Chris Conlon v Asciano Services Pty Ltd T/A Pacific National Pty Ltd

[2014] FWC 2127

[2014] FWC 2127

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Chris Conlon
v
Asciano Services Pty Ltd T/A Pacific National Pty Ltd
(U2013/10852)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT HAMBERGER SYDNEY, 15 MAY 2014

Termination of employment; application for relief from unfair dismissal.

[1] Mr Chris Conlon (the applicant) applied for an unfair dismissal remedy on 25 June 2013 in relation to the termination of his employment by Asciano Services Pty Ltd T/A Pacific National Rail (the respondent, Pacific National) on 19 June 2013.

[2] The letter confirming the respondent’s decision to terminate the applicant’s employment included the following:

‘This decision has been based on your involvement in the incident that occurred on 30 May 2013 in which the Steelink service 3XW4 was proceeding from Junee to Sydney Freight Terminal on the Up South Mainline when it passed signal YJ24 (Yass Jct Accept) at danger (“SPAD”). At the time the incident occurred you were the driver of the train. Pacific National has determined that your actions leading up to the incident seriously breached company policy, safety procedures and your obligations as a Rail Safety Worker under the provisions of the Rail Safety National Law (NSW), specifically that you:

● Failed to comply with DSN 11/03v2: Divisional Safety Notice
● Were driving the train at speeds exceeding the limits set out in DSN 11/03v2 at 2500m, 1000m, 500m, 50m, and Zero mark
● Failed to cross call, speed &/or distance
● Failed to identify stopping location
● Breached ARTC Procedure - ANSG 606 - Responding to signals & signs
● Breached ARTC Procedure - ANSG 608 - Passing Signal at Stop

Pacific National has taken this matter very seriously. Your actions caused serious and imminent risk to the health and safety of yourself, your co-driver and others. A head on collision with Train 5WM2 was approximately 120 seconds away (given the distance, gradient and speed that your train was travelling) and had the potential to result in multiple fatalities.

In reaching this decision we have also taken into consideration your response to the allegations and the matters raised by you including your length of service, age and personal circumstances. Before making the decision to terminate your employment as a qualified train driver, we actively sought to identify permanent non-driving positions as an alternative to termination; however, Pacific National does not currently have any such position available at Sydney Freight Terminal.

I note that the reasons for Pacific National’s decision have been discussed with you and you were given the opportunity to respond to this outcome before a final decision was made.’

[3] The application was referred to me for determination. Hearings were conducted on 3, 4 and 6 February 2014, with final submissions made at a hearing on 1 April 2014. The applicant was represented by M Barnes, solicitor and the respondent by Y Shariff, of counsel. The applicant gave evidence on his own behalf, along with his co-driver on 30 May 2013, Mr Chris Collison. Evidence was given on behalf of the respondent by:

● Mr Steven Baxter (Signal Manager, ARTC);
● Mr Gary Marshall (Acting Operations Supervisor, Sydney Freight Terminal);
● Mr Chris Graham (Operations Supervisor, Sydney Depot);
● Mr Brett Roberts (Operations Supervisor, Sydney Depot);
● Mr Greg Dougall (Sydney Depot Manager); and
● Mr Allan Cooper (National Linehaul Manager).

The applicant

[4] Mr Conlon is 63 years of age and left school before completing the School Certificate. He has worked in the rail industry for many years, commencing employment with National Rail in 1994, and subsequently for the respondent. He has been a train driver for about 30 years.

