Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Annette Treverrow

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APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
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STATUS: Confirmed by Appeal: Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Treverrow [2004] NSWCA 344, (2006) 5 DDCR 1

CITATION: Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Annette Treverrow
[2003] NSW WCC PD 17
APPELLANT: Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT: Annette Treverrow
INSURER: NRMA Workers Compensation (NSW) Pty Ltd
FILE NO: WCC2411-2002
DATE OF DECISION: 20 June, 2003
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President, Gary Byron
DECISION UNDER APPEAL: Decision by Arbitrator that the Respondent employer pay to the Applicant worker, compensation by way of weekly payments.  Injury arising out of or in the course of employment; whether employment is a substantial contributing factor; error of law; failure to provide reasons; determination of weekly wage rate; incapacity not continuing; determination of expenses not made pursuant to s 60 WCA.
DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL: 22 January, 2003
HEARING: 16 April, 2003
REPRESENTATION: Appellant:  Mr. M. Adamo, instructed by Turks Legal
Respondent: Mr. B. Batchelor, instructed by Bale Boshev Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

The decision by the Arbitrator as to total and partial incapacity for work is revoked and the following decision is substituted:

The Appellant is to pay to the Respondent Worker, weekly compensation at the rates to be determined according to law, for a period of total incapacity from 11 October, 2001 to 11 February, 2002, and thereafter, for periods of total or partial incapacity on presentation of appropriate medical certificates, up to 15 October, 2002.

The purported decision of the Arbitrator concerning the calculation and determination of the amounts of compensation payable to the Respondent Worker is not a valid decision and the matter is referred to the Registrar for return to the Arbitrator, for a decision to be made by her, according to law.

No order is made as to costs.

THE APPEAL

  1. On 19 February, 2003, Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd, the Respondent in the proceedings before the Arbitrator, (“the Appellant”), lodged an appeal with the Workers Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) against a decision of the Arbitrator, dated 22 January, 2003. The Arbitrator had decided that the Appellant should pay compensation to the Applicant (“the Respondent Worker”), pursuant to section 36 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”) at the rate of $495.80 per week from 11 October, 2001 to 23 March, 2002 and thereafter at the statutory rate as prescribed under the the 1987 Act, on presentation of appropriate medical certificates.

  2. The issues in dispute before the Arbitrator were summarised by the Arbitrator, at paragraph 6 of her decision, as follows:

    ·Did the Applicant receive an injury arising out of or in the course of her employment? (WCA s 9)

    ·Was the Applicant’s employment a substantial contributing factor to her injury? (WCA s 9A)

    ·Was the Applicant totally or partially incapacitated for work as a result of her injuries? (WCA s 33)

    ·For what period was the Applicant totally incapacitated? (WCA ss 36 and 37)

    ·For what period was…

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Details
Case
[2003] NSWWCCPD 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Annette Treverrow is a decision concerning a dispute between an employer and a former employee regarding workers' compensation. The case was heard by the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Commission (the Commission) constituted by an Arbitrator, with an appeal subsequently made by the employer to the same Commission constituted by a Presidential member. The central issue in the case was whether the Arbitrator's decision to award compensation to the employee was correct. Specifically, the employer contested the Arbitrator's findings on the causation of the employee's injury, the calculation of the weekly compensation amount, and the determination of certain expenses.

The legal issues before the Commission on appeal included whether the Arbitrator erred in finding that the employee's injury arose out of or in the course of her employment, whether the employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury, and if there were any errors of law in the Arbitrator's failure to provide reasons for her decision. The employer also challenged the Arbitrator's method of determining the weekly wage rate and questioned the validity of the expenses awarded. Furthermore, the employer argued that the Arbitrator's determination of the employee's incapacity and expenses was not made pursuant to section 60 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998.

