Charbaji v The Queen

[2011] NSWCCA 181

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Charbaji v R [2011] NSWCCA 181

Hearing dates:

9 August 2011

Decision date:

11 August 2011

Before:

Whealy JA at 1
Buddin J at 2
Harrison J at 39

Decision:

Leave to appeal granted

Appeal dismissed

Catchwords:

Criminal law - appeal against sentence - offence of supplying cocaine - whether error in consideration of prior record - whether error in assessment of objective gravity of offence - whether error in use of fact that offence committed on conditional liberty - whether sentence was manifestly excessive

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304
Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146
Khoury v R [2011] NSWCCA 118
Sivell v R [2009] NSWCCA 286
Locke v R [2010] NSWCCA 296
Mansour v R [2011] NSWCCA 28
R v Walker [2005] NSWCCA 109
Doolan v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 54
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465
R v Price [2005] NSWCCA 285
R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566
Frigiani v R [2007] NSWCCA 81
Chaplin v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 85
Lee v R [2011] NSWCCA 169
R v Mills (2005) 154 A Crim R 40
Van Can Ha v R [2008] NSWCCA 141

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Safwan Charbaji (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent)

Representation:

P Lange (Applicant)
T Smith (Respondent/Crown)
Lawyers Corp Pty Ltd (Applicant)
S Kavanagh (Respondent/Crown)

File Number(s):

2009/200262

 Decision under appeal 

Date of Decision:

2010-08-27 00:00:00

Before:

Zahra DCJ

File Number(s):

2009/200262

Judgment

1. WHEALY JA: I agree with Buddin J and the orders he proposes .

1. BUDDIN J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a sentence imposed upon him in the District Court. The applicant adhered to his plea, which was first entered in the Local Court, to an offence of supplying cocaine. That offence attracts a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and/or a fine of 2000 penalty units. He also pleaded guilty to an offence of dealing with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime, being a quantity of cash, as well as an offence of possessing a prescribed restricted substance, namely a steroid. In respect of the supply offence, the applicant was sentenced to an overall term of imprisonment of 5 years 6 months to commence on 31 August 2009 and to expire on 28 February 2015 with a non-parole period of 3 years to expire on 30 August 2012. A concurrent fixed term of 1 month was imposed in respect of the proceeds of crime offence whilst the offence of possessing the steroid was proved but dismissed pursuant to s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 .

1. The facts are not in dispute and can be shortly stated. Police executed a search warrant upon the applicant's premises in Bankstown on 31 August 2009. The applicant and two young children were present at the time. A total of $13,035 in cash was located in the applicant's bedroom. In the bedroom wardrobe police located a freezer bag filled with white crystalline rocks and powder, which upon analysis, was identified as being 73.49 grams of cocaine. In the bottom drawer of the wardrobe, police located a vial containing 9.5 mls of sustanol and a number of syringes. Police also located in the premises a set of electronic scales upon which was a small quantity of white powder, two mobile phones, approximately 100 small resealable bags, a collection of unused freezer bags and a torn piece of paper upon which a number of names and figures were written. The document had the appearance of being a drug ledger. The applicant declined the opportunity to be interviewed by police.

1. The applicant, who was aged 25 at the time of the offence, was born in Lebanon. He migrated to Australia with his family in 1988. Shortly thereafter his parents divorced, an event which greatly distressed the applicant. The applicant left school at the end of year 10 and gained employment in the building industry as a plasterer. In more recent times he had worked on a casual basis for family members in labouring jobs and as a waterproofer.

1. The applicant has a criminal record which commenced in 1999 when he was aged 15. In that year he was placed on a recognisance in the Children's Court in respect of an offence of goods in custody. In 2001 he was placed on a further recognisance in the Children's Court in respect of an offence of common assault. In 2002 he received fines in the Local Court for minor driving offences. In 2002 he was sentenced in the Children's Court to a control order of 21 months with a non-parole period of 9 months for offences of supplying a prohibited drug and the ongoing supply of a prohibited drug. In 2003 he was sentenced in the District Court to a period of 3 years and 5 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years in respect of an offence of armed robbery. In 2009 in the Local Court he was placed on a s 10 bond in respect of offences of having the custody of a knife in a public place and driving whilst suspended. In the same year he was also fined in respect of minor driving offences.

