IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P42 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
CHZ19
Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KIEFEL CJ
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 14 FEBRUARY 2020, AT 11.31 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.M.G. McINTYRE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MR B.L. NUGAWELA, for the applicant. (instructed by Soul Legal)
MR G.T. JOHNSON, SC: May it please your Honours, I appear with MS S.J. OLIVER for the first respondent. (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr McIntyre.
MR McINTYRE: Your Honours, the point which we say is of public importance has some general application and is apparently arguably at least the subject of a difference of opinion within this Court is the question of whether there may be a shifting onus of proof in relation to the question of materiality.
KIEFEL CJ: Is that by way of conceding – when you say “a shifting onus” – that SZMTA stands somewhat in your way in relation to onus of proof? You have to distinguish it.
MR McINTYRE: What we rely on is the difference between a majority view and a minority view. That is right, your Honour. So we would say that there is something to be – your Honour Justice Edelman in the more recent case of BVD17, in paragraph 67, started that paragraph by saying:
Subject to issues concerning the substantive or evidentiary onus of proof –
and then at footnote [59], the footnote of SZMTA, and referred to what the majority said at paragraph 46, which was:
Where materiality is in issue in an application for judicial review, and except in a case where the decision made was the only decision legally available to be made, the question of the materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof. Like any ordinary question of fact, it is to be determined by inferences drawn from evidence adduced on the application.
His Honour Justice Edelman then also references what Justices Nettle and Gordon said, at paragraphs 92 to 93, saying that:
Making materiality of error a criterion of jurisdictional error should be rejected for two further reasons.
First, it would impose the onus of establishing “materiality” on the applicant. That is reason in itself to reject it . . . Thereafter, it is for the decision‑maker, if seeking to have the court exercise its discretion to refuse to grant ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: Mr McIntyre, you do not seek to reopen SZMTA? As I understand it, you just seek to distinguish it somehow.
MR McINTYRE: Yes. We say that it is distinguishable because in this case we did not know…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 14
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's delegate, in considering the applicant's character, had failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely the applicant's rehabilitation and efforts to address the underlying causes of their offending behaviour. The applicant argued that the delegate's assessment of risk was vitiated by this failure, rendering the decision to refuse the visa unlawful.
Their Honours found that the delegate's reasons for decision did not demonstrate that the applicant's rehabilitation and efforts at addressing the causes of their offending were properly considered. While the delegate acknowledged the applicant's submissions regarding these matters, the reasoning focused predominantly on the seriousness of the past offending and the risk of future offending, without adequately engaging with the evidence of change. The Court reiterated the principle that when a decision-maker is required to consider a particular matter, they must genuinely and properly take it into account, not merely acknowledge its existence. The failure to do so meant the delegate had failed to take into account a relevant consideration.
The High Court made orders quashing the decision of the Minister's delegate to refuse the visa. The matter was remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant's argument before the High Court is that the Federal Court erred in finding that the onus of proving materiality rested with him. He argues that the onus should have shifted to the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, once he had discharged an evidentiary onus of proving materiality. The applicant argues that the Federal Court should have considered the contents of the allegation before it made its decision, but that it did not do so because the applicant did not press for disclosure of the allegation before the AAT. The applicant argues that this was inappropriate because the AAT did not raise public interest immunity as a defence to disclosure, and because the applicant was not provided with the allegation in order to make a public interest immunity argument before the Federal Court. The Minister for Home Affairs argues that the Full Court was correct to find that the onus of proving materiality rested with the applicant, and that the applicant did not discharge this onus. The Minister for Home Affairs argues that the applicant did not press for disclosure of the allegation before the AAT because he did not know what was in the allegation, and because the AAT found that the issue of public interest immunity should be dealt with before the AAT. The Minister for Home Affairs argues that the Full Court was correct to find that the allegation was not material, because the visa application could not have been approved even if the allegation had been disclosed.
