Christina (a pseudonym)

[2025] NSWCATGD 8

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Christina (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWCATGD 8

Hearing dates:

3 February 2025

Date of orders:

3 February 2025

Decision date:

03 February 2025

Jurisdiction:

Guardianship Division

Before:

B L Bowman, Senior Member (Legal)
M Bain, Senior Member (Professional)
J V Le Breton, General Member (Community)

Decision:

Guardianship

1. A guardianship order is made for Christina.

2.   The Public Guardian is appointed as the guardian.

3.   This is a continuing guardianship order for a period of 12 months from 3 February 2025.

4.   This is a limited guardianship order giving the guardian(s) custody of Christina to the extent necessary to carry out the functions below.

FUNCTIONS:

5.   The guardian has the following functions:

a)   Access

To decide what access Christina has to others and the conditions of access, effective from 27 February 2025.

b)   Advocacy

To advocate generally for Christina.

c)   Accommodation

To decide where Christina may reside, effective from 27 February 2025.

d) The guardian may authorise others including members of NSW Police and the Ambulance Service of NSW to:

i)   take Christina to a place approved by the guardian.

ii)   keep her at that place.

iii)   return her to that place should she leave it, effective from 27 February 2025.

e) Health care

To decide what health care Christina may receive, effective from 27 February 2025.

f) Medical/Dental consent

To make substitute decisions about proposed minor or major medical or dental treatment, where Christina is not capable of giving a valid consent, effective from 27 February 2025.

g) Services

To make decisions about services to be provided to Christina, effective from 27 February 2025.

h) Restrictive Practices

To give or withhold consent to restrictive practices used to influence Christina’s behaviour, effective from 27 February 2025.

CONDITIONS:

6. The conditions of this order are:

a) Standard Condition

In exercising this role the guardian shall take all reasonable steps to bring Christina to an understanding of the issues and to obtain and consider her views before making significant decisions.

b) NDIS Restrictive Practices Condition

The guardian(s) may only consent to the use of restrictive practices to influence Christina’s behaviour:

(i)   as a last resort to prevent Christina harming herself or others; and

(ii)   in accordance with a behaviour support plan which has been developed by a behaviour support practitioner after having conducted a functional behavioural assessment upon Christina, and which is reviewed regularly (and no less than every 12 months) and/or reviewed as soon as practicable if there is a change in circumstances which requires the plan to be amended.

Financial Management

1. The estate of Christina is subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW).

2.   The management of the estate of Christina is committed to the NSW Trustee and Guardian.

3.   This order be reviewed by the Tribunal within three years.

Catchwords:

GUARDIANSHIP – 17-year-old woman currently living in a secure care program – leaving the care of the Minister and moving to Supported Independent Living – multiple diagnoses – whether secure care orders made by the Supreme Court of NSW impact on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make an order – found that the Tribunal’s powers are not restricted – considered the subject person requires assistance for some important decisions in future as she transitions to SIL – limited informal and consistent supports to assist her in making decisions – Public Guardian appointed.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT – whether the subject person is capable of managing her affairs – the “special circumstances” approach – where the subject person’s finances were very simple at the time of hearing but were likely to increase in complexity when she transitioned to SIL – limited knowledge and ability to handle and manage money – found to be in her best interests that a financial manager be appointed – NSW Trustee appointed.

Legislation Cited:

Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), ss 3(1)-(2), 4, 14, 14(2), 15, 15(1)(b), 15(3), 25M

Cases Cited:

CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 at [38]

P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579

Department Family and Community Services; Re “Lee” [2015] NSWSC 2144

IF v IG [2004] NSWADTAP 3

McD v McD (1983) 3 NSWLR 81

P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579

P v R [2003] NSWSC 819

PB v BB [2013] NSWSC 1223

Re D [2012] NSWSC 1006

Re W and L (Parameters of Protected Estate Management Orders) [2014] NSWSC 1106

Texts Cited:

None cited.

