Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 1146

Citation: Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 1146
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Confidential v Social Security Appeals Tribunal & Anor [2010] AATA 328
Parties: KAY CHRISTIANSEN v SOCIAL SECURITY APPEALS TRIBUNAL, NEALE GREGORY SUTTON and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: QUD 339 of 2010
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 22 October 2010
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for extension of time to lodge notice of appeal from decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) – appeal from that decision of the AAT – whether decision of the AAT should be set aside and remitted to the AAT – original dispute over entitlement of applicant to receive child support payments from the second respondent pursuant to the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) – second decision published by AAT following letter from the Department of Human Services – outcome of first AAT decision reversed by second AAT decision – principles relevant to exercise of Court’s discretion to extend time during which an appeal may be instituted against the AAT – whether AAT made error of law in failing to provide adequate reasons – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether AAT’s decision was irrational or illogical – principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 – whether AAT had power to make second decision – principles in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597

Held: extension of time granted for lodgment of notice of appeal from decision of the AAT, decision of AAT set aside and the matter remitted to the AAT to be decided according to law

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39, 43, 44
Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 5 Div 4, ss 5(3), 7B(1), 12(2AA), 48, 49, 50, 74
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320 cited
Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 661 cited
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224 cited
Ramsay v Australian Postal Corporation (2005) 147 FCR 39 cited
Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457 cited
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 cited
Sagigi v Comcare [2009] FCA 385 cited
Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 1 ALD 383 cited
Campbell E, “Revocation and Variation of Administrative Decisions” (1996) 22 Monash U L Rev 30
Downes AM, The Hon Justice Garry, “Finality of Administrative Decisions” Hartigan Memorial Lecture, Brisbane, 30 November 2005
Orr R and Briese R, “Don’t…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal involved a dispute over child support payments. The applicant, a mother, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The dispute arose because the AAT had determined that the applicant no longer had care of her child, resulting in a termination of child support payments. The applicant argued that she had maintained care of her child despite a court order granting custody to the Department of Child Safety (DOCS).

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's decision was irrational or illogical, and whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The court needed to determine whether the AAT's decision to reject evidence of the applicant's care for her child was justified and whether the AAT adequately explained its reasons for this decision. Additionally, the court had to consider if the AAT's rejection of evidence previously accepted was adequately explained.

The court found that the applicant was indeed denied procedural fairness by the AAT. The AAT had accepted evidence that the applicant had care of the child for an average of three nights per week, which constituted almost 43% care. However, in its later decision, the AAT rejected this evidence without providing a clear explanation. The court held that the AAT's rejection of this evidence was not adequately explained and that the AAT's reasons for its decision were inadequate. The court also noted that the AAT's decision to reject the evidence amounted to a denial of procedural fairness to the applicant.

