Chowdhury v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 918
•17 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Chowdhury v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 918
File number(s): SYG 1253 of 2020
SYG 1254 of 2020
SYG 1255 of 2020
SYG 1258 of 2020
SYG 1259 of 2020
SYG 1260 of 2020Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 17 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – related applications for judicial review of decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal’s finding that a claim of mistaken identity was unsupported overlooked support for the claim in Australian Border Force records before the Tribunal – whether findings regarding inconsistencies were open – whether the Tribunal considered other evidence that was before it – materiality – writs issued Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 5.19 Cases cited: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 50 Date of last submission/s: 5 May 2025 Date of hearing: 27 March 2025 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicants: Ms T Baw Solicitor for the Applicants: LMP Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N L Gollan Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 1253 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MD HUMAYON KABIR CHOWDHURY
First Applicant
NURUN NAHER
Second Applicant
MD SHAKIL MAHMUD CHOWDHURY (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 8 May 2020 in case number 1801324.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
ORDERS
SYG 1254 of 2020 BETWEEN: MOHAMMED MURAD HOSSAIN
First Applicant
QUMRUN NAHAR LIZA
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 8 May 2020 in case number 1732045.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
ORDERS
SYG 1255 of 2020 BETWEEN: MD SOHEL RANA
First Applicant
MOSAMMAT AYSHA AKTHER SEULY
Second Applicant
SAFWAN RANA (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 8 May 2020 in case number 1820868.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
ORDERS
SYG 1258 of 2020 BETWEEN: KAKADU KIMBERLY FASHION WEAR PTY LTD ATF CHOWDHURY FAMILY TRUST
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 22 April 2020 in case number 1732042.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
ORDERS
SYG 1259 of 2020 BETWEEN: KAKADU KIMBERLY FASHION WEAR PTY LTD ATF CHOWDHURY FAMILY TRUST
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 22 April 2020 in case number 1726623.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
ORDERS
SYG 1260 of 2020 BETWEEN: KAKADU KIMBERLY FASHION WEAR PTY LTD ATF CHOWDHURY FAMILY TRUST
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 22 April 2020 in case number 1816686.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING:
Before the Court are 6 related applications for judicial review of decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) (as it was). In 3 of those decisions (in SYG 1258 of 2020, SYG 1259 of 2020 and SYG 1260 of 2020), the Tribunal affirmed decisions declining approval of nominations under r 5.19 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). In the other 3 of those decisions (SYG 1255 of 2020, SYG 1254 of 2020 and SYG 1253 of 2020), the Tribunal affirmed decisions declining to grant visas to the applicants in those matters.
There is substantial overlap between the reasoning in the nomination decisions. The visa application decisions depended upon the fate of the nomination decisions. The parties therefore focussed upon whether jurisdictional error was established in relation to one of the nomination decisions, namely, SYG 1260 of 2020. The parties agreed that if such error were established, then it would be established in all of the related matters due to the overlap in reasoning in the nomination decisions and the interconnectedness of the nomination and visa application decisions. If such error were not established, then it was agreed that the related review applications would be dismissed.
The reasoning below, therefore, focusses upon the Tribunal’s decision in SYG 1260 of 2020 unless otherwise stated. For the following reasons, I accept that the Tribunal’s decision in that matter was affected by jurisdictional error. It follows that the decisions in each of the related matters will be quashed, with the matters remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal to be reconsidered according to law.
BACKGROUND
The applicant in SYG 1260 of 2020 (Applicant) applied for approval of the nomination on 8 June 2017.
On 4 June 2018, a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refused the nomination application on the basis that it did not satisfy r 5.19(3) of the Regulations. The Delegate found that there was adverse information known about the nominator and that it was not reasonable to disregard this information.
On 7 June 2018, the Applicant applied for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
On 22 April 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal observed that the issue before it was whether the Applicant met the requirements for approval of the nomination set out in r 5.19(3) of the Regulations (at [14]). That provision relevantly required that there be “no adverse information known to Immigration about the nominator or a person associated with the nominator” or that it be “reasonable to disregard any adverse information”.
