Chief of Defence Force v Clark

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chief of Defence Force v Clark [2000] FCA 103

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Leave without pay to accompany spouse member (“LWOPASM”) granted pursuant to a determination made under Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 58B(1)(d) – whether Chief of Defence Force has power to revoke retrospectively a grant of leave without pay to accompany spouse member.

Defence Act 1903 (Cth), s 58B(1)(d)

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE v GARY JAMES CLARK
N 1140 of 1999

BLACK CJ, SACKVILLE AND EMMETT JJ
SYDNEY
10 FEBRUARY 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1140 of 1999

BETWEEN:

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE
APPELLANT

AND:

GARY JAMES CLARK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BLACK CJ, SACKVILLE AND EMMETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal be allowed.

2.   The orders made by the primary judge, including the order for costs, be set aside.

3.   The matter be remitted to the primary judge to determine whether the relief sought in paragraphs 3 (f), (g) and (h) of the respondent’s amended application for an order of review should be granted. 

4.   There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1140 of 1999

BETWEEN:

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE
APPELLANT

AND:

GARY JAMES CLARK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BLACK CJ, SACKVILLE AND EMMETT JJ

DATE:

10 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BLACK CJ:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Madgwick J in an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) for judicial review of what was said to be a “decision” of the appellant, the Chief of the Defence Force, not to revoke retrospectively a grant of leave without pay to the respondent, Mr Gary Clark. The application for judicial review followed a request by Mr Clark’s solicitors to the Chief of the Defence Force that he exercise what was said to be a power under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) to revoke the grant of leave to Mr Clark notwithstanding that his service with the Australian Defence Force (“ADF”) had then come to an end.

  2. The facts are set out in some detail in the judgment of the learned primary judge and it is necessary to make only brief reference to them in these reasons.  The respondent joined the ADF in 1986 and was appointed to the Royal Australian Airforce (“the RAAF”) as a Pilot Officer.  He graduated in dentistry and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant.  His duties were those of a Dental Officer.  In 1993, the respondent’s de facto marriage to another member of the ADF, Flight Lieutenant Kelly, was recognised by the RAAF.  In 1994, the respondent applied for assistance to undergo postgraduate study in dentistry. This application was rejected by the RAAF.

  3. In November 1994, the respondent was granted…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chief of Defence Force v Clark and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Chief of Defence Force v Clark, the Chief of Defence Force appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute centred on the respondent's claim for an order of review, seeking various remedies regarding his military service. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity and scope of the appeal.

The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge correctly exercised their discretion in granting the relief sought by the respondent and whether the respondent had standing to seek the relief he did. The court was also required to examine the appropriate scope of judicial review in this context, specifically in relation to military matters.

The court found that the primary judge had exercised their discretion improperly, leading to an incorrect decision in granting the relief sought by the respondent. The court held that the relief sought in paragraphs 3 (f), (g) and (h) of the respondent’s amended application for an order of review was outside the scope of judicial review available in this context. The court set aside the orders made by the primary judge and remitted the matter back to the primary judge for reconsideration of the relief sought in paragraphs 3 (f), (g) and (h). There was no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the primary judge, including the order for costs, be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the primary judge to determine whether the relief sought in paragraphs 3 (f), (g) and (h) of the respondent’s amended application for an order of review should be granted.

4. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLACK CJ, SACKVILLE AND EMMETT JJ

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLACK CJ, SACKVILLE AND EMMETT JJ

Full text does not contain this section.