The events on 30 May 2013

[5] The applicant and Mr Collison were driving freight train 3XW4 from Junee to Sydney, departing Junee at approximately 7:55am. 1 The two men were responsible for driving the train at different points of the journey.2 The applicant had driven the trip regularly and had been assessed as able to identify the known hazards and obstacles along the route.3 He had never complained about being able to see signals 201.0 or YJ24 at Yass Junction.4 He had been required in the past to stop at signal YJ24.5

[6] Mr Graham said in his statement that he would expect a route qualified driver like the applicant to be fully conversant with all known locations and controlled signals on the route in question, as well as the locations where crossings might take place and the signals approaching these locations. 6

[7] The journey was largely uneventful until the applicant was the driver and the train was approaching Yass. 7 The applicant went through signal 201.0 without noticing it was at yellow (‘at caution’). If a signal is at yellow, one enters a safety critical zone and the driver is required to modify the way he drives the train.8 The procedure for driving in a safety critical zone is set out in Divisional Safety Notice 11/03 (V2) (DSN 11/03 (V2)).9 In his statement the applicant expressed some scepticism that the signal was at yellow.

[8] The applicant acknowledged that neither he nor Mr Collison called out signal 201.0 or brought it to one another’s attention. ‘If it was seen by either of us as yellow you would call out words to the effect “one only, driver.”‘ 10 During cross-examination, the applicant agreed that as he was approaching the signal he was not as alert as he was required to be.11 He also agreed that he did not see signal 201.0 and that whether it was actually at yellow or not could not excuse his failing to observe the signal.12

[9] According to the applicant’s statement, at about this time Mr Collison was preparing food and drink for himself at the front console of the drivers’ cabin and was still in the process of eating his meal at the time of the SPAD (that is, when they went through the red light at Yass Junction). 13 During his cross-examination he agreed that when one has a co-driver who is attending to duties of that kind it places the driver on higher alert.14

[10] Mr Collison said in his statement that:

‘There is an obligation for both the driver and the co-driver to keep a lookout for signals however you are entitled whilst driving as the co-driver to prepare a meal or get a drink.... however if you are in a safety critical zone you are not permitted to do those things.... For myself I believe leading up to signal 201.0 I was preparing my meal or eating my meal when I saw the red at YJ24.’ 15

[11] The applicant agreed that he was doing approximately 60 kilometres an hour when the train approached the signal at Yass Junction (YJ24). 16 The applicant said during his cross-examination that one could see signal 201.0 from 400 metres away.17 He agreed that with 400 metres that would have given him roughly between 25 and 30 seconds to see signal 201.0.18 He had missed it - he claimed - because he was looking at the FreightMiser. During his cross-examination, Mr Collison agreed that any adjustments to the FreightMiser would only take a few seconds.19

[12] According to Mr Graham’s statement:

‘When using the FreightMiser a driver would usually input their destination and train details (such as the load) at the start of the trip. The system provides advice on the recommended speed to reach a destination at the calculated arrival time. The FreightMiser is an advice only system with no time critical input required from the driver. It also provides a graphical representation of the train’s current location and the location of approaching signals. I do not think the fact the Applicant was checking the FreightMiser provides him with a legitimate excuse for not sighting signal 201.0. It is not necessary for drivers to adjust the FreightMiser while they are driving. Even if the Applicant did adjust or check this device it would only take a couple of seconds at most.’ 20

[13] Having missed signal 201.0 at yellow, the train was travelling at 60 kilometres an hour in a ‘safety-critical zone’ driving with full power. 21 The applicant was still driving at around 60 kilometres an hour 500 metres from signal YJ24, though he had throttled down as he was now coming down a hill. More caution must be exercised when approaching a signal at ‘stop’ on a downgrade section of track compared with approaching a signal on the uphill section of track, as it is much more difficult to control a train when it is travelling downhill than when it is travelling uphill.22²³ Mr Collison’s evidence is that the applicant should have slowed the train down once he realised he had missed signal 201.0.24

[14] Based on photographs tendered during the proceedings, it is clear that signal YJ24 is visible from at least 500 metres away 25. As one proceeds along the track the signal is briefly obscured by vegetation, but the evidence of Mr Roberts - who had verified the relevant distances after the incident - is that YJ24 becomes visible again at least 300 to 350 metres out.26

