JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: CHARLES -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2021] WASCA 114
CORAM: MAZZA JA
MITCHELL JA
BEECH JA
HEARD: 23 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED : 23 JUNE 2021
PUBLISHED : 30 JUNE 2021
FILE NO/S: CACR 87 of 2020
BETWEEN: BRYIAH LEIGH NAOMI CHARLES
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BIRMINGHAM DCJ
File Number : IND 763 of 2019
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sentencing - Appeal against sentence for attempting to pervert the course of justice - Whether sentencing judge made a material factual error in finding that the offender pleaded guilty 'late in the day' when the plea was actually entered at the first reasonable opportunity - Whether a different sentence should have been imposed - Relevant considerations when sentencing an offender for an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 143
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 9AA
Result:
Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | F P Merenda |
| Respondent | : | B M Murray |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | The Defence Lawyers |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
LJH v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 155
Minister for Immigration v AAM17 [2021] HCA 6; (2021) 95 ALJR 292
NI v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 78
R v Lazarus [2017] NSWCCA 279; (2017) 270 A Crim R 378
Ranford v The State of Western Australia (No 2) [2006] WASCA 243; (2006) 166 A Crim R 451
Santos v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 164
Spence v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 171; (2014) 244 A Crim R 337
Todorovic v Moussa [2001] NSWCA 419; (2001) 53 NSWLR 463
Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2009] WASCA 202
REASONS OF THE COURT:
At the conclusion of the hearing of this appeal, the court made the following orders, for reasons to be published later:
(1)The appeal is allowed.
(2)The appellant's sentence of 2 years 6 months' immediate imprisonment for the sole count on District Court Indictment 763 of 2019 is set aside, and a sentence of 22 months' immediate imprisonment is substituted.
(3)The substituted sentence is taken to have commenced on 5 June 2020.
(4)The appellant is eligible for parole.
These are our reasons for making those orders.
Summary
On 28 November 2019, the appellant was convicted, on her plea of guilty, of one count of attempting to pervert the course of justice, contrary to s 143 of the Criminal Code (WA). The offence was allegedly committed between 20 December 2018 and 5 March 2019. It was alleged that the appellant attempted, by providing false evidence in support of a bail application, to pervert the course of justice…
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- Case
- [2021] WASCA 114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the revisions made to the oral reasons by the sentencing judge constituted a substantive change that affected the sentence. This required the court to delineate the boundaries of permissible revisions to oral reasons by a sentencing judge, particularly in criminal cases. The court needed to consider if the revisions were merely corrections of errors or if they amounted to altering the substance of the original sentence.
In resolving the matter, the court held that while it is permissible for a sentencing judge to correct errors of grammar or expression, or to clarify an obvious misstatement in civil cases, such revisions must not substantively alter the original reasons. The court emphasised that even in civil cases, substantive changes to the reasons are impermissible. The court further noted that the ability to revise oral reasons might be more constrained in criminal cases, where maintaining the integrity of the sentencing process is paramount. The court also highlighted that oral statements made after formal sentencing cannot be used to change the substance of the original remarks.
The court concluded that the revisions made by the sentencing judge in this case did not substantively alter the original sentence. The revisions were confined to correcting grammatical errors and clarifying expressions, which did not change the objective meaning of the sentencing remarks. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as no substantive error was found in the sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The precise limits of the ability of a sentencing judge, or a court which delivers ex tempore reasons, to make revisions to the oral reasons need not be analysed. It is clear that it is open to correct errors of grammar or infelicity of expression. It is also permissible, in civil cases at least, to correct an error where the oral reasons plainly misstate what the decision‑maker was meaning to say. However, it is established that, even in a civil case, a judge may not revise his or her reasons for decision to make an objectively substantive change to the reasons originally given.[19] The ability to make revisions to oral reasons may well be more limited in criminal cases.[20] [19] Minister for Immigration v AAM17 [2021] HCA 6; (2021) 95 ALJR 292 [30] - [32]; Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2009] WASCA 202 [56]; Todorovic v Moussa [2001] NSWCA 419; (2001) 53 NSWLR 463 [41] - [48]; R v Lazarus [2017] NSWCCA 279; (2017) 270 A Crim R 378 [122] - [124].[20] See Lam v Beesley (1992) 7 WAR 88, 93 - 95; Todorovic [46]. Likewise, oral statements following a judge's formal sentencing remarks cannot be used to change the substance of what a judge has said in the formal remarks. The appeal must be resolved by reference to the objective meaning of the judge's formal sentencing remarks, understood in their context. While a subsequent informal exchange with counsel may provide some context which assists in the construction of the judge's reasons, that exchange cannot be used to change the plain meaning of the formal reasons which the sentencing judge has given. This is not to say that a sentencing judge has no means of rectifying an error where the judge becomes aware, by an indication from a party or otherwise, that he or she has made an error in the sentencing process. In the limited class of case to which s 37 of the Sentencing Act applies,[21] the court may recall the order imposing the sentence and impose a sentence that is in accordance with the Sentencing Act and the written law under which the offence is committed, even after a Certificate of Final Outcome has been signed. Further, where a judge realises, before a Certificate of Final Outcome has been signed, that he or she has made an error of fact or law in sentencing an offender, which may be an error of a kind to which s 37 of the Sentencing Act does not apply, then the appropriate course is to recall the sentence and resentence the offender to correct the error. However, as will be apparent, that is not what occurred in this case.[21] As to which, see Santos v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 164 [24] - [35], [48]. If a decision‑maker delivers oral reasons and subsequently publishes written reasons which alter the substance of the reasons, it is the oral reasons to which an appellate court has regard in discerning whether appellable error is established.[22] Similarly, if in a subsequent oral statement a sentencing judge were to (purport to) alter the substance of sentencing remarks given earlier in passing sentence, an appellate court would direct its attention to the sentencing remarks in evaluating whether error has been demonstrated. [22] Vogt [57] - [59].