The Tribunal considered at [27]:
27.There is evidence before the Tribunal regarding the nominator that may be considered adverse. In submissions provided to the Tribunal on 13 February 2020 and the delegate’s decision record of 4 June 2017, the applicant voluntarily disclosed to the Tribunal that on the 21 August 2017 the Department barred the applicant from being an approved sponsor under section 140M (2) of the Act for two years (from 21 August 2017 until 21 August 2019), as it was found the applicant failed pursuant to regulation 2.89 to satisfy sponsorship obligation Regulation 2.86 - Obligation to ensure primary sponsored person works or participates in nominated occupation, program or activity.
The Tribunal found that the sponsorship bar constituted “adverse information” and that the Applicant therefore did not satisfy r 5.19(3)(g)(i) of the Regulations. The Tribunal proceeded to consider whether it was reasonable to disregard the information (at [31]-[33]).
The Tribunal reasoned (at [35]-[44]):
35.Based on the evidence before it and the oral evidence provided at the hearing, the Tribunal acknowledges that the action taken by the Department was in relation to finding the applicant breached their sponsorship obligations concerning the sponsorship of two 457 visa holders including the nominee Mr Md Sohel Rana. The Department found that the applicant failed to ensure that the 457 visa holders were employed in their respective nominated occupations.
36.At the hearing the applicant told the Tribunal that the Department erred and the Department Officers conducting the onsite inspection did not, contrary to their advice, interview Messrs Rana and Hossain. The applicant purports that Messrs Rana and Hossain were not present at the time of the onsite inspection and as such could not have been interviewed by the Department Officers. The applicant told the Tribunal that it was an error of judgement by the Department in that the persons interviewed by the Department were not the 457 visa holders but in fact Australian citizens. The Tribunal notes that the applicant despite claiming the Department erred in their decision, did not lodge an application for review with the Tribunal citing that by the time such a review was heard by the Tribunal the bar period would have lapsed and that he did not intend to sponsor others.
37.The Tribunal has considered the applicant's submissions. However, considering these along with the policy factors that the Tribunal may take into account when deciding whether it is reasonable to disregard the adverse information, there is no persuasive information before the Tribunal on why the adverse information should be disregarded.
38.The Tribunal is of the view that a two-year sponsorship bar is significant administrative action taken against the applicant. Information before the Tribunal shows that the Department held concerns that the failure of the obligation in relation to these two visa holders likely occurred over an extended period of time and that there was no evidence before the Department that the nominated positions ever genuinely existed.
39.The Tribunal notes the representative’s submission in which he claims that the incident occurred in 2015 however evidence before the Tribunal shows that monitoring did not commence until 21 March 2017 of which at the time, the applicant was advised via the Department sending a Commencement of Monitoring Letter (CoML). An unannounced site visit was conducted on 8 June 2017 during which the Department observed the 457 visa holders working as console operators.
40.In his Statutory Declaration signed and declared on 2 April 2012 [sic] the nominator acknowledges that the visa holders were working in the store during the holy month of Ramadan and due to a critical shortage of staff he relied upon the visa holders to fill the critical shortage of staff and they took on the extra responsibilities for the business and returned to their ordinary routine after the celebration. This statement is contrary to the evidence provided to the Tribunal at the hearing and in the applicant’s representative’s submission of 7th April in which it is asserted that the Department erred in that “It was based on circumstantial evidence from the site investigation, factually neither of them was working in store especially as console operators at the time. There is no evidence to prove that they are working or has been working as console operators.”
41.The applicant further submits that the Department mistook the identity of a staff member working the console. In the absence of collaborative evidence to support the applicant’s claims of mistaken identity, the Tribunal affords little weighting to these assertions and is satisfied the Department would have taken appropriate steps to verify the identity of persons present on site and interviewed on the day the site visit occurred…
43.The Tribunal acknowledges the nominee Mr Md Sohel Rana and his family have been in Australia and that he has worked for his brother in law, for a considerable period. It is unfortunate that the nominee will suffer adversely as a result of a decision to affirm and the applicant will lose an employee, nonetheless the applicant and the Tribunal must deal with the relevant legislation applicable to the matter before it.
