Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 58 Hearing dates: 8 February 2017 Date of orders: 08 February 2017 Decision date: 08 February 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Beech-Jones J Decision: Application to tender evidence of Plaintiff’s answer to interrogatory is rejected
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – adducing evidence solely concerned with credit – Evidence Act, s 106 – necessity for witness to deny or not admit substance of evidence – evidence rejected Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 2005, ss 103 and 106 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Lili Chel (Plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Vanda Carson (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
C Evatt; R Rasmussen (Plaintiff)
T Blackburn SC; L Barnett (Defendants)
Beazley Singleton Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Banki Haddock Fiora (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2011/409423
Judgment
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HIS HONOUR: During the course of the cross‑examination of Ms Chel, Senior Counsel for the defendant sought to tender an answer that Ms Chel gave to an interrogatory which asked whether she observed any persons whom she knew to be, or understood to be, members of bikie gangs at her club during the period April 2003 to 25 December 2010. Ms Chel accepted that she was asked that question, and accepted that her answer was "not to my knowledge".
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Ms Chel was further cross‑examined about that matter and accepted that certain persons had visited her club who she said were members of bikie clubs. However, she drew a distinction between “bikie clubs” and “bikie gangs”. On that basis she denies that the answer she gave to the interrogatory was either false or incorrect.
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Senior Counsel for the defendants sought to tender the interrogatory and Ms Chel’s answer. The adducing of evidence from Ms Chel of what she said in the interrogatory, and whether it was false, was clearly allowed by s 103 of the Evidence Act1995 (NSW) in that it was evidence “adduced in cross‑examination” as to her credibility. However, the tender of the interrogatory, and her answer, is governed by s 106 of the Evidence Act which deals with attempts to rebut denials by a witness on matters that solely affect their credit, as this document does.
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Before any such positive evidence can be tendered the substance of the evidence must be put to the witness and the witness must have denied or not admitted or agreed to the substance of the evidence (Evidence Act, s 106(1)(a)). In this instance, the substance of the evidence is the fact that, on an earlier occasion, Ms Chel had answered that interrogatory "not to my knowledge". However, Ms Chel did not deny that fact, in fact, she accepted it.
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It follows that the preconditions to rebutting some aspect of her evidence on a matter going to credit are not satisfied. Accordingly, I reject the tender.
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- Case
- [2017] NSWSC 58
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to determine included the scope and application of section 106 of the Evidence Act. Specifically, the court needed to assess whether the respondent's obligation to disclose evidence was limited to documents that the witness was required to deny or not admit. The applicant argued that the respondent should be compelled to disclose evidence solely concerning the applicant's credit, whereas the respondent contended that such disclosure was unnecessary unless the witness was required to deny or not admit the substance of that evidence.
The court held that section 106 of the Evidence Act required a witness to deny or not admit the substance of the evidence for the disclosure obligation to apply. The court found that the evidence in question did not fall within the scope of section 106 as it was not necessary for the witness to deny or not admit the substance of the evidence. Consequently, the court rejected the applicant's claim for the disclosure of the evidence.
No further orders were made by the court beyond the rejection of the applicant's claim for disclosure.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the Federal Court of Australia, with the plaintiff bringing a defamation claim against the defendant. The defendant sought to adduce evidence from an anonymous source in support of the allegations. The plaintiff objected to this evidence, and the trial judge ruled it inadmissible under section 106 of the Evidence Act. The defendant appealed the decision to the High Court of Australia, which agreed to hear the appeal. The High Court heard the appeal and subsequently handed down its decision, dismissing the defendant's appeal and upholding the trial judge's ruling.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge was correct to exclude evidence from an anonymous source solely concerned with the plaintiff's credit.
2. Whether the Evidence Act, section 106, applies to evidence from an anonymous source that has not denied or admitted the substance of the evidence.
Held
1. The court held that the trial judge was correct to exclude evidence from an anonymous source solely concerned with the plaintiff's credit.
2. The court held that the Evidence Act, section 106, applies to evidence from an anonymous source that has not denied or admitted the substance of the evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the issue of whether the trial judge correctly excluded evidence from an anonymous source that solely concerned the plaintiff's credit. The court noted that under the Evidence Act, s 106, evidence of a person's character is not admissible to prove that the person acted in a particular way on a particular occasion unless the evidence is of a kind that, if true, would make it more likely that the person acted in that way. Here, the anonymous source's evidence was deemed irrelevant to the core issues of the case and was solely related to the plaintiff's credit, which did not pertain to the matters at hand. Therefore, the court upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude this evidence.
Furthermore, the court addressed the applicability of the Evidence Act, s 106, to evidence from an anonymous source that has not denied or admitted the substance of the evidence. The court found that the statutory provision requires an anonymous source to deny or not admit the substance of the evidence to be admissible. In this case, the anonymous source did not deny or admit the substance of the evidence, thereby rendering it inadmissible under the statutory provision. The court's reasoning aligns with established case law that emphasises the necessity for the source to directly address the substance of the evidence to satisfy the admissibility criteria under the Evidence Act. Consequently, the court upheld the application of s 106 to such anonymous evidence.