CHAPMAN (Migration)
[2022] AATA 2912
•4 July 2022
CHAPMAN (Migration) [2022] AATA 2912 (4 July 2022)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REVIEW APPLICANT: Mr Joshua Robert CHAPMAN
VISA APPLICANTS: Ms Nishaben Jagdishchandra RAVAL
Ms Misha Vivekanand SHASTRI
Ms Mita Vivekanand SHASTRI
Mr Vishnu Vivekanand SHASTRIREPRESENTATIVE: Mr Sam Tejani
CASE NUMBER: 1718813
DIBP REFERENCE(S): BCC2016/1749774
MEMBER:Mireya Hyland
DATE:4 July 2022
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the application for a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa for reconsideration, with the direction that the first named visa applicant meets the following criteria for a Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) visa:
· all the subclauses in cl.309.21 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations; and
· cl.309.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the application for Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visas for reconsideration, with the direction that the second, third, and fourth named visa applicants meet the following criteria for a Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) visa:
· cl.309.311 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
Statement made on 04 July 2022 at 11:19am
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa – Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) – genuine and continuing relationship – validly married – limited evidence of shared finances and household – personal support through health issues – members of the family unit – wholly or substantially reliant – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Marriage Act 1961
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 12, 65, 88
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2, cls 309.211 – 309.213, 309.221, 309.321; rr 1.12, 1.15CASES
He v MIBP [2017] FCAFC 206
Huynh v MIMA [2006] FCAFC 122STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 8 August 2017 to refuse to grant the visa applicants, Nishaben Jagdishchandra Raval and her three children, Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visas under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Ms Raval and her children, Misha, Mita, and Vishnu VIVEKANAND SHASTRI, applied for the visas on 16 May 2017 on the basis of Ms Raval’s relationship with their sponsor, Joshua Robert CHAPMAN. At that time, Class UF contained one subclass: Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional). The criteria for the grant of this visa are set out in Part 309 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that Ms Raval does not satisfy cl.309.211 because the delegate did not accept that she is the spouse of Mr Chapman. Mr Chapman provided that decision to the Tribunal with his review application.
Mr Chapman appeared before the Tribunal on 17 June 2019 to give evidence and present arguments. The hearing was conducted in English. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from Ms Raval. She gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter in the Gujarati and English languages. Unfortunately, the telephone connection to India was unsatisfactory and Ms Raval and the interpreter could not hear or understand each other. Therefore, it was necessary for the Tribunal to adjourn the hearing. Unfortunately, a coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19), spread into a global pandemic requiring the Tribunal to stop its in-person hearings. At the time the only alternative was a telephone hearing. The Tribunal did not consider it appropriate to continue hearing Mr Chapman by telephone. On 2 April 2020, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Chapman informing him that as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was adjusting the way in which it operates and this would cause delays in finalising matters. It informed him that it was not holding face-to-face hearings for the foreseeable future and asked him to provide evidence in support of his case in writing. On 16 July 2020, Mr Chapman wrote to the Tribunal via his representative requesting the Tribunal resume the adjourned hearing via telephone. The Tribunal wrote to Mr Chapman on 5 August 2020, confirming that a telephone hearing had been deemed procedurally unfair in his case and informing him that it would resume the adjourned hearing at the earliest possible time.
When the Tribunal had the opportunity to hold hearings via Microsoft Teams video conference Mr Chapman expressed a preference for an in-person hearing. On 26 May 2021, the Tribunal invited Mr Chapman to a resumed hearing on 17 June 2021. On 2 June 2021, Mr Chapman requested that the hearing be postponed because he was suffering from ‘mental stress’ due to the Covid-19 pandemic ‘and so not in a stable mental condition to participate in the hearing’. He requested that the hearing be further adjourned until February 2022. On 16 November 2021, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Chapman requesting that he confirm that he met the Tribunal’s Covid-19 requirements for an in-person hearing. After five attempts to contact Mr Chapman or his representative the Tribunal was finally able to establish that he met the necessary requirements. On 31 March 2022, the Tribunal invited Mr Chapman to a resumed hearing on 4 May 2022. On 15 April 2022, Mr Chapman requested a postponement of the hearing because he would be overseas on 4 May 2022. He informed the Tribunal that he would return to Australia on 7 May 2022. Therefore, the Tribunal rescheduled the resumed hearing for 13 May 2022.
