FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 1146
Citation: Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 1146 Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Confidential v Social Security Appeals Tribunal & Anor [2010] AATA 328 Parties: KAY CHRISTIANSEN v SOCIAL SECURITY APPEALS TRIBUNAL, NEALE GREGORY SUTTON and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: QUD 339 of 2010 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 22 October 2010 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for extension of time to lodge notice of appeal from decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) – appeal from that decision of the AAT – whether decision of the AAT should be set aside and remitted to the AAT – original dispute over entitlement of applicant to receive child support payments from the second respondent pursuant to the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) – second decision published by AAT following letter from the Department of Human Services – outcome of first AAT decision reversed by second AAT decision – principles relevant to exercise of Court’s discretion to extend time during which an appeal may be instituted against the AAT – whether AAT made error of law in failing to provide adequate reasons – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether AAT’s decision was irrational or illogical – principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 – whether AAT had power to make second decision – principles in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Held: extension of time granted for lodgment of notice of appeal from decision of the AAT, decision of AAT set aside and the matter remitted to the AAT to be decided according to law
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39, 43, 44
Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 5 Div 4, ss 5(3), 7B(1), 12(2AA), 48, 49, 50, 74
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)Cases cited: Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320 cited
Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 661 cited
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224 cited
Ramsay v Australian Postal Corporation (2005) 147 FCR 39 cited
Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457 cited
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 cited
Sagigi v Comcare [2009] FCA 385 cited
Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 1 ALD 383 citedCampbell E, “Revocation and Variation of Administrative Decisions” (1996) 22 Monash U L Rev 30
Downes AM, The Hon Justice Garry, “Finality of Administrative Decisions” Hartigan Memorial Lecture, Brisbane, 30 November 2005
Orr R and Briese R, “Don’t…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 1146
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's decision was irrational or illogical, and whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The court needed to determine whether the AAT's decision to reject evidence of the applicant's care for her child was justified and whether the AAT adequately explained its reasons for this decision. Additionally, the court had to consider if the AAT's rejection of evidence previously accepted was adequately explained.
The court found that the applicant was indeed denied procedural fairness by the AAT. The AAT had accepted evidence that the applicant had care of the child for an average of three nights per week, which constituted almost 43% care. However, in its later decision, the AAT rejected this evidence without providing a clear explanation. The court held that the AAT's rejection of this evidence was not adequately explained and that the AAT's reasons for its decision were inadequate. The court also noted that the AAT's decision to reject the evidence amounted to a denial of procedural fairness to the applicant.
In conclusion, the court granted the applicant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and set aside the AAT's decision. The matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration according to law. The court's decision highlighted the importance of providing clear and adequate reasons for rejecting evidence and the need for procedural fairness in administrative decision-making processes.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In my view the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the AAT.Was the AAT’s decision irrational or illogical? In its submissions the second respondent accepts that what has been termed illogicality or irrationality on the part of a decision-maker raises a question of law. The leading Australian authority in this respect is the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611. There Crennan and Bell JJ observed:130. In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.131. What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. Similarly in that case Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J at [40] noted earlier comments of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224 recognising that a determination should not bear the defects of being irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds. Their Honours however observed that characterising a decision as bearing these defects is not to be done lightly (at [40]). The second respondent’s key submission against this ground of appeal is that the AAT made no finding that the applicant had an average of three days care per week of the child, and even if evidence was before the AAT that the child stayed with the applicant on average three nights per week this did not constitute three days per week and therefore more than 35% care. In my view however, this submission cannot be substantiated. As I observed earlier in this judgment, the reasons for decision of 6 May 2010 indicate that the AAT did accept that the child stayed with the applicant at least three nights per week as claimed by the applicant, Ms X and Mr Y. Any attempted distinction between the applicant caring for the child three days per week rather than three nights per week is hollow and artificial in the circumstances.