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

001: Guardianship Application

Christina (the person)
Grace (applicant)
Minister for Communities and Justice (carer)
Public Guardian

002: Financial Management Application

Christina (the person)
Grace (applicant)
Minister for Communities and Justice (carer)
NSW Trustee and Guardian

Representation:

C Pearson, appointed separate representative for Christina

File Number(s):

NCAT 2024/00418170

Publication restriction:

Decisions of the Guardianship Division of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal have been anonymised to remove any information that may identify any person involved in the Tribunal’s proceedings: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 65.

REASONS FOR DECISION

What the Tribunal decided

1. The Tribunal made a guardianship order for 12 months and appointed the Public Guardian as guardian for Christina with functions of advocacy, access, accommodation with the ability to authorise others, health care, medical and dental consent, services and restrictive practices.

2. The Tribunal made a financial management order and committed the management of Christina's estate to the NSW Trustee and Guardian. The order will be reviewed within three years.

3. At the end of these Reasons for Decision are lists of the people who attended the hearing. [Appendix removed from publication.]

Background

4. Christina is a 17-year-old young woman who is currently living in a secure care program in Southwest Sydney known as “The Cottage”. Christina prefers to be called Chris. For the purposes of the reasons and meaning no disrespect, the name Chris is used. Chris is part of the Sherwood program. She will be turning 18 in late February 2025. She has been under the care of the Minister since 15 July 2015. Her mother is Patricia and her grandfather is Don.

5. Grace submitted a document authored by Clinical Neuropsychology Registrar Mr Taylor authored on 11 September 2023 which outlines that Chris has previously attracted diagnoses of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), Oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), complex trauma, Tourette syndrome, conduct disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and developmental delay.

6. In late 2020, an application was filed with the NSW Supreme Court for a secure care order.

7. On 8 November 2024, Department of Communities and Justice Caseworker Grace submitted a guardianship application seeking to have the Public Guardian appointed with an advocacy function.

8. Chris is currently subject to multiple restrictive practices detailed in a Behaviour Intervention Support Plan authored by a senior psychologist from 1 April 2024: environmental restraint (routine for Chris and co-residents) including locked doors, cupboards, access to laundry and office, restricted access to sharps; food; chemicals; internet; community-line of sight; physical restraint (escort) and chemical restraint (psychotropic medication quetiapine routine and PRN).

9. On 8 November 2024, Department of Communities and Justice Caseworker Grace submitted a financial management application seeking to appoint the NSW Trustee and Guardian.

10. On 11 December 2024, an order was made appointing separate representation. Solicitor Carey Pearson has accepted the appointment.

11. Grace was unable to attend the hearing. Ruby (DCJ Casework Manager) attended the hearing and assumed the role of substitute applicant.

GUARDIANSHIP APPLICATION

The Tribunal's jurisdiction to make a guardianship order

12. The Tribunal understands that Chris is currently the subject of orders of the Supreme Court in its parens patriae jurisdiction, commonly referred to as secure care orders. In advance of the hearing questions were raised about whether these orders impacted on the Tribunal's jurisdiction to make a guardianship order.

13. Section 15 of Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) (“the Act”) provides as follows:

15 Restrictions on Tribunal's power to make guardianship orders

(1)    A guardianship order shall not be made in respect of a person-

(a)    if the person is under the age of 16 years, or

(b)   in the case of a person who is the subject of an order made by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the guardianship of persons-unless the Supreme Court consents to the making of the order, or

(c) in the case of a person who is the subject of an order made by the Children's Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 79A of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998-unless the Children's Court consents to the making of the order.