On 11 May 2022, Mr Chapman again requested a postponement of the hearing because he had suffered a leg injury. The Tribunal rescheduled the hearing to 8 June 2022. On 31 May 2022, Mr Chapman requested that the hearing scheduled to be held on 8 June 2022 be vacated and rescheduled for after 22 June 2022. He informed the Tribunal that his leg injury still did not allow him to travel to an in-person hearing and he was not comfortable conducting the hearing via Microsoft Teams. He also requested that the hearing be rescheduled until after his representative returned to Australia on 21 June 2022. The Tribunal rescheduled the hearing for 28 June 2022.
On 28 June 2022, Mr Chapman appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. The resumed hearing was conducted in English. Ms Raval gave evidence via Microsoft Teams from India. She gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter in the Gujarati and English languages. Misha and Mita also gave evidence via Microsoft Teams from India. They gave evidence in English. Vishnu was in school and unavailable to give evidence to the Tribunal.
The issues in the present case are whether Ms Raval is Mr Chapman’s spouse and whether Ms Raval’s children are members of her family unit. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Ms Raval was born in India on 28 September 1976 and is 45 years of age. She lives in Rajkot, Gujarat in India and is an Indian citizen. Ms Raval claims one previous married relationship to Vivekanand Jayendrabhai Shastri, born on 8 August 1972. They married on 20 February 1999 and divorced on 11 February 2009. There are three children of the marriage, the secondary applicants, Mita and Misha, born 28 December 1999 (now aged 22), and Vishnu, born 26 November 2004 (now aged 17). Ms Raval is a self-employed astrologer. Mr Chapman was born on 23 September 1985 in Sydney, Australia and is 36 years of age. He is an Australian citizen and claims no other nationality. He claims no previous relationships. He works for Westmead Children’s Hospital and does other casual work for extra money. He rents a residence in the Western suburbs of Sydney.
Ms Raval and Mr Chapman have known each other since November 2015 when they met on facebook through a mutual friend. They began chatting about common interests and eventually started talking on WhatsApp and Skype. They shared their views, likes, and values. Mr Chapman found Ms Raval to be a brave, intelligent, caring woman. She had the qualities he was looking for in a life partner. She helped him with some personal and professional issues he was facing at the time. Ms Raval was looking for a matrimonial partner. Mr Chapman proposed to Ms Raval on Valentine’s Day 2016. She hesitated at first because of their age gap and her three children. After discussing it with her children she accepted Mr Chapman’s proposal. Ms Raval and her children wanted a traditional Indian wedding. Therefore, Mr Chapman departed Australia on 3 April 2016 and went to India. They were married on 15 April 2016 which was the Rama Navami holiday. They honeymooned in the local area before Mr Chapman returned to Australia. Mr Chapman, Ms Raval and the children enjoyed a holiday in Thailand in September 2017 and Mr Chapman returned to India in 2018. Ms Raval met Mr Chapman in Thailand in April 2022.
Whether Ms Raval is Mr Chapman’s Spouse
Clause 309.211(2) and 309.221 require that at the time when the visa application was made, and at the time of this decision, a visa applicant is the spouse or de facto partner of an Australian citizen or Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen. In the present case Ms Raval claims to be the spouse of Mr Chapman who is an Australian citizen.
