Chiong and Sze

[2019] FamCA 265

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CHIONG & SZE [2019] FamCA 265

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Application for final orders – Where the husband seeks to set aside final property settlement orders made by agreement – Replacement orders sought – Whether the orders should be interfered with – s 79A Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) – Where the wife seeks that documents be executed to give effect the original orders – s 106A of the Act – Where the original proposed orders in the agreement were made satisfying the obligations in s 79 of the Act – Courts jurisdiction to set aside orders altering property interests – Where the husband contends that it was necessary for the wife to provide certain documents to him in order to comply with the original orders for share transfers and she failed to do so– Where the husband contends that the outcome of the original property agreement may not be what he anticipated – Where the husband does not provide any evidence that it has been impracticable for the orders originally made to be carried out – Where it is found that it was practicable for the husband to comply with the orders – Where various other measures and inquires could have been taken to retrieve the documents instead of requiring the documents as a condition precedent to the transfer – Where the husband failed to bring his circumstances within the requirements of the legislation – No evidence provided – Where the Court cannot interfere under s 79A of the Act – Order made under s 106A of the Act – Husband ordered to pay the wife costs of an incidental to the proceedings.

APPLICANT: Mr Chiong

RESPONDENT: Ms Sze

FILE NUMBER: SYC 7184 of 2017

DATE DELIVERED: 28 February 2019

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: Loughnan J

HEARING DATE: 28 February 2019

REPRESENTATION

APPLICANT: Husband in person

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Stenhouse

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Du & Associates

Orders

1. The Initiating Application filed by the husband on 25 June 2018 is dismissed.

2. The wife be appointed pursuant to s 106A Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute in the name of the husband the documents which are listed in Annexure W1 to the Case Outline document of the wife which is Exhibit 1 and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to those documents.

3. The husband pay the costs of the wife of and incidental to these proceedings as assessed or as agreed between the parties.

4. Subject to the agreement or assessment process or any subsequent agreement by the parties that payment is to be made within two months after the date of the agreement or assessment.

Note:  The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Chiong & Sze has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER:  SYC7184 of 2017

Mr Chiong

Applicant

And

Ms Sze

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These are proceedings that arise from an Initiating Application that was filed on 25 June 2018 on behalf of Mr Chiong (“the husband”). That is an application for final orders under s 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) whereby the husband seeks to set aside some of the final property settlement orders made by agreement on 28 March 2018. He seeks a number of consequential orders, in effect, to replace the orders that were included in the original property settlement. The application is opposed.

2. The matter has been set down for hearing on a preliminary issue and that is whether there was a basis for interfering with the orders of 28 March 2018 under s 79A of the Act. If that results in a finding that there is no basis for interfering then the application would be dismissed on all grounds.

3. By way of response, in addition to the dismissal of the husband’s application, the wife seeks that certain documents to give effect to the original orders be executed under provision s 106A of the Act. That section allows somebody else to execute documents in the name of a party. The orders sought are expressed as authorising the registrar, but the section would permit anyone to be authorised to execute those documents. Section 106A relevantly provides:

   (1)  If:

   (a)  an order under this Act has directed a person to execute a deed or instrument; and

   (b)  that person has refused or neglected to comply with the direction or, for any other reason, the court considers it necessary to exercise the powers of the court under this subsection;

   the court may appoint an officer of the court or other person to execute the deed or instrument in the name of the person to whom the direction was given and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed of instrument.

4. The husband was legally represented when he filed his Initiating Application but he is no longer represented today.  The Initiating Application was filed in June 2018 and events have overtaken some of the orders sought.  Where the application seeks to set aside orders 1 to 10 of the final orders the husband agreed that it was not necessary to pursue relief in respect of orders 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the original orders because of subsequent events.  In particular, there has been a sale of property in Country B.

