Christensen v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)
[2024] QIRC 34
•13 February 2024
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
| CITATION: | Christensen v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 34 |
PARTIES: | Christensen, Sarah v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) |
CASE NO: | PSA/2023/106 |
PROCEEDING: | Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a directive decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 13 February 2024 |
HEARING DATE: MEMBER: HEARD AT: | On the papers McLennan IC Brisbane |
| ORDER: | Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the decision appealed against is confirmed. |
| CATCHWORDS: | PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY –appeal against a directive decision – appellant employed as a custodial correctional officer – where the respondent initiated a performance improvement plan – whether a decision was made to commence a structured process to manage the appellant's unacceptable work performance – whether the respondent complied with all of the conditions required to initiate a performance improvement plan – whether the decision to implement a performance improvement plan was fair and reasonable – where the decision to implement a performance improvement plan was fair and reasonable – the decision appealed against is confirmed |
| LEGISLATION & OTHER INSTRUMENTS: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562C Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 131, s 132, s 133 Directive 11/20 Individual employee grievances Directive 15/20 Positive performance management cl 5, cl 7 |
Reasons for Decision
Ms Sarah Christensen (the Appellant) is employed as a Custodial Correctional Officer with Queensland Corrective Services (the Service) at Wolston.
On 31 May 2023, Ms Christensen filed an appeal against a decision issued on 10 May 2023 by Mr Andrew Wilson, Acting Chief Superintendent, General Manager, Wolston Correctional Centre to initiate a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), under Directive 15/20 Positive performance management (Directive 15/20).[1]
[1] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023.
Chronology
A series of allegations, meetings and correspondence preceded that decision. A chronology is as follows:
8 November 2022 Ms Christensen alleged being "intimidated by a supervisor while working in an unlocked unit" and submitted that her complaint was not properly investigated.[2]
[2] Ibid Schedule A, [2].
9 November 2022 In a discussion between Ms Christensen and Mr Wilson, he alleged she called the supervisors in a derogatory way.[3]
[3] Ms Christensen denied that claim but “… based on his word against mine Andrew substantiated this. I find this to be very self-righteous that an allegation of hearsay can be substantiated by the only witness who also happens to be the one substantiating it.”; Appellant's submissions filed 19 June 2023, 2.
22 November 2022 Ms Christensen was provided a letter from Mr Wilson, advising her of the outcome of numerous complaints raised against her.[4]
[4] Respondent's submissions filed 30 June 2023, [2].
24 November 2022 Mr Wilson met with Ms Christensen to discuss her poor performance and expected level of performance.[5] The Appellant submitted that Mr Wilson alleged that she had "made several statements in a derogatory manner, used expletives and name calling while alleging corrupt behaviour without the provision of evidence or request for investigation." The outcome of the meeting was that Ms Christensen's work area would be altered from "Secure to Residential for an extended period."[6]
[5] Ibid [2].
[6] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, Schedule A, [3]-[4].
12 December 2022 Mr Wilson wrote to Ms Christensen regarding several allegations against her (however, she did not receive this "until after 8 February 2023 due to being away on leave during the month of December").[7]
[7] Ibid [5].
8 February 2023 Mr Wilson emailed Ms Christensen, requesting that she meet with him about the alleged conduct issues and his intention to initiate a PIP, pursuant to Directive 15/20.[8] Ultimately, that meeting did not occur until 19 April 2023 "after numerous rejections by the Appellant with the PIP having never been formally commenced."[9]
[8] Respondent's submissions filed 30 June 2023, [3].
[9] Ibid [3].
19 April 2023 Mr Wilson met with Ms Christensen, who was accompanied by a support person. At that time, Ms Christensen disputed the commencement of the PIP process.[10] Ms Christensen expressed her intention to lodge a grievance "on the basis that policy had not been followed and proper investigations had not been conducted in relation to the investigations against me." Mr Wilson agreed that the commencement of the PIP process would pause, to enable Ms Christensen to do so.[11]
27 April 2023 Mr Wilson emailed Ms Christensen to follow up on some matters she had raised about the PIP. Mr Wilson indicated that he had since spoken with "Employee Relations" and believed it was "fair and reasonable for him to initiate a PIP" pursuant to cl 7.3 of Directive 15/20. [12]
10 May 2023 Mr Wilson emailed Ms Christensen in which he "confirmed the decision to commence a PIP against me … and attached an updated PIP plan." That is the decision subject of this appeal.