1. Shortly after his release from gaol in 2004, the applicant formed a relationship with a young woman and in due course they became engaged. In January 2008 the applicant received serious head injuries in an assault, as a result of which he remained in a coma for several days. Whilst he was recovering, his fiance was killed and his mother was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred as they were returning home from visiting the applicant in hospital. The applicant told a psychologist Mr Tim Watson-Munro, who prepared a report on his behalf, that he "continued to be plagued with symptoms of guilt, despair and depression" as a result of that tragedy. The offender reported that it was against this background that he began to self-medicate with alcohol and cocaine. A psychiatrist Dr Olav Nielssen, who also prepared a report on the applicant's behalf, diagnosed him as suffering from traumatic brain injury, substance abuse disorder and a depressive illness. The applicant informed the author of a pre-sentence report that he had accumulated a significant indebtedness to his drug suppliers and that he had dealt in drugs in order to financially support his addiction.

1. The sentencing judge extended to the applicant a discount of 25 per cent for his plea of guilty. Although the applicant did not give evidence, the sentencing judge took into account his "expression of remorse to others in a limited way". The sentencing judge referred to the fact that a number of testimonials had been furnished to the Court. His Honour found that they demonstrated the extent of the support which the applicant enjoyed in the community. They also revealed that he had made significant progress in overcoming his drug addiction. His Honour also referred to the fact that the applicant had participated in counselling programs whilst in custody. On the other side of the coin, he had also incurred two institutional charges. The sentencing judge concluded, in the circumstances, that "[o]ne must be guarded in assessing the offender's prospects of rehabilitation". His Honour nevertheless found "special circumstances" because of the applicant's need to have a lengthy period of parole supervision to enable him to address his issues around grief and depression and to assist him in avoiding a relapse into drug use.

1. The applicant relied upon the following grounds of appeal:

(a) His Honour erred in failing to determine the objective gravity of the offence:

(b) His Honour erred in failing to explain how the applicant's record of previous convictions would be taken into account;

(c) His Honour erred in treating the fact that the applicant had been placed on a bond pursuant to s. 10(1)(b) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure Act) 1999 as a previous conviction;

(d) His Honour erred by placing too great a weight upon the fact that the applicant was in breach of a bond previously imposed pursuant to s. 10(1)(b) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ;

(e) His Honour erred in failing to identify those factors which were either aggravating (other than the applicant's record of previous convictions) or mitigating; and

(f) The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

Ground 1

1. In order to evaluate this ground, it is necessary to refer to passages from the Remarks on Sentence which appear under a heading entitled "Assessment of the objective gravity of the offending". His Honour said:

For offences of supplying prohibited drugs the sentence should reflect the paramount importance of deterrence.

In R v Clarke NSWCCA 15 th March 1990 Hunt J with whom Sharpe J agreed, said:

This Court has...emphasised that sentences involving a substantial general deterrence are to be imposed on drug traffickers and...only in exceptional circumstances will a non-custodial order be appropriate.

Judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal subsequent to Clarke have indicated that this statement is not restricted to those cases in which a profit has been obtained and profit is an aggravating factor. What the statement is principally directed to is the trafficking, the dissemination of drugs to others. Trafficking alone in any substantial degree should normally lead to a custodial sentence.

1. His Honour then referred to an observation by Mr Watson-Munro that the applicant's drug use "compromised his judgment". He then continued:

The difficulty in understanding the offending here in terms of impaired judgment is that the supply here has elements of organisation. The offending could not be said to be impulsive. A considerable amount of drugs were found on the premises in various forms and places. There was a significant amount of cash and other paraphernalia including scales, resealable bags and mobile phones. Documentation found in his possession would suggest that the supply here was part of a significant ongoing enterprise.

