Churchill and Churchill

[2014] FamCA 340

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CHURCHILL & CHURCHILL [2014] FamCA 340

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – SPOUSE MAINTENANCE – Interim lump sum maintenance and property settlement to satisfy tax liability and litigation funding

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2) and 79

Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466

APPLICANT: Ms Churchill

RESPONDENT: Mr Churchill

FILE NUMBER: BRC 6562 of 2010

DATE DELIVERED: 28 May 2014

PLACE DELIVERED: Hobart

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Benjamin J

HEARING DATE: 12 May 2014

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Minnery

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Anthony Black Family Law Services

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Respondent husband in person

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Orders

1. By way of spouse maintenance, Mr Churchill (“the husband”) pay to Ms Churchill (“the wife”) $2,600 per month, the first payment being on 1 June 2014.

2. By way of interim property order, the husband pay to the wife the sum of $317,296.79 within fourteen (14) days from the date of this order and that the wife forthwith apply such sum as follows:-

   (a)as to $125,545.34 to the Australian Taxation Office against the wife’s liability for tax payable for the financial year ended 30 June 2012; and

   (b)the sum of $191,751.45 being the amount assessed as payable to the Australian Taxation Office for tax payable by the wife for the financial year ended 30 June 2013.

3. By way of interim property order the husband pay to the Trust Account of the solicitors for the wife the sum of $50,000 within thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

IT IS CERTIFIED

1. Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Churchill v Churchill has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT HOBART

FILE NUMBER: BRC 6562 of 2010

Ms Churchill

Applicant

And

Mr Churchill

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. On 10 March 2014 Ms Churchill (“the wife”) made an application for spousal maintenance and interim property orders against Mr Churchill (“the husband”).

2. On 5 May 2014 the husband filed a response to an application in a case opposing the orders sought by the wife and seeking other orders.

3. The proceedings had been listed for an interim/interlocutory hearing before a Judge of the Family Court the following week on Monday 12 May 2014.

4. The wife sought interim property orders to pay her tax liability of $318,296.79 plus a further amount of $100,000 to fund her legal costs in these proceedings.

5. In addition she sought periodic spousal maintenance of about $1,300 per week and an order that the husband fund any of her ongoing tax liabilities. 

6. The orders sought by the wife were opposed by the husband.  The husband sought a variety of orders, some of which were unclear.  The interim or interlocutory orders sought by him related to:-

   (a)directions that the parties employ independent accountants;

   (b)the wife lodging her 2011, 2012, 2013 income tax returns and meet the cost of that task;

   (c)superannuation, the nature of which was unclear and the powers to make that order were also unclear;

   (d)the wife authorising the release of money held in the C Trust to fund the parties litigation in relation to proceedings in the Supreme Court with Mr B (“the B litigation”);

   (e)the wife being restrained from withdrawing funds from the assets of either party or their corporate or trustee alter egos; and

   (f)the husband having permission to pay his tax bill out of the C Trust Term Deposit.

7. In terms of the husband’s application and response it was served late and there was inadequate evidence upon which it could be determined.  Accordingly, that application in reply has been stood over for interim hearing before me on Monday 23 June 2014 at Brisbane.

8. These reasons address the issues of spouse maintenance, interim property orders for tax and interim property orders for litigation funding sought by the wife.

Background

1. At the date of hearing the husband was aged 67 and is a professional by occupation.  The husband runs his professional business, a livestock business and juggles the financial demands including proceedings in this Court and the B litigation being conducted in the Supreme Court of Queensland.  He sets out his health difficulties in his affidavit.[1]  He provided some objective evidence in relation to his assertions of depression and anxiety being that contained in a report of Dr P dated 14 April 2014.[2]

   [1] At paragraphs 244 to 255 of the husband affidavit filed 5 May 2014.

   [2] Ibid at Annexure JC08.

2. The wife is aged 62.  She is qualified and licenced to work as a healthcare worker in field Q and field R, but is presently unemployed.  The wife asserted that she is in poor health, the detail of which I will deal with later in these reasons.