[10] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, Schedule A, [6].
[11] Ibid [7].
[12] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, Schedule A, [8].
Notwithstanding her desire to do so, ultimately Ms Christensen submitted that she could not "lodge a grievance about the decision to implement a PIP against me"[13] because "a decision relating to a person's work performance" "cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance" under cl 6.1(d) of Directive 11/20 Individual employee grievances (Directive 11/20). That is correct.
[13] Ibid [10].
Type of decision being appealed
The Form 89 Appeal Notice invites an appellant to identify the "Type of decision being appealed". Page 2 of that form instructs an appellant to "Please choose one decision type only". In the Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, I note that the Appellant has ticked that she appeals "a directive decision". She has identified the "Name of Directive" to be: "Directive 15/20: Positive performance management".
However, Ms Christensen then goes on to also indicate on the form that she is not required to use the employer's individual grievance process before lodging the appeal, against "a fair treatment decision". While that perhaps indicates that Ms Christensen sought to appeal against both "a directive decision" and "a fair treatment decision", it may also have been done in error. That is unhelpful.
Relevant legislation
Section 131 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (PS Act) provides that an appeal may be made against "a directive decision"[14] or "a fair treatment decision"[15] but that "… if an appeal may be made under this section against a decision, other than under [a fair treatment decision], the appeal cannot be made under [a fair treatment decision]"[16].
[14] Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 131(1)(b).
[15] Ibid s 131(1)(d).
[16] Ibid s 131(2).
Section 133 of the PS Act prescribes who may appeal against particular types of decisions:
(b) for a directive decision – a public sector employee aggrieved by the decision if the employee is entitled to appeal under a directive;
…
(d) for a fair treatment decision – a public sector employee aggrieved by the decision;
Ms Christensen is a current public sector employee and aggrieved by the decision, given the fact of this appeal. The appeal notice was filed within the required 21-day period. She has standing to bring an appeal.
With respect to s 133(b) of the PS Act above, cl 7.6 of Directive 15/20 provides that "An employee may appeal a decision to take, or not take, action under this directive …" As Ms Christensen is able to appeal against "a directive decision", she is not also permitted to appeal against "a fair treatment decision", if it were in fact her intention to do so.
Further in support of that determination, s 132(4)(d) of the PS Act provides that:
A person can not appeal against a fair treatment decision –
…(d) relating to a person's work performance, other than a decision about the person's work performance that is recorded in a formal way as part of a periodic performance review; or
Example for paragraph (d) –
A decision about performance recorded in a person's performance development agreement as part of the person's 6-monthly or annual performance review
For the above reasons, I will consider this matter as an appeal made against "a directive decision."[17]
[17] Public Sector Act 2022(Qld) s 131(1)(b).
Appellant's submissions
Ms Christensen submitted that Mr Wilson's decision was not fair and reasonable because it was an act of reprisal,[18] unwarranted[19] and the correct procedure[20] for initiating a PIP (set out in Directive 15/20) had not been followed.
[18] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, Schedule A, [11].
[19] Ibid [11].
[20] Ibid [12].
With respect to the 'reprisal' argument, the Appellant submitted that:
·Ms Christensen stated that the various allegations made against her, that resulted in the PIP, were only made in retaliation to her initial complaint against a supervisor on 8 November 2022.[21]
·Ms Christensen said the complaints made against her were vexatious.[22]
[21] Ibid [6].
[22] Ibid [14].
With respect to the 'unwarranted' argument, the Appellant submitted that:
·Ms Christensen stated that the complaints made against her "… had not been investigated by Mr Wilson, either at all or to a sufficient extent and as a result of the deficient investigation the allegations remain unsubstantiated."[23]
[23] Ibid [6].
·Ms Christensen maintained that her level of work performance does not warrant a PIP. She submitted that:
Since having been deployed to Residential in November 2022, I have not faced any allegations or complaints, and have thoroughly demonstrated my ability to meet Code of Conduct requirements. Implementing a PIP is wholly unjustified where I have maintained good conduct within the workplace. In fact, had the PIP been implemented when intended (albeit unjustifiably) back in December, the proposed PIP period would be almost at an end …[24]
·However, Ms Christensen did later acknowledge that there in fact had been one negative interaction with staff since her move to Residential, "where I attempted to take up my post without issue in secure on an OT shift."[25]
[24] Ibid [13].
[25] Appellant's submissions filed 19 June 2023, 3.