The offender is not to be sentenced for matters for which he is not charged. Conduct not the subject of charges may not be taken into account so as to result in the imposition of a sentence higher than would be merited by the conduct charged. Such conduct however may be relevant to deny leniency that might be afforded if the conduct charged were regarded as an aberration.

The offender told Dr Nielssen that he mainly sold cocaine to people that he knew. The amount of drugs that the offender possessed here were substantial and not readily explained by the offender's need to support his drug addiction even though it was likely that the offender had a significant addiction at the time. The offender did not give evidence before me and caution should be exercised in assessing the weight to be attached to untested histories provided to Dr Nielssen and Mr Watson-Munro.

In the context of the magnitude of the supply and the level of organisation, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the offender's moral culpability is reduced by the offender's underlying depression and substance abuse disorder. I am of the view ultimately that whilst the underlying conditions provide the context of the offending the offender's moral culpability is not reduced in a material way.

1. In advancing the submission that his Honour had erred in failing to determine the objective gravity of the offence, counsel for the applicant called in aid what was said in R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304. Latham J, with the concurrence of the other members of the court, said:

A bare recitation of the facts constituting the offences and a reference to the "objective features of the offences" does not satisfy the requirements of sentencing. The correct approach to imposing a sentence for an offence has been the subject of repeated pronouncements of this Court since the decision in R v Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594, as the following excerpt from the Court's judgment in R v Gordon (1994) 71 A Crim R 459 at 468 demonstrates :-

The sentence to be imposed for any crime must take into account the many different purposes which that sentence is expected to serve - the protection of society, personal and public deterrence, retribution and reform - even though those purposes overlap and sometimes are in conflict: Veen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 476; 33 A Crim R 230 at 237-238. It is important always to have regard first of all to the gravity of the crime viewed objectively for, without such an assessment, the other factors requiring consideration before arriving at the proper sentence to be imposed cannot properly be given their place : Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354. Except in well-defined circumstances such as the youth or the mental incapacity of the offender, public deterrence is generally regarded as the main purpose of punishment, and the subjective considerations relating to the particular offender (however persuasive) are necessarily subsidiary to the duty of the courts to see that the sentence which is imposed will operate as a powerful factor in preventing the commission of similar crimes by those who may otherwise be tempted by the prospect that only light punishment will be imposed. (Italics not in original)

In the instant case, there was no assessment undertaken of the objective gravity of the offences, insofar as no attempt was made to determine where on the scale of criminality these examples of the offences lay, referable to the maximum penalty prescribed by the legislature in each case. Accordingly, the respondent's criminal history, subjective circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation could not be meaningfully measured against the respondent's objective criminality. I do not mean to suggest by these remarks that it is necessary to undertake a mathematical or prescriptive approach to sentencing, or that one should engage in a two-tier approach : see Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25. However, his Honour's remarks lacked the transparency that would allow the respondent, this Court and the general community to understand how it was that his Honour arrived at the final result . [at 17-18] (emphasis in original)

1. Reliance was also placed upon what was said in Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146 in which Johnson J, with the concurrence of the other members of the court, observed that:

That said, the law requires that a sentencing Judge engage in consideration of matters bearing upon the objective seriousness of a crime for the purpose of determining sentence. The sentencing Judge reserved for a week on the question of sentence and had the opportunity to consider the helpful written and oral submissions on sentence. However, the extracts from the remarks on sentence set out at [38]-[40] above, reveal only general statements concerning this class of offending, without any assessment of arguments, let alone conclusions, concerning the objective seriousness of the Applicant's offences. The closest his Honour came to consideration of the Applicant's submissions on objective seriousness was the statement (at [38] above) that it "is all very well saying that the offence involved only touching, however that is exactly what the law is stating" . Of course, indecent "touching" of the victim was an element of the s.61M(2) offence. The submissions made to the Court concerned the nature and extent of the touching in this case. His Honour did not address this issue. [at para 52] (emphasis in original)

1. It is important nevertheless to have regard to the context in which those statements were made. In Cage unlike the present case, and as Latham J pointed out, there was simply no assessment whatsoever of the objective gravity of the offences. In Corby , at least one of the offences in question carried a standard non-parole period and, as is apparent, although submissions had been directed to the issue of the objective seriousness of the offence in the court below, they were scarcely addressed.