3. The parties married in 1978 and there are two children of their marriage who are now adults.  Ms D aged 30 and Mr A aged 26.  Ms D lives in London and Mr A resides in New York.  Since separation the wife has visited them about once a year and taken side trips with them whilst overseas.  The wife was subjected to criticism by the husband for undertaking such travel.

4. The wife asserted separation occurred in March 2010.  The husband says it was June/July 2009.  For the purpose of these applications this discrepancy makes little difference.  The parties lived in Darwin until March 2010 when the wife moved to South East Queensland and has established a home in that area. 

5. Proceedings between the parties commenced in July 2010.  These proceedings have not come to an end as a consequence of the B litigation.

6. As to the B litigation, the husband deposes that Mr B was an accountant who provided assistance or advice to the husband and two of his business alter egos in circumstances where the husband asserted that there was a claim of non-performance of contract and breach of fiduciary duty which led to litigation.

7. The husband, E Pty Limited and F Pty Limited (“the Companies”) commenced civil proceedings against Mr B in the Supreme Court of Queensland.  Mr B counter-sued the husband, the Companies and joined the wife to the proceedings.  Judgment was delivered on the substantive proceedings in September 2013 whereby Mr B was ordered to pay $2,086,700 to the husband and there was a verdict in favour of Mr B for $1,500,000.  There have been orders for interest.  Costs are yet to be determined and an appeal has been filed for the husband and a cross appeal has been filed by Mr B.

8. The husband, the Companies and the wife employed J Law Firm to act for them in the B proceedings and they have been paid about $1.8 million dollars in legal costs and disbursements.  Significant further costs are anticipated in terms of the costs applications, the appeals and cross-appeals.

9. The result for the parties is a verdict of $500,000, if it stands, plus interest and perhaps a costs order for or against them. 

10. The husband operates G Practice and has done so for many years.  He has operated under some complex commercial arrangements, trusts and companies; he also operates a livestock business.  There are considerable issues as to the extent and value of the property of each of the parties.

11. The wife says she has the following property:-

Home, I Street, Suburb H	$900,000
Shares	$100,000
Motor vehicle (approx.)	$100,000
Jewellery and household contents (approx.)	$42,000
Money in the bank (approx.)	$30,000

1. She says she has total assets of about $1,172,000.

2. The husband asserts that the wife has an additional sum of $700,000 being his view that the wife’s property has a value of $1,400,000 making it worth some $500,000 more than the wife.

3. The husband also claims that the wife received about $250,000 from a New Zealand solicitor.  In relation to the New Zealand money, the husband set out in his affidavit[3] that the wife had been queried by the Australian Taxation Office about money allegedly paid to her from K Law Firm of about $55,000 in December 2010 and about $197,000 in April 2011.  As to that alleged property, the wife deposed in her affidavit filed 8 May 2014 and confirmed in oral evidence that she had not received any such funds nor did she have any knowledge of such funds.  There is no evidence of the existence of that property apart from the assertion by the husband.

   [3] Ibid at paragraph 109.

4. As to the other property, the wife says that it falls into a number of areas:-

   ·Jointly owned property at L Street, Darwin with a value of $590,000 (the husband asserts the value of this is some $40,000 less). 

   ·The husband’s non-real estate property such as tractors, bull dozers, M collectables, household contents and the like which the wife asserts has a value of about $310,000).  The husband asserts they have a value of about $45,000).

   ·The value of G Practice has not been determined.  

   ·The parties own a property through F Pty Limited, Property N which the wife values at slightly more than $1 million dollars and the husband values at $950,000.

   ·The parties owe Mr B $1.5 million dollars pursuant to the Supreme Court proceedings. 

   ·E Pty Limited owns real estate which the wife values at $800,000 and the husband $400,000.

   ·The parties have an interest in G Practice Super Fund which the wife says has assets totalling about $1.28 million dollars.  The husband says that the value of the assets of the superannuation fund is $600,050.

   ·The parties control C Trust and the wife says that this has net assets totalling about $790,000.  It is from this fund where the wife says that the husband is able to pay funds to her.  The husband says the value of this asset is some $750,000.  This could be used as a source for the funds for interim property orders.

   ·The parties have a judgment against Mr B in the B litigation in the sum of about $2,000,000.  However, it is subject to an appeal.

