Chapple v Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution
[2025] NSWPICMP 475
•13 June 2025
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL | |
| CITATION: | Chapple v Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution [2025] NSWPICMP 475 |
| APPELLANT: | Lee Chapple |
| RESPONDENT: | Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution |
| APPEAL PANEL | |
| MEMBER: | Marshal Douglas |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR: | Dr Alan Home |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR: | Dr James Bodel |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 13 June 2025 |
CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; appeal of Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC); appeal concerning nature of injury as disease injury over a period or frank incident; issue whether deduction made by Medical Assessor (MA) under section 323(1) was an error; Appeal Panel held injury was caused by a frank incident; Appeal Panel found MA erred in deduction by not assuming deductible proportion of 10% under section 323(1); Held – MAC revoked. |
BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL
On 7 May 2025 Lee Chapple, the appellant, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Robert Kuru, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 15 April 2025.
The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
· the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
· the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed
1 March 2021 (the Guidelines) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th ed (AMA 5).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant commenced employment with Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution (the respondent) in 2005. Initially she was required to do entertainment, cooking, cleaning, laundry and nursing, but subsequent to starting her employment she obtained a Certificate III in Assistant in Nursing and her duties were then narrowed to nursing and laundry duties. In a statement she signed on 9 August 2024 she described in the following terms an incident that occurred on 8 February 2018 when she suffered an injury to her left shoulder:
“On or about 8 February 2018, at approximately 11:00am, I was pulling a load of towels out of the industrial washing machine. The towels were tangled together and so required additional force to pull the bundle out. As I was pulling, I heard a crack and felt immediate, significant pain down my left shoulder.”
She was taken to the Bathurst Base Hospital. She was certified there as being unfit to work for a few days. She continued experiencing significant pain in her left shoulder and also pins and needles and numbness in her left arm. Her symptoms affected her ability to carry out her self-care activities such that her daughter had to assist her with some of her activities. Following radiological investigation, it was revealed that she had full thickness supraspinatus tear in her left shoulder.
In her statement she said that prior to commencing her employment she satisfactorily completed a full fitness test, and that prior to the incident on 8 February 2018 she suffered no disability in her left shoulder.
The appellant also described in her statement that she commenced experiencing symptoms in right shoulder, which necessitated her consulting her general practitioner 11 February 2019. The appellant said that on 16 February 2022 she had a ultrasound and X-ray of her right shoulder that she said revealed mild subacromial bursitis, a full thickness supraspinatus tear, significant degenerative change in the greater tuberosity of the primal right humorous and a moderate degree of degenerative change at the acromial process.
The appellant’s solicitor’s organised for her to be examined by orthopaedic surgeon Dr Graeme Doig on 22 December 2023. In a report Dr Doig provided on 16 January 2024 to her solicitors he provided the following diagnoses of the appellant’s injury:
“a) A soft-tissue injury to the cervical spine with aggravation of pre-existing degenerative change.
b) A soft-tissue injury to the dominant-left shoulder with aggravation of rotator-cuff pathology, with the subsequent development of rotator-cuff arthropathy.
c) A consequential, soft-tissue injury to the non-dominant-right shoulder with the possibility of aggravation of pre-existing rotator-cuff damage, although no medical imaging was provided to allow me to clarify things further.”
In the history Dr Doig detailed in his report, he described that the appellant had “suffered an injury to her dominant-left shoulder and trapezius muscle on the left side of her neck on 08.02.2018”. He noted that at that time the appellant was removing heavy, wet towels from a washing machine that had become entangled and that as she pulled the fabric from the machine she suffered “a traction-type mechanism through the anatomical areas of the concern”. In answer to a question that the appellant’s solicitors posed to Dr Doig, viz, “on the balance of probabilities, what is the connection between our client’s employment and the injury diagnosed”, Dr Doig responded, “unless there is evidence to the contrary, in the absence of any prior or subsequent injury to the anatomical areas of the concern, the above diagnosis directly or indirectly related to employment and, particularly, of the incident of the 08.02.2018”.