5. The orders of 28 March 2018 provided to the following effect:

   (a)that a property in Suburb C in New South Wales, which is in the joint names of the parties, be transferred to the husband and that he discharge the mortgage on that property and protect the wife in relation to any future borrowings associated with that property;

   (b)that a property at Suburb D in the same State be transferred to the wife and that she discharge the mortgage thereon and protect the husband in relation to those borrowings;

   (c)that each party take one of two substantive businesses, Company E and Company F, and to that end the orders provide for the transfer of shareholdings, resignation as a director and indemnities in relation to liabilities in relation to each of the institutions; and

   (d)that a property in Country B be sold.

6. Other than the sale of the Country B property the orders have not been complied with. 

7. The provisions of s 79A of the Act deal with the circumstances in which a Court can interfere with final property settlement orders. The Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the property of a party is concluded by the making of a final property settlement order, save for enforcement, slip rule issues, machinery issues and appeal.

8. On 28 March 2018 the parties and their lawyers went before the Honourable Justice Le Poer Trench and satisfied his Honour that the orders proposed in their agreement represented a just and equitable settlement of their property. That means the Court was satisfied that there was a level of accounting against the obligations in s 79 of the Act for a just and equitable distribution of property in the terms of this agreement. The authorities have it that not much more than the fact of an agreement and that the parties are represented is required for that purpose. That was what his Honour would have required before making the orders, an assurance that there was an agreement, and an assurance from the lawyers that it represented a proper division of property and so on.

9. It is not possible to go behind that agreement, save as is necessary for determining the application before the Court. Section 79A of the Act is headed “Setting aside of orders altering property interests” and provides:

   (1) Where, on the application of a person affected by an order made by a court under section 79 in property settlement proceedings, the court is satisfied that:

   (a)there has been a miscarriage of justice by reason of fraud, duress, suppression of evidence, (including failure to disclose relevant information), the giving of false evidence or any other circumstance; or

   and the following two provisions the husband says he relies on –

   (b) in circumstances that have arisen since the order was made it is impracticable for the order to be carried out or impracticable for a part of the order to be carried out; or

   (c) a person has defaulted in carrying out an obligation imposed on the person by the order and in circumstances that have arisen as a result of that default it is just and equitable to vary the order or to set the order aside and make another order in substitution for the order;

10. There are other provisions, but they are not relevant here.  It falls to the applicant to bring his circumstances within the provisions of that section.  As I say, the Court does not otherwise have any jurisdiction in relation to the parties’ property. 

11. The evidence of the applicant is set out in his affidavit and he says he filed a response to the initiating application of the wife on 24 November 2017 seeking urgent orders and injunctive relief to prevent the wife from continuing to unilaterally deal with the two businesses, Company E and Company F.  The husband’s evidence in his affidavit filed 24 November 2017 is:

    4.The reasons that I am seeking urgent Orders for the management of the businesses are as follows:

    (a) During the marriage and following separation, the businesses have provided a significant income stream.

    (b) In September 2015 documents were fraudulently signed on my behalf to transfer 3 shares in [Company E] to [Ms Sze] (the wife) and to appoint [Ms Sze] as a Second Director of the [Company E].  I say the documents were also fraudulently signed on my behalf to transfer 175,000 shares in [Company F] to [Ms Sze] and to also appoint [Ms Sze] has a Second Director of this company (sic). …

    (c) Since June 2016, [Ms Sze] has refused to provide me with access to all financial records and documents relating to each of the businesses.  [Ms Sze] has also instructed staff members at each of the businesses not to provide me with such records and documents. 

    (d) During August 2016, [Ms Sze] opened four bank accounts in the names of the businesses without my authority as Director of each of the businesses.  [Ms Sze] then directed students to pay tuition fees into the bank accounts that were opened in contravention of … (“the Regulations”), which require all income to be deposited into Trust Accounts relating to each of the businesses.

    (e)In March 2017, [Ms Sze] terminated the employment of the bookkeeper for [Company E] and appointed a new bookkeeper, without my prior written consent.  …

    (f) In August 2016, [Ms Sze] unilaterally withdrew the sum of $280,000 from [Company E].  In the 2016 financial year, [Ms Sze] also paid herself director’s fees of $62,728, without my prior knowledge or consent. 

    (g) In October 2016, [Ms Sze] ceased paying me a wage from both the businesses.

