Appeal Panel - Internal
CITATION: Chapman v Cheng and Anor (RLD) [2003] NSWADTAP 23 PARTIES: APPELLANT
Michelle Chapman
FIRST RESPONDENT
Y H Cheng
SECOND RESPONDENT
Z M GaoFILE NUMBER: 039002 HEARING DATES: 09/05/2003 SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 05/09/2003 DATE OF DECISION:
07/04/2003DECISION UNDER APPEAL:
Chapman v Cheng & Anor (2002) NSWADT 275BEFORE: Chesterman M - ADCJ (Deputy President); Montgomery S - Judicial Member; Weule B - Member CATCHWORDS: leave to extend to the merits - refusal to receive evidence MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL: 025057 DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL: 12/20/2002 LEGISLATION CITED: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Conveyancing Act 1919
Retail Leases Act 1994CASES CITED: Chapman v Cheng & Anor [2002] NSWADT 275
Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 958REPRESENTATION: APPELLANT
C Chapman, agent
FIRST RESPONDENT
In person
SECOND RESPONDENT
Y H Cheng, agentORDERS: Appeal dismissed
Introduction
1 This is an appeal by the Appellant Lessee against orders made by the Tribunal on her application and on the Respondents’ cross application. The Tribunal’s judgment, given by Mr B G Donald, Judicial Member, is reported as Chapman v Cheng & Anor [2002] NSWADT 275. The proceedings concerned a retail shop lease of a florist shop at Leumeah given by the Respondent Lessors.
2 The Appellant’s claim, as formulated during the hearing at first instance, alleged the following three grounds of recovery:-
3 In the cross application, the Respondents claimed unpaid rent.
· breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment arising out of events surrounding attempts by the Respondents to recover rent in arrears and to negotiate a higher rent;
· refund of bond money; and
· damages under a number of heads, on account of the Respondents having made statements about the Appellant’s failure to maintain rent payments, locked her out of the shop and terminated the lease.
The Tribunal’s findings of fact
4 The lease in this matter was expressed to be for a term of 26 weeks and contained a monthly holding over provision. It commenced on 7 March 1998. The Appellant and her husband, Mr Colin Chapman, took possession at some time thereafter and carried on business as a retail florist.
5 Until the second day of the hearing at first instance, both parties proceeded on the basis that the term of the lease was as just defined, and that from September 1998 onwards the Appellant had been a monthly tenant under a holding over provision. But it was then suggested on behalf of the Appellant that the lease might be subject to s 16 of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (‘the Act’). This section provides that, unless a certificate under s 16(3) is executed, the duration of a lease under the Act (including options granted at the outset) must not be less than five years. Under s 7, this provision overrides anything to the contrary in the lease.
6 When this matter was raised, neither party produced a certificate under s 16(3) or could give evidence indicating…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWADTAP 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were twofold. Firstly, whether the Court should grant leave to appeal from the County Court's decision to dismiss the claim on the basis that the appellant was not permitted to adduce certain evidence. Secondly, if leave was granted, whether the appeal should proceed to the merits and, if so, whether the County Court's decision was correct. The court needed to consider the principles governing leave to appeal, the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence, and the impact of procedural errors on the outcome of the case. The Court of Appeal needed to balance the need for procedural fairness against the finality of judgments and the potential for prejudice to other parties.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and refused to grant leave. The Court held that the appellant had not demonstrated that the County Court's refusal to receive additional evidence was an error that warranted interference by the Court of Appeal. The Court emphasised that the trial judge has broad discretion to control the presentation of evidence and to exclude evidence that is not properly disclosed. The Court found that the appellant's failure to disclose the evidence in a timely manner was a procedural error that did not warrant a departure from the general rule that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's discretion. The Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the refusal to receive the additional evidence had a significant impact on the outcome of the case, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Court did not consider it necessary to proceed to the merits of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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