‘Spouse’ is defined in s.5F of the Act and provides that a person is the spouse of another where the two persons are in a married relationship. Persons in a married relationship must be married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of the Act, there must be a mutual commitment to a shared life as a married couple to the exclusion of all others, the relationship must be genuine and continuing, and the couple must live together, or not live separately and apart on a permanent basis: s.5F(2)(a)-(d) of the Act. In forming an opinion about these matters, regard must be had to all of the circumstances of the relationship: r.1.15A(2). This includes evidence of the financial aspects of the relationship and the nature of their household, as well as the social aspects of the relationship and the nature of their commitment to each other: r.1.15A(3). Each of the specific matters contained in r.1.15A(3) are effectively questions which must be answered[1] and the Tribunal has considered each one in relation to the evidence and satisfied itself about each of them.
[1] He v MIBP [2017] FCAFC 206.
Are Ms Raval and Mr Chapman Validly Married – s.5F(2)(a) of the Act
Section 12 of the Act states that for the purpose of deciding whether a marriage is to be recognised as valid for the purposes of the Act, Part VA of the Marriage Act 1961 (the Marriage Act) applies as if s.88E of that Act were omitted. The Marriage Act requires all marriages to be solemnised[2] and has other requirements depending on whether they were solemnised under Australian or foreign law. Sections 88C and 88D in Part VA of the Marriage Act provide for recognition of a foreign marriage[3] if it is recognised under the law of the country in which it was solemnised.[4] Section 88G of the Marriage Act states that a certificate or record of a foreign marriage issued by the relevant authority of that country is evidence that the marriage is valid under the local law.
[2] ss.23A, 23B, 40, 41, 48, 73 of Marriage Act.
[3] It gives effect to Chapter II of the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages 1978: s.88A of the Marriage Act.
[4] ss.88B, 88C, 88D and 88E of the Marriage Act. However, the Act limits the scope of foreign marriages recognised by excluding s.88E of the Marriage Act which recognises marriages under the common law rules of private international law.
The Tribunal has viewed the certificate from India showing Ms Raval and Mr Chapman furnished the necessary particulars to the government of Gujarat declaring their marriage was solemnised and it was registered on 19 April 2016 as required by Indian law. It finds that they were married to each other on 15 April 2016 in Rajkot, Gujarat, India under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of the Act as required by s.5F(2)(a) of the Act.
Are Ms Raval and Mr Chapman in a Married Relationship – s.5F(2)(b), (c) and (d)
In determining whether Ms Raval and Mr Chapman are in a genuine and continuing relationship with a mutual commitment to a shared life as a married couple to the exclusion of all others and live together or do not live separately on a permanent basis, the Tribunal must consider each matter in r.1.15A(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d), as well as any other relevant circumstances of the relationship under r.1.15A(2) of the Regulations.
The Tribunal has considered all the evidence provided by the couple. There are a number of difficulties with that evidence, most significantly the lack of almost any material to support the claim that Ms Raval is Mr Chapman’s spouse. First, the Tribunal has concerns about the lack of any documentation. Second, Mr Chapman’s evidence at the hearings was less than satisfactory given he was unable to tell the Tribunal much about the beginnings of the relationship and the relationship appears basic to say the least. Also, it is problematic for the Tribunal that Mr Chapman and Ms Raval have only spent very brief periods together.
There is almost no evidence of a financial aspect to the relationship. Ms Raval and Mr Chapman reside in different countries and they are both financially independent, generally not requiring remittances from each other, although there are claims that Mr Chapman provides some financial assistance. The beneficiary of Mr Chapman’s Will, superannuation, and life insurance remains his brother rather than Ms Raval and her children. When asked about this Mr Chapman told the Tribunal that this sort of paperwork has not been in the forefront of his mind. He has been focused on getting Ms Raval and the children to Australia. He has also suffered from health issues after having gastric bypass surgery in January 2018 and had some mental health ramifications from Covid-19. He and Ms Raval have not discussed in any detail how they will organise their finances once she comes to Australia. He has been saving money for a deposit on a house that they will buy together, somewhere near his work at Westmead, once she arrives. Ms Raval will sell her property in India to contribute to the deposit. Ms Raval may continue her profession as an astrologer in Australia, but enjoys cooking so she may get a job as a cook or do some study in hospitality. However, Mr Chapman is equally happy to support Ms Raval if necessary.