44.The Tribunal has considered the information before it, in regard to action taken by the Department in barring the applicant from making further applications/nominations with the Department for a period of two years (effective from 21 August 2017 to 21 August 2019). The Tribunal has given weighting to the nature of the adverse information and the circumstances contributing to the Department’s decision.
Having regard to the above, the Tribunal did not consider it reasonable to disregard the adverse information (at [45]). The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant was unable to meet the requirements of r 5.19(3) of the Regulations. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision (at [46]-[48]).
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
The Applicant filed an application seeking review of the Tribunal’s decision on 26 May 2020. The matter remained in the central migration docket for some years before being allocated to my docket more recently and listed for hearing. The Applicant ultimately relied upon a further amended application filed on 28 February 2025, containing the following grounds:
1.The Second Respondent (Tribunal) erred in finding material inconsistences unsupported by probative evidence and which were contradicted by the evidence. Further or in the alternative, the Tribunal was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical.
Particulars
(a)The Tribunal found the written evidence of the first applicant, the nominating employer, was inconsistent with his oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing.
(b)No such inconsistency existed; the transcript showed the evidence was consistent.
(c)The Tribunal found that the written evidence of the nominating employer was also inconsistent with the representative’s submissions.
(d)No such inconsistency existed; the evidence and submissions were consistent.
(e)The oral evidence of the nominating employer and its submissions stated that the Border Force delegate’s decision was based on erroneous factual findings. The Tribunal failed to understand that evidence of those erroneous factual findings was corroborated by the notice of intention issued by Border Force.
(f)The Tribunal relied on these findings of inconsistency to reach the conclusion that it was not reasonable to disregard the adverse information. Accordingly, its decision was affected by jurisdictional error.
2.The Tribunal failed to consider a claim, and failed to consider the evidence and submissions in support of that claim.
Particulars
(a)The applicant expressly claimed that the Border Force delegate’s finding, namely that the positions of the visa applicants never existed, was unsubstantiated and contradicted by the overwhelming evidence and submissions in support.
(b) The Tribunal failed to consider this claim.
(c)The Tribunal failed to refer to and consider the extensive evidence in support of this claim.
(d)The Tribunal failed to consider the submissions in support of this claim.
(e) Accordingly, the Tribunal miscarried in its statutory task of review.
Ground 1
In relation to ground 1, the Applicant took issue with the Tribunal’s consideration at [41] that there was an “absence of collaborative evidence to support the applicant’s claims of mistaken identity” in relation to the site visit. Ground 1 additionally took issue with findings of inconsistency that were made by the Tribunal. The ground overlapped to some extent with ground 2, which contended that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence.
The claim of mistaken identity was made by the Applicant during the Tribunal hearing, as is demonstrated by the transcript that is in evidence (Transcript). On page 23, Mr Chowdhury (the CEO) stated:
And this statement of refusal of the visa – they mentioned they talked to Murad, when Murad wasn’t there that day. So that’s number one mistake is been done from the delegate, because Murad wasn’t there that day at all. And in the other hand – and this Sohel Rana wasn’t working that time. And they say they have also have been interviewed to him. So there is a couple of mistake is happened from the department delegate when they went to see the shop.
This was echoed in submissions made by the Applicant’s representative on 7 April 2020 (at CB 1579), which stated:
The delegate in the sponsorship cancellation matter was grossly negligent in the fact- finding exercise. The delegate had erred in fact by stating that Mr Mohammad Murad Hossain was also interviewed on the 8 June 2017 site visit. Factually Mr Hossain was not on site at that time, and never spoke to the departmental investigator in person or over the phone or otherwise.
