Charara v Commissioner of Police

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Charara v Commissioner of Police [2008] NSWCA 22
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

FILE NUMBER(S):
40079/07
40227/07

HEARING DATE(S):
15 February 2008

JUDGMENT DATE:
10 March 2008

PARTIES:
Jamal Charara - Appellant
Commissioner of Police NSW - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:
Giles JA McColl JA Campbell JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court - Common Law Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
10879/06

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Malpass AsJ; Latham J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
5/2/07; 22/2/07

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Charara v The Commissioner of Police NSW [2007] NSWSC 26

COUNSEL:
In person - Appellant
P Menzies QC; T Ryan - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
In person - Appellant
NSW Police Legal Services - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – Forensic procedure – hair sample taken from serious indictable offender in periodic detention – police officer performing procedure purporting to act under authority of order made under s 70 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act – whether taking of hair unlawful – proper construction of s 70 of Act – whether s 70(1)(c) or s 70(2)(c) of Act applicable in the circumstances – proper construction of s 62(1) and s 74(3) of Act – whether failure to comply with s 71 of Act because hair sample could have been taken pursuant to court order under s 74(3) – relevance of privilege against self-incrimination – whether right to natural justice arises – whether compliance with s 73 of Act – whether compliance with s 73 is a precondition for the validity of an order made under s 70 – whether if in circumstances taking of hair sample was unlawful Act would require destruction of sample and information derived from sample
STATUTES – Interpretation – whether definition of “order” in s 3 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act applies to s 70 of Act – s 6 Interpretation Act 1987
APPEAL – whether appeal from a final decision of an Associate Justice lies to a single judge or to the Court of Appeal
PROCEDURE – costs – appeal from decision of Associate Justice brought in incorrect tribunal – respondent awarded costs of motion on indemnity basis – appeal – whether conduct of appellant has degree of delinquency concerning conduct of proceedings to warrant order for indemnity costs

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000
Interpretation Act 1987
Justices Act 1902
Supreme Court Act 1970
Supreme Court Rules
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Brennan v Comcare (1994) 50 FCR 555
Charara v The Commissioner of Police NSW [2007] NSWSC 26; (2007) 168 A Crim R 89
Fernando v Commissioner of Police (1995) 36 NSWLR 567
Gill v Residential Tribunal [2001] NSWSC 896; (2001) 53 NSWLR 425
Kerr v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWSC 637
Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWSC 113
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355
Silvestro v Ming [2007] NSWSC…

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Details
Case
[2008] NSWCA 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the lawfulness of a hair sample taken from the appellant, who was a serious indictable offender in periodic detention. The police officer who performed the procedure purported to act under an order made pursuant to section 70 of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act*. The appellant argued that the taking of the hair sample was unlawful, and sought declarations that the taking was unlawful and that the sample and derived information be destroyed. The appeal was brought from a decision of an Associate Justice.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were the proper construction of various provisions of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act*, including sections 70, 62(1), 74(3), and 71, to determine whether the taking of the hair sample was lawful. Specifically, the court had to consider whether section 70(1)(c) or 70(2)(c) applied, whether a failure to comply with section 71 occurred because a court order under section 74(3) could have been sought, and the relevance of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to natural justice. The court also considered whether compliance with section 73 was a precondition for a section 70 order and, if the taking was unlawful, whether the Act mandated the destruction of the sample and derived information. Finally, the court addressed the procedural issue of whether an appeal from a final decision of an Associate Justice lay to a single judge or the Court of Appeal, and the appropriateness of an indemnity costs order.