[15] There are two signals at Yass Junction that are opposite one another each side of the track. On the driver’s left there is a signal that regulates the track that the train was on, and another signal on the driver’s right, on the opposite side of the track, that is usually at red and does not regulate the track that the train was on. The applicant said in his statement that while he was driving the train his eyes were initially drawn to the signal on the other track and he was processing that signal and coming to the conclusion that it was irrelevant to him when he realised that the signal on his left that did regulate his train was also red. 27

[16] In his initial signed statement he stated the following:

‘At about the same time that I was processing that information my co-driver called out that there was a red light (the term used was “all on driver”). I applied the emergency brakes and I agree that the front of the train went approximately 4 engine lengths (84 metres) past the signal YJ24. This was at 11:23 am.’  28

[17] At the hearing, the applicant changed this to the following:

‘On seeing the signal was at red I commenced to apply the emergency brakes and whilst in the process of doing that my co-driver called out there was a red signal (the term used was “all on driver”). I agree the front of the train went approximately 4 engine lengths (84 metres) past the signal YJ24. This was at 11:21 am, that the SPAD was recorded to have occurred.’

[18] The applicant agreed that he did not apply the emergency brakes until 204 metres from signal YJ24. 29 This is despite acknowledging that he could see YJ24 from about 320 metres away.30

[19] During his cross-examination he agreed that he could provide no plausible explanation for his conduct and that the respondent had ‘enough reason’ to think he ‘had blank spots for which there were no explanations.’ 31

[20] Mr Collison said that as they were coming down and around the hill and approaching YJ24 he saw that the signal was at stop and called to the applicant ‘Stop. All on.’ 32

[21] Mr Collison said in his statement:

‘I sensed that the Applicant was already beginning to respond but then he took the necessary steps he had to take and that was to apply the emergency brake.’ 33

[22] During his examination-in-chief Mr Collison said:

‘I called the signal and as I looked across to the applicant, he was already in the process of applying the brakes. I have never intended to say that he was applying the brakes in response to me calling the signal and that is not my belief as to what happened.’ 34

[23] During his cross-examination, Mr Collison re-iterated that his calling the signal and Mr Conlon applying the brakes occurred ‘pretty much all at the same time.’ 35

[24] Mr Graham said in his statement:

‘Based upon my analysis of the download of the data from the train I am of the opinion that the Applicant failed to follow DSN 11/03 (V2) because:

a) he failed to see that signal 201.0 was at ‘caution’ and reduce the speed of the train accordingly;

b) he failed to see that signal YJ24 was at ‘stop’ and only applied the emergency brakes when his co-driver Mr Collison alerted him to this fact;

c) he caused the train he was driving to pass signal YJ24 at ‘stop’ resulting in a SPAD.’ 36

[25] After coming to a stop, Mr Collison rang ARTC’s Control Centre in Junee and they were advised to stay where they were. The applicant rang Sydney Driver Operations Supervisor and spoke to Brett Roberts and told him of the SPAD. 37 Once relieved, Mr Collison and the applicant travelled by car to the Sydney Freight Terminal at Chullora. The applicant was told that he would be stood down with pay pending the outcome of an investigation.38

[26] The applicant was then interviewed by the Operations Supervisor, Mr Chris Graham, The record of interview included the following:

‘While traversing the section from Bowning towards Yass I was adjusting the Freight Miser to gain optimum fuel efficiency which may have distracted my sighting of the signal automatic 201.0.

Chris and I have a habit of cross calling signals at all locations, but on this occasion we failed to do so.

As the train approached the overhead bridge (Hume Hwy), I drove the train according to the freight miser.

As we crested the grade and approached signal YJ24 its view was obstructed by the bend.

On sighting the signal I noted the signal was at Stop, I went to emergency to bring the train to stand as quickly as possible.

The train stopped approx four engine lengths (88 metres) past YJ24. I was incredibly annoyed that this situation had occurred....’ 39

[27] In the record of the interview with Mr Collison that day, he was recorded as saying, inter alia:

‘I did not see the Automatic signal 201.0 as I was preparing my lunch.