Dr Doig also said later in his report that the appellants:
“…anatomical areas were asymptomatic prior to the incident 08.02.2018, therefore the incident at work and subsequent employment conditions appear to have resulted in an aggravation to both anatomical regions, rendering the pre-existing pathology permanently symptomatic, unless there is evidence available to the contrary”.
That latter remark of Dr Doig was in response to another question that the appellant’s lawyers had put to him relating to whether the appellant’s symptoms were “entirely due to pre-existing degenerative changes in her left shoulder” and whether “the incident on the 8 February 2018 caused a temporary aggravation of those changed [sic] but that aggravation had subsequently ceased”.
Dr Doig advised the appellant’s lawyers that he assessed the appellant had 25% permanent impairment from her injury, which was a combination of a 12% whole person impairment (WPI) of her left shoulder (being 13% WPI less a 10% deduction for pre-existing pathology), 10% WPI for her right shoulder, and 5% WPI for her cervical spine (being 6% WPI but less a deduction of 10% due to degenerative change).
From the material before the Appeal Panel it is apparent that preceding that report of Dr Doig the appellant had claimed compensation from the respondent for permanent impairment from her injury. It is also apparent that respondent declined her claim. The documents by which the appellant made that claim and the respondent’s response to it, are not before the Appeal Panel. What is before the Appeal Panel is a letter date 29 January 2024 from the appellant’s lawyers to the respondent in which they request the respondent review its decision declining the appellant’s claim. They provided the respondent a copy of Dr Doig’s report with their letter.
On 7 June 2024 the respondent’s insurer wrote to the appellant advising it that it disputed she was entitled to compensation for permanent impairment. It advised her its reasons were that it did not agree that her “injury to the right shoulder and/or cervical spine arose out of employment”. It also advised her, in the alternative, that it did not agree that her employment was a substantial contributor factor “to any injury to the right shoulder and/or cervical spine”. It advised it that it did not consider her employment was a main contributor factor to the contraction of any disease in her left shoulder, or to the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of any disease in her right shoulder or cervical spine. It advised that it did not believe her the permanent impairment from her injury was more than 10%, and therefore did not exceed the threshold for her to be entitled to compensation under s 66(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. It referred to reports of orthopaedic surgeon Dr John Bosanquet dated 14 March 2022 and 23 April 2024, that were addressed to the respondent’s solicitors and which followed Dr Bosanquet’s examination of the appellant on respectively 18 June 2022 and 16 April 2024. Dr Bosanquet in his earliest report advised he assessed the appellant had 12% WPI of her left shoulder but a considered all of that is due to pre-existing degenerative changes in her left shoulder. In his subsequent report Dr Bosanquet advised that his opinion is the appellant did not have a consequential injury to her right shoulder and that the appellant suffered from “natural deterioration of underlying of degenerative changes” in her right shoulder and that the appellant had not suffered any injury to her cervical spine.
Following that correspondence from the insurer, the appellant registered with the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) an Application to Resolve a Dispute dated 26 August 2024 (ARD), by which she sought the Commission determine her claim compensation for permanent impairment from her injury. In the ARD the appellant described her injury in the following terms:
“The Applicant worked as an Aged Care and Laundry Worker with the Respondent. On 8 February 2018, the Applicant was pulling a load of towels out of a washing machine. They had become tangled together, causing the Applicant to apply additional force to pull them out. As she did, she heard a crack and experienced immediate pain down her left shoulder, causing injury to her left shoulder and cervical spine. The Applicant made attempts to return to work and for a period, return to pre-injury duties. The Applicant relied on her bilateral, right arm, causing a consequential right shoulder condition.”
The appellant placed a tick beside the words “Deemed Date” in the ARD.
Following the respondent lodging a reply with the Commission to the appellant’s ARD, the matter was referred to one of Commission’s Members, namely Ms Kathryn Camp, who with the consent of the parties made several determinations on 1 November 2024 that included the following:
“2. Award for the applicant in respect of injury on 8 February 2018 to the left upper extremity (shoulder) and consequential condition in the right upper extremity (shoulder).
