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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M46 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
RAMONA MARGARET CHHIBBER
Applicant
and
NORMAN BENJAMIN BARTON and
RUTH ZARA RACHEL BARTON
Respondents
Application for special leave
to appeal
DEANE J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
| Chhibber |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 8 JUNE 1990, AT 2.59 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| M1Tl3/l/RB | 1 | 8/6/90 |
MS S. MORGAN: If the Court pleases, in this matter I appear
for the applicant. (instructed by Al"wJ11 Samuel & Associates)
| MR N. MUKHTAR: | May it please the Court, I appear on behalf |
o the respondent. (instructed by Lester Fielden
& Faraone)
| DEANE J: | Yes, Ms Morgan. |
| MS MORGAN: | If the Court pleases, this matter has an unusual |
curial history and if Your Honours desire me to
outline that or to answer questions, I would be
happy to do so.
| DEANE J: | You can take it that we have read the documents and |
are well acquainted with the past rather long
history of these proceedings.
| MS MORGAN: | As Your Honour pleases. | The applicant is a |
suburban housewife who has had, as Your Honour has
observed, a longstanding dispute with her neighbours.
I would submit, however, that the question raised by
this application is a question of public importance.
I would submit that the question of adverse
possession generally, and in particular the significance
of fencing and of the interpretation of section 27(c)
of the LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ACT and the concept of
mistake in the concept of adverse possession are
matters of public importance.
Your Honours, section 27 of the LIMITATION OF
ACTIONS ACT is extracted in the judgment of
His Honour Mr Justice Hampel and appears at page 60
in the application book. I believe that there are no reported Australian authorities upon this
provision and there is certainly no authority of
this Court; indeed, Your Honours, it appears that
the only reported authority is that of a single judge,Mr Justice Pearson.
Your Honours have recently had occasion to
consider mistake in a new situation, that of electronic
transfers of funds in WESTPAC V THE ANZ BANK and I would submit, Your Honours, that an appropriate
occasion now arises to consider section 27 and the
concept of mistake in relation to adverse possession.
I would respectfully submit further, Your Honours,
that the situation presented by this dispute has an
added twist to it, in that the mistake, as I understand
the facts found by the trial judge, was the mistake of
a contractor employed by the defendants - or at least
the defendants'predecessor in title - and the predecessor
in title - I am sorry, the respondents, if Your Honours please - and the predecessor in title of the applicant.
| GAUDRON J: | But where is the action for relief from the consequence |
of mistake?
| M1Tl3/2/RB | 2 | 8/6/90 |
| Chhibber |
| MS MORGAN: | Your Honour, I would submit that in defending these |
proceedings as she…
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- AGLC
- Chhibber v Barton [1990] HCATrans 128
- Case
- [1990] HCATrans 128
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were the interpretation of section 27 of the Limitation of Actions Act, particularly the meaning of "mistake" in the context of adverse possession, and whether the applicant could rely on this provision. The applicant argued that there was no authoritative Australian case law on this section and that the present dispute offered an appropriate occasion for the High Court to consider it, especially given a recent decision on mistake in a different context. A further point of contention was that the mistake in question was allegedly made by a contractor employed by the respondents' predecessor in title, and potentially the applicant's predecessor in title.
The applicant contended that by defending the proceedings, she was seeking relief from the consequences of a mistake within the meaning of section 27. She argued that the trial judge's view, that she could not have succeeded on the basis of section 27 even if she had been the plaintiff, was incorrect. The applicant submitted that if she had been the plaintiff, she could have relied on a common mistake between the parties. The court noted that the action for relief from the consequences of mistake was distinct from the applicant's defence.
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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