I noted going up the hill towards the McDonald’s and under the Hume Hwy. I had missed seeing the signal 201.0, Chris was driving as per normal but had not called any signal indication to me. So I took the situation as being alright.

We over the hill (sic) approaching YJ24 and noted it was at Stop we were approximately 500 metres away. And I called the signal at Stop.

Chris Conlon applied the emergency brake but the train was unable to stop in time.’ 40

[28] Mr Graham prepared a ‘72 Hour incident Investigation Report’ on 31 May 2013. This showed, inter alia, that Signal YJ24 was passed at a speed of 40 km/h and the train came to a stand approximately 90 metres beyond the signal. 41 He also prepared a Data Logger Analysis Report on 5 June 2013. 42 These reports included times and distances taken from and recorded by the data logger on the locomotive the applicant was driving at the time of the incident. A data logger is a tamper resistant event recorder which is fitted on a locomotive to record certain control actions, such as the speed, date and time.43

[29] This data was then used to prepare a Class 3 Incident Investigation Report. 44 This report was attached to a letter to the applicant from Mr Dougall (Sydney Depot Manager) to the applicant on 12 June 2013. It also noted that:

• ‘Controlled Signal YJ24 was in the Stop position protecting the interlocking at Yass Jct. Train 5WM2 was sitting approximately 2,200 meters beyond signal YJ24 on the Up Main Line facing in the Down direction. This allowed for the Down XPT on the Down Main Line to overtake Train 5WM2. The potential for Head on collision with 5WM2 on the Up Main Line was high.’ 45

[30] In his statement Mr Graham said:

‘If Mr Collison had not alerted the Applicant to the fact that signal YJ24 was at ‘stop’ the train could have proceeded further along the track and had a collision with another vehicle as train 5WM2 was sitting approximately 2200 metres further along the same track. 46

[31] In his statement, the applicant said:

‘One of the arguments that kept being advanced against me was raised on more than one occasion on 3 June was that there was this high risk of a collision and risk of injury to persons and life. I am not cavalier or indifferent to issues of safety and I’m certainly not suicidal. What happened is that I have had a SPAD and the train has stopped. There was no imminent risk of hitting another vehicle or occasioning any property damage once the vehicle had stopped. The situation was immediately under control.

If I had not stopped when I did and assuming some reason that the train kept proceeding and that there had been no further intervention by myself or the co-driver there were other safety steps that would have come into effect. These included:

a) The operation of the vigilance control. If the driver does not press it within 90 seconds the emergency brakes will apply. The only thing that stops that event occurring is either you adjust the train controls or press the vigilance control.

b) The layout of the track itself and range of vision coming into Yass. I would estimate the co-driver and myself, had the train continued to proceed, would have had the better part of 2 km of vision down to Yass Station. It clearly would have been available to see a further signal at red and a train on my track. On the basis of the Respondent’s figures I estimate that co-driver and myself had the best part of 2 km of vision and would have been able to pull the train up in under 400 m.’ 47

[32] In his statement, Mr Graham responded:

‘The vigilance control system is an alarm system. Roughly every 90 seconds a driver will receive a warning and has to press a button to keep the train moving. The system was designed as a safety precaution to avoid accidents which are caused by drivers falling asleep at the wheel. The vigilance control system does not take effect when a train has passed a signal at stop, it only takes effect if the driver does not push the button. It is true that if the Applicant and Mr Collison were for some reason incapacitated, the vigilance control system would take effect at some point and stop the train. I do not believe that this is relevant considering that neither the Applicant nor Mr Collison were incapacitated at the time of the Yass incident. Furthermore, if Mr Collison had not alerted the Applicant to the fact that signal YJ 24 was at ‘stop’ and the Applicant had continued to drive the train, he would have kept pressing the button and the vigilance control system would not have taken effect....