The case of CHZ19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor is an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, CHZ19, sought to appeal a judgment concerning a matter of materiality in the context of procedural fairness and the disclosure of an adverse allegation document. The case had its origins in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) where the applicant first raised the issue of procedural fairness due to the non-disclosure of the adverse allegation document. Following the AAT's decision, the applicant appealed to the Federal Court, which found that the non-disclosure constituted a breach of procedural fairness but did not address the issue of materiality in detail. The applicant then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the question of whether the onus of proof should shift in relation to materiality is of public importance. The High Court, however, refused special leave to appeal, indicating that the case did not provide an appropriate vehicle to consider the issues raised. The procedural history involved significant interplay between the AAT and the Federal Court, with the applicant's argument centring on the need for the respondent to prove the non-materiality of the undisclosed document.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is there a shifting onus of proof in relation to the question of materiality in the context of an application for judicial review?
2. Can the materiality of a breach be considered a criterion of jurisdictional error, and if so, does it impose the onus of establishing materiality on the applicant?
3. In cases where the applicant did not press for disclosure of a document due to concerns about public interest immunity, can the applicant still establish the materiality of the breach based on the adverse nature of the allegation alone?
4. Does the court's reasoning in SZMTA provide a sufficient basis to reject the applicant's argument for a shifting onus of proof, and if not, what distinguishes the current case from SZMTA?
5. Can the court consider the issue of shifting onus of proof when the document in question has not been disclosed to the applicant or the court, and the applicant did not press for disclosure before the tribunal?
Held
1. The court refused special leave to appeal, concluding that the application did not provide the appropriate vehicle to consider the issues sought to be ventilated.
2. The court did not address whether there is a shifting onus of proof in relation to the question of materiality, as it found the application did not provide the appropriate vehicle to consider this issue.
3. The court did not address whether the materiality of a breach can be considered a criterion of jurisdictional error or if it imposes the onus of establishing materiality on the applicant.
4. The court did not address whether the adverse nature of the allegation alone can establish the materiality of the breach when the applicant did not press for disclosure due to concerns about public interest immunity.
5. The court did not consider the issue of shifting onus of proof when the document in question had not been disclosed to the applicant or the court, and the applicant did not press for disclosure before the tribunal.
6. The court's reasoning in SZMTA was not addressed as the court found the application did not provide the appropriate vehicle to consider the issues sought to be ventilated.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court's refusal of special leave to appeal in CHZ19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor involved a nuanced discussion on the onus of proof, particularly in relation to the materiality of procedural errors in judicial review applications. The Court engaged with the argument that there could be a shifting onus of proof concerning the materiality of a breach, particularly where the document in question had not been disclosed to either party. The applicant argued that the adverse nature of an allegation alone could suffice to establish materiality, shifting the onus to the respondent to demonstrate that the non-disclosure did not impact the decision.
The court's reasoning began by considering the existing jurisprudence, particularly SZMTA, which had established that the onus of proving materiality lies with the applicant. The applicant in CHZ19 sought to distinguish SZMTA on the basis that the materiality of the breach was not ascertainable due to the non-disclosure of the document. The Court acknowledged that the applicant had not pressed for disclosure due to concerns about public interest immunity, but noted that typically, materiality assessments rely on the content of the undisclosed document.
The court examined whether making materiality a criterion of jurisdictional error should impose the onus of establishing materiality on the applicant. The Court referenced BVD17, where Justice Edelman noted that imposing such an onus on the applicant could be problematic. However, the Court held that the reasoning in SZMTA provided a sufficient basis to reject the applicant's argument for a shifting onus of proof. The Court distinguished CHZ19 from SZMTA on the basis that in SZMTA, the document had been disclosed, allowing for a more comprehensive assessment of materiality.
Furthermore, the Court considered whether it could address the issue of shifting onus of proof when the document in question had not been disclosed. The Court noted that the absence of the document precluded a full assessment of materiality, but emphasized that the onus of proving materiality remained with the applicant. The Court reasoned that the applicant had not discharged even an evidentiary onus of materiality because they had not seen the document and could not assess its contents.
In conclusion, the High Court's decision in CHZ19 underscores the importance of the content of undisclosed documents in determining materiality. The Court refused to shift the onus of proof to the respondent, adhering to the principle established in SZMTA that the applicant bears the onus of proving materiality. The Court distinguished CHZ19 by highlighting the critical role of the undisclosed document in evaluating materiality, and it declined to consider shifting the onus in the absence of such evidence. The ratio decidendi is that in judicial review applications, the onus of proving materiality remains with the applicant, and this cannot be shifted merely based on the adverse nature of an allegation without the disclosure of the relevant document.