FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chappell v Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1248
File number: WAD 453 of 2016 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 21 October 2016 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – industrial law – interlocutory application for injunction to restrain use of video recording – where video recording secretly obtained by company security guard – where company seeks to use the recording in connection with disciplinary and possible termination action – where applicant’s characterisation of conversation changed at the hearing – whether private conversation – identification of parties to conversation Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340(1), 343
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 3, 5(1)(a), 6(1)(a), 9(1)
Cases cited: Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Ltd [2010] SASC 266
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148
Georgiou Building Pty Ltd v Perrinepod Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 72
Re Surveillance Devices Act 1998; Ex Parte TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 246
Date of hearing: 17 October 2016 Registry: Western Australia Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicants: Ms KA Vernon Solicitor for the Applicants: Turner Freeman Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr AJ Power Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons ORDERS
WAD 453 of 2016 BETWEEN: WAYNE CHAPPELL
First Applicant
AUTOMOTIVE, FOOD, METALS, ENGINEERING, PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION KNOWN AS THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS' UNION (AMWU)
Second Applicant
AND: GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 OCTOBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Subject to the deletion of the words ‘or otherwise’ in (b) and (c), the undertaking of 4 October 2016 continue until further order of the Court.
2.If the undertaking is withdrawn, an injunction be granted in similar terms until further order of the Court.
3.Liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
INTRODUCTION
In the midst of an ongoing substantial industrial dispute, the first applicant (Mr Chappell) was secretly videoed making particularly adverse and colourful comments about the respondent Company. Mr Chappell seeks urgent relief to restrain usage of a recording of the secret video for any purpose. The purpose foreshadowed by the Company was to use the content of the recording against him in connection with disciplinary and possible termination action.
The question arising in this interlocutory application is whether there is an arguable case that the recording was taken in breach of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). This Court has jurisdiction because the second basis of the interlocutory relief is that the threat to use the recording accompanied by the action foreshadowed upon usage of the recording is arguably ‘adverse action’ pursuant to s…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved interpreting the term 'private conversation' under the Surveillance Devices Act and determining whether the conversation in question qualified as private. Chappell's initial characterisation of the conversation had changed by the time of the hearing, but the court focused on whether the conversation was private based on the circumstances and the intent of the participants. The court had to decide if the video recording was obtained unlawfully and whether injunctive relief was warranted to preserve the status quo pending the final determination of the case.
The court found that there was an arguable case that the conversation was private, involving only the four participants and not intended to be overheard by others. Given the arguability of this contention and the potential for irreparable harm if the video recording was used, the court granted the injunctive relief. This meant that the company could not use the video recording or proceed with any disciplinary actions against Chappell based on it. The court also noted that the company could still consider Chappell's conduct but could not rely on the video recording in doing so.
The final orders included an undertaking by the company to refrain from using the video recording or taking any disciplinary action against Chappell based on it until further order of the court. If the undertaking was withdrawn, an injunction would be granted in similar terms. The court emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo and protecting the privacy of the participants pending the final determination of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Subject to the deletion of the words ‘or otherwise’ in (b) and (c), the undertaking of 4 October 2016 continue until further order of the Court.