Paragraph 41 of the Tribunal’s decision is set out above. On the basis of what was found to have been a lack of “collaborative evidence”, the Tribunal placed “little weighting” upon the Applicant’s “claims of mistaken identity”. The Tribunal, instead, was “satisfied the Department would have taken appropriate steps to verify the identity of persons present on site and interviewed on the day the site visit occurred”.
As was submitted by the Applicant, the problem with this is that the Applicant’s claims of mistaken identity were corroborated by the Department’s own records regarding the site visit.
Those records included a “Notice of intention to take action” dated 20 June 2017 (CB 768) (Notice of Intention) and a “Notice of Decision” in relation to the sponsorship bar dated 21 August 2017 (CB 779) (Sponsorship Decision).
The Notice of Intention recorded an understanding that the Applicant employed four “457 visa holders”, namely Alamgir Hossain Chowdhury; Mohammed Murad Hossain; Sohel Rana; and Humayon Kabir Chowdhury. In this regard, the Applicant drew attention to evidence at CB 1614, indicating that Md Alamgir Hossain Chowdhury had been granted a Subclass 186 visa on 29 September 2016.
In any event, the Sponsorship Decision relied, amongst other things, upon the following:
The sponsor has asserted that the rosters copied at the time of the site visit were “bespoke” and were the result of the absence of another 457 visa holder, Md Humayon Kabir Chowdhury, who has been on sick leave since February 2017.
The site visit at which Md Sohel Rana and Mohammed Murad Hossain were interviewed was conducted on 08 June 2017 or approximately four months after the date of Md Humayon Kabir Chowdhury’s illness.
As such even if the sponsor’s assertion regarding the bespoke nature of the rosters that indicate Md Sohel Rana and Mohammed Murad Hossain to be working as console operators were the direct result of Md Humayon Kabir Chowdhury’s illness this circumstance has existed for an extended period of time…
(emphasis added)
However, the above was contradicted by the record of site visit contained in the Notice of Intention. That document recorded that, at the time of arrival, only Md Alamgir Hossain Chowdhury was working at the premises. Mr Rana came into the store, appearing to be a customer. He explained that he lived nearby and had “dropped in” to use the ATM, as he was not rostered until that night. Contrary to the Sponsorship Decision, the record of site visit in the Notice of Intention indicated that Mr Hossain was not interviewed at the site visit (and was not present in the store during the visit at all). The Applicant’s contention that there had been a case of “mistaken identity” was therefore supported by inconsistency in the Department’s records of what had happened that were before the Tribunal. It is therefore difficult to see how the Tribunal, if it had considered the Notice of Intention against the Sponsorship Decision, could have concluded at [41] that there was an “absence of collaborative evidence to support the applicant’s claims of mistaken identity”.
The Tribunal’s reliance at [39] upon a finding that during the site visit “the Department observed the 457 visa holders working as console operators” is also peculiar. As set out above, the record of site visit contained in the Notice of Intention indicated that Mr Rana appeared to be visiting the store as a customer during the site visit. It did not record him being “observed” working as a “console operator” at the time. Although the Applicant submitted that the Tribunal’s error in this regard was taken from the Sponsorship Decision, the Sponsorship Decision did not expressly find that Mr Rana was “observed” working as a “console operator” at the time of the site visit. In any event, such an interpretation was contradicted by the Notice of Intention.
It is difficult to see how the Tribunal’s reasoning at [41] could have been reached if the Tribunal had considered the record of site visit contained in the Notice of Intention. It is also difficult to see how the Tribunal’s finding at [41] that there was no “collaborative evidence” supporting the claim of mistaken identity was relevantly open to the Tribunal. On the face of the material, the Tribunal’s reasoning at [41] was refuted by the Department’s records in the Notice of Intention and Sponsorship Decision.
