may commit.

   c)In the coming months the applicant’s father received telephone calls from private numbers, but “we were scared to answer”. Further, men whom the applicant recognised through the intercom as being members of the Basij came to the applicant’s house, but the applicant did not answer. The applicant decided to move to Kish after he became more and more depressed and scared that he would be subjected to torture.

   d)While living in Kish members of the Basij continued to call and come looking for the applicant. After deciding he could not remain in hiding in Kish, the applicant returned to Tehran. On his return the applicant attempted to call the friend who tattooed the applicant, but his friend’s mother answered the telephone. She told the applicant that his friend had been taken by the authorities, and his computer had been confiscated. That information scared the applicant because his friend’s computer contained many photos of the applicant’s tattoos and the Basij could therefore compare the photos they had taken of the applicant’s tattoos with the photos on the computer. The applicant decided he must leave straight away or he would be killed.

   e)The applicant does not believe in the Islamic faith and, given Iran is an Islamic country, the applicant’s lack of faith makes it very difficult for him to subsist. Further, because the applicant has claimed asylum in a Western country, he will be considered to be a supporter of the West and therefore be considered to be anti-Islamic.

   f)The applicant believes that if he were to return to Iran he would be seriously harmed or killed because the Iranian authorities would target him; and he would be so targeted because of his tattoos.

3. Before the Tribunal the applicant claimed that “people like him” – that is, persons who wear “t-shirts with “black straps”, sports shoes or black shoes, and who have goatee beards and spiky hair” – attract whispers behind their backs that they are crazy and dangerous. The applicant said people would say he is homosexual. The applicant further said that most of the time he and his friends were mocked by a group of people.[8] Also before the Tribunal, the applicant said that since he first came to Australia his belief in atheism became stronger; and in Iran one cannot discuss such things, but in Australia it was easy to do so. He can no longer remain silent about his views.[9] The applicant claimed he spreads the word and he has a duty to spread the word about atheism.[10]

   [8] CB196, [69]

   [9] CB196, [71]

   [10] CB196-197, [72]

Tribunal’s reasons

1. The Tribunal accepted the applicant has large tattoos on each arm and on one of his legs.[11] The Tribunal did so, not because it observed them (the applicant appeared before the Tribunal by video link); the Tribunal relied on the delegate and the RRT having seen them.[12] The Tribunal, however, otherwise found the applicant was not a credible witness, and that he fabricated his claim that in Iran he was detained and tortured for having tattoos, and that a person whom he claimed to be his friend was arrested as a result of which the applicant feared for his safety and decided to leave Iran.[13] The Tribunal relied on a number of matters which included the following:

   a)Until the hearing before the Tribunal the applicant maintained that the burns he sustained form the pouring of the acid during his torture by the Basij were so deep he could see the exposed bone. Before the Tribunal the applicant said that he had confused “lipid” (which the Tribunal noted meant “fat tissue”) for bone.[14]

   b)The applicant gave inconsistent evidence about how, when, and what treatment he received for the acid burns. In the Statutory Declaration the applicant said he was “more comfortable going to the local clinic” rather than the hospital; to the delegate the applicant said he went to his mother’s plastic surgeon rather than to the hospital so he would not be questioned by the authorities; before the RRT the applicant claimed he was so fearful he did not wish to leave home at all, and it was only after his parents implored the applicant to seek medical treatment that the applicant sought medical treatment, and he sought such treatment by his father covering the applicant with a blanket to hide him and taking the applicant to a dermatologist/plastic surgeon whom his mother had used in the past; and before the Tribunal “the applicant sought to combine the two versions and said he could not remember exactly how long after the detention he had gone to get medical help”.[15] The Tribunal considered “there is a significant difference between the applicant going to a clinic where he could get dental and skin treatment by himself and the reluctant applicant being covered with a blanket and taken surreptitiously to a dermatologist”.[16]

   c)In the Statutory Declaration the applicant stated he went to the clinic the next day after he was tortured, but before the RRT the applicant said his wounds became infected and it was only under pressure from his parents that he agreed to obtain medical help 2 to 3 days after his detention.[17]

   d)The Tribunal found it implausible that the Basij would become so enraged by the applicant’s tattoos that they tortured him yet they did not charge him with any political offence or any offence against Islam in the months before they arrested the applicant’s friend.[18]

   e)The Tribunal found it implausible that the Basij would interrogate and torture the applicant and then release him without finding out exactly who had tattooed the applicant or exactly where it was done, and then the authorities eventually realise it was the applicant’s friend who had tattooed the applicant.[19]

   f)Although the applicant claimed he was in hiding at Kish, he had not denied he undertook scuba diving courses there with private instructors, and he provided his own name and received diving certificates obtained in his own name.[20]

   g)In 2011 the applicant freely travelled to Turkey and to the United Arab Emirates and on both occasions returned to Iran.[21]

   [11] CB201, [95]

   [12] CB201, [95]

   [13] CB199, [91]; CB201, [94]

   [14] CB199, [93.a.]