3. Award for the respondent as to injury caused to the cervical spine by way of personal injury, aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration, or consequential condition.
4. The matter is remitted to the President for referral to a Medical Assessor pursuant to s 321 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 for assessment as follows:
(a) Date of injury: 8 February 2018 – Personal
(b) Body systems / parts:
(i) Left upper extremity (shoulder)
(ii) Right upper extremity (shoulder) – consequential condition
(c) Method of Assessment: Whole person impairment”
A delegate of the President duly issued a referral to the Medical Assessor on 9 December 2024 and the Medical Assessor conducted an examination of the appellant on 14 March 2025 for the purpose of assessing the medical dispute referred to him.
As said the Medical Assessor issued the MAC on 15 April 2025. The history he detailed in that regarding the mechanism of the appellant’s injury was that on 8 February 2018 she was “pulling towels out of the washing machine when she acutely developed pain in her left shoulder”. He noted that imaging demonstrated a tear of the rotator cuff, that she had steroid injections into her shoulder, that she received physiotherapy and that she was referred to orthopaedic surgeon Dr Kwa who, on reviewing an MRI of the shoulder, concluded that the appellant had “a chronic retracted tear of the left supraspinatus”. The Medical Assessor noted that “about 2 years later” the appellant developed similar problems in her right shoulder and that the appellant attributed that to her having to rely on her right shoulder. The Medical Assessor noted that an ultrasound of the appellant’s right shoulder on 16 February 2022 demonstrated “mild subacromial subdeltoid bursitis with bursal impingement” and that “the supraspinatus tendon is not visualised as full thickness tear”.
The Medical Assessor recorded that the appellant “denies” any previous injuries to her shoulder but he observed from the clinical records of the appellant’s general practitioner that the appellant presented to her general practitioner on 20 May 2008 for right shoulder pain and that a record relating to a subsequent consultation between appellant and her general practitioner on 8 July 2008 noted that an ultrasound had demonstrated a supraspinatus tear.
The Medical Assessor detailed his findings of motion of the appellant has of her shoulders, about which the appellant makes no complaint in her appeal against the MAC.
The Medical Assessor noted in the MAC that he had viewed on the PRP PACS the film of an MRI investigation of the appellant’s left shoulder that was done on 14 November 2018. He briefly recorded the results of those investigations.
The Medical Assessor provided the following summary of the appellant’s injury:
“Ms Chapple sustained an injury to her left shoulder at work, aggravating pre-existing rotator cuff disease and glenohumeral joint arthritis. She has subsequently become symptomatic with similar pathology in her right shoulder.”
The Medical Assessor assessed the appellant had 10% WPI of her left shoulder based on her restricted range of motion of that joint, and 5% WPI of her right shoulder also based on her restricted range of motion of that joint. The appellant makes no complaint in her appeal against those assessments.
The Medical Assessor identified that the appellant had pre-existing conditions of a rotator cuff tear in her left shoulder and a rotator cuff tear in her right shoulder tear. The appellant takes issue with that finding, contending that she did not have any pre-existing condition at the relevant date.
The Medical Assessor made a deduction of one third under s 323(1) of the 1998 Act for the proportion of the appellant’s permanent impairment that he considered was due to the pre-existing conditions. The appellant, in the event the Appeal Panel were to find that she had a pre-existing condition in each shoulder at the relevant date, takes issue with the extent of the deduction the Medical Assessor made. The Medical Assessor’s reasoning for making a deduction of one third was contained within Part 11b of the MAC and is as follows:
“The previous injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality directly contributes to the following matters that were taken into account when assessing the whole person impairment that results from the injury, being the matters taken into account in 10a, and in the following ways:
(i) Injury to both shoulders represents aggravagtion (sic) of pre-existing pathology in the arm, unrelated to work injury.