The Minister observed that the Tribunal had considered the claim made of mistaken identity at [36]-[37] of its decision. The Tribunal had found that it was unpersuaded by the Applicant’s evidence, noting that the Applicant had not sought review of the Sponsorship Decision. The Minister suggested that it was open to the Tribunal not to have accepted the Applicant’s claims on the basis that the Sponsorship Decision had not been formally challenged. Even if this were so, it does not explain the Tribunal’s lack of advertence to evidence that was before it on the subject and that was centrally relevant, contained within the Notice of Intention.
The Minister observed that the differences between the Notice of Intention and the Sponsorship Decision were never brought to the attention of the Tribunal. That may be so, however I am not persuaded that it means that the Tribunal was not required to consider the evidence in question. The Tribunal relied upon evidence of the site visit and the Sponsorship Decision in making findings against the Applicant. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal was not, then, obliged to consider evidence of what occurred during the site visit, simply because specific issues with this evidence were not put to it with precision by the Applicant.
The Minister submitted that the importance of the evidence ought to be considered within the context of the Sponsorship Decision more broadly. In particular, the Minister drew attention to evidence obtained during the site visit (such as rosters and what was said by Mr Rana) indicating that visa holders within the business were performing functions other than their stated roles. Within this context, it was submitted that there was no realistic possibility “even if Border Force had not made this identification error in its decision, that this would have changed the outcome and Border Force would not have issued the sponsorship ban”.
However, that is not the question before the Court. Materiality, in this context, requires consideration of whether the outcome of the Tribunal’s nomination review decision may have been different had the error in question not occurred: see LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 (LPDT) at [16] (per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ). The threshold for materiality is not a high one: LPDT at [14]-[16]. I do not accept the Minister’s submission that, within the above context, the Tribunal would have inevitably refused to disregard the Sponsorship Decision.
The Applicant’s case was, essentially, that the Sponsorship Decision ought to be disregarded because it was unreliable and affected by error. Had the Tribunal considered the evidence before it regarding the misidentification error, then it is possible that it may have accepted the Applicant’s submissions in this regard. Comparison between the record of site visit in the Notice of Intention and the Sponsorship Decision demonstrated that at least one of them was inaccurate. Had the Tribunal considered this, then it is possible that the Tribunal may have accepted the Applicant’s contention that the Sponsorship Decision was unreliable (and therefore declined to rely upon it).
On the basis of the above, I accept that jurisdictional error has been demonstrated in relation to the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal overlooked evidence that was centrally relevant to the question that was before it. The Tribunal therefore fell into the species of error considered in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) (Robertson J).
In post-hearing submissions, the Minister suggested that the Applicant’s case was “not (properly understood) an allegation that there was a failure to consider relevant evidence, but rather that there was a failure to consider a claim put to the Tribunal, namely that there was a disparity between the notice of intention and the notice of decision of Border Force”. I do not accept this submission. The Applicant’s submissions before, during and after the hearing took issue (inter alia) with the Tribunal’s non-consideration of the record of site visit contained within the Notice of Intention. The Minister’s pre-hearing submissions recognised and responded to the Applicant’s reliance upon cases “regarding the circumstances in which a failure to consider a claim or evidence may give rise to jurisdictional error” (emphasis added) (at [18]-[19]). The Applicant also relied upon cases such as SZRKT as authority for the principle that “there is no clear distinction in each case between claims and evidence” (SZRKT at [11]). The Applicant’s case, therefore, was broader than was suggested in the Minister’s post-hearing submissions. This was confirmed, expressly, in the Applicant’s post-hearing submissions.
I accept the Applicant’s submission that there are also other problems with how the Tribunal reasoned. As was submitted by the Applicant, there are difficulties with the Tribunal’s findings of inconsistencies. At [40], the Tribunal found:
40.In his Statutory Declaration signed and declared on 2 April 2012 [sic] the nominator acknowledges that the visa holders were working in the store during the holy month of Ramadan and due to a critical shortage of staff he relied upon the visa holders to fill the critical shortage of staff and they took on the extra responsibilities for the business and returned to their ordinary routine after the celebration. This statement is contrary to the evidence provided to the Tribunal at the hearing and in the applicant’s representative’s submission of 7th April in which it is asserted that the Department erred in that “It was based on circumstantial evidence from the site investigation, factually neither of them was working in store especially as console operators at the time. There is no evidence to prove that they are working or has been working as console operators.”