   [15]CB199, [93.b.]

   [16] CB200, [93.b.] (emphasis in original)

   [17] CB200. [93.c.]

   [18] CB200, [93.f.]

   [19] CB200, [93.g.]

   [20] CB200, [93.h.]

   [21] CB201, [93.i.]

2. The Tribunal also did not accept there was a real chance the applicant will be subjected to serious harm amounting to persecution now or in the foreseeable future because of his tattoos and his Western hairstyle and clothes.[22] The Tribunal relied on its findings that the applicant did not suffer the harms he claimed he suffered, the absence of any other evidence of past harm to the applicant, and on country information.[23] The Tribunal relied on the Country Information Report on Iran published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT Report) which stated that tattoos are increasingly common in Iran; that it is possible that a person with a visible tattoo could come to the attention of security and result in “low-level harassment”; that it was unaware of specific penalties that could be imposed for having a tattoo, but it is likely that any such penalties would be similar to those imposed for “improper” dress or hair style, “penalty” in this context meaning a warning or a fine; and that it believed it is unlikely authorities would maintain an interest in someone who had previously come to their attention for having a tattoo, unless the tattoo gave evidence of another crime.[24]

   [22] CB202, [100]

   [23] CB202, [100]

   [24] CB201, [96]

3. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant is actively committed to atheism, agnosticism, or anti-Islamic views.[25] The Tribunal so found even though it accepted that after he arrived in Australia the applicant had posted material on Facebook and had joined online the Agnostics and Atheists Society. The Tribunal found that the applicant engaged in this conduct for the sole purpose of strengthening his refugee claims and, for that reason, because of s.91R(3) of the Act, it disregarded that conduct when assessing the applicant’s claims under s.36(2)(a) of the Act.[26] Given that finding, the Tribunal did not accept that on return to Iran the applicant will do or say anything that would draw the attention of the Islamic authorities to his atheistic, agnostic, or anti-Muslim statements in Australia, or cause him to be imputed with atheist religious views.[27]

   [25] CB204, [111]

   [26] CB204, [111-112]

   [27] CB204, [113]

4. The Tribunal did not accept there was a real chance the posts he made on Facebook would be monitored by the Iranian authorities or otherwise become known to them, or that the posts would cause him to be perceived as an apostate and targeted for serious harm.[28] In any event, even if the Iranian authorities do find out he had posted the material he did, the applicant would be telling the truth if he tells the authorities that his interest in agnosticism and atheism was never more than superficial and done for no other reason than to try to remain in Australia.[29]

   [28] CB204, [114]

   [29] CB204, [115]

5. The Tribunal also did not accept the applicant would be imputed with Christian views because his friend who tattooed the applicant is a Christian, or because the applicant is engaged to be married to a Christian in Australia.[30] Nor did the Tribunal accept that the applicant’s lack of belief in Islam means that he will be regarded as a political dissident in Iran. The Tribunal found the applicant can accurately be described as a non-practising Muslim, rather than an agnostic, or atheist, or Satanist, or Christian.[31] The Tribunal also did not accept there is a real chance the applicant will be targeted for not practising Islam if he returns to Iran now or in the foreseeable future. The Tribunal relied on country information about the low level of mosque attendances in Iran, and the absence of persons being targeted for not attending mosques.[32]

   [30] CB204, [117]

   [31] CB204, [118]

   [32] CB204, [119]

6. The Tribunal was also not satisfied the applicant faces a real risk of serious harm as a returnee. The Tribunal relied on the DFAT Report which stated that returnees, whether travelling on their own passport or on a temporary travel document, are generally only questioned if they had done something to attract the specific attention of authorities, but that the vast majority of people questioned are released after an hour or two.[33] The Tribunal found the applicant did not have a profile with the Iranian authorities when he left Iran, and had acquired none while in Australia; and, for that reason, he is not a person the Iranian authorities would be interested in arresting and prosecuting for any reason.[34] The Tribunal found the applicant is likely to be questioned immediately on his arrival in Iran, have his travel document taken away, and he may need to have to report to police, but these matters, considered alone or together, did not amount to serious harm capable of amounting to persecution.[35]