14. The question for the Tribunal was whether the secure care orders constituted an exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction with respect to the guardianship of persons such that the Tribunal could only make orders with the consent of the Court. Relevantly, this issue was dealt with in Secretary, Department Family and Community Services; Re “Lee” [2015] NSWSC 2144 in which Brereton J states at [9]:

“The Public Guardian has sought guidance as to how the guardianship functions and the role of the Court will interact. At least as I presently understand the position, the (NSW) Guardianship Act 1987 is expressed in terms that it does not affect the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court. That means, I think, that to the extent that this Court makes provision in respect of Lee's care, it would prevail over the guardianship function. But it does so only to the extent that the Court by order makes such provision, and only to the extent of any inconsistency. As I propose to discharge the secure accommodation order and the recovery order, there will be no subsisting orders in place concerning Lee's management, other than those of the Guardianship Division of NCAT. However, until I am satisfied that an appropriate guardianship order is in place, I do not propose entirely to vacate the field, but to keep Lee's management under the supervision of the Court. She is not a ward of the Court and she is not the subject of a committee of the person, but it is well established that in the parens patriae jurisdiction, the Court can make orders pertaining to the welfare of an incapable person without making them a ward or appointing a committee. At this stage, I am not making any such order, leaving it open to the Guardianship Division to make such orders as it is persuaded are appropriate, and to the Public Guardian to make decisions under the authority conferred by those orders. Accordingly, for the time being, I do not think that any difficulty of conflicting jurisdictions or orders is posed for the Public Guardian.”

15. In Re “Lee”, the Court appears to make a distinction between the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction to make a person a ward or appointing a committee and the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction to make other orders (such as the authorisation of medical treatment or secure care). In Re “Lee”, Brereton J states that the former is an exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the guardianship of persons and the latter is not. As such, a person under secure care orders is not the subject of an order made by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the guardianship of persons and therefore is not captured by s 15(1)(b) of the Act.

16. Accordingly, we were satisfied that the Tribunal's power to make orders with respect to Chris was not restricted by s 15(1)(b) of the Act.

What did the Tribunal have to decide?

17. The questions which had to be decided by the Tribunal were:

• Is Chris someone for whom the Tribunal could make an order because she a disability which prevents her from being able to make important life decisions?

• Should the Tribunal make a guardianship order and if so, what order should be made?

• Who should be the guardian and how long should the order last?

Is Chris someone for whom the Tribunal could make an order because she has a disability which prevents her from being able to make important life decisions?

18. Section 14 of the Act provides that we may make a guardianship order for a person if we are satisfied that the person is “a person in need of a guardian”.

19. A person in need of a guardian is “a person who, because of a disability, is totally or partially incapable of managing their person”: the Act, s 3(1). The disability must restrict them in one or more major life activities to the extent that they require supervision or social habilitation: the Act, s 3(2). Commonly, we consider the person's ability to make important personal, health and lifestyle decisions; the ability to make such decisions being a major life activity that impacts on the person's ability to function normally in the community with others.

Evidence and submissions

20. We were provided with the following health and medical reports about Chris:

• Behaviour Management Support Plan dated 1 April 2024 prepared by the senior psychologist;

• report dated 11 September 2023 from Mr Taylor, Clinical Neuropsychology Registrar; and

• report dated 23 October 2024 from a Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist.

21. In summary the evidence indicates that Chris has diagnoses including ADHD, Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, FASD, Tic Disorder, and a mild intellectual disability. Chris has a complex social history characterized by adverse childhood experiences including inconsistent care, neglect, and sexual abuse in the family environment and multiple placements in out of home care.

22. Mr Taylor reported the following findings:

• Chris’ neurocognitive assessment results showed general intellectual ability in the very low range, well below the level of her age matched peers.

• Chris’ performance on tasks measuring executive function was broadly reduced, and well below age expectations. While her non-verbal abstract reasoning and ability to inhibit a prepotent verbal response met age expectations, she demonstrated significant difficulties with verbal abstract reasoning, mental-flexibility and task shifting, planning and organisation, and problem-solving and conceptual flexibility, with evidence of perseveration and no appreciable benefit from corrective feedback.

• Specifically, her deficits in problem-solving and conceptual flexibility, will negatively impact her capacity to flexibly implement strategies, learnt and developed in the therapeutic setting, across the wide variety of real-world scenarios that might indicate their use. Additionally, her mental rigidity and inability to benefit from corrective feedback, suggests that she will require significant additional scaffolding and support to effectively apply therapeutically derived strategies.