The Court of Appeal held that the Act provided specific remedies for breaches of its provisions, and that destruction of a sample or information was only mandated if a court found the evidence inadmissible, which had not occurred. The court found that the appellant had not established that relevant matters were not taken into account as required by section 71, and that the legislation did not imply that a court order under section 74 was a prerequisite for a section 70 order, nor that a police officer should only make a section 70 order if obtaining a court order was impracticable. The court also determined that an appeal from the Associate Justice's final decision lay to the Court of Appeal, not a single judge.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal set aside the order for indemnity costs made by Latham J and substituted an order for ordinary costs. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, with the appellant ordered to pay 95% of the respondent's costs of the appeal proceedings, including the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Set aside the order of Latham J made 22 February 2007 that the Appellant pay the costs of the Respondent of the Notice of Motion then before her Honour on an indemnity basis. (2) In lieu, order the Appellant to pay the costs of the Respondent of that Notice of Motion. (3) Otherwise, appeal dismissed. (4) Appellant to pay 95% of the costs of the Respondent of the appeal proceedings, including the application for leave to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

He also submits that the principles of the “right against self incrimination” and “denial of natural justice of being heard by the court before the making of an order” are important rights that Parliament should not be taken to be interfering with. Thus, he submits, the court should be resorted to for orders for the taking of forensic samples if it is practicable to do so, and in his case it would have been perfectly practicable for the hair sample to be taken pursuant to court order rather than by a purported order under section 70(2). The Appellant submits that on his construction section 70 orders still have work to do, in circumstances where a senior police officer is reasonably of the view that there is a special reason, such as urgency, why the procedure must be carried out immediately, or it is otherwise impracticable to obtain a court order. The Evidence About What was Taken Into Account The evidence in the present case included some cross-examination of Sergeant Hassett by the Appellant (who appeared for himself at the trial as well as on the appeal). It included:“Q.What matter do you say you considered yourself on the day before you proceeded to issue that order?A.There were numerous things to consider, I suppose; among the most important is, you are serving a sentence; you are currently serving a sentence for an indictable offence that can carry five years or more; that you have been requested under section 68 to consent to the order, and have failed to do so. Basically, that all the other information in section 69 has been read out to you and you have been informed of it; that you have had time beforehand in relation to the procedure carried out by Corrective Services.Q. Can you say that again?A.I said Corrective Services had been informed you are undergoing this procedure and made available to you that information, and you have also had the availability of speaking to a legal officer, if required, in relation to the buccal swab; that is some of them.…Q.Are you able to tell this Court whether it was a matter of urgency or not?A.A matter of urgency – other things taken into consideration, I suppose the length of period of time that you had left to serve is taken into account, the fact that we probably would say, we worked on a roster system, we were doing the whole State, and just can’t get back to this, to different gaols.” That evidence was clearly not an exhaustive statement of the matters taken into account – the list of matters taken into consideration by Sergeant Hassett stated only some that were “among the more important”. The cross examiner did not "close the gates" by requiring Sergeant Hassett to give an exhaustive list of the matters he took into consideration, nor did he put directly to Sergeant Hassett that he had not taken into consideration the possibility of obtaining an order from the court. When Sergeant Hassett alluded to the period of time that the Appellant had remaining in gaol, and to the way in which the work demands on his team extended beyond the particular gaol in which the Appellant was housed, there was no follow-up cross examination to establish that, notwithstanding these matters, it would have been practical to approach the court for an order that the hair sample be taken.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Malpass AsJ held, at [28]-[30]:“Whilst the argument of the plaintiff seemed to be that there was a failure to take into account relevant matters, the identification of any such matters remained elusive. In my view, the plaintiff has not satisfied the Court that there were matters that were relevant and which were not taken into account as required by section 71. There was mention of a question of lack of urgency which should have been taken into account. The thrust of the plaintiff’s argument seemed to be that there was time for the making of an application to the Court for an order pursuant to section 74 and that if this had been done it would have given the plaintiff an opportunity to challenge the making of the order in court. There was some evidence relevant to any question of urgency. It is somewhat unclear as to whether any regard was had to it. I will merely mention some of the evidence that was elicited. At the time of the carrying out of the procedure, the plaintiff was three weeks away from completing his periodic detention. There was evidence that at times periodic detainees failed to turn up for testing. I take this matter no further. It is immaterial in this case, as the plaintiff’s argument is misconceived.”Decision Re Section 71 At least on the appeal, there was no elusiveness about what the relevant matters were that the Appellant alleged should have been taken into account. They were that a court order could, and in the circumstances should, have been obtained. As it is part of the case of the Appellant that these are matters that should have been taken into account, and were not taken into account, the Court must be persuaded that on the correct construction of the legislation they should have been taken into account, and the Appellant bears the onus of establishing that in fact they were not taken into account. Insofar as the Appellant submits that the legislation evinces any intention that it is only when obtaining an order from the court is for any reason impracticable that a police officer can (or perhaps should) make an order under section 70, I do not accept that either of those possibilities is the correct construction of the legislation. A simple, but nonetheless powerful reason is that there are no express words in the statute that say so. Nor is there any reason to read an implication to that effect into the statute. Rather, in my view, section 71 requires the police officer to take into account the various ways in which, in some circumstances, a non-intimate forensic procedure could be carried out on a serious indictable offender without there being an order under section 70. “Taking it into account” does not, in itself, say what the result should be once it is taken into account. One indication that the Act does not make a court order the preferred way of obtaining a hair sample emerges from section 74(6) of the Act. Section 74(6) uses identical wording to section 71, in relation to a court’s determination about whether it should make an order. If section 71 meant that a police officer should stay his or her hand concerning the making of an order under section 70 if an order could be made under section 74, then section 74(6) would likewise mean that a court should stay its hand if it were possible for a police officer to make an order under section 70. Such a construction leads to an endless circularity of reasoning, and thus could not be the correct one.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