    (h)Since about March 2017, [Ms Sze] has also directed the income from each of the businesses into external bank accounts …

    (i) [Ms Sze] has failed to disclose the extent of the income collected and retained by her.

    …

    20. Between about 2006 and November 2016, I frequently travelled to [Country H] to manage offices in [Country H] (both of which are now closed) for each of the businesses and other companies I was involved with in [Country H] during that period.  I also frequently travelled to ([Country B]) to manage companies that I operated in [Country B] during that period. 

    21. Although I often travelled overseas… I was involved in the operation of the offices in Sydney for each of the businesses.  I took on a managerial role undertaking tasks such as sourcing and purchasing equipment … .

12. The husband deposed that he was effectively locked out of the business.

13. The husband makes a further complaint about taxation problems between 2010 and 2014.  The husband says he left the arrangements with accountants, to the wife.  He had concerns about tax invoices from Company J, which the wife appointed as accountants for the companies. 

14. The husband says that it was his understanding that the intention of the March 2018 orders was that the Country B properties would be sold and, in turn, a line of credit would be discharged, and that would occur prior to the deadline for refinancing the Suburb C mortgage into his sole name.

15. The husband conceded in cross-examination today that that is not what the orders say.  The husband says that on 10 April 2018 the wife provided documents for the transfer of the shares.  He says that although he had been a co-director of the companies, he has not had access to company documents since about June 2016.  For that reason he says that his solicitors sent correspondence to the wife’s solicitors on 10 April 2018 requesting that the wife provide him with the documents relating to Company F that would be required to properly operate the business.  The call for those documents is the central issue in the husband’s case.

16. In that letter his solicitors proposed that there be an exchange of documents including documents that the husband was required to sign to relinquish his interests in Company E and another entity called Company K, in accordance with the orders.  The husband refers to a course of correspondence over time.  He says that he was given notice in May 2018 that documents were delivered to his solicitors.  He was overseas at that time.  He says there was then further correspondence and ultimately a demand by him for yet other documents and a response from the wife indicating that she was not required under the orders to provide the documents sought.

17. At one point there was a letter from the wife to the effect:  You will have all of the documents and they will be provided simultaneously with the transfers”.  It is the central contention by the husband that the March 2018 orders require the wife to provide to the husband all of the records of the business in advance of the share transfers.  The husband told me that the records are held on the business premises.  The order relevantly provides:

    Within seven days from the date of the orders the wife shall do all such things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to transfer to the husband her shareholding in Company F, resign from the position as director of Company F and indemnify the husband and keep him indemnified in relation to certain debts.

18. It is submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband will have all of the records as soon as the transfer is completed.

19. It is the husband’s concern that there might be debts incurred by the business that he does not know about or that records might be missing or might have been removed.  That goes to the husband’s concern that the ultimate outcome of the orders might not be what he anticipated when he signed the agreement. 

20. The husband was not able to identify a basis in law or practice for any inherent or collateral undertaking of the type that the husband contends should be implied in the orders.  Just as with an order for the transfer of a house or the order for a transfer of a motor vehicle, there are other things to do apart from a discharge of a mortgage and the signing of a memorandum of transfer and the payment of any associated utilities and so on.  The keys for the property or the motor vehicle need to go to the purchaser and there would usually be other records.  There might be certificates of insurance.  In relation to fixtures in a house there might be documents evidencing guarantees or warranties in relation to appliances.  There might be, for example, the codes for a security system.  However, in my view, it is not a condition precedent to the transfer of a real estate, the transfer of a motor vehicle that all of those things are done in advance of settlement. 

21. The husband does not have any evidence that supports the ultimate proposition in his case.  He does not have any evidence that since the order was made it has been impracticable for the order to be carried out.  On any day after the proposal was made on 10 April 2018 the husband could have signed the relevant share transfer, received a signed resignation and the required indemnity from the wife.  It was not a necessary step for those things to happen that he have access to all of the records of the relevant business. 