• Chris’ difficulties with planning & organisation and plan implementation, may impact her ability to implement the most appropriate approach for a given real-word situation.

• Chris’ performance in tasks of verbal memory was reduced, and below age expectations.

23. The Behaviour Management Support Plan outlined that Chris’ key behavioural challenges include sexualised behaviour and absconding. These behaviours have presented frequently in community and are a high risk for her health and wellbeing. Chris is a vulnerable, young person when unsupervised in the community with significant risk of exploitation. Chris does not demonstrate an understanding of the risks associated with these mentioned behaviours. Chris has limited ability to self-regulate her emotions and manage her stress effectively, which appears to be a significant factor in her use of maladaptive, challenging behaviours. Chris requires continuous support, supervision, and timely carer intervention. She requires full support to access the community and to maintain a positive community presence and full support to manage transport. Chris relies on the targeted support from her Casework Team to assist with decision-making.

24. The evidence at the hearing, and the reports provided in advance of the hearing, were all consistent with the view that Chris has difficulties in making informed decisions for herself.

Findings and conclusions

25. We accepted the evidence provided in the clinical reports outlined above. We accepted on the basis of this evidence that Chris requires support to meet her daily needs and to manage day-to-day choices and decisions.

26. We are satisfied that Chris is at least partly unable to manage her own activities of daily living and has impaired decision-making abilities. We decided that because of the incapacities arising from her disabilities, Chris is “a person in need of a guardian” for whom a guardianship order may be made.

Should the Tribunal make a guardianship order and if so, what order should be made?

27. Section 14(2) of the Act outlines a number of equally important factors for us to consider and balance in the exercise of our discretion. These matters have no hierarchy or weighting and each is a mandatory consideration. However, the Tribunal must undertake a balancing exercise for its consideration of the matters in s 14(2) of the Act. When undertaking this task, the Tribunal may be guided by the principles that are set out in s 4 of the Act (see IF v IG [2004] NSWADTAP 3). The Tribunal has had regard to each of the mandatory s 14(2) factors of the Act, which are only referred to herein to the extent that they are of particular relevance to the decision made by the Tribunal.

Overview of evidence

28. Ruby, Manager Casework (DCJ) provided written and oral evidence to the following effect:

• Chris has been residing in The Cottage since June 2024. It has not been an easy transition for Chris. She has been hospitalised on occasion for self-harming incidents. She has also absconded from the placement on occasion and placed herself in unsafe situations. For this reason, it was submitted that the authorise others function would need to be given to an appointed guardian to ensure that Chris could be returned to her accommodation if she absconded.

• It is proposed that Chris transition to Supported Independent Living accommodation upon turning 18. She is not presently funded for Supported Independent Living (SIL) accommodation. It is proposed that a change of circumstances application be submitted in anticipation of her turning 18 and no longer being under the parental responsibility of the Minister. A change in her accommodation may also necessitate a change in her National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) service providers.

• As Chris exits the Sherwood Program, she will need to transition to mainstream health services. There is also a need for Chris to transition from paediatric to adult services.

• Chris’ contact with her maternal family has to date been supervised by DCJ. It was submitted that the appointed guardian should have the authority to decide what access Chris has to others and the conditions of access to ensure that she is protected from abuse.

29. An NDIS support coordinator agreed with Ruby's comments above and was supportive of a guardianship order being made. She stated that Chris would not be able to navigate the NDIS system or understand and sign service agreements. Accordingly, she submitted that the appointed guardian should hold the services function.

30. The Behaviour Support Plan outlined that Chris is currently subject to multiple restrictive practices including environmental restraint (including locked doors, cupboards, access to laundry and office, restricted access to sharps, food, chemicals, internet and community-line of sight); physical restraint (escort) and chemical restraint (psychotropic medication quetiapine routine and PRN).

