Chhibber v Barton

Case [1990] HCATrans 128


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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M46 of 1989

B e t w e e n -

RAMONA MARGARET CHHIBBER

Applicant

and

NORMAN BENJAMIN BARTON and

RUTH ZARA RACHEL BARTON

Respondents

Application for special leave

to appeal

DEANE J
GAUDRON J

McHUGH J

Chhibber

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 8 JUNE 1990, AT 2.59 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

M1Tl3/l/RB 1 8/6/90

MS S. MORGAN: If the Court pleases, in this matter I appear

for the applicant. (instructed by Al"wJ11 Samuel & Associates)

MR N. MUKHTAR:  May it please the Court, I appear on behalf

o the respondent. (instructed by Lester Fielden

& Faraone)

DEANE J:  Yes, Ms Morgan.
MS MORGAN:  If the Court pleases, this matter has an unusual

curial history and if Your Honours desire me to

outline that or to answer questions, I would be

happy to do so.

DEANE J:  You can take it that we have read the documents and

are well acquainted with the past rather long

history of these proceedings.

MS MORGAN:  As Your Honour pleases. The applicant is a

suburban housewife who has had, as Your Honour has

observed, a longstanding dispute with her neighbours.

I would submit, however, that the question raised by

this application is a question of public importance.

I would submit that the question of adverse

possession generally, and in particular the significance

of fencing and of the interpretation of section 27(c)

of the LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ACT and the concept of

mistake in the concept of adverse possession are

matters of public importance.

Your Honours, section 27 of the LIMITATION OF

ACTIONS ACT is extracted in the judgment of

His Honour Mr Justice Hampel and appears at page 60

in the application book. I believe that there are

no reported Australian authorities upon this

provision and there is certainly no authority of

this Court; indeed, Your Honours, it appears that
the only reported authority is that of a single judge,

Mr Justice Pearson.

Your Honours have recently had occasion to

consider mistake in a new situation, that of electronic

transfers of funds in WESTPAC V THE ANZ BANK and I

would submit, Your Honours, that an appropriate

occasion now arises to consider section 27 and the

concept of mistake in relation to adverse possession.

I would respectfully submit further, Your Honours,

that the situation presented by this dispute has an

added twist to it, in that the mistake, as I understand

the facts found by the trial judge, was the mistake of

a contractor employed by the defendants - or at least

the defendants'predecessor in title - and the predecessor

in title - I am sorry, the respondents, if Your Honours please - and the predecessor in title of the applicant.

GAUDRON J:  But where is the action for relief from the consequence

of mistake?

M1Tl3/2/RB 2 8/6/90
Chhibber
MS MORGAN:  Your Honour, I would submit that in defending these

proceedings as she…

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Chhibber v Barton [1990] HCATrans 128
Case
[1990] HCATrans 128
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The applicant, Ramona Margaret Chhibber, a suburban housewife, was involved in a longstanding dispute with her neighbours, Norman Benjamin Barton and Ruth Zara Rachel Barton. The applicant sought to raise questions of public importance concerning adverse possession, specifically the significance of fencing, the interpretation of section 27(c) of the Limitation of Actions Act, and the concept of mistake in adverse possession.

The central legal issues before the court were the interpretation of section 27 of the Limitation of Actions Act, particularly the meaning of "mistake" in the context of adverse possession, and whether the applicant could rely on this provision. The applicant argued that there was no authoritative Australian case law on this section and that the present dispute offered an appropriate occasion for the High Court to consider it, especially given a recent decision on mistake in a different context. A further point of contention was that the mistake in question was allegedly made by a contractor employed by the respondents' predecessor in title, and potentially the applicant's predecessor in title.

The applicant contended that by defending the proceedings, she was seeking relief from the consequences of a mistake within the meaning of section 27. She argued that the trial judge's view, that she could not have succeeded on the basis of section 27 even if she had been the plaintiff, was incorrect. The applicant submitted that if she had been the plaintiff, she could have relied on a common mistake between the parties. The court noted that the action for relief from the consequences of mistake was distinct from the applicant's defence.

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