Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Chapman v Gibbo’s Transport Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 720 Hearing dates: 31 May 2022 Decision date: 01 June 2022 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adamson J Decision: (1) Grant leave to the second defendant to file an amended defence which adds the paragraphs in annexure “A” to its notice of motion filed on 3 February 2022.
(2) Otherwise dismiss the second defendant’s notice of motion filed on 3 February 2022.
(3) Reserve the costs of the motion, including the costs of the hearing on 31 May 2022.
(4) Stand the matter over for further directions before me at 9.15am on Wednesday, 24 August 2022.
Catchwords: TRAFFIC LAW AND TRANSPORT — Traffic law — Motor accident legislation — Application — whether Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) applies — where not immediately clear from pleadings — where question not suitable to be answered in notice of motion — where left to trial judge
Legislation Cited: Motor Accidents Act 1995 (NSW)
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3, 3A 79, 92, 94, 108, 109
Cases Cited: Adlawan v Recochem Inc [2021] NSWSC 223; (2021) 95 MVR 304
Emad Trolley Pty Ltd v Shigar (2003) 57 NSWLR 636; [2003] NSWCA 231
Millard v State Transit Authority [2013] NSWCA 321
Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 228 CLR 529; [2006] HCA 11
Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Michael William Chapman (Plaintiff)
Gibbo's Transport Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Qube Logistics (SL) Pty Ltd (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
R de Meyrick (Plaintiff)
S Flett (First Defendant)
G J Parker SC (Second Defendant)
W Fitzsimmons SC (QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited)
CBD Law (Plaintiff)
Moray & Agnew (First Defendant)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Second Defendant)
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited)
File Number(s): 2020/104131
Judgment
Introduction
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By notice of motion filed on 3 February 2020, Qube Logistics (SL) Pty Ltd (the second defendant) seeks leave to file an amended defence and summary dismissal of the amended statement of claim filed on behalf of Michael Chapman (the plaintiff). The second defendant contended that the proceedings against the second defendant were prohibited by s 108 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (the Act), since the claim fell within s 3A of the Act. All references to legislation in these reasons are, unless otherwise indicated, references to the Act.
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It was common ground that the plaintiff was employed by Gibbo’s Transport Pty Ltd (the first defendant) and that the first defendant contracted with the second defendant for the haulage of flour. On 1 August 2016, the truck which the plaintiff usually drove, which was owned by the first defendant, was being repaired. A truck, which was owned by the second defendant, was allocated to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was driving the truck, which was hauling flour from Manildra Flour Mills to Sydney, the truck rolled. The plaintiff suffered substantial injuries, including traumatic brain injuries, as a consequence.
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It was common ground that the plaintiff has…
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- Case
- [2022] NSWSC 720
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the matter of whether the Act applied and found that it was not immediately clear from the pleadings. The court held that such a question was not suitable to be answered in a notice of motion and should instead be left to the trial judge. The reasoning behind this decision was that the matter required a more thorough investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, which could only be done by the trial judge during the trial. The court also noted that the question of whether the Act applied was a complex one that required a detailed analysis of the legislation and its application to the specific circumstances of the case.
As a result of the court's reasoning and decision, the matter of whether the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) applied to the circumstances of the accident was left to the trial judge. The court held that it was not appropriate to answer this question in a notice of motion and that a more thorough investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case was required. The final orders of the court were that the matter of whether the Act applied would be determined by the trial judge during the trial. This decision ensures that the parties involved in the case have an opportunity to present their arguments and evidence to the trial judge, who can then make an informed decision on whether the Act applies to the circumstances of the case.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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