29. The separate representative was supportive of a guardianship order being made. She submitted that Chris is entering into a period of significant change as she exits the Minister's care and the Sherwood Program and transitions into adulthood and more independent living. There are many important decisions to be made, and a guardianship order would promote Chris’ interests as she progresses into adulthood. She submitted that the evidence weighed in favour of the Tribunal exercising its discretion to make an order.

The views of Chris

32. Chris provided a clear view about guardianship. Chris accepted her diagnoses. However, she contended that she could make her own decisions and there was no need for a guardian to be appointed. Chris had concerns about the restrictive practices. She was very focused on her phone and being able to have unrestricted access to it.

Findings and conclusions

33. We have had regard to Chris’ views and her strong desire to live without restrictions and make her own decisions. We have balanced this with our obligations under ss 4 and 14(2) of the Act to ensure Chris’ welfare and interests are paramount, and that she is protected from neglect, abuse and exploitation.

34. We have decided that Chris requires the assistance of a guardian for some important decisions regarding her future needs. Chris is a vulnerable young person who is transitioning from out of home care to the adult disability system. She has limited informal and consistent supports to assist her to make decisions in her best interests and has a history of behaviours of concern. We consider it important that Chris is guided to make decisions which will protect her from harm and ensure her health, welfare and rights are protected.

35. Accordingly, we found that there are decisions to be made about where Chris will live, what services she will receive and who will have access to her. There will be a need to obtain and share health information to ensure that accommodation and services meet Chris’ needs. We found that there is no practicable way for decisions about access, accommodation, healthcare, or services, to be made without appointing a guardian. We accepted the evidence about Chris’ history of absconding from her placement and found that the authorise others function would promote her best interests.

36. We accepted the evidence that Chris is compliant with her medication, which includes major medications. We accepted the evidence that Chris is unable to provide her own medical consent, and we considered whether it is practicable for decisions about medical and dental treatment to be made without appointing a guardian. We concluded that it was not practicable.

37. We accepted evidence that Chris is presently subject to restrictive practices at The Cottage which will likely be continued in a SIL environment. In NSW, a restrictive practice may only be used if informed consent is provided by the person subject to the proposed restrictive practice, or in circumstances where the person is unable to provide informed consent, by a guardian who is conferred a restrictive practices decision making function, and in accordance with any conditions associated with the guardian's appointment.

38. Historically, when appointing a guardian with a restrictive practices function, it has been necessary for the Tribunal to closely scrutinise the proposed use of restrictive practices and determine what type(s) of restrictive practice a guardian may be permitted to consent to the use of. In the current regulatory framework, it is no longer essential for the Tribunal (as a protective jurisdiction) to be as prescriptive in its orders when appointing a guardian with a restrictive practices function.

39. The role of the Tribunal is to consider firstly, whether there is a need for a guardian to make a decision regarding the use of restrictive practices, and secondly, to consider who is appropriate to make such decisions. In appropriate circumstances it may not be necessary to be prescriptive as to the particular category of restrictive practices that a guardian may consent to, as there are otherwise appropriate safeguards in place through the regulatory framework to mitigate against the inappropriate use of restrictive practices. Being overly prescriptive may, at times, not be in the best interests of the person subject to a guardianship order because it may impede the ability of a guardian to make prompt, appropriate decisions in light of a person's changing circumstances.

40. In the current matter, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a need for a guardian to be appointed for the purpose of consenting (or withholding consent) to the use of restrictive practices, and it is unnecessary for the Tribunal to prescribe any particular category of restrictive practices that a guardian may make decisions about. The exercise of this function, however, must be in accordance with the conditions attached to the Tribunal's order, and in accordance with the requirements of the relevant regulatory scheme.

41. Having considered the evidence and reached the conclusions noted above we made the guardianship order encompassing the functions as set out in the Tribunal's decision.

Who should be the guardian and how long should the order last?

42. The Tribunal is not able to appoint the Public Guardian as a person's guardian if there is a private person who can be appointed: the Act, s 15(3).

43. In this case, there was no private person that we could appoint as guardian for Chris. We therefore appointed the Public Guardian.