As was submitted by the Applicant, it is difficult to see how a finding of inconsistency was relevantly open on the evidence. At hearing, the Applicant’s CEO (Mr Chowdhury) had given evidence about Ramadan in the context of seeking to explain the hours worked more generally over this period. He expressed that staff shortages had been experienced during Ramadan, with the result that the situation was different from “the normal approach it’s supposed to be” (page 23 of the Transcript). He also expressed that one of their staff had a heart surgery (page 25 of the Transcript). In his statutory declaration, Mr Chowdhury further expressed that during the period around the month of Ramadan, Mr Hossain and Mr Rana had taken further responsibilities (in addition to their standard duties).
Having regard to the above, it is not apparent how the evidence given at hearing contradicted the statutory declaration. I accept the Minister’s submission that the “inconsistency” the Tribunal appears to have been describing in [41] was the fact that it had been said on the one hand that the visa holders were working unusual shifts in the store due to Ramadan, but on the other hand it had been said that the two 457 visa holders (Messrs Rana and Hossain) were not working at the store at the time of the site visit.
However, the problem with this is that the evidence of unusual shifts during Ramadan was not inconsistent with the claim that Messrs Rana and Hossain had not been working in the store during the site visit. As set out above, the latter claim was consistent with the record of site visit provided in the Notice of Intention. That record indicated that Mr Hossain was not present during the visit and Mr Rana appeared to be visiting the store to use the ATM (rather than working). An explanation for why they may otherwise have been rostered on during the month of Ramadan was not inconsistent with this.
The Minister submitted that the statutory declaration “suggested” that the visa holders were in the store during the site visit because of changes to rostering. However, this is not what was stated in the statutory declaration. The statutory declaration simply referred to the site visit coinciding with the month of Ramadan, during which staff were not working their usual hours. As the Applicant submitted, this appears to have been responsive to concerns raised regarding rosters found during the site visit, which indicated shifts worked by the visa holders around that time.
Having regard to the above, it is difficult to see how a finding of “inconsistency” was relevantly open on the material. It may be that the Tribunal’s misunderstanding of this evidence was influenced by its non-acceptance of the Applicant’s contention that Messrs Rana and Hossain had not been working in the store during the site visit (believing, incorrectly, that it was unsupported on the materials before it). If the Tribunal had appreciated that the record of site visit supported the Applicant’s contention that Messrs Rana and Hossain had not, in fact, been working in the store at the time of the site visit, then the Tribunal may have appreciated that Mr Chowdhury’s explanation regarding Ramadan did not claim that the visa holders were working in the store at the time of the site visit, but rather sought to explain the position regarding rostering more generally at the time (during the month of Ramadan).
In any event, for the reasons given above, the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
Ground 2
Ground 2 further contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the Applicant’s claim that the finding in the Sponsorship Decision that the relevant positions never existed was unsubstantiated and contradicted by evidence and submissions to the contrary. The ground also contended that the Tribunal did not consider evidence and submissions put forward by the Applicant in support of the claim.
The Applicant observed that the Tribunal had generally stated at [37] that it had “considered the applicant’s submissions” but found that there was “no persuasive information before the Tribunal on why the adverse information should be disregarded”. However, this did not disclose how or why the Tribunal found that various evidence that had been provided to it was considered unpersuasive.