1. The real complaint in the present case appears to be that the sentencing judge did not resolve an issue which had arisen between the parties as to whether the offence lay "at the upper range of criminality" or that it "fell below the mid-range of such offences".

1. The short answer to the submission is that as the offence in question does not carry a standard non-parole period, it was not necessary for the sentencing judge to have made a finding as to where precisely it lay on the spectrum of offending. In Khoury v R [2011] NSWCCA 118, Simpson J observed:

Thus, while an assessment of objective gravity is, in all cases, a necessary aspect of the sentencing determination, it is only in respect of offences that, pursuant to Pt 4 Div 1A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, carry a standard non-parole period that an evaluation of where, on a putative or notional scale of objective gravity an offence falls, is necessary. [at 74]

See also Sivell v R [2009] NSWCCA 286 [at 5]; Locke v R [2010] NSWCCA 296 [at 62]; Mansour v R [2011] NSWCCA 28 [at 63].

But, in any event, it is conspicuously clear that the sentencing judge identified, in the passages to which I referred earlier, the salient features of the offence which pertained to the question of its objective gravity.

1. I would reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 2

1. Under a heading entitled "Antecedents", the sentencing judge said:

Prior criminal record cannot be taken into account when determining the objective seriousness of the offence. Prior record does not have the effect of aggravating the offence but it may either deprive the offender of leniency or indicate that more weight is to be given to retribution, personal deterrence and the protection to the community R v McNaughten (sic) [2006] NSWCCA 242.

1. His Honour then set out the details of the applicant's antecedents. It is true, as counsel for the applicant contended, that his Honour did not explicitly state if, and in what fashion, the applicant's criminal record was to be taken into account. Counsel referred to R v Walker [2005] NSWCCA 109, in which Johnson J, with the concurrence of the other members of the court, said:

It should be observed, however, that a passing reference to s.21A(2)(d) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 , without reference to the precise manner in which the sentencing judge takes that factor into account on sentence, is unsatisfactory. A failure to explain the manner in which the factor is taken into account does not enlighten the sentencing process, in a manner which s.21A appears to have been designed to achieve. Nor does it inform the offender, the Crown and the community of the use which the sentencing judge has made of this factor. In a case where the offender's criminal history is not capable of attracting the principles in Veen (No. 2) , error may be demonstrated which affects the sentencing process. It is important that sentencing judges keep firmly in mind the limited purpose for which an offender's criminal record may be taken into account, in a manner adverse to the offender, in the exercise of sentencing discretion. [at para 32]

See also Doolan v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 54 [at 20].

1. Those authorities however are of limited assistance because at no stage did the sentencing judge refer to s 21A(2)(d) of the Act or even hint that he was treating the applicant's record as an aggravating factor.

1. I am inclined however to assume that the sentencing judge did, in fact, give more weight to retribution, personal deterrence and protection of the community on account of the applicant's prior record. Indeed, his Honour stressed the need, in determining the appropriate sentence "to meet the fundamental purpose of protection of society." I have already referred, albeit in a different context, to the sentencing judge's observations concerning whether the present offence was "an aberration". Given the circumstances of the present offence, and the nature and extent of the applicant's prior offending, it could scarcely be suggested that his present conduct could be regarded as an "uncharacteristic aberration". By the same token it could not be said that the applicant had displayed a "dangerous propensity" in the sense in which that expression was used in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465. Nor, of course did his Honour make such a suggestion. Furthermore, I am not unmindful that in R v Price [2005] NSWCCA 285, Simpson J said:

Veen is not, in my opinion intended to apply to every case where an offender has some criminal history, even of a like kind to that under consideration in the sentencing exercise.[at 38]

Much will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. Indeed, in Price the prior offence had resulted in the imposition of a s 10 bond. In the present case, in my view, the applicant's prior convictions were relevant "in determining the appropriate level of punishment for the particular offence": R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566 [at 25].