Nor, for similar reasons, is there much evidence about the nature of any household. The couple live in separate countries and Mr Chapman has only visited India twice, once for a week or so when they married, and once for a week in 2018. The couple stayed at a friend’s guest house rather than at Ms Raval’s residence with her sister, although the children stayed with them as well. They gave evidence that Mr Chapman enjoyed Indian food and culture during his visit in 2016, but physical complications from his gastric surgery means he can no longer tolerate seasoning in his food or have regular meals which affected his trip to India in 2018. The couple has vacationed together twice in Thailand, once in 2017 with the children, and again in April 2022. Although, they intended to spend three weeks together, Vishnu became very ill after a week and Ms Raval had to return to India. Mr Chapman told the Tribunal that difficulties with food and the heat prevented him from staying longer than a week in India with Ms Raval in 2018 and meant he could not consider going to India with her when Vishnu got sick in April 2022. The Tribunal notes that the focus of the evidence about the nature of any future household was on the children. There is a clear plan that Vishnu, who is about to complete school, will come to Australia and do further education in IT. Misha and Mita, however, will remain in India to complete their qualification in March 2023 before coming to Australia.
There is no evidence of the social aspects of Ms Raval’s and Mr Chapman’s relationship. Evidence from Misha and Mita makes clear that they are familiar with Mr Chapman and the relationship as well as the couple’s future plans. But Mr Chapman did not have much contact with Ms Raval’s extended family during his two short trips to India. Otherwise, they have only spent short periods in Thailand. The couple do have mutual friends, but no evidence was provided about how they intend to socialise when Ms Raval arrives in Australia.
Mr Chapman gave very convincing evidence about the couple’s commitment to each other however. Although his evidence was somewhat fragmented, he has been consistent about his claims that Ms Raval has been supportive of him and helped him through a number of difficult events over the last few years. He told the Tribunal that she has given him confidence and built his self-esteem. Ms Raval and Mr Chapman communicate daily via messaging and speak once or twice a week. However, it is relevant that they have only spent a few weeks physically together during their entire relationship. That said, the Tribunal puts weight on the fact that as soon as practical after Australia’s borders reopened from the Covid-19 pandemic they arranged to meet in Thailand and that these arrangements were made before the Tribunal was in contact with Mr Chapman about his resumed hearing.
The Tribunal accepts the medical evidence that complications from major surgery like a gastric bypass can affect memory and so it has given limited weight to the fact that Mr Chapman had difficulties with dates and the sequence of some basic events that took place in 2015 and 2016. It also understands that significant health issues that result in life-altering changes like those that can occur from gastric bypass surgery can lead to depression and a limited capacity to tackle peripheral matters like changing ones beneficiary. The problem the Tribunal has is that there just is very little evidence of this relationship. The couple appear to have had few discussions about their future life together except that they will buy a house and in relation to the children. And there is almost no documentation of any kind. However, what evidence there is of the relationship was consistent. Mr Chapman and Ms Raval gave the same basic information about how they met, got engaged, the wedding as well as their plans and communications. There were discrepancies in Mr Chapman’s evidence about the timing of things, but the Tribunal has accepted his explanation. They gave very similar evidence about Mr Chapman’s trip to India in 2018 and his difficulties with food with only the minor discrepancies one might expect from information coming from two different perspectives. The information about the children’s future and the April 2022 trip to Thailand for their anniversary was consistent and supported by Mita’s and Misha’s evidence.
While there is little evidence in support of the relationship, nor is there any particularly adverse evidence in this case. Therefore, the Tribunal has given Ms Raval and Mr Chapman the benefit of the doubt. It finds that what evidence does exist, as little as that might be, about their finances and nature of their household, their social life and, in particular, their commitment to each other, and all the other circumstances of their relationship, demonstrate that Ms Raval and Mr Chapman are in a genuine married relationship: r.1.15A(2) and (3).