With respect to the 'procedural' argument, the Appellant submitted that:
·Ms Christensen stated that she was She further submitted that:
… the alleged unacceptable work performance was not documented and discussed with me before the PIP was drafted, nor was I allowed a reasonable amount of time to address the conduct and correct the behaviour being complained of before being requested to sign the drafted PIP. As such, policy and procedure have not been complied with as required.
·However, Ms Christensen then later stated that:
Since November 8th, 2023 (sic), I have had a never-ending flow of emails from Mr Wilson, if I was to include all the correspondence, we would all be reading pages and pages of correspondence …[26]
[26] Ibid 3.
·Specifically, Ms Christensen noted "the following conditions which must be met before initiating a PIP", as contained in s 7.3 of Directive 15/20, "have not been fulfilled, along with the early intervention steps in the related checklist" (emphasis added): [27]
[27] Appeal Notice filed 31 May 2023, Schedule A, [15]
(c)the unacceptable work performance or the gap between the actual and expected work performance was previously raised, documented and discussed with the employee
(d)the employee was offered appropriate support and allowed a reasonable period of time to self-correct
·Ms Christensen also submitted the proposed PIP was of approximately 6 months duration,[28] which she submitted "exceeds the recommended timeframe of 12 weeks."[29]
·Ms Christensen stated: "At no stage has Mr Wilson attempted to mend the relationship with (the supervisor involved in the 8 November 2022 incident) nor has he provided any practical guidance to me or assistance. I have sought to set up mediation to resolve the conflict so I may resume duties in secure accommodation however this has yet to be facilitated nor do I feel Mr Wilson has any intention of making this happen."[30]
[28] Ibid [13].
[29] Ibid.
[30] Appellant's submissions filed 19 June 2023, 3.
Respondent's submissions
With respect to the 'fair treatment' aspect of the Appeal Notice, the Respondent submitted that:
·The decision subject of this appeal is the Respondent's decision to commence a structured process to manage unacceptable work performance through the initiation of a PIP, under cl 7 of Directive 15/20.[31]
[31] Respondent's submissions filed 30 June 2023, [7].
·The Appellant does not have jurisdiction to bring this appeal against "a fair treatment" decision because s 132(4)(d) of the PS Act does not permit it.[32] "The PIP was intended to be implemented on the basis of managing the Appellant's poor work performance in a structured process and not a result of a periodic performance review."[33]
·"… the Respondent intended to initiate the PIP on the basis of numerous genuine and substantiated complaints made against the employee for their conduct. Where there is substantiated evidence of poor performance, it can not be said that the intention to initiate a PIP was made as an act of reprisal."[34]
·The allegations resulting in the intention to initiate a PIP were adequately investigated.[35]
[32] See [11].
[33] Respondent's submissions filed 30 June 2023, [10].
[34] Ibid [12].
[35] Ibid [13].
With respect to the 'directive decision' aspect of the Appeal Notice, the Respondent submitted that:
·"As chief executive has not made a decision to commence a structured process to manage the Appellant's unacceptable work performance, no appealable decision under Directive 15/20 has been made, and there is consequently no decision that the Appellant is entitled to appeal."[36]
[36] Ibid [19].
·The Respondent has complied with all conditions required to initiate a PIP, under cl 7.3 of Directive 15/20.[37] That is:
[37] Ibid [20]-[25].
· The level of expected work performance was documented and provided to the Appellant on 22 November 2022 "by way of a letter which outlined the allegations substantiated against the Appellant, how the Appellant's work performance fell short of the expected level of work performance by failing to comply with the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service (the Code), provided the Appellant a copy of the relevant clauses of the Code, and outlined the performance expectations of the chief executive of the Appellant."
· On 24 November 2022, the gap between actual and expected work performance was raised, documented and discussed at a meeting between the Appellant and Mr Wilson.
· On 8 February 2023, the Appellant was provided with "a draft PIP alongside a meeting request to discuss the commencement of the PIP."
· The Appellant was provided with a reasonable period of time to self-correct prior to commencing the PIP. As the "conduct and underperformance demonstrates as an immediate action, rather than a pattern of work, a lesser period of time is required to self-correct."
The Respondent asserted that the Appellant does not have jurisdiction to appeal the fair treatment decision.
With respect to the appeal against a directive decision, the Respondent's position is that "a decision has not been made to commence a structured performance management, and in any event, the Respondent has complied with all requirements of Directive 15/20."