Whilst the extent of the deduction is difficult or costly to determine the available evidence is that the deductible proportion is large and a deduction of one tenth is at odds with the available evidence. In my opinion the deductible proportion is one-third for the following reasons:
(i) Left Shoulder: In the absence of pre-existing retracted rotator cuff tear, it is likely that an injury would not have occurred or if it did occur, that it would have been surgically repaired and substantially lower impairment would have been assessable for the left shoulder.
(ii) Right Shoulder: Injury to the right shoulder has been accepted on the basis of there being a consequential condition. General practitioner ‘s records indicate pre-existing pathology in the right shoudler (sic) with an ultrasound demonstrating a supraspinatus tear recorded on 8 July 2008. The development of a consequential condition in the right shoulder is again on the basis of significant pre-existing constitutional pathology documented some 17 years earlier.”
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the appellant to undergo a further medical examination. This is because the material before the Appeal Panel is sufficient for it to determine the appeal.
EVIDENCE
The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.
SUBMISSIONS
Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
In summary, the appellant submitted that the injury she suffered, that was the subject of the medical dispute that was referred to the Medical Assessor to assess, is a disease that she contracted due to the nature and conditions of her employment with the respondent from 2005. The appellant submitted that there are no clinical records or other evidence that she had any conditions in her shoulders at 2005. The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor consequently made an error by making a deduction under s 323(1) of the 1998 Act.
In the alternative, the appellant submitted if she did have degenerative changes in her shoulders those changes were not affecting her function which is demonstrated by the fact that she was able to work. The appellant submitted that any degenerative change she had in her shoulders did not contribute to the permanent impairment she has from her injury.
The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor failed to refer to several radiological investigations of her shoulders that had been done. The appellant submitted that it is not clear that the Medical Assessor had regard to all relevant scans when determining whether a deduction should be made under s 323(1).
The appellant submitted that if the Medical Assessor making a deduction under s 323(1) is not an error, then the Medical Assessor did not provide sufficient reasoning why that deduction should be one third. The appellant submitted that based on the available evidence, if there is to be a deduction, the deduction should be assumed in accordance with s 323(2) to be 10%.
In reply, the respondent submitted that the injury that is the subject of the appellant’s claim is a personal injury that occurred in a particular incident and is not an injury that arose as a consequence of the appellant’s employment since 2005.
The respondent submitted “the medical consensus is that there was a pre-existing condition”. The respondent submitted that the Medical Assessor made clear that the pre-existing condition is rotator cuff tear in both of the appellant’s shoulders. The respondent submitted that the Medical Assessor was entitled to reach his conclusion on the deduction to be made under s 323(1) on an intuitive basis.
The respondent submitted the Medical Assessor considered the contemporaneous medical evidence which indicated that the appellant had a pre-existing condition. The respondent submitted that the appellant is cavilling with the Medical Assessor’s judgement. The respondent observed that both Dr Doig and Dr Bosanquet had applied deductions, albeit with significant variations.
FINDINGS AND REASONS
The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons.
The Medical Assessor was required to assess the medical dispute that had arose between the parties. That required the Medical Assessor to identify that medical dispute by reference to the documentation the parties lodged with the Commission.[1] Crucial to identifying what the medical dispute is, is identifying the injury from which the appellant has a permanent impairment.
[1] Skates v Hills Industries Ltd [2021] NSWCA 142 at [29]-[30], [44], [46]-[48]; Oswell v Sublime Install Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1586 at [8]-[9].
The appellant contends in her submissions that that injury occurred as a consequence of the work she did from the commencement of her employment in 2005, whereas the respondent contends it occurred due a single incident that occurred on 8 February 2018 when the appellant experienced severe pain down her left arm when pulling towels from a washing machine.