The Tribunal finds that Ms Raval and Mr Chapman have a mutual commitment to a shared life together to the exclusion of all others and are in a genuine and continuing relationship. Although they live separately and apart because Ms Raval does not currently have a visa to enter and reside in Australia, they have lived together in India and Thailand (albeit briefly) and will live together in the Western suburbs of Sydney near Westmead Hospital once they are given that opportunity. They, therefore, meet all the requirements in s.5F(2)(b), (c), and (d). The Tribunal is satisfied that Ms Raval and Mr Chapman are in a married relationship.
Does Ms Raval Meet cl.309.21 and cl.309.221
Based on the evidence above, the Tribunal accepts that Ms Raval and Mr Chapman satisfied the requirements of s.5F(2) at the time of the application. Although some of the matters on which it has relied occurred after that date, it finds those matters are nonetheless indicative of the couple’s relationship on 16 May 2017. Since Ms Raval and Mr Chapman were in a married relationship at the time of application, she was the spouse of an Australian citizen and cl.309.211(2) is met.
The sponsor, Mr Chapman, must not be prohibited by cl.309.212(2) of the Regulations from being a sponsoring partner: cl.309.212(1). Ms Raval is not a male person: cl.309.212(2)(a). Therefore, Mr Chapman is not prohibited from being a sponsor and cl.309.212 is met.
The Tribunal has viewed the sponsorship application and finds that Ms Raval was sponsored by Mr Chapman, who was born in 1985 and so had turned 18 at the time of the application. Therefore, cl.309.213 is met.
The Tribunal finds that at the time of the application Ms Raval satisfied all the criteria in cl.309.21 of the Regulations.
The Tribunal also finds that at the time of this decision Ms Raval is the spouse of Mr Chapman, who is an Australian citizen. Since she continues to satisfy the criterion in cl.309.211, she meets cl.309.221 of the Regulations.
Given the findings above, the appropriate course is to remit Ms Raval’s application for the visa to the Minister to consider the remaining criteria for a Subclass 309 visa.
Ms Raval’s Children
Clause 309.311 of the Regulations requires that at the time of the application a secondary applicant is a member of the family unit of, and made a combined application with, a person who satisfies the primary criteria in Subdivision 309.21. Clause 309.321 requires that at the time of decision the secondary applicant continue to be a member of the family unit of that person. Since Ms Raval is the person who satisfies the primary criteria, to satisfy the Regulations Ms Raval’s daughters and son must be members of her family unit at the time of application and at the time of this decision.
Regulation 1.12 sets out the definition of ‘member of the family unit’. Relevant to this case, r.1.12(2)(b) prescribes that a person is a member of the family unit of another person if the person is the child of that other person (other than a child who is engaged to be married or has a spouse or de facto partner) and has either not turned 18 or turned 18, but not turned 23, and is dependent on that other person. None of Ms Raval’s children are engaged to be married or have a spouse or de facto partner.
Members of Ms Raval’s Family Unit at the Time of Application - cl.309.311
Ms Raval’s daughters, Mita and Misha, were born on 28 December 1999. At the time of application, being 16 May 2017, they were 17 years old. Ms Raval’s son, Vishnu, was born on 26 November 2004. At the time of application, he was 12 years old. At the time of application all Ms Raval’s children had not turned 18.
The Tribunal is satisfied that Ms Raval’s children met r.1.12(2)(b) and were members of her family unit on 16 May 2017. As a result, they meet cl.309.311 because they made a combined application with Ms Raval and were members of her family unit at the time of the application.
Members of Ms Raval’s Family Unit at the Time of Decision - cl.309.321
Although they made a combined application with Ms Raval, because Ms Raval has not been granted a Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) visa at the time of this decision, her children do not meet cl.309.321 of the Regulations. However, for the following reasons the Tribunal finds that they meet r.1.12(2)(b) and are members of Ms Raval’s family unit at the time of decision for the purposes of cl.309.321.
At the time of this decision, Vishnu is 17 years of age and so still has not turned 18. Therefore, he continues to meet r.1.12(2)(b)(i) of the Regulations and is a member of Ms Raval’s family unit at the time of this decision.