Consideration
The question to be decided is whether or not Mr Wilson's decision to initiate a PIP for Ms Christensen was fair and reasonable.
For the reasons above, the Appellant does not have jurisdiction to bring this matter as an appeal against a fair treatment decision. However I will proceed to consider it as an appeal against a directive decision.
Has a decision been made to commence a structured process to manage the Appellant's unacceptable work performance?
Ms Christensen has filed this appeal against a decision issued on 10 May 2023 by Mr Wilson to initiate a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Clearly then, Ms Christensen believes that 'a decision' has been made.
The point is significant because if there is 'no decision', then there is nothing that can be appealed. That is the Respondent's position, who submitted that:
A PIP begins at the point of time it commences, which is when the PIP practically has effect on the employee. Until the PIP commences, it has not begun, and therefore has not been initiated. Where a PIP has not been initiated, a final choice or judgement about its commencement has not been decided upon, and a decision cannot be said to have been made.[38]
[38] Ibid [18].
In my view, the Respondent's explanation unnecessarily complicates matters and rather muddies the issue. The question is not when the PIP commences, it is when the decision to initiate it is made. I do not accept that a decision has not been made until the PIP has actually commenced. Mr Wilson's email correspondence to Ms Christensen makes his decision clear, as the 10 May 2023 email reads (emphasis added):
Good morning Sarah,
I don't believe I have received any further response in respect to the PIP?
In the absence of a response my intention is to commence the plan from Monday the 22nd of May 2023. Please find attached an updated version of the plan for signing. Please return a signed copy before the scheduled commencement date.
Note I have removed from issue section the incident dated 24th of November 2023 at your request. This remains subject to further inquiries following our discussion on the 19th of April 2023 and your subsequent Officer Report. Correspondence on this matter will be forthcoming.
Pat will begin to schedule regular meetings as part of the plan.
As previously discussed, Converge is available on…[39]
[39] Correspondence from Mr A. Wilson, Acting Chief Superintendent, General Manager, Wolston Correctional Centre to Ms S. Christensen dated 10 May 2023 (the decision letter).
I find that Mr Wilson's email is a decision because it contains the following components:
·The date of commencement of the PIP;
·The updated version of the PIP;
·A request to sign the PIP before the commencement date; and
·That regular meetings will be scheduled, as part of the PIP.
At the point Mr Wilson formally communicates to Ms Christensen 'what is happening and when it will begin', it is a decision. Just as an Appellant in another matter type may appeal against a disciplinary penalty decision that has been communicated to them in writing, but has not yet been actioned, so too it is the case here. A decision has been made, the Appellant has been told, but the appeal is filed before the date of commencement. There is nothing unique in those circumstances.
For those reasons, I find that Mr Wilson's 10 May 2023 email to Ms Christensen contains a decision. It is able to be appealed.
Has the Respondent complied with all conditions required to initiate a PIP?
Directive 15/20 sets out the positive performance management principles and processes for managing employee work performance, including how unacceptable performance can be managed in a supportive way.[40]
[40] Directive 15/20 Positive performance management, cl 1 Purpose.
Clause 5.1 of Directive 15/20 expressly requires that the management of public sector employees be directed towards principles including (emphasis added):
…
(e) providing opportunities and support to employees for improving performance
(f) continuously improving performance through the provision of training and development
(g) identifying at the earliest possible stage performance that does not meet expectations
…
Clause 7.3 of Directive 15/20 prescribes the conditions that must be met before determining whether it is fair and reasonable to initiate a PIP. That is:
(a) the expected level of work performance for the role was documented and provided to the employee and the employee had a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate the expected level of work performance
(b) the expected level of work performance was relevant and appropriate to the role
(c) the unacceptable work performance or the gap between actual and expected work performance was previously raised, documented and discussed with the employee
(d) the employee was offered appropriate support and allowed a reasonable period of time to self-correct.
I find that Mr Wilson did comply with all conditions required to initiate a PIP because:
·The expected level of work performance for the role was documented and provided to Ms Christensen in the letter dated 22 November 2022. I accept the Respondent's submissions that the letter clearly outlined:[41]
[41] Respondent's submissions filed 30 June 2023, [21].
· the allegations substantiated against the Appellant, contained in pages 1-2 of that correspondence;
· how the Appellant's work performance fell short of the expected level of work performance by failing to comply with the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service (the Code), contained in pages 3-4 of that correspondence;
· provided the Appellant a copy of the relevant clauses of the Code, contained in pages 3-4 of that correspondence; and
· outlined the performance expectations of the chief executive of the Appellant, contained in page 4 of that correspondence.
