Child Support Registrar and Pearce & Anor

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR & PEARCE AND ANOR [2018] FamCAFC 10

FAMILY LAW – LEAVE TO APPEAL – CHILD SUPPORT – Administrative review of decision of the Child Support Registrar – Where the primary judge allowed an appeal against a decision of the former Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on the basis there had been a denial of procedural fairness – The issue the subject of the procedural fairness complaint did not properly arise for consideration by the Tribunal – In any event, the Tribunal did not have an obligation to identify something that was apparent from the very nature of the decision that had to be made – Held the approach adopted by the primary judge was misconceived – Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed – No order as to costs – Costs certificate granted to the first respondent.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Notice of Contention – The first respondent’s submissions relied on the same erroneous basis advanced in opposition to the appeal – Notice dismissed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Application to adduce further evidence – Unnecessary to consider the application due to the merit in the appellant’s primary argument.  

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 98B, 98C, 98S(2), 117

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103T (since repealed)

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286

APPELLANT: Child Support Registrar
FIRST RESPONDENT: Ms Pearce
SECOND RESPONDENT: Mr Pearce
FILE NUMBER: PAC 2109 of 2013
APPEAL NUMBER: EA 131 of 2016
DATE DELIVERED: 31 January 2018
PLACE DELIVERED: Perth
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Thackray, Aldridge & Watts JJ
HEARING DATE: 11 August 2017
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Federal Circuit Court of Australia
LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: 18 July 2016
LOWER COURT MNC: [2016] FCCA 1789

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: Mr Lloyd SC
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: Lander & Rogers
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr Longworth
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Legal Aid NSW
THE SECOND RESPONDENT: No appearance

Orders

  1. Leave to appeal be granted.

  2. The appeal be allowed.

  3. The Notice of Contention be dismissed.

  4. The orders made by Judge Scarlett on 18 July 2016 be set aside and in their place the following order is made.

    1.   The appeal filed on 25 June 2014 be dismissed.

  5. The application in an appeal filed 11 November 2016 be dismissed.

  6. There be no orders as to costs.

  7. The Court grants to the first respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FamCAFC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court involved the Child Support Registrar and two respondents, Pearce and another, concerning the father’s liability to pay child support based on his earning capacity. The mother had applied in 2013 for the father's child support assessment to be altered to consider his earning capacity rather than his actual income. This application was grounded in s 117(2)(c)(ib) of the Assessment Act, subject to the conditions outlined in s 117(7B), which mandates that certain criteria must be satisfied before a parent's earning capacity can be taken into account. The father appealed the Tribunal's decision to the primary judge, who allowed the appeal on the basis of a denial of procedural fairness. The Registrar then appealed to the court, challenging the primary judge's decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge correctly allowed the appeal against the Tribunal's decision. The court needed to determine if the issue of procedural fairness properly arose for consideration by the Tribunal and whether the Tribunal had an obligation to identify certain elements inherent in the decision-making process. The court also had to consider the submissions of the first respondent and an application to adduce further evidence. The court found that the procedural fairness issue did not properly arise for the Tribunal to consider, as it was apparent from the nature of the decision that had to be made. The court held that the Tribunal did not have an obligation to identify something that was self-evident in the context of the decision.

The court held that the approach adopted by the primary judge was misconceived and allowed the Registrar's appeal. The court set aside the orders made by the primary judge and dismissed the father's appeal. The court also dismissed the notice of contention and the application to adduce further evidence due to the merit in the Registrar's primary argument. No order was made regarding costs, but the court granted a costs certificate to the first respondent under s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), allowing the Attorney-General to authorise a payment for the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the appeal. The form of the order was subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Leave to appeal be granted.

2.

The appeal be allowed.

3.

The Notice of Contention be dismissed.

4.

The orders made by Judge Scarlett on 18 July 2016 be set aside and in their place the following order is made.

1. The appeal filed on 25 June 2014 be dismissed.

5.

The application in an appeal filed 11 November 2016 be dismissed.

6.

There be no orders as to costs.

7.

The Court grants to the first respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The mother’s September 2013 application sought that the father’s liability to pay child support be based on his “earning capacity”, rather than on his actual income. This ground for changing an assessment arises from s 117(2)(c)(ib) of the Assessment Act, but must be read subject to s 117(7B) which provides that:(7B) In having regard to the earning capacity of a parent of the child, the court may determine that the parent’s earning capacity is greater than is reflected in his or her income for the purposes of this Act only if the court is satisfied that:(a)one or more of the following applies:(i)the parent does not work despite ample opportunity to do so;(ii) the parent has reduced the number of hours per week of his or her employment or other work below the normal number of hours per week that constitutes full-time work for the occupation or industry in which the parent is employed or otherwise engaged;(iii) the parent has changed his or her occupation, industry or working pattern; and (b) the parent’s decision not to work, to reduce the number of hours, or to change his or her occupation, industry or working pattern, is not justified on the basis of:(i) the parent’s caring responsibilities; or(ii) the parent’s state of health; and(c) the parent has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support in relation to the child.(Emphasis added) The fact that a ground for changing an assessment is satisfied is not itself a sufficient basis for changing the assessment. The decision maker must also be satisfied, inter alia, that such a change would be “just and equitable” (s 117(1)(b)(ii) of the Assessment Act). In determining if it would be “just and equitable”, s 117(4) requires various matters to be taken into account, including any “hardship” that would be caused to the child or the carer entitled to child support by “the making of, or the refusal to [change the assessment]”. The father’s application to the Tribunal for a review of the decision to change the second assessment was made pursuant to the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), which conferred on the Tribunal all of the powers and discretions possessed by the Senior Case Officer (s 103T now repealed). The Tribunal was thus undertaking a full merit review of the decision and was obliged “to do over again” the task the Senior Case Officer had undertaken: Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475 at 502 per Kitto J, cited with approval in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at 315 per Hayne and Heydon JJ. In conducting its review, the Tribunal was not limited by the terms of the mother’s application for a change of assessment, since s 98S(2) of the Assessment Act provides that the Registrar is not subject to such a limitation. It was this provision which permitted the Tribunal to change the second assessment in the way that it did.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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