   ·The wife asserts there are some add-backs which are challenged by the husband.

   ·Payments from the trust were made to J Law Firm and other payments to the wife (referred to later) were apparently treated as distributions.  It is possible that as a consequence the wife had incurred tax debts of about $311,000.

5. Any statement of fact in these proceedings is to be regarded as a finding of fact unless the contrary is clear from the context.

The Evidence

The wife

1. The wife relied upon the following:-

   (a)her affidavits filed 10 March 2014 and 6 May 2014:

   (b)affidavits of her solicitor filed 10 March 2014 and 9 May 2014;

   (c)her statement of financial circumstances filed 16 July 2010 (no significant reference was made to this in submissions); and

   (d)her application in a case filed 10 March 2014 and amended application filed 7 May 2014.

2. The wife tendered in evidence the following:-

   (a)W1 – email to husband 8/5/2014 serving amended application.

   (b)W2 – letter from accountants O Accountants showing her liability to the tax office for the 2012 financial year at $125,545.34.

   (c)W3 – letter from O Accountants showing the wife’s income tax liability for the 2013 financial year at $191,751.45.

   (d)W4 – the financial report of C Trust Pty Ltd for the financial year ended 30 June 2013.

   (e)W5 – a notice of PAYG instalments regarding income tax dated 15 March 2014.

3. The husband relied upon the following:-

   (a)his response to an application in a case filed 5 May 201; and

   (b)his affidavit filed 5 May 2014.

4. In terms of the husband’s affidavit, I treat the material contained in paragraphs 142 to 163 of his affidavit filed 5 May 2014 as submission rather than evidence and not as expert evidence.  The material contained in those paragraphs was given no evidentiary weight.

5. Each of the parties made oral submissions and provided written submissions.  The wife’s by a document marked Exhibit W6 and the husband by document marked Exhibit H1.

6. The wife was cross-examined on her affidavit material by the husband.

7. The husband was self-represented and the wife was represented by counsel and instructing solicitors.

Spousal Maintenance

1. The wife seeks periodic spouse maintenance in terms of items 1 and 1(a) of her amended application in a case filed 7 May 2014.  She seeks $1,344 per week plus payment of her home and mobile telephone bill as and when they fall due or alternatively the sum of $1,150 per week and payment of her accounting expenses with O Accountants as and when they fall due and PAYG tax as and when it falls due.

2. The alternative is supported by, inter alia, a notice dated 15 March 2014 to the wife assessing her PAYG tax instalments.[4]

   [4] Exhibit W5.

3. The wife’s application is pursuant to s 72(1) of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The wife claims that her age and physical capacity are such that she is unable to obtain gainful employment and that the husband is reasonably able to meet the needs of the wife.

4. The evidence of the husband is that he has been providing support for the wife since July 2009.  He does not concede that these were ‘spousal maintenance payments’ but prefers to refer to them as ‘co-operation payments’.  The husband says that in that period of about five years he has paid a total sum of $257,337 to the wife which equates to about $1,000 per month.  Given this evidence, I am satisfied that the husband has shown a demonstrated ability over that period of time to pay that amount albeit at different rates from time to time.

5. As to the husband’s income, the wife sets out her views as to his capacity to pay in her affidavit.[5]  She observes that the husband is a qualified professional and is self-employed in that capacity.  She said he has not disclosed his tax returns for the last two financial years.  In 2011 he earned a taxable income of about $150,000.  In addition she says he operates a livestock business as a sole trader.

   [5] At paragraphs 125 to 141 filed 10 March 2014.

6. The husband complains that he has health difficulties (I referred to this earlier) and that he needed to borrow money to fund the litigation.  He sets out details of his finances in his affidavit.[6]  He says this is due to the severe impact of the B litigation. The husband has no doubt committed significant resources to the B litigation.  However, I accept the submissions made on behalf of the wife that the husband has significant earnings and the husband has not filed a financial statement setting out his current financial circumstances. 

   [6] Ibid at paragraph 256 to 263.

7. I am satisfied in all of the circumstances that the husband has the financial capacity, given the history of his business and the substantial assets that the parties have accumulated and the husband’s capacity to pay ‘co-operation payments’ for a long period of time.