The Applicant observed that the evidence and submissions before the Tribunal included the following (at [43] of the Applicant’s written submissions):
a.An offer of employment to Mr Sohel Rana for the position of Business Development Manager for the Chowdhury Family Trust (including job description), signed and dated 13 June 2013 (CB11-21); and again signed and dated 24 May 201[7] (CB22-31).
b.An amendment to the Employment contract dated 22 May 2024, for Mr Rana, signed (CB512).
c.Organisation Chart of Chowdhury Family Trust, as at March 2017, which shows Mr Rana in the role of business development manager; and Mr [Mohammed] Murad Hossain in the role of stakeholder Service Manager (CB204).
d.Organisation Chart, undated which shows Mr Rana and Mr Hossain again in managerial roles (CB527).
e.Letter from representative to the Tribunal, dated 13 February 2020 (CB580-581) which enclosed supporting material including:
i.Position descriptions and employment contracts dated 15 November 2019 for all three nominees:
1.Customer services manager for Mohammed Murad Hossain (Mr Hossain) CB619 CB624-634;
2.Merchandise Planner for MD Humayon Kabir Chowdhury (Mr Kabir) CB621, CB644; and
3.Business Development Manager for MD Sohel Rana (Mr Rana) CB623.
ii.Current organisational chart as at November 2019, which showed each of the three nominees in the said positions (CB618).
iii. Employee staff list (CB617).
iv.Individual tax returns for the nominees which described their occupations as follows:
1.Mr Hossain, “Customer service manager” 2018 CB646; 2019 CB651;
2. Mr Kabir, “Merchandise planner” 2018 CB665; 2019 CB672;
3.Mr Rana, “Business development manager” 2018 CB689, 2019 CB694.
f.Letter from representative to Tribunal, dated 17 March 2020 (CB802-806), stated:
i.Mr [Hossain] is employed as a customer services manager for the nominator and in that capacity, he also works for Pacific College as well as Sunbit (Sunbit Oil, Sunbit sunglasses) which are associated entities of the nominator. It also described his job responsibilities.
ii.Mr Kabir is employed as a merchandise planner for the nominator and in that role, he also works for Sunbit (Sunbit Oil, Sunbit sunglasses). It also described his job responsibilities.
iii.Mr Sohel Rana is employed as a business development manager for the nominator and in that capacity, he also works for Pacific College as well as Sunbit (Sunbit Oil, Sunbit sunglasses) which are associated entities of the nominator. It also described his job responsibilities.
g.A strategic business plan for Pacific College Sydney included the names, job title and skills of staff, which named Mr Hossain as the Compliance and Customer [Service] Manager, and Mr Rana as the Business Development Manager (CB861); and an organisational structure also showed Mr Rana and Mr Hossain in their respective managerial positions (CB878).
h.An offer of employment to Mr Hossain for the position of Stakeholder Services Manager for the Chowdhury Family Trust (including job description), signed and dated 1 February 2013 (CB1121-1130).
i.Training review form of Pacific College Sydney naming Mr Hossain as the compliance and customer services manager (CB1149).
j.Business card of Mr Hossain with position Customer Service Manager of Pacific College Sydney, Kakadu Kimberly Fashion, 7 Eleven and Sunbit (CB1185-1186); of Sunbit (CB1187-1188).
k.Email sent from Mr Hossain to a buyer of cooking oil, signing off as Customer Services Manager of Sunbit [CB 1191]
l.Sales contracts with a company in Malaysia, dated… March 2019, for goods priced USD$37,548.88, signed by Mr Kabir as Merchandise Planner (CB1208-1210); another dated 12 September 2019 for around the same price, and similarly signed by Mr Kabir (CB1223-1225).
m. Various invoices for the 7 Eleven store signed by Mr Kabir (CB1235-1237).
n.Sunbit giving authority to various persons, on its letterhead and signed by Mr Kabir as Merchandise Planner (CB1268-1271).
o.A sunglasses supplier emailing Mr Kabir dated 14 November 2019 (CB1286-1289).
p.A supplier providing ingredients information to Mr Kabir naming him as Merchandise Planner (CB1307).
q.Mr Rana signing a letter on Pacific College Sydney letterhead, with title business development manager (CB1329)
r.International Agent Agreement with Pacific College Sydney, signed by Mr Rana as business development manager (CB1355).
