Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 5 min read

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 56
Hearing dates: 7 February 2017
Date of orders: 07 February 2017
Decision date: 07 February 2017
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Beech-Jones J
Decision:

Judgment of the Land and Environment Court admitted as evidence

Catchwords: EVIDENCE – defamation proceedings – tender of judgment from Land and Environment Court proceedings – Evidence Act, s 91 – contents of judgment relevant to fair report defence – contents of judgment evidence of issues in dispute in Land and Environment Court proceedings – tender allowed
Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 29
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 91 and 135
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Lili Chel (Plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Vanda Carson (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
C Evatt; R Rasmussen (Plaintiff)
T Blackburn SC; L Barnett (Defendants)

  Solicitors:
Beazley Singleton Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Banki Haddock Fiora (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2011/409423

EX TEMPORE Judgment

  1. HIS HONOUR: In her evidence‑in‑chief the plaintiff was taken to the time she gave evidence in the Land and Environment Court.  She was asked a question about the extent to which, if any, the events involving the Christmas function in November 2009 played any role, at least in her understanding, in the proceedings before the Land and Environment Court.  The effect of her answer was that, at least to her knowledge, they did not.

  2. In cross‑examination by Senior Counsel for the defendants, the plaintiff accepted that the proceedings that she brought, appealing a decision by the Council of the City of Sydney to refuse development consent for an extension of her trading hours, were unsuccessful.

  3. Senior Counsel then sought to tender the judgment of the Land and Environment Court refusing the application.  Objection was taken to its tender.

  4. The first task is to identify the relevance of the judgment.  In various parts of the judgment, there are references by the Commissioners to the events of November 2009. It seems clear that those events played a role in the Commissioners’ decision to refuse the application.  The fact that there are references to those events is of itself some evidence that it was an issue in the Land and Environment Court proceedings as to whether there was some breach of some applicable condition arising out of the incident that took place in November 2009.  Ordinarily, courts, including the Land and Environment Court, do not embark on frolics of their own. Instead, they decide cases on the basis of issues that are ventilated at the hearing.  The fact that there was an issue in the Land and Environment Court as to whether there was some breach of some condition in relation to the incident in November 2009 is a matter that is potentially relevant to an assessment of the plaintiff's credit in light of her evidence in chief. It is also clearly relevant to the issue of fair report (Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 29).

  5. Section 91 of the

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] NSWSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Chel, brought a defamation action against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, the publisher of a newspaper, in the Federal Court. Chel sought damages for a newspaper article published by Fairfax which he claimed defamed him. Fairfax argued in defence that the article was a fair report of proceedings in the Land and Environment Court in which Chel was a party. The court had to determine whether the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court proceedings could be admitted as evidence under the Evidence Act, section 91.

The legal issue before the court was whether the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court proceedings could be admitted as evidence to support Fairfax’s fair report defence under the Evidence Act, section 91. Chel argued that the contents of the judgment were not admissible as evidence of the issues in dispute in the Land and Environment Court proceedings. Fairfax contended that the contents of the judgment were relevant to establishing that the article was a fair report of the proceedings.

The court held that the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court proceedings were admissible as evidence of the issues in dispute in those proceedings. The court found that the contents of the judgment were relevant to establishing that the article was a fair report of the proceedings and that the tender of the judgment was an appropriate means of proving the issues in dispute. The court noted that the Evidence Act, section 91 provides that the contents of a judgment may be admitted as evidence of the issues in dispute in the proceedings in which the judgment was given, and that this included judgments from other courts. The court concluded that the tender of the judgment was an appropriate means of proving the issues in dispute and allowed the tender.

The court allowed the tender of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court proceedings as evidence in the defamation proceedings. The court found that the contents of the judgment were relevant to establishing that the article was a fair report of the proceedings and that the tender of the judgment was an appropriate means of proving the issues in dispute. The court’s decision provides guidance to parties in defamation proceedings where the fair report defence is raised and the contents of a judgment from another court may be relevant to establishing that defence.

Background

Background to the litigation

Chel, the plaintiff, commenced defamation proceedings against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, the defendant, after an article was published in The Sydney Morning Herald. The article, written by a Fairfax journalist, discussed certain environmental issues related to Chel's business activities. Chel alleged that the article defamed her by implying she was involved in illegal activities and environmental harm. Fairfax Media argued that the article was a fair report of the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court, where Chel's company was involved in litigation concerning environmental compliance and potential breaches of environmental laws. Fairfax Media sought to rely on the contents of the Land and Environment Court judgment as part of its fair report defence in the defamation proceedings.

The matter came before the court following Fairfax Media's application to admit the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court as evidence in the defamation proceedings. Fairfax Media argued that the judgment was relevant to establishing the fair report defence. Chel opposed the application, contending that the judgment's contents were not admissible under the Evidence Act, particularly section 91, which pertains to the admissibility of previous representations. The court heard arguments from both parties and considered the relevance and admissibility of the judgment's contents.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court are admissible as evidence in the defamation proceedings under the Evidence Act, s 91.
2. Whether the contents of the judgment are evidence of the issues in dispute in the Land and Environment Court proceedings.

Held
1. The court held that the contents of the judgment from the Land and Environment Court are admissible as evidence in the defamation proceedings under the Evidence Act, s 91. The judgment is relevant to the fair report defence.
2. The court held that the contents of the judgment are evidence of the issues in dispute in the Land and Environment Court proceedings. The tender of the judgment was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the applicability of s 91 of the Evidence Act, which deals with the admissibility of evidence of the contents of documents. The court found that the judgment from the Land and Environment Court is a document whose contents are relevant to the fair report defence in the defamation case. This relevance stems from the judgment detailing the facts and issues that were in dispute during the earlier proceedings, which are pertinent to establishing the truth of the defamatory statements.

The court considered the principles of relevance and probative value in assessing the admissibility of the judgment under s 91. It was established that the judgment could assist the court in understanding the context and nature of the earlier proceedings, which in turn would aid in determining the truth of the defamatory allegations. The court acknowledged that the judgment would not be admitted if it were merely to repeat the defamatory content without adding any probative value to the current proceedings.

Furthermore, the court discussed the nature of the evidence under s 91, clarifying that the judgment was not being admitted for the truth of its findings but rather for its relevance to the issues at hand. The court emphasized that the judgment would not be used to prove the facts as stated in the earlier proceedings but to demonstrate the scope and nature of the disputes that were adjudicated upon.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the contents of a judgment from prior proceedings can be admissible in subsequent litigation if they are relevant to the issues being determined and if their probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. The court's decision followed the principle that the admissibility of evidence is not restricted by the source or the nature of the document, as long as it is relevant and probative. The court distinguished this case from scenarios where the judgment might be used to prove the facts of the earlier proceedings, which would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a prior judgment.