In conclusion, the court granted the applicant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and set aside the AAT's decision. The matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration according to law. The court's decision highlighted the importance of providing clear and adequate reasons for rejecting evidence and the need for procedural fairness in administrative decision-making processes.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my view, it is appropriate both that the applicant be granted an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal, and that an order be made setting aside the decision of the AAT and remitting the matter to the AAT to be decided according to law. Before turning to the reasons for this decision, it is appropriate to examine the background facts giving rise to these proceedings.Background The applicant and the second respondent are parents of a child (“the child”). The second respondent has paid child support to the applicant in respect of the child in accordance with the Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth) (“Child Support Act”). On 15 April 2009 an order in respect of the child was made in the Children’s Court of Queensland granting custody of the child to the Department of Child Safety (Queensland) (“DOCS”). The child support payments of the second respondent to the applicant were made because the applicant had care of the child. On 18 May 2009 the Agency decided not to amend its assessment of child support notwithstanding the 15 April 2009 order of the Children’s Court. In June 2009 the second respondent objected to this decision of the Agency, however in July 2009 the agency disallowed the second respondent’s objection. On 4 August 2009 the second respondent sought a review of the Agency’s decision in the SSAT. On 22 September 2009 the SSAT set aside the decision of the Agency, and substituted a decision that from 15 April 2009 the applicant no longer had care of the child and that, as a result, a terminating event occurred in relation to the relevant child support case on that date. The applicant applied to the AAT for review of the decision of the SSAT.Proceedings before the AAT The matter was heard by the AAT on 19 April 2010. Both the applicant and the second respondent were self-represented. On 6 May 2010 the AAT delivered a decision.“First” decision of the AAT The decision of the AAT delivered 6 May 2010 was as follows: So far as relevant, the reasons for decision were as follows:EVIDENCE2. A hearing of this matter was held in Brisbane on 9 April 2010. The applicant attended and gave evidence on her own behalf. Her sister (Ms X) and a friend (Mr Y) also attended to give evidence as did the joined party.3. The applicant referred to her daughter staying with her for some three nights a week on average after the child was placed in the care of DOCS. Even though DOCS records do not reflect the visits to her mother’s house, the applicant contended that Child B would sleep at the applicant’s house and the applicant would take her to school or back to Kingsbury House as required. This began about a month after the Court order was made.4. On 28 October 2009, Child B came to live with the applicant with the consent and knowledge of the Agency who checked, usually by telephone, about the arrangements. DOCS was also aware of Child B staying with Mr Y who lives some 20 minutes away from the applicant.5. The applicant explained how her health was “a lot better” than what it was and that she no longer sees a doctor regularly. Child B stays with her and Mr Y and DOCS is aware of the arrangement that has been “permanent” since 28 October 2009. Indeed, they have approved of the shared care arrangements with Mr Y.6. The applicant confirmed that Child B had been staying with her regularly since the Court Order and that DOCS had not documented Child B’s visits or the times she was with her mother “properly”. The applicant referred to her and her daughter’s situation and position last year and how Child B would come and stay with the applicant since May 2009. The arrangements were organised verbally with DOCS and “nothing formally was put in place”. She reiterated that she has had full time care of Child B since 28 October 2009 and that the joined party has been making payments in this regard. The applicant stated she had legal guardianship of her daughter and would be asked to sign consent forms for her education and the like. She noted that if things were as bad as the joined party had suggested, DOCS would not have allowed Child B to go home with her mother.7. Ms X explained how she had lived with the applicant from June to October 2009 and that Child B had stayed with them on average three nights a week during that period. She stopped living with the applicant on 28 October 2009 and at that time Child B was in the applicant’s “full time care”.8. Mr Y whom she has known for some five years was often at the applicant’s house and confirmed that Child B would be there some three to four times a week. Child B also stays with him at this house and has been doing so with DOCS knowledge for some two months now. The applicant provides money to him for Child B’s upkeep. He supported the applicant’s evidence that DOCS would not recognise the times Child B would leave Kingsbury and just roam around.9. The joined party referred to a chronology of events and how he had been contacted by a child welfare officer in March 2009. He referred to a Voluntary Care Agreement signed by the applicant with DOCS involving Child B going to a residential care facility. He referred to two clauses in the agreement whereby she gave custody and the decisions of the child’s care to DOCS. Child B moved to Kingsbury in March 2009 and on 15 April 2009 the Magistrate granted custody for one year to DOCS who became responsible for all decisions relating to Child B for that time.10. The joined party confirmed he has never had custody, care or control of Child B and only heard of the problems from a DOCS officer in March 2009. He said that Child B was a high frequency absconder and her arrangements were ad hoc. He said she would run away to see friends and not her mother.CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS11. Pursuant to Part 5 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (the Act) a person’s child support liability depends on the division of care in relation to an eligible child. The working out of a percentage of care is contained in s 48 of the Act. Division 4 of the Act provides that percentage care in part may be determined by oral or written agreement, a parenting plan or court order or in their absence by the Registrar.12. From the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has for some time now cared on a noticeable basis for Child B. The Tribunal accepts that although the Court Order of 15 April 2009 indicated that the care of the child was the responsibility of DOCS, Child B would go and stay with her mother on an increasing basis. This was confirmed by Ms X and Mr Y who spent time at the applicant’s house. Indeed, from 28 October 2009 the applicant had the care of Child B. This was acknowledged in a letter from a Child Safety Officer from DOCS dated 27 November 2009. That officer also confirmed that DOCS was aware of the present care and living arrangements for Child B with the applicant and Mr Y.13. DOCS material sighted by the Tribunal indicates that the Department was working towards the “reunification” of the applicant and her daughter over time and expected that the “reunification will occur during the period of the current order” (ie. the Court Order of 15 April 2009). As well, the Tribunal notes that in August 2009 a note from DOCS indicates that while Child B was in hospital “any decisions about invasive medical treatment is required to be made by her guardian”. Child B’s mother’s name and phone number have been provided.14. The Tribunal notes that the reports of the Agency show an improved relationship between the mother and daughter over the year with the applicant working to overcome her earlier deficiencies and difficulties. Over time, Child B appears to have spent more time at her mother’s place or in her care as supported by Ms X and Mr Y.15. Therefore, on all of the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant exercised a level of care in relation to Child B even though the Court Order of the Children’s Court had not been revoked or varied. Particularly, from 28 October 2009, when it appears that Child B was in her mother’s overall care and which living arrangements were acknowledged by DOCS who also noted that “[Child B’s] placement at Kingsbury Residential was closed shortly after this time” (28 October 2009). Consequently, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has had care of Child B for a period of time now at least since October 2009 notwithstanding the Court Order that was to expire on 15 April 2010 and that DOCS was aware of Child B’s care arrangements as acknowledged in its letter of 27 November 2009.DECISION16. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes that decision that from at least 28 October 2009 the applicant has had care of Child B.Letter from the Department of Human Services