8. The next question is what are the reasonable needs of the wife.

9. I have set out earlier the wife’s age and concerns about her health.  The wife’s state of health was the subject of submissions by both the husband and the wife.

10. The wife complained that she had vision difficulties and provided a statement by her optometrist.[7]  The wife had two episodes where her vision was ‘blurred in the centre of vision of right eye’.  The evidence produced by the wife was that it was linked to stressful situations.  The wife’s evidence was that the first episode was relatively short and the second episode was longer and was related to stress issues.  The wife has not seen an ophthalmic surgeon nor did she adduce evidence of other medical treatment apart from seeing an optometrist.  I am satisfied that illness has resolved itself and does not prevent the wife from working, at least part time.

    [7] At annexure SC11 of wife’s affidavit sworn 4 March 2014.

11. The wife claims she has suffered from osteoporosis.  There was a debate between the husband and the wife as to whether it was osteoporosis or close to osteoporosis.  In any event the wife had problems which makes it difficult for her to lift heavy objects and difficult for her to stand for long periods.

12. The wife also claimed that she suffered from osteoarthritis which added to those work difficulties.  She provided some medical evidence in that respect. The wife worked for two months in Darwin before she moved to Brisbane in 2010.  She worked for ten months in South East Queensland from October 2011 until August 2012.  She was earning between $1,000 and $1,300 per fortnight on casual rates.

13. The wife sets out the difficulties she had with that work.  The wife does not assert that she left work on the recommendation of a doctor.  She has not been in paid employment since August 2012.  Since that time the wife has been assisted by the provision of orthotics and attending a gym on a regular occasion.

14. The wife is qualified as a healthcare worker in field R and maintains her registration together with her union affiliation.  The wife’s training as a healthcare worker in field R was completed in 2009.  The wife is also qualified as a healthcare worker in field Q and retains her skills in that regard.  

15. I accept that the wife has difficulty working full time given her age and her health difficulties.  However, I do not accept that she is unable to work part time and I find that she is able to work part time and earn up to $550 per week gross.

Reasonable needs of the wife

1. The wife had filed a financial statement on 16 July 2010 and says her circumstances have changed since that time although she estimated her weekly expenses to be about $1,387.  She says that estimate was based upon the husband paying council rates, water rates, electricity bills, phone bills which he ceased paying in September 2013.

2. The wife included in her expenses her gym membership to which the husband objected.  Given the wife’s evidence of her health and in particular her osteoarthritis, I am satisfied that that is, in all of the circumstances, necessary for her.

3. The parties’ two children live overseas and the wife asserted that she spends about $171 per week for overseas travel to visit her children.  From time to time she goes on side trips with them when overseas.  Given the assets of the parties and the lifestyle which they have led, that expense seems, in all of the circumstances, reasonable.

4. The wife provides cash support to her children.[8]  Those are not reasonable expenses.

   [8] At paragraph 106 of the wife’s affidavit filed 10 March 2014.

5. I am satisfied that the wife’s reasonable expenses are as set out in her affidavit[9] in the total sum of $1,149 per week.

   [9] Ibid at paragraph 107.

6. The wife claims $100 per week fuel for her car.  The husband objected to that, providing a convoluted calculation.  In all of the circumstances and given her need to visit her father, that expense does not, in the circumstance of these parties, seem unreasonable.

7. The wife has property totalling at least slightly over $1 million dollars on her figures and larger on the husband’s figures.  Most of this is taken up in the value of the home in which she lives.  I am satisfied that she has a capacity to work part time as a healthcare worker in field R and I am satisfied that she earns an income from her shares of about $5,000 per year ($100 per week).

8. The wife does not have the care of or to provide support for another apart from herself.  There was no evidence as to her eligibility for her pension or allowance.

9. The parties lived a good standard of living in Darwin and had accumulated significant assets and lived a relatively affluent lifestyle.  The standard of living which the wife seeks is, in many ways, similar to that of the husband albeit the wife seeks to travel overseas to see the parties’ children from time to time.

