Chukwuma v Attorney General of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chukwuma v Attorney General of Australia [2022] FCA 948  

Review of: Decision of the Attorney General of Australia made on 10 August 2021
File number: SAD 206 of 2021
Judgment of: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 16 August 2022
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of decision by delegate of the Attorney-General to refuse the applicant’s release on parole – where applicant to be deported upon release – whether reference to “the community” in ss 19AKA and 19ALA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) are only to the “Australian community” – whether delegate took into account an irrelevant consideration by considering the applicant’s risk to a foreign community or made an illogical finding by considering the applicant’s risk to the Australian community – delegate of the Attorney-General did not err – application dismissed
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AB

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e), 5(1)(h), 5(2)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3A, 16(1), 16A, 19AB, 19AF, 19AK, 19AKA, 19AL, 19ALA, 19AMA, 19AN, 19AU, 52

Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 2A(1)(a), 135(1)

Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth) s 307.5(1)

Crimes LegislationAmendment (Powers, Offences and Other Measures) Act 2015 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14, 189(1), 196(1), 198(1)

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Powell (2017) 251 FCR 470

Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte (2017) 341 ALR 179

Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76

Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520

Johnson v The Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 616

Liophar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF (2020) 276 FCR 415

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623

Pulini v Assistant Minister to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1543

South Australia v O'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378

Whiteoak v State Parole Authority and the Attorney-General of NSW [2020] NSWSC 185

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings
Number of paragraphs: 89
Date of last submissions: 31 March 2022 (Applicant)
6 April 2022 (Respondent)
Date of hearing: 10 March 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr E Belperio
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sykes Bidstrup
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Glover
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SAD 206 of 2021
BETWEEN:

JOSEPH CHUKWUMA

Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. The applicant is serving a sentence of imprisonment of about 10½ years, with a non-parole period of 6½ years,…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 948
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chukwuma v Attorney General of Australia involved a prisoner, Chukwuma, who applied for judicial review of a decision by a delegate of the Attorney-General to refuse his release on parole. Chukwuma was sentenced to imprisonment for drug-related offences and was due for release in 2021. The dispute arose because Chukwuma was to be deported upon release, and he contested the delegate's decision that his release would pose an unacceptable risk to the community. The court was tasked with determining whether the delegate's consideration of risks to a foreign community was lawful and whether the delegate's finding about the risk to the Australian community was logical and supported by evidence.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the delegate of the Attorney-General took into account an irrelevant consideration by assessing the risk to a foreign community, and whether the delegate made an illogical finding by considering the risk to the Australian community when it was unlikely that Chukwuma would return to Australia. The applicant argued that the references to "the community" in sections 19AKA and 19ALA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) were limited to the Australian community, and that the delegate should not have considered the risk to a foreign community or made an illogical finding about the risk to the Australian community. The court had to determine if these arguments had merit and whether they provided a basis for the application to succeed.

The court found that the delegate did not err in making the decision. The court reasoned that the delegate's consideration of the risk to the Australian community was logical given the statutory requirements and the likelihood that Chukwuma would be removed from Australia. The court held that the delegate could reasonably consider the risk to the Australian community, as it was not definitively established that Chukwuma would not return to Australia upon release. Furthermore, the court concluded that any consideration of the risk to a foreign community was not irrelevant, as the delegate was entitled to consider all factors that might contribute to the overall risk assessment. The application was dismissed on the basis that the delegate's decision was not flawed.