·On 24 November 2022, the gap between actual and expected work performance was raised, documented and discussed at a meeting between Mr Wilson and Ms Christensen. That occurrence was referenced in the email from Mr Wilson dated 25 November 2022, subject 'CCO Sarah Christensen', attached to the Respondent's submissions.
·On 8 February 2023, Mr Wilson provided Ms Christensen with a draft PIP along with a meeting request to discuss the commencement of the PIP. That is evidenced by the email of the same date, attached to the Respondent's submissions.
· Although Ms Christensen stated that she was "not informed about the PIP nor offered an opportunity to discuss the allegations prior to the PIP being drafted in accordance with procedural requirements" - that assertion is contradicted by the documentary evidence of the emails and correspondence filed in this matter. So I cannot accept Ms Christensen's assertion. Further, Ms Christensen herself appears to contradict that claim, where she later complained of the "never-ending flow of emails from Mr Wilson"[42] about the matter.
[42] Appellant's submissions filed 19 June 2023, 3.
· I note that Ms Christensen was offered appropriate support, by way of the temporary move to Residential. In his 22 November 2022 correspondence, Mr Wilson sensitively explained why he decided to take management action to deploy her to the different working environment - and the mentoring support Ms Christensen was encouraged to pursue whilst located there. Mr Wilson said:
… You have acknowledged in conversations your often emotive responses and you have advised of seeking out mentorship from a current Residential Supervisor. Placing you in the Residential area will hopefully allow you to gain more mentoring from this person. After a period, and if the pattern of behaviour disappears, consideration of a return to Secure can be undertaken.
…
·Mr Wilson formally advised Ms Christensen of the outcome of various allegations on 22 November 2022, though it was not until 8 February 2023 that a draft PIP was raised and a meeting to discuss that was sought. As noted in the Chronology earlier in this Decision, that meeting did not occur until 19 April 2023 "after numerous rejections by the Appellant with the PIP having never been formally commenced." More time passed, as Mr Wilson permitted Ms Christensen to explore her rights to contest the initiation of a PIP as an Individual Employee Grievance (IEG), follow up on changes she sought to have made to the PIP, and consulted HR - until finally the decision to initiate the PIP was made on 10 May 2023. That is a very reasonable period of time to self-correct, particularly with the move from Secure to Residential. Notwithstanding that though, at least one further issue arose in that time that was consistent with the pattern of behaviour shown by Ms Christensen.
·Further evidence of Mr Wilson's fair-minded assessment of the allegations in the 22 November 2022 correspondence was to be found in his substantiation of only three of the six allegations, in circumstances where he considered there to be insufficient evidence. That is most appropriate.
·Further, I accept Mr Wilson's sound reasoning for identifying a six month PIP:
I have set a total review period for approximately 6 months due to continuous shift work and movement between centre rosters as this will allow you the best opportunity to improve your engagement with colleagues and Supervisors across the entire Centre.
With this plan in place you can be maintained on your scheduled rostered posts with suitable support in place.[43]
[43] Email from Mr Wilson to Ms Christensen (and others) dated 8 February 2023.
Was the decision to implement a PIP fair and reasonable?
Clause 7.1 and 7.2 of Directive 15/20 states that (emphasis added):
7.1 The process for managing unacceptable work performance must be supportive, directed to the positive performance management principles, and take into account factors (work and non-work related) that may be affecting the employee:
(a)Non-work related issues that may be affecting an employee could include personal circumstances that may be impacting their work performance (for example, domestic violence, family caring responsibilities, or a medical condition)
(b)Work-related issues that may be affecting an employee could include workload issues, workplace conflict or poor communication.
7.2 The chief executive may initiate a performance improvement plan (PIP) as a structured process to address unacceptable work performance where the chief executive considers it fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
Referring to the relevant period around the 8 November 2022 incident with a Supervisor, Ms Christensen submitted that she "had only just recently returned to full time hours after being diagnosed with adjustment disorder and remaining absent from the workplace for 7 months." She asserted that there had been no follow up or support upon her return to the workplace, and that this interaction "took a toll on my recovery and my return to work."[44] While Ms Christensen has not submitted any evidence of her medical condition and lengthy absence, that has not been contested by the Respondent. It is possible that condition may have contributed to Ms Christensen's apparent pattern of poor workplace conduct; however, I do not know the nature of her interactions with colleagues and supervisors before the 7 month absence. Without any medical evidence or report attesting to a connection between her condition and conduct, I simply cannot know.