   [33] CB205, [122]

   [34] CB205, [126]

   [35] CB205, [127]

7. Finally, the Tribunal assessed the applicant’s claims against the complementary protection criterion provided for by s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. After noting the definition of “significant harm” given in s.36(2A) of the Act, and the judgment of the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB,[36] the Tribunal repeated or referred to the findings it had already made, and concluded it did not accept there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm from the Iranian authorities or any other person for any reason.[37]

   [36] [2013] FCAFC 33

   [37] CB207, [142]

Grounds of application

1. The applicant relies on an amended application filed on 31 August 2017. The amended application removes grounds 1 and 3 of the original application (which originally contained four grounds) and adds a new ground. It otherwise retains the numbering of the grounds of application as originally filed. 

2. The applicant also relies on written submissions. At the hearing counsel for the Minister submitted that particulars C to F of the submissions made in relation to ground 2 appear to state a claim that is not contained in the amended application; and counsel further noted that particular C of the submissions made in relation to ground 5 is significantly more detailed than paragraph C of the particulars to ground 5, and the particulars stated in paragraph D of the submissions made in relation to ground 5 are entirely new. Mr Hodges, who appeared on behalf of the applicant, informed me that the written submissions were intended to support the grounds stated in the amended application. I informed the parties that I would not make any order about whether the submissions went beyond the scope of the grounds stated in the application, and noted that I would hear submissions in the course of the hearing about whether the particulars of the submissions to which counsel for the Minister referred were relevant to the grounds stated in the amended application.

Ground 2 of the amended application

1. Ground 2 of the amended application is as follows:

   The Tribunal committed error by relying on some observations, but not others, of the applicant’s tattoos made by the delegate and the first tribunal without seeking or allowing the applicant to allow the same observations to the second tribunal.

   PARTICULARS

   a.Both the delegate (allegedly) and the first tribunal were shown some of the applicant’s tattoos and in particular the area/scar/wound where one tattoo had allegedly been removed by acid being poured on it.

   b.The tribunal in coming to the decision that the applicant was implausible, lacking of credibility and/or inconsistent, did not seek to examine the tattoos for itself and instead relied on inadequate, incomplete and inconsistent descriptions of the tattoos observed by the delegate and first tribunal.

2. In his written submissions the applicant submits the Tribunal acted unfairly, and the invitation it had given the applicant to appear before it was not meaningful because he was prevented from presenting to the Tribunal evidence of his scars. In his oral address Mr Hodges referred to the Tribunal having recorded the observations made by the RRT of their being “visible signs of scarring and faint patterns of ink on one particular “site” on one arm where the applicant allegedly had a tattoo of a scull”;[38] and he submitted the Tribunal had no regard to the fact that the applicant had scarring on his arm. Counsel for the Minister, on the other hand, submitted that although the scar could be treated as corroborative of the applicant’s claims, its significance as corroborative evidence depended entirely on the applicant’s account of how a tattoo was removed from his arm; and that is because the tattoo could have been removed in other ways.

   [38] CB191, [32]

3. The gist of the complaint made by ground 2, at least as developed in oral address by Mr Hodges, is that the Tribunal was aware the applicant had a scar on his arm, the scar was consistent with a tattoo having been removed from the applicant’s arm, the removal of the tattoo was consistent with the applicant’s case that the scar was removed in the manner he claimed it had been removed, but the Tribunal gave no weight to the fact that the scar was consistent with the applicant’s claims.

4. Although the Tribunal itself did not observe the applicant’s tattoos and the scaring, it said it accepted the applicant did have tattoos. And although it did not expressly say so, I find the Tribunal also accepted the applicant’s arm bore a scar and faint patterns of ink on one particular site. The basis of that finding is that is how the RRT described the scar, and the Tribunal repeated the RRT’s description of the scar and faint patterns of ink in its reasons for decision without any further comment.[39] I also find that, as submitted by Mr Hodges, the Tribunal gave the scarring no weight when assessing the applicant’s claim that the Basij removed a tattoo from his arm by the means by which the applicant claimed it had been removed. The question is whether it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to give the scar no weight when assessing that claim.