The final orders of the court were that the application was dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding. This outcome affirmed the delegate's authority in making parole decisions and upheld the statutory framework governing such decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is necessary to examine the factual background and the statutory scheme for parole in order to give context to the applicant’s grounds of review.Factual background On 14 October 2016, the applicant was sentenced in the District Court of South Australia to a term of 10 years, 6 months and 8 days’ imprisonment, commencing on 17 February 2015, for an offence of unlawfully attempting to possess a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug, namely methamphetamine, contrary to s 307.5(1) of the Criminal CodeAct 1995 (Cth). The District Court imposed a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months, expiring on 16 August 2021. The applicant’s head sentence will expire on 24 August 2025. The applicant was involved in a scheme arranged by Nigerian principals for the importation of methamphetamine from China. The applicant’s role was to arrange the transportation of the methamphetamine from Sydney to Adelaide and then collect it in Adelaide. At the time of his sentencing, the applicant was on parole for similar offending. On 16 July 2021, an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department wrote to the applicant informing him that he would be considered for parole. The letter set out a number of matters militating against the applicant’s release on parole and invited him to comment. The letter stated, amongst other things: Without further information about your plans if you are released into immigration detention or the community in Liberia (sic), the decision-maker may consider that you currently lack adequate post-release plans and that your release on parole at this time therefore poses an unacceptable risk to the community. The applicant responded in an undated letter. The applicant stated, relevantly: After being assessed for my IDP (Individual Development Plan) by Sentence Management Unit, I was deemed not suitable for any custodial based course or program. I have repeatedly asked my Case Management Co-ordinator during my case reviews, and point to point contact, for participation in core programs and tertiary education. I rely on the department, as a vulnerable person, to facilitate these courses, I cannot, and am not allowed to facilitate these courses for myself. I am completely reliant upon the department.As you know, I am currently at a medium security prison (Mobilong Prison), and the normal progression to low security institutions are Cadell Training Centre, Adelaide Pre-release Centre and home detention. Normally I would be eligible to progression. But because my visa cancellation and potential deportation, I was not allowed to progress. Now I await my deportation outcome.After speaking with Scott (ID PRSJAF) from Australia Border Force. I have carefully reconsidered my position and I confirm that I accept my visa cancellation. I am a citizen of Nigeria and I hold a current and valid Nigerian passport. I have applied for my deportation to go back to my home county (Nigeria). My whole family live in Nigeria. We have businesses there. This is where all my support networks are located. My support networks, family and friends will help assist me, both in, the risk of reoffending and reintegrating back into society.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 19ALA sets out a non-exhaustive list of matters that may be considered when considering making a parole order:19ALA Matters that may be considered in decisions about parole orders(1)In making a decision under section 19AL in relation to a person, the Attorney General may have regard to any of the following matters that are known to the Attorney General and relevant to the decision:(a)the risk to the community of releasing the person on parole;(b)the person’s conduct while serving his or her sentence;(c)whether the person has satisfactorily completed programs ordered by a court or recommended by the relevant State or Territory corrective services or parole agency;(d)the likely effect on the victim, or victim’s family, of releasing the person on parole;(e)the nature and circumstances of the offence to which the person’s sentence relates;(f)any comments made by the sentencing court;(g)the person’s criminal history;(h)any report or information in relation to the granting of parole that has been provided by the relevant State or Territory corrective services or parole agency;(i)the behaviour of the person when subject to any previous parole order or licence;(j)the likelihood that the person will comply with the conditions of the parole order;(k)whether releasing the person on parole is likely to assist the person to adjust to lawful community life;(l)whether the length of the parole period is sufficient to achieve the purposes of parole;(m)any special circumstances, including the likelihood that the person will be subject to removal or deportation upon release.(2)Subsection (1) does not limit the matters that the Attorney General may consider in making a decision under section 19AL. Section 19AMA provides, relevantly, that a person’s parole period starts when the person is released from prison on parole, and ends at the last day of any federal sentence being served. Section 19AN provides that:A parole order:(a)is subject to the condition that the offender must, during the parole period, be of good behaviour and not violate any law; and(b)if the parole order specifies in accordance with subsection 19AL(3) that the person is to be released subject to supervision—is subject to the condition that the offender must, during the supervision period, be subject to the supervision of a parole officer or other person specified in the order and obey all reasonable directions of that officer or other person; and(c)is subject to such other conditions (if any) as the Attorney General specifies in the order. Section 19AU(1) allows the Attorney-General to revoke a parole order before the end of the parole period if the offender has failed to comply with a condition of the order, or there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person has failed to comply.Consideration The applicant’s first ground asserts that the Attorney-General’s delegate erred in finding that the applicant, “posed an unacceptable risk to the community in circumstances where the evidence before the decision maker disclosed that the applicant would not return to the Australian community”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 19AU(1) allows the Attorney-General to revoke a parole order before the end of the parole period if the offender has failed to comply with a condition of the order, or there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person has failed to comply.Consideration The applicant’s first ground asserts that the Attorney-General’s delegate erred in finding that the applicant, “posed an unacceptable risk to the community in circumstances where the evidence before the decision maker disclosed that the applicant would not return to the Australian community”. The applicant relies on the grounds of review in ss 5(1)(e) and 5(1)(h) of the ADJR Act. The ground under s 5(1)(e) is improper exercise of power, which, under s 5(2), includes taking an irrelevant consideration into account, and exercising a power in a way that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power. The ground under s 5(1)(h) is that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. Section 5(1)(h) must be read with s 5(3), which provides that the ground is not made out unless, relevantly, there was no evidence or other material from which the decision maker could reasonably be satisfied that the relevant matter was established. The delegate stated in her reasons:You lack sufficient post-release plans if you are released into immigration detention or deported to Nigeria. You have not identified any plans on how you can further your rehabilitation and improve your prospects of reintegration and you have not provided information about why you do not pose a risk to the safety of the community. You have not provided adequate information about your plans if you are released into immigration detention or if you are deported. I am concerned that your release at this time therefore poses an unacceptable risk to the community. The applicant submits that the references in ss 19AKA and 19ALA of the Crimes Act to “the community” are to the Australian community, and that when making a decision under s 19AL(1), the Attorney-General can only consider the risk to the Australian community. The applicant submits that if the delegate’s finding was that he would pose a risk to the Nigerian community if released on parole, that was an irrelevant consideration. The applicant submits, in the alternative, that if the delegate’s finding was that he would pose a risk to the Australian community, that finding was illogical, unreasonable and made without evidence, in circumstances where he will never enter the Australian community. In his response to the Department’s letter of 16 July 2021, the applicant made it clear that his visa had been cancelled and that he had requested his removal to Nigeria. As the applicant does not hold a visa that is in force, he is an “unlawful non-citizen” within s 14 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Sections 189(1) and 196(1) of the Migration Act require that the applicant, as an unlawful non-citizen, be held in immigration detention after his release from prison, until, pursuant to s 198(1), he is removed from Australia. The Attorney-General must be taken to have correctly understood the law: compare CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [6] (Keifel CJ and Gageler J). Accordingly, the delegate must have understood that it was highly unlikely that the applicant would enter the general Australian community upon his release on parole.