FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chaudhri v Takeovers Panel [2011] FCA 1488
Citation: Chaudhri v Takeovers Panel [2011] FCA 1488 Parties: AMBREEN CHAUDHRI and DATA BASE SYSTEMS LIMITED v TAKEOVERS PANEL, BELLWETHER INVESTMENTS PTY LTD, JAMES STUART CRAIG, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION and FAROOQ KHAN File number: WAD 329 of 2011 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 21 December 2011 Corrigendum: 30 January 2012 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – Takeovers Panel – internal review – application to extend time to consider making a declaration of unacceptable circumstances and consequential orders – power to extend time – undertaking given pursuant to s 201A of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) – uncertainty in undertaking – no declaration – considerations relevant to Court’s discretion to extend time – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Pt 6.10, Div 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Takeovers Panel – hearing concluded on undertaking being given – decision to accept undertaking considered to be possibly jurisdictional error or a mistake – whether Panel has power to make later decision or declaration – opportunity to consider whether to make a declaration – whether power has been exercised – whether there is utility in granting an extension of time
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether an application is an interlocutory or final – timing of application
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 201A(3), 201A(4)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 657A(1), 657A(2), 657A(3), 657B, 657C(2), 657C(3), 657D(1), 657D(3), 657EA(4), 657EA(5)Cases cited: Attorney-General (Cth) v Alinta Ltd (2008) 233 CLR 542
Bentley Capital Limited [2011] ATP 8
Bentley Capital Limited O1R [2011) ATP 13
Chandler v Alberta Association of Architects [1989] 2 SCR 848
Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No 1) (1991) 32 FCR 219
Export Development Grants Board v EMI (Australia) Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 269
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423
Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) (2005) 24 VAR 90
Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) (2006) 25 VAR 449
Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213
McCann v Pendant Software Pty Ltd (2006) 235 ALR 566
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Re Takeovers Panel [2002] FCA 1120
Takeovers Panel v Glencore International AG (2005) 55 ACSR 453Date of hearing: 18 November 2011 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 86 Counsel for the Applicants: JC Giles with P Fletcher Solicitor for the Applicants: Paul Fletcher & Co Counsel for the First Respondent: S Dharmananda Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondents: The Second Respondents did not appear Counsel for the Third Respondent: DJ Jackson Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: ML Bennett Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Bennett & Co FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chaudhri v Takeovers Panel [2011] FCA 1488
CORRIGENDUM
1.In paragraph 56 of the Reasons for Judgment, in the fifth…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1488
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues revolved around the power of the Takeovers Panel to extend time limits, the completeness of the Panel’s function upon accepting undertakings, and the implications of the Panel's acceptance of undertakings on its ability to revisit its earlier decisions. The applicants contended that the Panel had not fully discharged its function and could revisit its earlier decision to make a declaration of unacceptable circumstances. Conversely, the Panel argued that once it accepted undertakings, its function was complete and it did not have a roving commission to revisit matters.
The Court considered the statutory framework, including the time limits for making a declaration under the Corporations Act, and the principles of administrative law pertinent to the Panel’s powers. It noted that while there was a common understanding that an extension of time might be granted, the more significant issue was whether the Panel’s function was complete upon accepting undertakings. The Court concluded that once the Panel accepted the undertakings, its function was complete, and it did not have the power to revisit its earlier decision to accept those undertakings. The Court found that the Panel’s acceptance of undertakings concluded its function, and there was no power to revisit the decision. Therefore, the application for an extension of time was dismissed. The Court further ordered that unless contrary submissions were filed within 14 days, the Review Panel was to pay the costs of the applicants and the fourth respondent. If submissions on costs were filed, the applicants and fourth respondent would have a further 14 days to reply, and any issue as to costs would be determined on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. Unless submissions to the contrary are filed by the first respondent within 14 days, the first respondent is to pay the costs of the applicants and the fourth respondent to be taxed if not agreed.
3. If submissions on costs are filed by the first respondent, the applicants and fourth respondent have a further 14 days to reply.
4. Any issue as to costs will be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Again, the parties are at odds over this issue.CONSIDERATIONIs there power to extend time? In Glencore, Finkelstein J made observations (at [17]), expressly obiter, to the effect that if the Panel believes that the original declaration requires variation, it can make appropriate changes under its power to vary the decision under review (s 657EA(4)(a) CA) and there is no time constraint in the exercise of that power. Those observations, however, preceded the amendments made in 2007 which added s 657EA(5) CA setting up special time limits for the making of a declaration by a Review Panel. It is clear from s 657EA(5) CA that the Review Panel can only make a declaration of unacceptable circumstances, after conducting its review, if the declaration is made within three months after the circumstances occur or, alternatively, within one month after the application for review was made, whichever is the later time. The Court may extend the period on application by the Panel. There is no reason to believe, nor was it argued in this case, that such an application must be made within the original time period. However, delay will clearly be a factor to take into account given the emphasis in the entire Panel regime on expeditious decision-making within a potentially dynamic market environment. Interestingly, although the amendment by s 657EA(5) CA stipulates the time limit within which the Review Panel should make a declaration, it does not impose any express time limit for any of the other acts to which subs (4) is directed, such as varying the decision reviewed or setting it aside, or setting it aside and substituting a new decision. In any event, for the purposes of this application, it is accepted by all parties that an extension of time is necessary if the Review Panel is to be permitted to revisit its earlier decision. To the extent that Glencore might be taken as authority for the proposition that if the Panel believes the original declaration requires variation, it can make appropriate changes under its power to vary the decision under review without any time constraint, in my view, the amendment makes it clear that if a Review Panel wishes to make or vary the original declaration and it has not done so within the time limits, it needs leave to do so. The power to vary consequential orders is not, in my view, the same as the power to make a declaration. Although it is common ground that an extension of time is needed and that it may be sought and granted outside of the original maximum time period, there is another more significant question. That question is whether the function of the Panel is complete. Senior counsel for the Review Panel made the submission that the Panel does not ‘put away the file’ once there has been a declaration or order or an acceptance of undertakings. Counsel for Mr Khan made it clear that ‘putting its file away’ is exactly the effect of the legislation once the Panel has discharged its function. Counsel for the applicants made the point that the Panel does not have a roving commission to enquire into matters generally once it has discharged its function of either making or not making a declaration with or without consequential orders.