It is possible that, if the Applicant had not stopped the train when he did, he may have seen signal YJ20 at ‘stop’ further down the track and stopped the train before a collision occurred. However, it is unlikely this would have occurred because:

i. the Applicant had not been properly looking at the signals of the track;

ii. it would have taken the Applicant a longer period of time to stop the train once it had passed signal YJ24 because the train’s speed would have increased to approximately 80 km an hour as the train was now on a downhill section of track;

iii. there was only approximately 260 m between signal YJ20 (the signal after signal YJ24) and the train 5MW2;

iv. Boorowa bridge would have obscured the Applicant’s view of the track and train 5MW2 and;

v. I estimate it would have taken the Applicant 600 m to stop the train in time, assuming the Applicant had kept a proper lookout and saw signal YJ20 at ‘stop’ or train 5MW2 ahead.’  48

[33] In his statement, the applicant said that the SPAD would have set off a warning signal in the ARTC control room in Junee. The ARTC would have then contacted the applicant and the co-driver as a matter of urgency. This would have meant that it would have been ‘remote in the extreme’ for him to have continued without any interruption or intervention to hit the train at Yass. 49

[34] Mr Graham said in his statement:

‘... the time it would take the ARTC to contact a driver in these circumstances would depend on when an ARTC train controller actually saw the SPAD alert and how quickly the train controller at the Network Control Centre at South Junee was able to react to the situation. In this particular incident ... ARTC Control was not aware of this SPAD until Mr Collison informed the train controller after the train had stopped. Notwithstanding that the Applicant may have received such a warning, it is still possible that a collision could have occurred given the time it would take for a warning to be sent through, the time it would take the Applicant to react, the fact the Applicant was travelling downhill towards Yass and the fact there was another train only 2200 metres away on the same track.’ 50

Meeting on 3 June 2013

[35] On 3 June 2013 an ‘investigative interview’ was conducted with the applicant, by Mr Dougall, Mr Roberts, and Mr Graham. The record of interview was attached to Mr Dougall’s statement. 51 The applicant was accompanied by Mr David Mathie, an experienced driver and RTBU representative. The record of interview shows that the applicant was asked to describe the sequence of events leading up to and missing signal 201.0. He responded that he was preoccupied with FreightMiser. He indicated that he was familiar with the route in question, and had had to stop at YJ24 previously. He was asked how much sight one normally had of YJ24 and replied around 400-500 metres. When asked what he was doing between 500 metres from the YJ24 and Mr Collison calling the signal he replied (according to the record of interview):

‘I don’t know I was looking for the signal.’

[36] The applicant was told that there were three key areas in question:

• No cross-calling;



• No defensive driving;



• DSN not adhered to.

[37] The applicant was given the opportunity to ask any questions, but declined to do so 52. A separate interview was conducted with Mr Collison. Following the interviews the 72 Hour Report, the Data Logger Analysis Report and the Class 3 Investigation Report were prepared.

Meeting and letter of 12 June 2013

[38] A further meeting was held on 12 June 2013, when the applicant was given a letter which outlined the allegations against him. 53 As well as outlining the various policies and procedures that the applicant was alleged to have breached, the letter included the following:

‘The company has calculated that signal 201.0 (showing caution) was visible for approximately 450 metres and that both you and the co-driver failed to see the signal. Furthermore, YJ24 signal (showing stop) was visible for approximately 500 meters, however you did not see this signal and the co-driver called signal at stop. Some 20 seconds after YJ24 became visible, you applied the emergency brakes. Once the emergency brakes were applied the train came to a standstill approximately 84 metres past signal YJ24.

The likely and potential consequences of this event could have been catastrophic. Train 5WM2 was sitting approximately 2,200 meters beyond signal YJ24 on the Up Main Line facing in the Down direction. The potential for a head on collision with 5WM2 on the Up Main Line was high.

Pacific National takes this matter very seriously. In accordance with Pacific National Intermodal Train Crew Enterprise Agreement 2009 clause 24.2, you are required to respond to the allegations set out above. You are to respond to me in writing outlining the reasons for you conduct and any other matters you believe should be considered and deliver your response to me...by no later than 5:00pm on Friday 14th June 2013.’