2. If the undertaking is withdrawn, an injunction be granted in similar terms until further order of the Court.
3. Liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Chief Operating Officer of the Company, Mr Terence Gray provided a detailed affidavit as to the timing of the various events and, in particular, explaining the delay between the recording of the conversation and the next steps taken by the Company. It is unnecessary to consider this aspect for present purposes as it is directed to the adverse action contention. CONSIDERATION There is no dispute as to the Court’s jurisdiction and the well settled law relating to the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The purpose of an interlocutory injunction may be to preserve the status quo pending trial as identified in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 (at [65]). The questions arising have been identified in many cases, including Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 (at 153):(a)whether there is a serious question to be tried in the sense that if the evidence remains the same, there is a probability that at trial the party will be entitled to relief;(b)whether the claimants will suffer irreparable harm for which damages will not be adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and(c)whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. To these limbs a further important rider must be added, namely the interests of justice. It is important, in my view, that the question of whether there is a serious question not be considered in isolation from the issue of the balance of convenience: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 (at 416). As I have indicated above, I have focused on the Surveillance Devices Act issue. It is an offence under the Surveillance Devices Act to use or cause to be used a listening device to record a private conversation to which that person is not a party (by virtue of s 5(1)(a)), or to use or cause to be used an optical surveillance device to record visually or observe a private activity in which that person is not a party (s 6(1)(a)) and/or to knowingly publish or communicate a private conversation or a report or record of a private conversation or private activity that has come to the person’s knowledge as a direct or indirect result of the use of a listening device or an optical surveillance device (by virtue of s 9(1)). In Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Ltd [2010] SASC 266, Sulan J observed, in relation to the equivalent legislation in South Australia, which also uses the expression ‘private conversation’, that the ordinary meaning of the term conversation is “an informal interchange of thoughts by spoken word”. His Honour said (at [29]-[35]) (footnotes omitted):29 The ordinary meaning of the term “conversation” as defined in the Macquarie Dictionary is:1.informal interchange of thoughts by spoken words; a talk or colloquy.2.an instance of this.3.association or social intercourse; intimate acquaintance.4.Archaic behaviour, or manner of living. [Middle English, from Old French, from Latin conversation frequent use, intercourse].30 Counsel for Alliance submits that the Act does not prohibit the recording of private “communications” but only “private conversations”. Counsel contends that not all communications are conversations. 31 I agree. Although the conversation in the Act should not be given a restricted meaning, the communication should have the characteristics of a conversation which includes a degree of informality and would not normally apply to the proceedings of a committee.32 Proceedings which take place at the Management Committee meetings are of an entirely different character to a “private conversation”. They have a commercial character and purpose. Each party to the joint venture is a body corporate which acts through representatives or agents, who have a duty to report to the corporation. The exchanges at meetings do not have the required characteristics of a conversation. Meetings have formal written agendas upon which the parties exchange positions orally and in writing, including the provision of reports. The parties seek to reach decisions that will affect the legal rights and duties of the parties to the joint venture. A formal record is kept of the meeting. There is a formality about meetings of the joint venture. Statements made and positions taken orally by those entitled to speak at the meeting cannot be said to be conversations in the ordinary meaning of that word.33 As to the question of whether the communication is private, Alliance submits that a final determination of privacy involves reference to whether or not the communication is desired to be confined to the parties to the communication. Counsel for Alliance submits that the parties simply could not have intended the communication to be private given that each representative present has, to the knowledge of the other, a duty to report the communications to his or her principal. Counsel for Quasar submits that the content of the discussions at the meetings was and is highly confidential material, protected by a confidentiality clause in the JVA. It is contended that the term “private conversation” should not be given a narrow meaning having regard to the objects of the Act, and that it should not be construed to exclude conversations of a business or employment nature. 34 I have had regard to the remarks of Doyle CJ in Thomas who observed at [36]-[38]: The definition of “private conversation” indicates that a conversation is private if the conversation, as it takes place and progresses, is intended to be confined to the parties to the conversation, or known participants in the conversation.A conversation can be private even though the participants are at liberty to tell others about it later. In the Act, “private” is used not in the sense of “secret” or “confidential”, but in the sense of “not public”. A telephone conversation with a friend is a private conversation, even though the friend is at liberty later to tell another about it. On the other hand, a telephone conversation on talkback radio is not a private conversation.There is no reason to give a narrow meaning to the concept of “private conversation”, bearing in mind the objects of the Act. There is no need to trace the precise limits of the concept of a private conversation. I am satisfied that each of the conversations was a private conversation, in the sense that the circumstances indicated that the participants other than Mr Nash wished the actual conversation to be confined to the known participants.35 The fact that each representative has a duty to report back to their respective principals would not alter the private nature of the verbal discussions which take place during the Management Committee meetings. As observed by Doyle CJ in Thomas, a conversation will be private even though the participants are at liberty to tell others about it later. It is clear that the nature of the communications which take place at the meetings are of a confidential nature and are private in the sense that they are “not public”.