s. Statutory Declaration from Mr Rana dated 19 March 2020 (CB1544-1546).
t. Statutory Declaration from Mr Hossain dated 19 March 2020 (CB1548 -1554).
u. Statutory Declaration from Mr Kabir dated 19 March 2020 (CB1557-1559).
v.Oral evidence of Mr Chowdhury, Mr Hossain, Mr Kabir and Mr Rana, at the Tribunal hearing dated 24 March 2020, in the transcript.
w. Written submissions of representative date 7 April 2020 (CB1575-1585).
x. Statutory Declaration of Mr Chowdhury, dated 2 April 2020
I accept, as the Minister submitted, that the Tribunal was not obliged to refer to every document that was before it. However, it is unclear why the Tribunal would not have referred to at least the purported business documentation provided, in some manner, had it in fact been considered. This included what appeared to be numerous business records supporting the visa holders having the roles described, including employment contracts, organisational charts, sales contracts, business cards, correspondence, invoices and training forms. The records included interactions with third parties, including the Australian Taxation Department, suppliers, actual/potential business partners and others.
I accept, as the Minister submitted, that the Tribunal referred at [29] to a submission made by the Applicant’s representative that there was “overwhelming evidence in support of the positions”. However, this reference was contained in one of a number of paragraphs of the representative’s submission that were reproduced in the Tribunal’s decision at [29]. It did not demonstrate consciousness, let alone evaluation, of the documentation that had been put forward by the Applicant in seeking to demonstrate the positions in question.
As the Minister submitted, at [29] and [35]-[36], the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claim that the adverse information should be disregarded because it was affected by errors. This was not accepted by the Tribunal, with the Tribunal noting that review had not been sought of the Sponsorship Decision (at [36]). The Tribunal also relied upon perceived inconsistencies in the evidence and what was found to have been a lack of “collaborative evidence” supporting the claims of mistaken identity (at [39]-[41]). Difficulties with this reasoning are considered above. In any event, this reasoning did not involve consideration of the records detailed above that had been submitted by the Applicant.
The documentation in question was centrally relevant to the case sought to be made by the Applicant. That case was that adverse information ought to be disregarded because (a) it was based upon a flawed or unreliable process, and (b) because it was contradicted by evidence put forward by the Applicant demonstrating the positions held by the visa holders.
The Minister submitted that the documentation in question was a “paper version” of the positions, which did not demonstrate that the positions actually existed. However, whether or not the records in question sufficiently demonstrated the existence of the positions was a matter for evaluation by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s reasons do not disclose that (or how) such a process of evaluation occurred.
The Tribunal suggested at [22] that it had considered “numerous evidence” but only referred to that “which was considered material”. However, it is not apparent from the Tribunal’s reasoning if or why the purported business records provided were not considered “material”. This was in a context where the Applicant had advanced a case that the records in question proved the existence of the positions. The records provided were, clearly enough, central to that case.
The inescapable inference from the above is that the Tribunal did not engage with, or consider, this evidence. For the foregoing reasons, had it been necessary to do so, I would also have found that jurisdictional error had been demonstrated under ground 2.
CONCLUSION
As set out above, the reasoning of the Tribunal in SYG 1260 of 2020 was substantially mirrored in the other two nomination decisions (in SYG 1259 of 2020 and SYG 1258 of 2020). The visa application decisions in SYG 1255 of 2020, SYG 1254 of 2020 and SYG1253 of 2020 were determined by the fate of the nomination decisions. Accordingly, the parties accepted that if jurisdictional error were demonstrated in SYG 1260 of 2020, then the decisions in each of the related matters ought to be set aside and the matters remitted for redetermination according to law. For the above reasons, I have found this to be the case.
I will hear from the parties on the question of costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing. Associate:
Dated: 17 June 2025
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SYG 1253 of 2020 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
JANNATUN NEIM TISHA
SYG 1255 of 2020 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
MD RAKIBUL HASSAN
Fifth Applicant
MISHKAT JAHAN SARIN
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