1. I am satisfied that the wife’s reasonable expenses are as set out in her affidavit[10] in the total sum of $1,149 per week.  I am satisfied she has a capacity to earn $450 per week net of tax given her training and expertise and notwithstanding her health.

   [10] Ibid.

2. I have considered the other relevant factors under s 75(2) of the Act and I determine, in all of the circumstances, that the husband should pay to the wife spousal maintenance at the rate of $600 per week. In making the order, I will calculate on a calendar month basis rather than a weekly basis. The sum of $600 per week amounts to $31,200 per year, which in turn is $2,600 per month.

Interim Property

1. The power to make interim property orders was considered in Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466. It seems that there are two stages to an application pursuant to that power.

2. Firstly, the Court should be satisfied that it should exercise its discretion to entertain the application.  Given the material provided to me and the maters set out below, in this case, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to consider the exercise of its power to make an interim property order.

3. The second step is to consider briefly, the relevant matters required under s 79 of the Act in terms of determining the order to be made. I have done so, as set out below, I have considered the division of the property in the context of the long marriage of the parties and as best I can, given the limited evidence on the value and extent of property in that consideration.

4. In terms of the property the wife argued that there was a pool of property of about $6,700,000.  That is on the wife’s evidence and that is significantly disputed by the husband as I indicated earlier.  There is no evidence as to the value of the husband’s professional practice or his livestock business.

5. There is no issue that the husband, at present, submitted that the wife should receive 50 per cent of the assets although in his argument he seemed to be suggesting that his contributions (at least over recent years) were greater than those of the wife.

6. Given that the parties have ‘caught the tail of the tiger’ in the B litigation and significant parts of the costing in that respect have been paid by the husband, it is not clear that the pool of assets will be as large as is anticipated by the wife and given the effect on the husband in terms of health, whether he will be able to continue working his professional practice.

7. The wife seeks interim property orders in two areas. 

8. The first issue relates to the income tax she is liable to pay for the financial year ended June 2012 of $125,545.34[11] and the second is for $191,751.45[12] for the financial year ended June 2013 making a total of $317,296.79 (“the tax liabilities”).  These are large sums and apart from selling the home in which she lives the wife has no capacity to pay these amounts.

   [11] Exhibit W2.

   [12] Exhibit W3.

9. In addition the wife seeks an order that the husband pay any PAYG payable by the wife assessed as payable by the Australian Taxation Office as and when such payments fall due.

10. In terms of the wife’s tax liabilities the wife sets out in her affidavit the tax issues from paragraph 109 to 120.  In addition Exhibit W 1 updates the 2012 tax amount and Exhibit W3 updates the 2013 tax.  I accept the amounts are payable.

11. The failure by the parties to work constructively meant that the income of the trust for the year ending 30 June 2012 was $491,033.00.[13].  It is not clear on the evidence whether that tax liability arose out of income from the professional practice or the distributions to fund the litigation or payments of the ‘co-operation payments’ by the husband.

    [13] Annexure SC16 to affidavit of wife filed March 2014.

12. The husband asserted in his affidavit that in 2011 the wife withdrew the sum of $50,500 and the husband gave her about $135,000 in February 2012.  These appear not to be challenged but an explanation was provided as to the expenditure of those funds.

13. From the evidence before the Court it is clear that tax needs to be paid and there are funds available for the husband to pay that tax liability through the C Trust.

14. As I said earlier the wife has limited resources to fund that tax debt herself and it may be (although it is not clear) that part of the tax arises on funds paid by the Trust for the B litigation but paid by the husband through the Trust as income or distribution in the name of the wife.

15. Given the funds presently contained in the C Trust, I am satisfied that the husband has resources available to him to meet an interim property order to enable payment of the wife’s tax liabilities as set out above.   

16. The parties have substantial assets, which are to be measured in millions of dollars.  They were married for many years and it is likely that the wife will be entitled to a substantial amount of money once values of the businesses and all of the assets of the parties and their alter egos are established.

17. Further and if, on the other hand, the husband is correct in his assertion as to the limited value of the assets in his name and those of the wife, and I am wrong in this assessment then the wife is well able to make a contribution back to the husband on the sale of her present home.

