FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chi Cong Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 178
Appeal from: Le v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 445 File numbers: NSD 492 of 2019 Judges: NICHOLAS, KATZMANN AND BROMWICH JJ Date of judgment: 18 October 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – where primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where second respondent affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to cancel the appellant’s Class BS (Subclass 801) (Partner) visa – whether primary judge erred in finding that the appellant provided incorrect answers in visa application forms – whether primary judge erred in finding that there was no jurisdictional error by the second respondent considering documents to be subject to a valid s 375A certificate and thereby not providing those documents to the appellant pursuant to a request under s 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – held: appeal dismissed with costs Legislation: Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 23(1)(b), 23(2), 88E
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5F(1), 5F(2)(a), 12, 100, 101, 101(b) 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 362A, 375A, 375(1)(b), 376(1)(b), 438
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.41, sch 2, cl 300.211, cl 820.211(2),
Cases cited: Adelaide Motors Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1942) 66 CLR 436
AIU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 520
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 363 ALR 599
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355
Salama v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 2
Date of hearing: 13 August 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Poynder Solicitor for the Appellant: Kah Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson SC with Mr M J Smith Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs. ORDERS
NSD 492 of 2019 BETWEEN: CHI CONG LE
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
NICHOLAS, KATZMANN AND BROMWICH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 October 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by which an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was dismissed. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to cancel the appellant’s Class BS…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 178
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge was correct in his findings. The court held that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "related to your partner by blood" was not displaced as suggested by the applicant. The court found that the relationship question in the visa application form was relevant to both the nature and the bona fides of the applicant's relationship with his sponsor, not just the former. The court held that the question was relevant to the legality and genuineness of the relationship, and that it could be relevant in all sorts of other ways. The court also found that the applicant was under an absolute obligation to give truthful answers to questions in visa application forms under s 101, and that there would be non-compliance even though the applicant may have been unaware that he or she was providing incorrect information. The court held that the Tribunal and the primary judge were correct and that this ground should fail.
The court dismissed the appeal with costs. The court held that the Tribunal and the primary judge were correct in their findings, and that the appeal should be dismissed. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submits that the ordinary meaning of “related to your partner by blood” conceded by the appellant is not displaced as suggested for the following reasons:(1)The fact that the possible entitlement to a partner visa would not necessarily be affected by a familial relationship with a sponsor does not displace this “ordinary meaning” in the context of the relationship question in each visa application form. That is, the Minister submits, because the phrase in issue was simply directed to whether the appellant and the sponsor were “related by blood”, not to whether the marriage was permissible under Australian law – the wider former inquiry should not be read as confined by, or directed only towards, the latter narrower inquiry.(2)The Minister submits that the appellant’s reliance on Salama is misplaced. The visa applicant in Salama was required to select his relationship status from a list of options, one of which was “married”. As the online form indicated in a “?” dropbox, reproduced in her Honour’s judgment, “married” described a situation where the visa applicant and partner “have entered into a marriage which is legally recognised and documented”. It was against this very different context and background that Perry J said (at [60]-[61]) that the word “married” meant a marriage that was recognised in Australian law. Her Honour’s comments therefore do not support the proposition that the relationship question in this case is confined to ascertaining whether the appellant was in a relationship that would be recognised as a marriage under Australian law.(3)Rather, the Minister submits, the question “are you related to your partner [or fiancé(e)] by blood” was relevant to both the nature and the bona fides of the appellant’s relationship with the sponsor, not just the former: that is, both legality and genuineness. It could be relevant in all sorts of other ways. The primary judge was therefore correct to find (at [19]), that the Tribunal did not err in rationalising that “it may well be relevant to the Department in considering the genuineness of a relationship to have regard to the closeness of that relationship, without it meaning an automatic preclusion from the granting of the visa”. (4)As an alternative, and without diminution of the preceding arguments, the Minister submits that even if the question were not relevant to the determination of the appellant’s visa application, this would not assist the appellant. That is because visa applicants are under an absolute obligation to give truthful answers to questions in visa application forms under s 101, and there will be non-compliance even though the applicant may have been unaware that he or she was providing incorrect information (s 100). Nothing in the text of the Migration Act suggests that the absolute obligation to give correct answers is limited only to questions confined to visa criteria. The appellant breached this absolute obligation by providing incorrect answers to the relationship question “are you related to your partner by blood” and thereby failed to comply with s 101(b).(5)The Minister points out that the appellant’s contention that the term “related by blood” has a breadth that is potentially expansive or even absurd was taken into account by the Tribunal at [42]-[44]. The Tribunal observed that it “can include very distant relatives, which could go to the point of absurdity”, but considered that the form of the question required the appellant “to disclose the existence of any known blood relationship no matter how distant”. (6)The Minister also points out that the Tribunal observed that discretion could deal with most cases where the relationship was so distant as not to be relevant to a decision to grant or not grant the visa, but that here the appellant was “very closely related to the sponsor” and, while the relationship “would not have automatically precluded him from being granted the visa, it would have indicated to the Department that it may need to investigate the relationship more fully”. (7)The Minister therefore submits that a question which seeks to gain information that may be of assistance in investigating a relationship is not absurd, but rather serves a legitimate purpose. Here, the appellant and his sponsor were first cousins, their mothers being sisters, and the Tribunal (at [44]) therefore correctly characterised the appellant as being “very closely related” to the sponsor. A relationship of this kind was therefore both within the ordinary meaning of the phrase “related by blood” and relevant to the decision-maker’s task. The relationship question “are you related to your partner [or fiancé(e)] by blood” reached the relationship between the appellant and his sponsor, requiring the answer “Yes”.(8)The Tribunal and the primary judge were correct and this ground should fail.Consideration