The applicant’s response and the decision to terminate

[39] The applicant responded in writing on 14 June 2013. He said that he did not believe DSN 11/2 (V2) was applicable ‘as even though we did not see signal 201.0 we had no reason to believe signal YJ24 would be at stop as we had spoken to Junee Control... at 0919 and nothing was said about the possibility of crossing any trains at Yass.’ He also denied the potential consequence would have been catastrophic, saying that he was looking for the signal and did bring the train to a stop, without damage to infrastructure, rolling stock or time lost to any other services. He said that he was seriously disappointed at himself that he did not see the caution signal and then did not get ‘a direct view of signal YJ24 at stop.’ He apologised and asked that his long and loyal service be taken into account in determining his punishment. 54

[40] After having considered the applicant’s response 55, the respondent considered whether he should be found a suitable non driving role, given his remorse, service and age.56 However no such roles were available, and the decision was made to terminate the applicant’s employment.57

Other SPADs

[41] SPADs do not always lead to dismissal. According to Mr Graham, there were around one or two SPADs in relation to the respondent’s operations at the Chullora Depot a year. 58 Indeed the applicant himself had been involved with a previous SPAD in January 2012 at Port Kembla. The applicant passed a signal by five to ten centimetres, but was not disciplined as he had a high fatigue score.59

[42] Evidence was presented concerning two SPADs. One was at Forbes on 24 March 2013 where a Pacific National train 5PS6 passed signal X MLI which was at stop and entered onto and crossed the Newell Highway. 60 Both train drivers were given a written warning rather than being dismissed.61 The decision not to dismiss the drivers was taken by Mr Cooper. His evidence was that this decision was taken because the driver displayed a reasonable level of due diligence - in particular all possible actions were taken by the driver to stop the train once the signal became visible.62

[43] The second incident took place at Moss Vale on 14 August 2013. 63 In that case the driver and co-driver incorrectly identified the stopping location.64 They were both given a warning.65

Consideration

[44] In considering whether the dismissal of the applicant by the respondent was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, I must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the applicant’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and

(b) whether the applicant was notified of that reason; and

(c) whether the applicant was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to his capacity or conduct; and

(d) any unreasonable refusal by the respondent to allow the applicant to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and

(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the applicant had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and

(f) the degree to which the size of the respondent’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.

[45] The applicant was dismissed on the grounds of his conduct on 30 May 2013, as set out in his letter of termination.

[46] The applicant was an experienced train driver, driving a very heavy freight train, on 30 May 2013. He was very familiar with the route he was driving. Nevertheless, he failed to see two safety signals: 201.0, which was at ‘caution’, and YJ24, which was at ‘stop’.

[47] In relation to 201.0, the applicant failed to see the signal at all. This is despite his familiarity with the route, the considerable length of time the signal was visible and the fact that he knew his co-driver was otherwise occupied preparing and eating his lunch. Any attention the applicant needed to give to FreightMiser at this time should have only taken a few seconds.

[48] In relation to YJ24, the applicant failed to see the signal when it first became visible at around 500 metres, or when it became visible again at about 350 metres out. He did not apply the emergency brakes until 204 metres from the signal, resulting in the train not stopping until it was over 80 metres past the signal. Despite the revised statements made on the day of the hearing by the applicant and Mr Collison, it is unlikely that that the latter would have called for the train to stop if the applicant had already started applying the brakes. My conclusion, based on all the evidence, including what the applicant and Mr Collison had told the respondent prior to the applicant’s dismissal, is that the applicant only applied the brakes after Mr Collision had called for him to do so. Indeed, given that the signal was clearly visible well before he applied the emergency brake, the evidence suggests that the applicant had made little if any effort to look for the signal. Moreover, the applicant had taken no action to alter the speed of the train prior to applying the emergency brakes - even though on his own testimony he had realised by this time that he had missed signal 201.0.