18. Having regard to the limited evidence of the substantial assets combined with the availability of finance, I find that there is every probability that the wife would receive at least half a million dollars and possibly much more.  As such I am satisfied that I ought to make an order that the sum of $317,296.79 be paid to the wife and that the wife should be required to forward the whole of those funds to the Australian Taxation Office in payment of the liabilities for the 2012 and 2013 tax.

19. Further within the Trust there are funds available to meet this tax debt and the husband, with the consent of the wife, would be able to access the funds and make a direct payment to the Australian Taxation Office.  The husband asserted that these funds are necessary to pursue the B litigation, whether that is wise or not is a matter for the parties, but the costs of pursuing that litigation are expenses yet to be incurred and the tax liabilities presently exist.

20. The second issue is that the wife seeks the sum of $100,000 to fund her family law litigation expenses; such payment is sought by way of interim property settlement.

21. The evidence in terms of the quantum of the costs is contained in the affidavits of the wife’s solicitor, Ms Barbour, filed 10 March 2014 and 9 May 2014. At present the wife’s solicitors hold about $13,000 in their trust account and this will be reduced to $4,500 when the early May bill is paid.  Ms Barbour provided an estimate of the costs to mediation as at March 2014 being between $61,600 and $98,000.  In addition there will be a need to obtain joint valuations.

22. The joint valuations would be dealt with under the Rules of Court and when the amount of those valuations and the details of those valuations are available, it is open, at that stage for further application to be made in the light of those costs.

23. The wife has some resources of her own to fund that litigation.  Not the least of which are shareholdings of some $100,000.00 and an expensive motor car which she values at $100,000.00.

24. I am troubled by the evidence of Ms Barbour that the cost of junior counsel for running, a then considered, one day interim hearing was between $20,000 and $30,000.  It seems entirely out of proportion with the amounts involved.

25. It appears that the costs of the wife are running at a very high level.  Those costs between March 2014 and May 2014 amounted to the sum of about $9,000.  Each of the parties is engaged in expensive and adversarial litigation as between themselves.

26. In addition they are caught in the B litigation which appears to be ongoing and appears to be even more expensive.

27. It is staggering that these parties (without making any finding as to who is driving the litigation or whose fault it may or may not be) would spend $1.8 million dollars of their funds to chase a verdict of $2 million dollars and then be left with a net amount, if that remains in place, of about $500,000.

28. In addition the wife was content to spend $100,000 on a car, notwithstanding the litigation that existed between her and the husband, notwithstanding the B litigation.  She spent about $7,000 on medical procedures in 2013, the detail of which she would not provide to me except to say it was elective surgery.  To fund that and her lifestyle the wife removed funds from the superannuation fund which was the subject of criticism of her by the husband.

29. These parties should pause and take breath; litigation is decimating their wealth and if they continue to expend costs as they have done up date, their material efforts of a lifetime may well be lost.  Clearly they need to start talking to each other and engaging in meaningful negotiations and mediation. 

30. I will not be ordering the full sum sought by the wife given the propensity of the parties to expend significant amounts of their monies on litigation and funding that may be available to the wife through the sale of shares or her car.

31. Given the facts before me, I will be making an order for a payment by way of interim property order that the husband pay to the wife the sum of $50,000 in that respect.

Application to pay PAYG tax payable by the wife, if any, assessed and payable to the Australian Taxation Office as and when such tax payments full due

1. In support of that application the wife relied upon her affidavits and Exhibit W5 where her notional tax was assessed at $134,683.

2. There was not sufficient information from the affidavits or from the documents from the Court to make an assessment as to the wife’s liabilities in relation to this tax and how it could be calculated.

3. From the evidence of the husband it seems that a similar liability may vest in him.  Given the amount of money in C Trust Pty Ltd and the other competing claims on that fund in terms of that subject to the husband’s claim in his 5 May 2014 response and the ongoing B litigation, I am not satisfied that an open ended order such as sought by the wife in the current circumstances is warranted.  Accordingly no order will be made in that respect.

4. I therefore make the orders as are identified at the commencement of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding ninety two (92) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Benjamin delivered on 28 May 2014.

Associate:     

Date:   28 May 2014