1. That being so I do not detect error, with the consequence that this ground should be rejected.

Grounds 3 and 4

1. These grounds may be dealt with together. It is common ground that for the purposes of s 21A(2)(d) of the Act a dismissal of a matter pursuant to s 10 of the Act should be disregarded: see Price (supra)

1. It was pointed out on behalf of the applicant that the sentencing judge had, when listing the applicant's antecedents, referred to the matters in 2009 concerning which the applicant had been dealt with pursuant to s 10 of the Act. It was submitted that his Honour had erred in not drawing a distinction between those offences, and the other offences to which I have referred that had resulted in convictions.

1. The submission, in my view, is quite untenable. So much is clear from the sentencing judge's remarks. Indeed all that his Honour said was that:

In 2009 the offender was placed on a bond pursuant to s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act on counts of custody of a knife in a public place and driving whilst suspended. The offender was subject to this bond at the time of the commission of the present offence which is a significant aggravating factor.

1. Furthermore, as I have said, his Honour did not in any event refer to s 21A(2)(d). It is clear however that the sentencing judge regarded the fact that the applicant was on bonds at the time as a matter of aggravation.

1. It is the passage to which I have just referred that gives rise to Ground 4. The complaint is that the sentencing judge erred in using the epithet "significant" to describe what was otherwise accepted to be an aggravating factor. It was also submitted that the breach of those bonds should not have weighed heavily in the balance. Reliance was placed upon Frigiani v R [2007] NSWCCA 81 in which Howie J, with whom the other members of the Court were in agreement, said that:

It is clear that the prior matter was relevant in two ways. Firstly it was an aggravating factor because the offence for which the applicant was being sentenced was committed in breach of a good behaviour bond. That is an aggravating factor listed in s 21A(2)(j) regardless of the conduct in respect of which the bond was imposed. However, it is generally considered to be more aggravating when the conduct is similar to that for which the offender is being sentenced. The second paragraph of his Honour's remarks quoted above reflects this fact. [at para 24]

1. See also Chaplin v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 85 in which it was observed that the "aggravation will be more severe in circumstances where a similar offence is committed whilst a person is on conditional liberty" [at para 27]. Moreover, it was submitted that the offences in respect of which the bonds had been imposed were not, of themselves, particularly serious and certainly not as serious as the offence for which the applicant stood to be sentenced.

1. In Lee v R [2011] NSWCCA 169, Basten JA in the context of considering an argument about parity, said:

The respondent [Crown] contended on the appeal that limited weight should be given to the fact that [the co-offender] committed the offence while on conditional liberty, because the matters for which he was on conditional liberty were relatively minor offences, not involving personal violence. This contention should be rejected. The underlying offences were factors to be taken into account, as in fact they were, in relation to [the co-offender's] minor criminal record for offences of dishonesty. ... It may be that the breach would have been more serious if the offences for which he was on conditional liberty were similar to those committed in the present case, but the mere fact of conditional liberty is, as the sentencing judge noted, a significant factor of aggravation. [at para 41] (emphasis added)

1. In my view, those remarks are equally apposite to the present case. I am not persuaded that error of the relevant kind has been established and accordingly I would reject grounds 3 and 4.

Ground 5

1. At the conclusion of the Remarks on Sentence, the sentencing judge said that "I must take into account such of the aggravating factors and mitigating factors referred to in s 21A of that Act and any other relevant factor". Complaint was made that the sentencing judge had not thereby identified those factors that had particular relevance to the present case.

1. Counsel for the applicant relied upon R v Mills (2005) 154 A Crim R 40 in which, Wood CJ at CL with the concurrence of the other members of the court, said:

As is also the case in relation to s 21A of the Act, more is expected than mere lip service to the legislation. What is required is a clear identification of the relevant factors, the weight given to them, and their role in the structuring of the sentencing order: see R v Walker [2005] NSWCCA 109 [at para 49]

1. It is important to understand the context in which his Honour's remarks were made. The Court was there dealing with a Crown appeal in respect of offences which carried a standard non-parole period. Immediately prior to the passage which is set out above, Wood CJ at CL said:

His Honour dealt with the requirement that the court identify the reasons for increasing or reducing the standard non-parole period in the following passage:

The standard non-parole sentence is five years. I consider in the circumstances of this case and taking into account the submissions of counsel, that it is appropriate

that the sentence to be imposed be less than the standard non-parole term. That is the view of the Court in relation to each of the counts.