The Appeal Panel considers that, based on the documentation before it, the injury the subject of the appellant’s claim occurred in a frank incident on 8 February 2018. In her statement on 9 August 2024 that is how she described her injury occurred. It is also how she described how her injury occurred in the ARD. The Appeal Panel considers that the report of Dr Doig, on which the appellant relied to support her claim, is to be read such that he is of the view that the appellant’s injury occurred in a frank incident 8 February 2018. Whilst Dr Doig did mention that the appellant’s injuries to the anatomical areas of concern are “directly or indirectly related to employment”, the Appeal Panel considers that when his report is read as a whole his view is that the appellant’s injury to her left shoulder and the condition she consequently suffered in her right shoulder occurred due to the incident of 8 February 2018. He identified that as being the “particular” incident that resulted the appellant’s diagnosis. He described the mechanism by which she suffered her injury as a “traction type mechanism through the anatomical error of concern” that occurred when she removed heavy wet towels from a washing machine. He said that the incident on 8 February 2018 aggravated pre-existing pathology, and when assessing the degree of her permanent impairment relating to the appellant’s left shoulder, he made a deduction of 10% for pre-existing pathology “identified on imaging undertaken immediately following the injury”. As the appellant submitted, and as the Appeal Panel will shortly discuss, there is no convincing evidence that reveals the appellant had any significant pathology in her shoulders preceding the commencement of her employment with the respondent in 2005.
Given all that, and as indicated earlier, the reasoning of Dr Doig for his assessment of the appellant’s permanent impairment is that it resulted from an injury that occurred in a single event on 8 February 2018, that event causing an aggravation of a pre-existing degeneration in her left shoulder. To repeat, that accords with how the appellant described her injury in her statement and how she described it in the ARD. It was her impairment from that injury that is the subject of the medical dispute between the parties.
The Appeal Panel agrees however with the appellant’s submission to the effect that the explanation the Medical Assessor provided for the deduction he made of one third pursuant to s 323(1) of the 1998 Act does not support a deduction of that order. If the assessment of the deductible proportion for the purpose of s 323(1) would be difficult or costly, s 323(2) requires a Medical Assessor to assume it is 10% unless that is at odds with the evidence. The reason the Medical Assessor provided for making not assumption is that he considered that absent the appellant having an existing rotator cuff tear her injury would not have occurred or if her injury had occurred it could have been surgically repaired and her would then be impairment lower.
The contribution of the appellant’s pre-existing condition to the appellant’s permanent impairment from her injury must be assessed at the time of examination. That is a different thing from the contribution of that pre-existing condition to the occurrence of the appellant’s injury. It cannot be assumed that because she would not have suffered injury without having pre-existing condition that the pre-existing condition must be larger than 10%. To repeat, the test is whether the pre-existing condition contributes to her permanent impairment and if so to what extent. Evidence that merely establishes the pre-existing condition was a necessary factor in the occurrence of injury is not at odds with assuming the contribution of a pre-existing condition to permanent impairment from an injury is 10%. To state the obvious, it would only be at odds with the evidence if the evidence revealed the contribution of the pre-existing condition was greater. Hence, the Medical Assessor’s explanation for not making that assumption was off point. He focused on the contribution the appellant’s pre-existing condition made to the occurrence of her injury, rather than her permanent impairment from her injury.
Further, the Medical Assessor was wrong to consider a hypothetical of the appellant’s permanent impairment being lower had she been able to have surgical intervention. Making a deduction under s 323(1) by reference to a hypothetical situation is assessing that issue by reference to an assumption, which is an error.[2]
[2] Fire & Rescue NSW v Clien [2013] NSWSC629 at [32]; Pereira v Siemens Ltd [2015] NSWSC1133 at [88].
The Appeal Panel considers that the appellant’s submission to the effect that the Medical Assessor did not provide adequate reasons for not applying the assumption under s 323(2) of the 1998 Act is correct. The radiological evidence, including the MRI scans of the appellant’s left shoulder done on 6 April 2018 and 14 November 2019 do not reveal that the appellant had extensive degeneration in her shoulder before 8 February 2018. What they do reveal is that she had a full thickness tear of her left supraspinatus. That was likely to have occurred in an event of 8 February 2018. The appellant had been functioning in her employment for several years without impediment in her left shoulder. The MRI of her left shoulder on 6 April 2018, which was done shortly after she suffered injury, revealed an “acute-on-chronic tear involving supraspinatus”. That indicates that the appellant was likely to have had some tearing of supraspinatus prior to her injury, which the event on 8 February 2018 worsened and precipitated the appellant suffering symptoms. Further that investigation also revealed that she had spurring and AC joint degenerative changes. It is consequently likely that she did have degeneration in the joint immediately proceeding 8 February 2018, but to what extent cannot be known from that investigation, or any of the others done subsequently.
