FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Cheong v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 955
File number(s): SYG 2594 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS Date of judgment: 20 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – extension of time – seven days out of time – where related judicial review matter dismissed – no arguable case for jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 457.223
Cases cited: CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1537
MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 38 Date of hearing: 23 May 2025 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicants: Mr J R Young Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr J Park of Wentworth Lawyers & Partners Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr M Wong of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
SYG 2594 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JAEHYANG CHEONG
First Applicant
SANG WON PARK
Second Applicant
YEOLMEA PARK
Third Applicant
YENA PARK
Fourth ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2.The name of the second respondent be amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’.
3.The application filed on 17 November 2020 be dismissed.
4.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an application filed under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), seeking an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 6 October 2020.
By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants Subclass 457 Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visas (subclass 457 visas), on the basis that the first applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination.
This application was heard in conjunction with the related matter of G'day Japanese…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 955
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants filed their appeal application seven days beyond the statutory 35-day period, triggering the need for an extension of time under section 477(2) of the Act. The legal issue before the court was whether the extension should be granted, considering the two-limbed test specified in the statute: whether the application was made in writing detailing the reasons for the extension, and whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension.
The court noted that the first limb of the test was satisfied, as the application was indeed made in writing and included the reasons for the extension. However, regarding the second limb, the court found that the applicants had not established any compelling reason why an extension should be granted. The court considered the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, and the merits of the underlying application, concluding that it was not necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time limit. The court also noted that the outcome of the related matter concerning the sponsor's nomination application would determine the outcome in this proceeding.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time, and the Tribunal’s decision remained in place. The applicants' visa applications were therefore denied, and no appeal lay to the Federal Court of Australia under the Act. However, the applicants retained the option to apply for special leave to appeal to the High Court under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 477(2)(a) of the Act is thus satisfied.Necessary in the interests of the administration of justice The second limb of s 477(2)(b) allows the Court to grant an extension of time for the filing of an application, if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28 (Tu’uta Katoa) at [12], the High Court observed that the Court’s power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant, rather on the broader interests of the administration of justice. The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time but the Court may look at a myriad of facts and circumstances including the length of the applicant’s delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The principles regarding an application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that case at [40], Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation to ‘evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice’. Further, their Honours identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time – although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:(a)the extent of the delay and explanation for it;(b)any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted;(c)the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended;(d)the interests of the public at large; and(e)the merits of the substantive application. At hearing on 23 May 2025, Counsel for the applicant, Mr Young, submitted that if the related matter of G’day Japanese were to succeed, then so to must the present application by virtue of the interrelated nature of the two applications. Mr Young also conceded that if the related matter were to fail, so to must this application. The Minister’s representative, Mr Wong, agreed with the applicants’ submissions that the outcome of the related matter would so determine the outcome in this proceeding. Mr Young, however, submitted that if the Court were minded, the Court should exercise its discretion to grant the extension of time, even if I were to ultimately dismiss the substantive application, so as to allow the applicant a right of appeal. I observe that if the extension of time is refused then the Tribunal’s decision will stand, with all the consequences that follow for the applicants in relation to their subclass 457 visa application. No appeal would lie to the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to s 476A(3)(a) of the Act, however an application to that Court may be made under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).