Chester v Waverley Corporation

The plaintiff, Janet Chester, brought an action against the defendant, the Council of the Municipality of Waverley, seeking damages for nervous shock and resulting ill health. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's negligence in excavating and inadequately guarding a trench in a public street led to her seven-year-old son falling in and drowning. The plaintiff claimed she suffered severe shock and impairment of health as a result of witnessing the recovery of her son's body from the trench. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the defendant council owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and if so, whether that duty was breached, leading to the plaintiff's injury. Specifically, the court had to determine if the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that its negligent excavation and inadequate guarding of the trench could cause a mother to suffer nervous shock and resulting physical harm upon witnessing the recovery of her drowned child's body. This involved considering the scope of the duty of care owed by a local authority in relation to public works and the remoteness of the plaintiff's alleged injury from the defendant's actions.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., Rich and Starke JJ., held that the facts did not disclose a breach of any duty owed by the defendant council to the plaintiff. Their reasoning focused on the principle that a defendant is only liable for consequences that a reasonable person would have foreseen. The majority concluded that while the council might have been negligent in relation to the child, the nervous shock suffered by the mother upon seeing the recovered body of her child was too remote a consequence to be reasonably anticipated by the council. They distinguished the present case from those where a duty of care was owed to persons directly affected by the negligent act or omission, finding that the plaintiff's injury was not within the reasonable contemplation of the defendant when carrying out its work on the road.

Evatt J. dissented, finding that there was ample evidence from which a jury could infer negligence on the part of the defendant. He argued that the council's failure to adequately guard the trench, which was known to be attractive to children, created a foreseeable risk of harm. Evatt J. considered that the shock suffered by the mother was a direct consequence of the defendant's negligence and fell within the scope of a duty owed to those who might be closely and directly affected by the defendant's actions. Despite the differing opinions, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.