When the Act expressly states the consequences that are to follow if there has been a breach of, or failure to comply with, any provision of the Act in relation to a forensic procedure carried out on a person, the remedies that are available in the event of any such breach or failure are those that the Act expressly provides. The only circumstance in which the Act provides that the hairs taken from the Appellant should be destroyed is if a court finds that evidence of the hairs, or evidence of any results of any analysis of the hairs, or evidence obtained as a result of, or in connection with, the taking of the hairs, is inadmissible. That event has not yet happened, and might never happen. Thus, even if the hair had been taken in breach of a provision of the Act, there would have been no occasion for an order that either the hair, or the records relating to it stored in the police database, be destroyed.The Relief Sought - Declaration If I had come to a different view about whether the taking of the hair was lawful, a question would arise concerning whether, in circumstances where remedies of destruction of the hair itself, and removal of the information from the police database were not available, and where it is not suggested that any particular practical consequences flow from the hair and the data continuing to be in existence, it would be appropriate for the Court to make a declaration that the taking was unlawful. In the circumstances, that question need not be further considered.Latham J’s Cost Order The proceedings before Malpass AsJ were proceedings for final relief, namely the declaration that the taking of the hair was unlawful, and the order that the hair and the records relating to it be destroyed. At the time that the Appellant filed the Notice of Motion which was ultimately heard by Latham J Part 60, rule 17 Supreme Court Rules provided for an appeal to lie to the Court of Appeal (subject to leave when section 101 Supreme Court Act 1970 imposed a requirement for leave to appeal) from a decision of an Associate Judge, inter alia: “(k)where the decision of the Associate Judge is a final decision other than:(i)a decision on an application for a summary judgment, or (ii)a decision on an application for a summary dismissal of proceedings.”In accordance with that provision, no appeal lay to a single judge of the Supreme Court from a final decision of an Associate Justice, such as Malpass AsJ’s decision in the present case. Section 104 Supreme Court Act provided:“Subject to the rules, an appeal shall not lie to the Court of Appeal from any decision, judgment, order, opinion, direction or determination of the Court in a Division constituted by an Associate Judge …”: As section 104 is expressed to be “subject to the rules” rule 60.17 prevails over it. That rights of appeal flow in this way is also consistent with rule 49.4 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which provides:“An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any decision of an Associate Judge of the Supreme Court, except in any case where an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.”