44. An initial guardianship order can be made for a period of up to one year from the date on which it was made.

45. We decided to make a continuing guardianship order for 12 months because it is likely that there will be decisions that need to be made by a guardian for at least this length of time. At the end of the 12 months, there will be another hearing at the Tribunal to review the guardianship order.

46. The Tribunal was satisfied that continuing the guardianship order will promote Chris’ welfare and interests, and that the restriction on her autonomy, freedom of decision and action, and self-reliance is proportionate to her capacity to make her own decisions. We considered her views. There is no spouse to provide their view. There is no other practicable way to make the needed decisions. There was no evidence to indicate that the guardianship order would be detrimental to family relationships or cultural and linguistic environments. We were satisfied that the order was made for the shortest practicable time consistent with Chris’ welfare.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT APPLICATION

What did the Tribunal have to decide?

47. The questions to be considered by the Tribunal are:

• Is Chris incapable of managing her affairs?

• Is there a need for another person to manage Chris’ affairs and is it in their best interests for a financial management order to be made?

• If so, who should be appointed financial manager?

Is Chris incapable of managing her affairs?

48. In Re D [2012] NSWSC 1006, White J assessed the history of case law in relation to financial management and noted that initially the issue of capability was approached by referring to hypothetical or abstract notions of the ordinary affairs of man. However, the Court now assesses the person's own capacity to do what they are proposing to do [58]. White J used a "rational appreciation" of assets test to determine a person's capability to manage his or her affairs. He adopts the reasoning of Barrett J in P v R [2003] NSWSC 819 who said that the task of the Court in these circumstances:

“... is to make a judgment as to the capacity and ability of the person concerned to cope with the ordinary routine affairs of living, particularly so far as they concern the person's property...the requisite judgment is to be made in the light of objective physical facts concerning the relevant person's property, money and other assets and the way the person is able to look after them. If there is a lack of capacity, the reason for it does not matter [26].”

49. In PB v BB [2013] NSWSC 1223, Justice Lindsay confirmed that the question focuses attention on the special circumstances of the person. His Honour stated, at [7]:

Of central significance is the functionality of management capacity of the person said to be incapable of managing his or her affairs, not: (a) his or her status as a person who may, or may not, lack "mental capacity" or be "mentally ill"; or (b) particular reasons for an incapacity for self-management.

50. The test for determining a person's capability to manage his or her affairs has been described as follows (P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579, [307]-[308]):

“Is a person reasonably able to manage his or her own affairs in a reasonably competent fashion, without the intervention of a [financial manager] charged with a duty to protect his or her welfare and interests?

...

[A] focus for attention is whether the person is able to deal with (making and implementing decisions about) his or her own affairs (person and property, capital and income) in a reasonable, rational and orderly way, with due regard to his or her present and prospective wants and needs, and those of family and friends, without undue risk of neglect, abuse or exploitation.”

51. In considering whether the person is “able” in this sense, consideration may be given to:

• past and present experience as a predictor of the future course of events;

• support systems available to the person; and

• the extent to which the person, placed as he or she is, can be relied upon to make sound judgments about his or her welfare and interests: see Lindsay J in CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 at [38], and P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 at [309].

52. The relevant time for considering whether a person is incapable of managing his or her affairs is not merely the day of the hearing but the reasonably foreseeable future (McD v McD (1983) 3 NSWLR 81 at 86). See Lindsay J in Re W and L (Parameters of Protected Estate Management Orders) [2014] NSWSC 1106 at [20]:

“Each case must, of course, be considered on its own facts, including not only actual facts presently known but also, so far as they can be known, prospective developments.”

Overview of evidence

53. The evidence as set out above in respect of the impact of Chris’ disabilities upon their ability to make important life decisions applies to her capacity to manage her financial affairs.

54. Chris was very clear about financial management and agreed that she needs a financial manager. Chris is a very vulnerable young person with very limited experience managing her own finances.