22. I gather there is a story to be told about a poor relationship between the parties.  I gather there have been problems with the husband accessing business premises.  It is not relevant to these proceedings, but the husband has complained about the wife’s conduct in that regard since 2015 or 2016.

23. He could have taken action to resolve any of those things. He was an officer of the company. He could have had the company wound up. He could have had the wife dealt with for breaches of the Corporation Law. He could have had the police involved if what she did amounted to fraud or larceny. If there was forgery in relation to business records, action could be taken against her. Those things could have all been addressed, but as I say, none of that is relevant to these proceedings. What that alleged history does explain is why the husband’s application is not an application under s 79A(1)(a) of the Act. He had the very concerns that he expresses today on the day he signed the orders.

24. It was practicable for the husband to comply with the orders.  He could have done all he had to do to satisfy his part of the orders, to attend on a day, to be ready to sign the transfer, to have the necessary documents ready.  That has not been done because he apparently had in his mind that instead of doing all this before he signed the agreement on 28 March 2018, and instead of insisting on getting those documents if he wanted them at that time, or having an agreement about access to company records or having an accountant come in and make a separate assessment of the business, or issuing a subpoena to the tax office to find out what the situation was in relation to the tax obligations of the party, or an FOI request if that was needed, he decided to require those documents as a condition precedent to the transfer.

25. He could have made all of those inquiries, had all of those things done before he signed the agreement on 28 March 2018.  Instead, he has assumed that in addition to the wording of the agreement there was another term that said that he did not have to do any of the things in order 1 of the orders until he was satisfied about a whole lot of other things that are not mentioned in the orders.  He cannot make that case.  As I say, the concern has fallen away in relation to the Country B transfer.  I apprehend that the husband would say he did not comply with the orders in relation to Suburb C partly because he did not have the funds from the Country B sale until more recently.

26. The husband says that he understood the agreement to mean that the Country B sale would have to come first.  That is not what the orders say.  He concedes that fact.  Once he did have the funds from the Country B sale, then the shoe was on the other foot.  The husband belatedly asked the wife to join in a transfer of Suburb C and she refused on one occasion a request from solicitors acting on the conveyances, to attend at their office.  She was asked about that, and indicated that she refused to do that because, in part at least, she said that she had done all she had to do in relation to that transfer.

27. Just stopping there for a moment, although the parties have not been able to achieve it, there seems to be no impediment in relation to the reciprocal transfers of the Suburb D and Suburb C properties.  The husband has funds to discharge the mortgage.  I gather that the wife would be able to meet her obligations in relation to the Suburb D property and each of the parties is in a position to give effect to those orders.  I am told through the respondent’s counsel that it would be anticipated that a proposal will be made for a settlement perhaps on neutral ground, in a matter of weeks rather than months, to give effect to those orders.  Again, those matters have nothing to do with the issue before the Court.

1. It fell to the husband to bring the circumstances within the terms of the legislation and he has not been able to do it. 

2. As I have said, during the course of submissions, even if the husband’s case could be made that there was some difference between what the parties intended to achieve by the orders they agreed to and the ultimate outcome of the orders of 28 March last year, there is no evidence to support that proposition.  There is no evidence of value whether at the time of the agreement or today.

3. It is quite a complicated thing, and the evidence just is not provided.  For example, the husband says there are relevant tax obligations.  There is no evidence as to what they are.  The orders, as agreed, are not entirely clear in respect of the indemnity provisions.  It might be that there is a slip in relation to order 1, but giving an idea of the problems, the husband’s proposal for a replacement provision in paragraph 3 of his application is completely unintelligible.

4. It provides for the wife to indemnify the husband and keeping him indemnified, (save for an amount of 27-odd thousand dollars), in relation to any other liability.  That is said to exclude a Tax Office debt, suit, loan account, debt, action, consequence and/or penalty.  What all those terms mean in the context of this case, I have no idea.  The proposed order refers to the period in which the wife had sole control of Company F, including the period from 1 June 2016 to the date of compliance with order 2, I think by that, the husband means today.  The order has not been fully complied with, he would say, but when I asked him when that period commenced, he said 2010.  How would that be established to anyone’s satisfaction?  In my view the proposed terms are unworkable. 