I do not consider that this was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of s 54B(4). A mere statement of the conclusion, accompanied by a confirmation that the submissions of counsel, and the circumstances of the case, have been taken into account, does not constitute an identification of the reasons which are expected in a case which falls within the umbrella of the Division. [at paras 48 - 49]

1. In truth, the only aggravating feature which his Honour identified was the fact that the applicant was on conditional liberty. There is no basis for concluding, as was submitted, that his Honour determined that the offence was part of a planned or organised criminal activity such as constitute an aggravating feature within the meaning of s 21A(2)(n) of the Act. Not only did his Honour not say that he was taking that matter into account, but neither party at the sentencing hearing contended that there was any basis for doing so. It was conceded, however, by the applicant's counsel then representative that there was, as the evidence demonstrated, a measure of planning. The references by his Honour to their being a "level of organisation" are to be understood in the context of an assessment as to whether the applicant had impaired judgment or reduced moral culpability for his actions.

1. Clearly enough, and contrary to the applicant's submissions, the sentencing judge did have regard to those mitigating features upon which the applicant could rely, including his early plea of guilty, the fact that he had displayed some remorse, the fact that he enjoyed a significant level of support in the community as well as what his Honour described as his "significant progress towards overcoming his drug addiction".

1. Finally, as Grove J observed in Van Can Ha v R [2008] NSWCCA 141, a judge is not required to "engage in a ritual analysis of the possible factors [listed in 21A] in order sufficiently to reveal the processes involved in the penalty assessment" [at para 4]. This ground of appeal should be rejected.

Ground 6

1. In submitting that the sentence was manifestly excessive, attention was drawn to the mitigating features of the case, and to the fact that this was, so it was contended, an unremarkable instance of a 'deemed supply' of a quantity of cocaine which was "considerably less than a third of the commercial quantity".

1. Whilst counsel for the applicant conceded that statistics retained by the Judicial Commission provide a blunt tool for determining the appropriateness of a particular sentence, it was nonetheless submitted that they demonstrated that the present sentence, and in particular the head sentence, was beyond the range. The statistical material that was before the sentencing judge revealed that only 2 out of 52 persons received a non-parole period as long as that imposed upon the applicant. However, it should be observed that the table relates to all offenders. In other words, it does not allow for the particular features of the applicant's offending. For some unexplained reason the cohort for the total term consists of only 12 persons, none of whom received a sentence as long as the applicant. That apparent anomaly makes reliance upon the use of those statistics even more problematic than might otherwise be the case. Although the Court was provided with more recent information which revealed that the cohort for the total term was now 70 cases, that did not add anything of particular significance to the material that was before the sentencing judge.

1. Although the sentence which was imposed, and particularly the total term, may be considered to be towards the upper end of the range for such an offence, I am not persuaded however that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The quantity of drugs was substantial (bearing in mind that the indictable quantity was 5 grams) and had a relatively high level of purity (being in the range of 57.5 per cent to 60.5 per cent). Furthermore, as I have said, police located a document which was in the nature of a drug ledger. It contained a considerable number of references to the names of individuals and to sums of money. For example, figures of $3,250, $1,750 and $1,450 respectively appear on the document. That material, together with the discovery of the various kinds of paraphernalia that are commonly associated with drug supply, strongly indicate that this was, as his Honour indicated, a "significant on-going enterprise". Moreover, the applicant was on conditional liberty and had prior convictions for supplying drugs. In my view this ground should be rejected.

Orders

1. I propose that leave to appeal be granted but that the appeal be dismissed.

1. HARRISON J: I agree with the reasons of Buddin J and with the orders that he proposes.

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Decision last updated: 11 August 2011