[44] Appellant's submission filed 19 June 2023, 1.
Further to my consideration of that matter is the email exchange regarding a Reasonable Adjustment Agreement (RAA) filed by Ms Christensen on 21 July 2023. While the version of the RAA filed stated that Ms Christensen had a "Medical condition that causes difficulty with fatigue management", Ms Christensen had objected to that inclusion and refused to sign the form because "… I do not see anywhere in my medical documents which says that I have trouble with fatigue management. It states that my medication that I take at night makes me drowsy. If we could amend the form I will be happy to sign it."[45] For these reasons, it is not appropriate to assume that the pattern of poor conduct was related to Ms Christensen's medical condition.
[45] Email dated 17 October 2022 from Ms Christensen to Ms S. Smith, Manager Human Resources, Wolston Correctional Centre, filed 21 July 2023.
However, even if that were the case, the wording of cl 7.1 makes clear that such factors must be "taken in account" - that is not the same as saying that the presence of any of those factors absolve the employee subject of allegations, nor act as a bar to management actions of the type employed by Mr Wilson. In his 22 November 2022 correspondence, Mr Wilson expressed his concern about the potential impact of Ms Christensen's poor workplace conduct on "your own wellbeing and the wellbeing of others." Although Mr Wilson made the point gently, he has obligations to both Ms Christensen and Supervisors whose own wellbeing may be negatively affected by a pattern of disregard, disrespect and derogatory reference.
In addition to all that, it must be recognised that the particular workplace in question is a correctional facility. There are inherent and obvious risks in such settings, that elevate the significance of good communication and functional working relationships between colleagues and supervisors. As Mr Wilson astutely observed of Ms Christensen's "pattern of disregard and failure to show respect towards Supervisors" in the 22 November 2022 correspondence, her "engagement with several Supervisors has impacted your working relationship and resulted in several emotive interactions. These interactions are not conducive to a professional or productive working environment and potentially may be detrimental to the safety and good order of the area …" That is a most measured assessment of why management action was appropriate in this case.
In a five-page email dated 25 November 2022, Mr Wilson detailed his past and intended management of Ms Christensen's poor conduct - and recounted a meeting held with her about it. At the start of that account, Mr Wilson said:
Apologies for the lengthy email however the issue continues to grow and grow with repeated poor behaviour from Ms Christensen. Each time I sit down to scribe the events and present a management plan an additional incident occurs.
…
I have made attempts to pro-actively manage the personal conduct of Ms Christensen via repeated attempts to notify her and address unacceptable conduct. I have taken prompt action and yet we repeatedly are having to deal with Ms Christensen's outburst, vexatious allegations and multiple staff feeling threatened, intimidated and angered by her behaviour. Ms Christensen is taking up an exorbitant amount of time from her Supervisors, Manager and myself.Ms Christensen is about to commence a period of scheduled leave returning 20th of December 2022. It is my preference to have a show cause process and/or conduct plan in place for when she returns.
…While Ms Christensen certainly had some success in delaying the initiation of a PIP by various means in the period between her return from leave in late December 2022 and the decision of 10 May 2023, the implementation of a PIP is indeed warranted here. Mr Wilson's email dated 8 February 2023 chronicled numerous statements made by Ms Christensen in a meeting with him on 24 November 2022, in which she spoke of colleagues and Supervisors "in a derogatory manner, used expletives and name calling while alleging corrupt behaviour without the provision of evidence or request for investigation." The documentary evidence filed in this matter has consistently demonstrated Mr Wilson's commendable patience and careful attention to his obligations to faithfully apply the requirements of positive performance management, as contained in Directive 15/20.
Finally, Mr Wilson's decision of the 10 May 2023 revealed that he had engaged with Ms Christensen about the draft PIP, sought her feedback and made amendments to the document based on input received. That is evidenced by the following inclusions (emphasis added):
I don't believe I have received any further response in respect to the PIP?
…
Please find attached an updated version of the plan for signing.
…
Note I have removed from issue section the incident dated 24th of November 2023 at your request.
…
For the reasons explained above, I find Mr Wilson's 10 May 2023 decision to initiate a PIP for Ms Christensen was fair and reasonable.
I order accordingly.
Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the decision appealed against is confirmed.
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