55. The applicant provided the following information at the hearing about Chris’ financial affairs:

• Chris receives the Disability Support pension

• The payment is paid into a bank account in her name

• Chris’ expenses include her phone, medication, clothes, nails and hair

• Chris has no savings and no significant assets

• Chris is expected to receive a Victims Recognition Payment upon turning 18.

56. In the application for financial management, it was stated Chris does not have the skills or capacity for money management. Chris has never been responsible for managing or handling money independently, nor had to manage bills and financial responsibilities. Concerns were raised about Chris’ capacity to manage her rent and bills independently. Due to Chris’ significant vulnerability, there are concerns that Chris is vulnerable to exploitation and harm by others that may hope to take her money from her.

57. Mr Taylor found that Chris demonstrates relatively greater difficulties with numeracy (i.e., a poor understanding of numbers and their magnitude), memorisation of number facts (mathematical relationships), and thereafter difficulty applying mathematical concepts, facts, or procedures to solve quantitative problems.

Consideration

58. The evidence about Chris’ financial affairs indicated that they were very simple in nature at the time of the hearing. She is living in an out of home care placement and the evidence indicated that she was receiving considerable support to manage her money.

59. While Chris is able to undertake basic activities relating to accessing and spending her money, we noted it is envisaged that arrangements will be put in place for Chris to receive a range of more formal supports and services which may include living independently in alternative accommodation. There will be a greater degree of complexity in relation to her finances in the future, including the need for more budgeting and setting up of arrangements for the payment of regular expenses.

60. Taking into account the evidence of Chris’ poor numeracy skills and her disorganisation and difficulties with planning, initiating and following through on tasks as well as Chris’ own evidence about her money management skills, we were satisfied that, as a result of her disabilities, Chris is not capable of managing the full range of her financial affairs into the immediate future.

61. We were satisfied, on the evidence, that Chris is not capable of managing her affairs.

Is there a need for another person to manage Chris’ affairs and is it in her best interests for a financial management order to be made?

62. In considering the issue, the Tribunal had regard to the documents referred to above and the oral evidence given at the hearing.

63. Chris is a vulnerable young person who has no budgeting skills and is due to receive a victims recognition payment. As the pre-conditions to making a financial management order are satisfied, the power to make a financial management order can be exercised. Having regard to the statement of principles contained in s 4 of the Act which require that we observe, among other things, the principle that Chris must be protected from neglect, abuse, and exploitation, we have decided that it is appropriate to exercise the power to make a financial management order.

64. The evidence was that Chris does not currently have the range of skills to independently take the kinds of actions that will be required to facilitate her greater independence as she transitions to adulthood, particularly if she moves to SIL accommodation. These include engaging with Centrelink about the appropriate income support payment she should be receiving as well as setting up arrangements to ensure income is allocated to pay for the goods and services required.

65. We found that, if no financial manager is appointed, there is the risk that Chris will not have access to money to support herself and may not be able to meet her expenses and daily needs. We also found that without a financial manager, Chris would be at risk of financial exploitation.

66. We were satisfied that there is a need to make financial decisions for Chris and that it is in her best interests to appoint a financial manager to do so because there is no other practicable way of managing her finances.

Who should be appointed as financial manager?

67. In appointing a financial manager, as in making all other orders under the Act, the Tribunal must act with the interests of the person concerned as the paramount consideration and in accordance with the other principles set out in s 4 of the Act.

68. Section 25M of the Act provides that, if the Tribunal makes a financial management order, it may appoint a suitable person to manage the person's estate or may commit the management of the estate to the NSW Trustee and Guardian.

69. There was no private person available to be appointed as Chris’ financial manager. We appointed the NSW Trustee and Guardian.

70. We accepted the submissions of the separate representative that the order should be reviewed. Chris expressed a desire to learn to budget and manage her own affairs. We decided that the order should be reviewed in three years. This would give sufficient time for several matters to be pursued and key arrangements to be put in place in relation to Chris’ finances. It would be appropriate to review the order in light of any capacity building assistance Chris may have received and her ability to manage various aspects of her affairs at that time.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 18 August 2025