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In light of the serious ramifications for the applicant resulting from the “new” decision of 23 July 2010, reasons more than this wholly inadequate statement were warranted.Inadequate explanation for rejection of evidence previously accepted Second, it is not clear to me from the decision of 23 July 2010 why the AAT was not satisfied that the applicant had care of the child amounting to or exceeding 35% after the Children’s Court order of 15 April 2009. Indeed, the basis on which the AAT makes this finding of fact is not articulated, and I am not persuaded that the reasons are apparent from the decision of 6 May 2010. Notwithstanding the decision of the AAT on 23 July 2010 as to the extent of the applicant’s care of the child, I accept the submission of Mr Rangiah SC that, in fact, in its reasons of 6 May 2010 the AAT plainly accepted the evidence of the applicant, Ms X and Mr Y that the child stayed with the applicant three nights per week on average after the Children’s Court order of 15 April 2009. As Mr Rangiah SC submitted, three nights per week constitutes almost 43% care of the child. Examining the AAT’s reasons of 6 May 2010 I note:oParagraph 3, where the AAT observed:The applicant referred to her daughter staying with her for some three nights a week on average after the child was placed in the care of DOCS. Even though DOCS records do not reflect the visits to her mother’s house, the applicant contended that Child B would sleep at the applicant’s house and the applicant would take her to school or back to Kingsbury House as required. This began about a month after the Court order was made.oParagraph 7, where the AAT observed:Ms X explained how she had lived with the applicant from June to October 2009 and that Child B had stayed with them on average three nights a week during that period.oParagraph 8, where the AAT observed:Mr Y whom she has known for some five years was often at the applicant’s house and confirmed that Child B would be there some three to four times a week.oParagraph 11, where the AAT observed that the calculation of a percentage of care is contained in s 48 of the Act.o Paragraph 12, where the AAT found:From the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has for some time now cared on a noticeable basis for Child B. The Tribunal accepts that although the Court Order of 15 April 2009 indicated that the care of the child was the responsibility of DOCS, Child B would go and stay with her mother on an increasing basis. This was confirmed by Ms X and Mr Y who spent time at the applicant’s house.oParagraph 15, where the AAT found:Therefore, on all of the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant exercised a level of care in relation to Child B even though the Court Order of the Children’s Court had not been revoked or varied. Particularly, from 28 October 2009, when it appears that Child B was in her mother’s overall care and which living arrangements were acknowledged by DOCS…