   [39] CB191, [32]

1. In my opinion it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to give the scar no weight in determining whether to accept the applicant’s claim that a tattoo was violently removed from his arm by the application of acid. That is so because the presence of the scar by itself could reasonably have been viewed by the Tribunal to be consistent not only with the applicant’s claim that it was caused by the violent removal of a tattoo by means of the application of acid, but also with the tattoo having been removed by other means. For example the applicant himself could have caused to have the tattoo removed by laser therapy, a possibility suggested by the RRT.[40] In those circumstances the presence of the scar could not assist in determining whether the tattoo was violently removed by the application of acid, as the applicant claimed, because the existence of the scar could reasonably have been viewed by the Tribunal to be consistent with both the applicant’s claim being true and the applicant’s claim not being true.

   [40] CB137, [14]

2. The question the Tribunal considered, therefore, was whether the applicant’s account of how the tattoo was removed was credible. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant’s account was credible for the reasons it gave. The applicant does not submit it was not open to the Tribunal to so conclude for the reasons it gave. The Tribunal made no error in proceeding this way.

3. In arriving at these conclusions I have not overlooked the applicant’s representative’s submission referred to in paragraph 83 of the Tribunal’s reasons, and the submissions Mr Hodges made about this in response to the submissions made by counsel for the Minister. The representative’s submission was stated to be a response to “the Tribunal’s request for clarifying the kind of treatment the Applicant received after being tortured”.[41] The representative’s submission repeated the applicant’s instructions, which were to the effect that with the help of his father the applicant went to the local medical centre where he was seen by a dentist and a dermatologist; the dermatologist was a laser surgeon specialist who advised the applicant “to undertake laser treatment for his acid inflicted wounds as it would assist in healing the wound” and that “after the laser treatment [the applicant] was given an ointment to use on the wound and keep it bandaged with gauze”. The representative submitted that laser treatment “is widely practiced by dermatologists”. These submissions were supported by what the submission described as “the enclosed information from Wikipedia” which the submission stated explains the laser treatment on open wounds, and by a “Persian (Farsi) article of which a relevant section has been translated using Google translation”.[42]

   [41] CB167

   [42] CB168-169

4. Mr Hodges accepted that this letter addressed the concerns the Tribunal expressed about the kind of treatment the applicant claimed he had after his torture. Mr Hodges also accepted that this submission did not address evidence that showed how the applicant’s scarring occurred, and in particular whether it was consistent with acid having caused the scarring. Mr Hodges submitted that the Tribunal failed to alert the applicant that it saw as an issue whether the scar was consistent with the applicant’s claim that the tattoo had been removed by the application of acid and this, in turn, indicates the Tribunal did not consider the scar to be relevant to the assessment of the applicant’s claim.

5. I do not accept that submission. Whether or not the applicant had been tortured in the manner he claimed was always an issue before the Tribunal, given that the delegate did not accept the applicant’s claims that he had been tortured. That necessarily put in issue the question of whether the applicant’s scar was in fact caused by the violent removal of the applicant’s tattoo by means of acid, as the applicant claimed.

6. Ground 2, therefore, fails.

Ground 4 of the amended application

1. Ground 4 of the amended application is as follows:

   The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing [to] provide adequate reasons for its decision.

   PARTICULARS

   a.     In reaching its findings, the tribunal did not address the obvious fact that there was a scar or wound on the applicant’s arm.

   b.     The first tribunal had accepted there this was of a skull and referred to an outline being observed.

   c.      The tribunal herein fell into error in accepting other observations and findings and then failing to explain why it did not accept that there had been a skull tattoo in the first place.

2. In his written submissions the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to consider evidence the applicant advanced about his scars.

3. Ground 4 overlaps with ground 2; and to the extent it does, it fails for the reasons I have found ground 2 fails. Ground 4 also claims, however, that the Tribunal did not accept the applicant did have a skull tattoo in the first place.

4. It is true the Tribunal did not accept the applicant did have a skull tattoo in the first place; that is evident from the Tribunal’s description of the RRT’s observations, namely, their being “visible signs of scarring and faint patterns of ink on one particular “site” on one arm where the applicant allegedly had a tattoo of a scull” (emphasis added).[43] That, however, is an accurate description of the RRT’s observations. The RRT observed “some visible signs of scarring and faint patterns of ink on that site”, but it did not record any observation or conclusion that what had been removed was a skull; the RRT only referred to the applicant’s having given evidence “that he used to have a skull tattoo at the bottom of the tattoo on one arm which has since been removed”.[44] I find it is for this reason that the Tribunal referred to the applicant’s “allegedly” having had a tattoo of a skull.