5. The husband’s application requires that he demonstrate that the Court would interfere with the orders under s 79A of the Act and he has not been able to make that case. Therefore his application as to the substantive relief fails and will be dismissed.

6. Orders are sought in the wife’s response in addition to the dismissal of the husband’s application, for a variation or a refinement or more specificity in relation to the orders under s 106A of the Act to give effect to the company transfers.

7. The documents include minutes of meetings, transfer forms, directors’ resignations and so on. As I have indicated to the parties, s 106A of the Act is not limited to authorising a registrar of the Court to sign, and it seems to me that it would not be proper for a registrar to sign minutes of a meeting, for example. The rules in relation to minutes of meetings is an interesting thing, but there are certain representations to be made by the people who confirm the minutes of a meeting, that the meeting occurred and so on. A registrar cannot give any assurance to the authorities about that, and, I suppose, depending on what the minutes say, there would be no way of the registrar knowing who attended and what was said and so on.

8. As I indicated to the parties, an option would be that the wife sign. She has responsibilities in her own right as an officer of the company. The same obligations would apply in relation to her execution of a document under an order under s 106A of the Act. It seems to me that that is a better course, and she will have the records, she will be able to make the necessary inquiries, she can give the assurances, she will be responsible to the company authorities in relation to those things if there is any issue through ASIC or any other agency.

9. These transfers need to happen. The parties asked the Court to make the orders requiring those transfers. There has been no appeal against the orders and there is no basis under s 79A of the Act to interfere with the orders. In my view it is appropriate to make an order under s 106A of the Act.

10. Finally, there are applications for costs raised in both the interim and substantive responses filed. The applications are made on an indemnity basis. The Court has power to make an order for costs. The general provision is that parties bear their own costs. If a Court is to make an order for costs it is to take into account certain matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act. They are:

    (a)The financial circumstances of each of the parties.

    (b)Whether either of the parties are in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and the terms of the grant.

    (c)Conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings, including pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, admissions of fact and so on.

    (d)Whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders.

    (e)Whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings.

    (f)Whether either parties made an offer of writing to the other to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer.

    (g)Any such other matters as the Court considers relevant.

11. There is a Financial Statement for the wife.  She says that she has an income of $1,622.35 a week.  She lives with her son, who earns $91.44 a week.  She spends $2,734.57 a week, which is significantly more than her income.  She pays for the benefit, I think, of the parties’ children, Y and Z, $527 a week and $335 a week respectively.  She owns with the husband a property at Suburb D.  She says her half-interest is worth $588,656.  There is a property in Country B in which she has an interest valued at $1,577, which is a one per cent interest in the property.  There is another property, also with a one per cent interest at $4,108.  I was told that the statement was up to date but I apprehend that the Country B properties have been sold.

12. The wife has $19,223.63 in Bank N, $75,000 being a half-share in the Company E, the same amount being a half-share in Company F, some household contents at a nominal value, superannuation at $13,259.64.  The wife has liabilities totalling $1,265,000, including two mortgages at $557,039.84 and $369,000, income tax at $19,113.95.  Some other mortgages, $193,700 for a mortgage associated with Company F.  She has interest under a trust which she values at $298,000, and she acknowledges there has been the sale of a property in Country B which was sold for $1.7 million. 

13. The husband’s income is $225 a week, made up of $28 from interest, $190 a week from, he says, board from a Ms O.  He also says that he was a driver.  The husband estimates his expenses at $2,055 a week.  He puts the Suburb C property, a half an interest, at $750,000, and the Suburb D property at the same amount.  Therefore there is a big difference between the parties about the values of those properties.  He has an interest in a property in Country B as to 99 per cent rather than one per cent.  He does not give an estimate of value. 