The fact that the appellant had some tearing of the supraspinatus prior to the incident of 8 February 2018 and also had some arthritis in that joint would contribute to her current impairment of the left shoulder joint, noting that her impairment is being rated by reference to the restricted range of motion she has in joint. In the Appeal Panel’s view it is difficult, as a consequence of not knowing the exact extent of the degeneration in her left shoulder joint at the time she suffered injury, to determine to what the extent her impairment in her left shoulder is due to that pre-existing condition. Given that, the Appeal Panel considers that Medical Assessor was in error in not assuming in accordance with s 323(2) that the deduction to be made under s 323(1) is 10%. Making that assumption is not at odds with the evidence, that evidence being that the event of 8 February 2018 was likely to have resulted in a complete tear of the appellant’s cuff in the supraspinatus and the appellant being able to perform the tasks of her employment over several years without impediment.
Further, and as already said, the Medical Assessor’s approach in terms of determining what deduction should be made under s 323(1) involved error because he determined that medical dispute by reference at the fact that the appellant’s pre-existing condition was material factor in the causation of her injury rather than the contribution it made to her present impairment, and also because he had regard to an assumption of what might have been the case had the appellant suffered a different injury and could have had surgery.
The Appeal Panel must correct the demonstrable error in the MAC relating to the appellant’s left shoulder, that error being that the Medical Assessor was wrong not to apply s 323(2). The Appeal Panel corrects that error by applying s 323(2) and assuming the deduction under s 323(1) is one-tenth.
With respect to the deduction the Medical Assessor made when assessing the degree of permanent impairment of the appellant’s right shoulder, the fact the appellant had a partial tear in her right shoulder in late July 2008 is of limited relevance. The only relevance is that it was then existing, and then causing her symptoms. The records of the appellant’s general practitioner do not indicate she had any further problem with her right shoulder beyond 8 July 2008. As said before, the appellant was able to undertake her duties in her employment without impediment until 8 February 2018. That indicates that any pathology in her right shoulder was not presenting any problems to her over the course of almost 10 years.
Her condition now is an aggravation of pre-existing degeneration in her right shoulder joint. Because her impairment of the joint is measured by reference to the restricted range of motion she has in her joint, which is partly due to the pre-existing degeneration, a deduction should be made under s 323(1) on account of it. That is to say, the pre-existing condition contributes to her present restricted range of movement in her joint. However, again, it is difficult to determine the exact contribution it makes because the exact degree of the degeneration in her right shoulder preceding her injury on 8 February 2018 cannot be known. Further, given that the Appeal Panel considers that a deduction of 10% should be made relating to her left shoulder, the same deduction should be made with respect to her right shoulder.[3]
[3] Secretary, Department of Communities & Justice v Virtue [2024] NSWSC1380 at [53] – [54]
For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 15 April 2025 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.
WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION
APPEAL PANEL
MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE
Injuries received after 1 January 2002
Matter number: | W25408/24 |
Applicant: | Lee Chapple |
Respondent: | Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution |
This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.
The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Robert Kuru and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:
Table - whole person impairment (WPI)
| Body Part or system | Date of Injury | Chapter, page and paragraph number in NSW workers compensation guidelines | Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides | % WPI | Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition | Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6) |
| Left upper extremity | 8/02/2018 | Chapter 2 | P 476 P 477 P 479 | 10% | 1/10 | 9% |
| Right upper extremity | Chapter 2 | P 476 P 477 P 479 | 5% | 1/10 | 5% | |
| Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals) | 14% | |||||
0
3
0