   [43] CB191, [32]

   [44] CB136, [12]

5. In these circumstances the Tribunal was not bound to accept what the applicant had said to the RRT, namely, that the tattoo that had been removed was a skull tattoo; and the Tribunal made no jurisdictional error to the extent it did not accept that the tattoo that had been removed was a skull. Even if the Tribunal was in some way bound to accept the tattoo that was removed was a skull, the Tribunal’s not having proceeded on the basis that the tattoo that was removed was a skull could not have had a material impact on the Tribunal’s decision, and therefore could not have resulted in the Tribunal making any jurisdictional error.

6. Ground 4, therefore, also fails.

Ground 5 of the amended application

1. Ground 5 of the amended application is as follows (emphasis in original):

   The Tribunal committed jurisdictional [error] by failing to give proper, genuine or realistic consideration to the applicant’s claim that he suffered significant harm after he was detained by the Basij.

   PARTICULARS

   a.At [38], the applicant claimed that, in May 2011, he was detained by the Basij after they saw his tattoos. While he was detained, the applicant was beaten, tortured and blindfolded before acid was poured onto his arm to burn off his skull tattoo.

   b.At [42], the AAT refers to the applicant’s written claims where he stated that he was badly burnt to the extent he could see his bones.

   i.At the hearing, as noted at [93], the applicant claimed that he [had] mistaken his bones for fat tissue (lipid).

   iiThe AAT considered that, on the basis of the applicant’s inconsistent evidence, he was not a credible witness.

   iii.However, the AAT failed to give genuine consideration to the fact that the applicant, who was not a trained medical professional, and was suffering a large amount of pain, could have reached the conclusion that the acid had burnt his skin to the extent that his bone was exposed.

   c.At [43], the AAT noted that the applicant provided inconsistent evidence in relation to the treatment he sought after he suffered acid burns to his arm.

   i. At [93], the AAT considered that the applicant had fabricated his claims since there was a great difference between his earlier claim that he sought treatment by himself and his later claim that he only sought treatment, reluctantly, after his father took him to a dermatologist with a blanket wrapped around his arm.

   iiThe AAT failed to consider that the applicant never expressly claimed to have sought treatment by himself.

2. This ground is directed to two of the matters on which the Tribunal relied in concluding the applicant was not a credible witness. The first of the two matters is the applicant’s having stated up until the hearing before the Tribunal that the burns he sustained were so deep he could see the exposed bone, while the applicant said that he had confused “lipid” (which the Tribunal noted meant “fat tissue”) for bone. The applicant appears to say that the Tribunal failed to consider that the applicant, not being medically trained, and having sustained torture, could reasonably have believed that what he saw was exposed bone rather than lipid. I do not accept that submission. The Tribunal in its reasons records that the applicant said that when he was tortured, and when he saw his arm, he was in pain, in fear, and confused, and thought the acid had burned his arm to the bone, but that “he now realised what he saw was lipid”.[45] In those circumstances, I am not prepared to find the Tribunal did not genuinely consider the applicant’s explanation for initially stating the he thought the acid had burned his arm to the bone.

   [45] CB194, [54]

3. The second matter on which the Tribunal relied in concluding the applicant was not a witness of credit to which ground 5 is directed is the different accounts the applicant had given about the treatment he received after his torture. The ground claims the Tribunal relied on the applicant’s having claimed that he had by himself sought medical attention. The ground claims the applicant had never “expressly claimed” that he had sought assistance by himself. That may be accepted. It was reasonably open, however, to the Tribunal to have interpreted the applicant to have impliedly claimed that he had sought medical assistance by himself. The basis of that implication is that in the Statutory Declaration and before the delegate the applicant referred to his seeking medical attention without mentioning he had sought that attention with any other person, yet before the RRT the applicant mentioned he had sought medical attention by his father covering the applicant with a blanket.

4. Ground 5, therefore, also fails.

Conclusion and disposition

1. The applicant has failed on each of the grounds on which he relies. I propose to order that the application be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

Associate: 

Date:  26 October 2018