[49] I am satisfied that the failure of the applicant to see the two signals meant there was a serious risk of a head-on collision with a train further down the track.

[50] Involvement in a SPAD does not necessarily justify dismissal. The evidence is that the respondent quite appropriately makes decisions about what disciplinary sanction to apply when SPADs occur based on the particular circumstances of the case.

[51] Looking out for signals and adjusting the speed of the train in accordance with those signals is one of the most fundamental aspects of a train driver’s duties. The applicant failed to comply with this duty on 30 May 2013, for no good reason. This created a significant risk of a serious accident. It is also enough to raise a genuine doubt as to whether the applicant could be relied upon to drive safely into the future. The respondent had a valid reason for dismissing the applicant based on his conduct.

[52] The applicant was notified of the respondent’s concerns, including in the letter of 12 June 2013. He was given - and took - the opportunity to respond to those concerns, in writing. He was given the opportunity to have a support person present at the meetings leading up to his dismissal. The procedures adopted by the respondent in relation to the applicant’s dismissal were consistent with the size and sophistication of the respondent.

[53] I have taken into account the applicant’s age and work experience. There is no doubt that the dismissal of the applicant has had very significant consequences for him. However, in the all the circumstances of this case, I do not consider that the dismissal of the applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

M Barnes, solicitor for the applicant

Y Shariff, of counsel for Asciano Services Pty Ltd T/AS Pacific National Rail

Hearing details:

2014

3, 4, 6 February

1 April

 1   Exhibit C1, paragraphs 8-10

 2   Exhibit C1, paragraph 15

 3   PN338 - 349

 4   PN331-332

 5   PN456

 6   Exhibit PN6

 7   Exhibit C1, paragraph 20

 8   Exhibit C8, paragraph 19

 9   Exhibit C1, attachment D

 10   Exhibit C1, paragraph 34

 11   PN418

 12   PN616

 13   Exhibit C1, paragraph 35

 14   PN416

 15   Exhibit C8, paragraphs 20-21, 28

 16   Exhibit C1, paragraph 36

 17   PN371

 18   PN491

 19   PN1114

 20   Exhibit PN6, paragraph13

 21   PN503-505

 22  

23 Exhibit PN6, paragraph 12

 24   PN1337

 25   Exhibit PN5

 26   PN3537

 27   Exhibit C1, paragraph 38

 28   Exhibit C8, paragraph 37

 29   PN623-624

 30   PN631

 31   PN637-638

 32   Exhibit C8, paragraph 36

 33   Exhibit C8, paragraph 37

 34   PN1069

 35   PN1244

 36   Exhibit PN6, paragraph 15

 37   Exhibit C1, paragraphs 42-43

 38   Exhibit C1, paragraphs 45-47

 39   Exhibit C1, attachment C

 40   Exhibit C8, attachment A

 41   Exhibit PN6, attachment 1

 42   Exhibit PN6, attachment2

 43   Exhibit PN6, paragraph 15

 44   Exhibit C8, attachment D

 45   Exhibit C1, attachment D

 46   Exhibit PN6, paragraph 21

 47   Exhibit C1, paragraphs 57-58

 48   Exhibit PN6, paragraph 22

 49   Exhibit C1, paragraphs 61-62

 50   Exhibit PN6, paragraph 23

 51   Exhibit PN8, attachment 2

 52   Exhibit C1, paragraph 54

 53   Exhibit C1, attachment D

 54   Exhibit C1, attachment E

 55   Exhibit PN8, paragraph 13

 56   Exhibit PN8, attachment D

 57   Exhibit PN9, paragraph 12

 58   PN3080

 59   Exhibit C1, paragraph 66

 60   Exhibit C1, attachment J

 61   Exhibit PN9, paragraph 19

 62   PN4204

 63   Exhibit PN9, attachment 7

 64   PN3127

 65   PN3176

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