Decision

Reasons for decision

The matter was heard by the AAT on 19 April 2010. Both the applicant and the second respondent were self-represented. On 6 May 2010 the AAT delivered a decision.“First” decision of the AAT The decision of the AAT delivered 6 May 2010 was as follows: So far as relevant, the reasons for decision were as follows:EVIDENCE2. A hearing of this matter was held in Brisbane on 9 April 2010. The applicant attended and gave evidence on her own behalf. Her sister (Ms X) and a friend (Mr Y) also attended to give evidence as did the joined party.3. The applicant referred to her daughter staying with her for some three nights a week on average after the child was placed in the care of DOCS. Even though DOCS records do not reflect the visits to her mother’s house, the applicant contended that Child B would sleep at the applicant’s house and the applicant would take her to school or back to Kingsbury House as required. This began about a month after the Court order was made.4. On 28 October 2009, Child B came to live with the applicant with the consent and knowledge of the Agency who checked, usually by telephone, about the arrangements. DOCS was also aware of Child B staying with Mr Y who lives some 20 minutes away from the applicant.5. The applicant explained how her health was “a lot better” than what it was and that she no longer sees a doctor regularly. Child B stays with her and Mr Y and DOCS is aware of the arrangement that has been “permanent” since 28 October 2009. Indeed, they have approved of the shared care arrangements with Mr Y.6. The applicant confirmed that Child B had been staying with her regularly since the Court Order and that DOCS had not documented Child B’s visits or the times she was with her mother “properly”. The applicant referred to her and her daughter’s situation and position last year and how Child B would come and stay with the applicant since May 2009. The arrangements were organised verbally with DOCS and “nothing formally was put in place”. She reiterated that she has had full time care of Child B since 28 October 2009 and that the joined party has been making payments in this regard. The applicant stated she had legal guardianship of her daughter and would be asked to sign consent forms for her education and the like. She noted that if things were as bad as the joined party had suggested, DOCS would not have allowed Child B to go home with her mother.7. Ms X explained how she had lived with the applicant from June to October 2009 and that Child B had stayed with them on average three nights a week during that period. She stopped living with the applicant on 28 October 2009 and at that time Child B was in the applicant’s “full time care”.8. Mr Y whom she has known for some five years was often at the applicant’s house and confirmed that Child B would be there some three to four times a week. Child B also stays with him at this house and has been doing so with DOCS knowledge for some two months now. The applicant provides money to him for Child B’s upkeep. He supported the applicant’s evidence that DOCS would not recognise the times Child B would leave Kingsbury and just roam around.9. The joined party referred to a chronology of events and how he had been contacted by a child welfare officer in March 2009. He referred to a Voluntary Care Agreement signed by the applicant with DOCS involving Child B going to a residential care facility. He referred to two clauses in the agreement whereby she gave custody and the decisions of the child’s care to DOCS. Child B moved to Kingsbury in March 2009 and on 15 April 2009 the Magistrate granted custody for one year to DOCS who became responsible for all decisions relating to Child B for that time.10. The joined party confirmed he has never had custody, care or control of Child B and only heard of the problems from a DOCS officer in March 2009. He said that Child B was a high frequency absconder and her arrangements were ad hoc. He said she would run away to see friends and not her mother.CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS11. Pursuant to Part 5 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (the Act) a person’s child support liability depends on the division of care in relation to an eligible child. The working out of a percentage of care is contained in s 48 of the Act. Division 4 of the Act provides that percentage care in part may be determined by oral or written agreement, a parenting plan or court order or in their absence by the Registrar.12. From the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has for some time now cared on a noticeable basis for Child B. The Tribunal accepts that although the Court Order of 15 April 2009 indicated that the care of the child was the responsibility of DOCS, Child B would go and stay with her mother on an increasing basis. This was confirmed by Ms X and Mr Y who spent time at the applicant’s house. Indeed, from 28 October 2009 the applicant had the care of Child B. This was acknowledged in a letter from a Child Safety Officer from DOCS dated 27 November 2009. That officer also confirmed that DOCS was aware of the present care and living arrangements for Child B with the applicant and Mr Y.13. DOCS material sighted by the Tribunal indicates that the Department was working towards the “reunification” of the applicant and her daughter over time and expected that the “reunification will occur during the period of the current order” (ie. the Court Order of 15 April 2009). As well, the Tribunal notes that in August 2009 a note from DOCS indicates that while Child B was in hospital “any decisions about invasive medical treatment is required to be made by her guardian”. Child B’s mother’s name and phone number have been provided.14. The Tribunal notes that the reports of the Agency show an improved relationship between the mother and daughter over the year with the applicant working to overcome her earlier deficiencies and difficulties. Over time, Child B appears to have spent more time at her mother’s place or in her care as supported by Ms X and Mr Y.15. Therefore, on all of the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant exercised a level of care in relation to Child B even though the Court Order of the Children’s Court had not been revoked or varied. Particularly, from 28 October 2009, when it appears that Child B was in her mother’s overall care and which living arrangements were acknowledged by DOCS who also noted that “[Child B’s] placement at Kingsbury Residential was closed shortly after this time” (28 October 2009). Consequently, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has had care of Child B for a period of time now at least since October 2009 notwithstanding the Court Order that was to expire on 15 April 2010 and that DOCS was aware of Child B’s care arrangements as acknowledged in its letter of 27 November 2009.DECISION16. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes that decision that from at least 28 October 2009 the applicant has had care of Child B.Letter from the Department of Human Services

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my view the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the AAT.Was the AAT’s decision irrational or illogical? In its submissions the second respondent accepts that what has been termed illogicality or irrationality on the part of a decision-maker raises a question of law. The leading Australian authority in this respect is the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611. There Crennan and Bell JJ observed:130. In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.131. What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. Similarly in that case Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J at [40] noted earlier comments of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224 recognising that a determination should not bear the defects of being irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds. Their Honours however observed that characterising a decision as bearing these defects is not to be done lightly (at [40]). The second respondent’s key submission against this ground of appeal is that the AAT made no finding that the applicant had an average of three days care per week of the child, and even if evidence was before the AAT that the child stayed with the applicant on average three nights per week this did not constitute three days per week and therefore more than 35% care. In my view however, this submission cannot be substantiated. As I observed earlier in this judgment, the reasons for decision of 6 May 2010 indicate that the AAT did accept that the child stayed with the applicant at least three nights per week as claimed by the applicant, Ms X and Mr Y. Any attempted distinction between the applicant caring for the child three days per week rather than three nights per week is hollow and artificial in the circumstances.