14. The husband has 27 bank accounts and some investments of unknown value.  He does not know the value of the Company E, nor of Company F.  He thinks his interest in Company F Country B has a value of $1,145,928.  He has an interest in Company K.  He does not have the value of that.  He has some personalty, a similar amount of superannuation as the wife, $13,259.  There are many ‘not knowns’ in his financial statement but he declares $1,010,300 in various debts, some secured, some unsecured.  He gives evidence about the disposition of some property in Country B. 

15. The husband says that his total savings amount to $700,000 rather than that being the contents of one particular Country P & Bank Q account, which he referred to in his evidence. 

16. There were a couple of instances where the parties’ communication was not ideal.  There was one instance where the wife was asked questions in cross-examination as to whether she had refused to attend on solicitors to settle the conveyance of the Suburb C and Suburb D properties, and she said no.  And what she meant to say, as she explained minutes later, was that she had refused to attend.  English is not the first language for either of the parties, but they are people of obvious intelligence and have managed businesses.

17. I think the husband said to me that he has a degree.  My communication with the husband in relation to him having $700,000 in a savings account was apparently not successful.  We disagreed about what he said in evidence.  My associate has a record, albeit not the Auscript record, and that was consistent with my recollection.  I am not aware that either of the parties asked for arrangements to be made to have an interpreter present today.  If that was sought, then that would have been arranged.  That is all I can say about that.

18. However, no particular harm was done.  Nothing in the proceedings turns solely on the credit of the parties.  There are no credit issues.  There was no effective challenge to the evidence of the wife.  The husband did not resile from any significant factual proposition in his case.  The case is really about apprehension, about what the husband understood by the terms of the agreement that was made in March 2018, and not about some factual issue that parties give different evidence about.  I think they largely agree about the broad factual matrix.  Indeed, some propositions were put to the wife about her removing the husband, I think, as an office holder of a company and taking certain steps, and she readily conceded those matters.  Nothing about credit was raised in the course of submissions. 

19. There is no legal aid. 

20. As to the conduct of the proceedings.  It is submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband’s application followed immediately upon the filing of an enforcement application by her.  That had the effect of delaying those proceedings.

21. Whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with orders.  In the sense, they were.  Over a long time now, there has been a failure to comply with the orders. 

22. There is conduct complained of by the husband about the wife’s failure to sign the Suburb C documents. That conduct post-dated the proceedings. 

23. The husband has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings.  As to offers of writing, I have not seen a document which goes to that specifically.  There were letters in the style of:  “If you do this, I will do that”.  There was a letter that said, “If you sign some documents I will produce some documents at the same time”, but I was not taken to any relevant document that constituted an offer, whether a formal offer or otherwise.  It probably derailed any process of settlement once the husband ceased to be represented.

24. Unlike normal proceedings for a property settlement these proceedings have been brought by one party only and they have been effectively a waste of time.  In that way they are of a different character to proceedings for parenting orders or proceedings for property settlement where both parties usually seek orders.  In my view, it is appropriate that there be an order for costs.

25. Aside from special orders such as orders for costs assessed on a trustee basis or, any order for costs calculated on a basis greater than party and party costs requires special justification.  That applies whether the claim is for costs to be assessed on a solicitor and own client basis or full indemnity, as is sought here.

26. The authorities from general civil litigation would require a circumstance such as the imprudent refusal of an appropriate offer of settlement or a false allegation of fraud. Here there are allegations of fraud made by the husband. They have not been tested before me. There is no evidence of a imprudent refusal of an unambiguous offer. Whether that applies as comfortably in this jurisdiction where s 117(2A) of the Act has its own provision in relation to offers of settlement, is a moot point. It is appropriate that there be an order for costs. There is no reason to depart from the normal quantification of costs. I doubt that the parties would be able to reach an agreement about it, but if they cannot, then there will need to be an assessment by a taxing officer.

27. The husband says, that such an order might interfere with the settlement of the Suburb C property or it might mean that he needs to raise money and is unable to do so because he does not have regular paid employment that would satisfy a lending authority.  On the evidence that is largely his own fault.  I note that he will have title to a valuable property, which will be mortgage-free or virtually mortgage-free.

I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Loughnan delivered on 28 February 2019.

Associate:

Date:  30 April 2019