Mita and Misha have turned 18, but at 22 years of age have not turned 23. They will meet r.1.12(2)(ii) if they are ‘dependent’ on their mother. The term ‘dependent’ is defined in r.1.05A of the Regulations. Relevantly, it requires that at the relevant time, and for a substantial period immediately before that time, the person who is claiming to be dependent (that is, Misha and Mita) must be wholly or substantially reliant on the other person (in this case, Ms Raval) for financial support to meet basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. Further, Misha’s and Mita’s reliance on Ms Raval must be greater than their reliance on any other person or source of financial support to meet those basic needs: r.1.05A(1)(a)(ii) and (ii). The terms of r.1.05A(1) do not carry with them any implication of necessity or lack of choice. The question is whether, as a matter of fact, the children are relying on their mother for support.[5] That said, the claim is that her daughters are completely financially reliant on Ms Raval, not only for their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter, but for everything.
[5] Huynh v MIMA [2006] FCAFC 122 at [44].
The Tribunal accepts based on the documentation and evidence at the hearings that after completing school, Mita and Misha started a four year course in homeopathic medicine. It also accepts that they completed exams in March 2022 and are now undertaking unpaid work experience for 12 months, until March 2023, in order to complete their qualification. Although Mr Chapman has provided some funds for their course, Mita and Misha continue to live with their mother in the home shared with her sister. The family has lived there together since before the time of application. Ms Raval has always been and continues to be responsible for providing Mita and Misha with all their food and all their clothing.
On the basis of its findings above, the Tribunal finds that at the time of this decision and for a substantial period immediately before that time, Mita and Misha were wholly or substantially reliant on Ms Raval for financial support to meet their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. It finds they were not reliant on any other person or source of support for financial support to meet their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. At the time of this decision Mita and Misha are dependent on Ms Raval as defined in the Regulations.
Therefore, Mita and Misha continue to meet r.1.12(2)(b) of the Regulations and are members of Ms Raval’s family unit at the time of this decision.
Given the findings above, the appropriate course is to remit the children’s applications for the visas to the Minister to consider the remaining criteria for a Subclass 309 visa.
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the application for a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa for reconsideration, with the direction that the first named visa applicant meets the following criteria for a Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) visa:
·all the subclauses in cl.309.21 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations; and
·cl.309.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
The Tribunal remits the application for Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visas for reconsideration, with the direction that the second, third, and fourth named visa applicants meet the following criteria for a Subclass 309 (Partner (Provisional)) visa:
·cl.309.311 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
Mireya Hyland
MemberAttachment - Extract from Migration Regulations 1994
1.15ASpouse
(1)For subsection 5F (3) of the Act, this regulation sets out arrangements for the purpose of determining whether 1 or more of the conditions in paragraphs 5F (2) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act exist.
(2)If the Minister is considering an application for:
(a)a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa; or
(b)a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa; or
(c)a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa; or
(d)a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa;
the Minister must consider all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the matters set out in subregulation (3).
(3)The matters for subregulation (2) are:
(a)the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets; and
(ii) any joint liabilities; and
(iii) the extent of any pooling of financial resources, especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iv) whether one person in the relationship owes any legal obligation in respect of the other; and
(v) the basis of any sharing of day‑to‑day household expenses; and
(b)the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for the care and support of children; and
(ii) the living arrangements of the persons; and
(iii) any sharing of the responsibility for housework; and
(c)the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the persons represent themselves to other people as being married to each other; and
(ii) the opinion of the persons’ friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship; and
(iii) any basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities; and
(d)the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, including:
(i) the duration of the relationship; and
(ii) the length of time during which the persons have lived together; and
(iii) the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other; and
(iv) whether the persons see the relationship as a long‑term one.
(4)If the Minister is considering an application for a visa of a class other than a class mentioned in subregulation (2), the Minister may consider any of the circumstances mentioned in subregulation (3).
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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