The Commission found that the Arbitrator had indeed erred in several respects. The Commission held that the Arbitrator had failed to provide reasons for her decision, which was a breach of natural justice. Additionally, the Commission found that the Arbitrator's determination of the weekly wage rate and the expenses was not in accordance with the law. The Commission also noted that the Arbitrator had incorrectly determined the employee's incapacity and the expenses. Consequently, the Commission revoked the Arbitrator's decision and remitted the matter back to her for reconsideration according to law. The Commission did not order any costs.

In summary, the appeal by the employer was successful in part. The Commission upheld the Arbitrator's finding that the employee's injury arose out of or in the course of her employment and that the employment was a substantial contributing factor. However, the Commission found that the Arbitrator had made errors in the calculation of compensation and in the determination of expenses. The matter was remitted back to the Arbitrator for reconsideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

The decision by the Arbitrator as to total and partial incapacity for work is revoked and the following decision is substituted:

The Appellant is to pay to the Respondent Worker, weekly compensation at the rates to be determined according to law, for a period of total incapacity from 11 October, 2001 to 11 February, 2002, and thereafter, for periods of total or partial incapacity on presentation of appropriate medical certificates, up to 15 October, 2002.

The purported decision of the Arbitrator concerning the calculation and determination of the amounts of compensation payable to the Respondent Worker is not a valid decision and the matter is referred to the Registrar for return to the Arbitrator, for a decision to be made by her, according to law.

No order is made as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 352 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) provides:352 Appeal against decision of Commission constituted by Arbitrator(1)A party to a dispute in connection with a claim for compensation may, with leave of the Commission constituted by a Presidential member, appeal to the Commission as so constituted against a decision in respect of the dispute by the Commission constituted by an Arbitrator.(2)The Commission is not to grant leave to appeal unless the amount of compensation at issue on the appeal is both:(a) at least $5,000 (or such other amount as may be prescribed by the regulations), and(b) at least 20% of the amount awarded in the decision appealed against.(3)If the Commission refuses to grant leave to appeal, the Commission must state reasons for the refusal in writing to the parties.(4)An appeal can only be made within 28 days after the making of the decision appealed against.(5)An appeal under this section is to be by way of review of the decision appealed against.(6)Evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to the decision appealed against may not be given on an appeal to the Commission except with leave of the Commission.(7)On appeal, the decision may be confirmed or may be revoked and a new decision made in its place.(8)In this section, decision includes an award, interim award, order, determination, ruling and direction. Section 354 of the 1998 Act provides for and sets out, the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the Commission.Leave to Appeal As previously stated, the Respondent Worker objected to leave to appeal being granted. The submission on this point is found in paragraph 11 of the submissions dated and lodged on 7 March, 2003, as follows:“There is a significant burden upon the employer to show the statutory policy underlying the requirement for leave is outweighed by the nature and significance of the error alleged in the Judgment, per Kirby P in Gurr –v- Robertson (CA) NSW (Full Court, 381/85) 10 February, 1986 (Unreported); Daily Newspapers –v- McLaughlin (1904) AC 776.” In Gurr v Robertson the question of leave to appeal from a decision of the District Court was considered. Section 130 of the District Court Act 1973 provided that leave of the Supreme Court was required to appeal from the District Court where the appeal involved directly or indirectly, any claim, demand or question to or respecting any property or any civil right amounting to or of the value of less than $5,000. The Court of Appeal in that case was considering the question of leave to appeal in a matter where the amount in issue fell below the statutory threshold for appeals from the District Court. That is not the position in the instant case where the threshold requirements for leave to appeal, prescribed in section 352(2) of the 1998 Act, are satisfied. In Gurr and Robertson the “statutory policy” and other “justifications” referred to by His Honour, were reflected in the threshold provision in the relevant Act, (as they are in the 1998 Act), and were referred to by the Court of Appeal when it declined to grant leave in circumstances where that threshold was not met. In the instant case there is no suggestion that the statutory threshold has not been met, and no argument has been put forward in support of any such proposition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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