Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessy

The matter before the Court was an application by Chapel of Angels to set aside two statutory demands made by Mr Hennessy and Hennessy Building under s 459H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The statutory demands were based on the amounts owing pursuant to two judgments of the District Court of Queensland. Chapel of Angels sought to set aside the statutory demands on the basis that there was a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debts claimed. The legal issues the Court was required to decide were whether there was a genuine dispute for the purposes of s 459H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act and, if not, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to set aside the statutory demands under s 459H(2). The Court found that there was no genuine dispute as to the existence of the debts, as the statutory demands were founded upon judgment debts. The Court also found that there were no other grounds for setting aside the statutory demands. The Court dismissed the applications and ordered Chapel of Angels to pay the defendants' costs of and incidental to the application on an indemnity basis.

The Court found that the statutory demands were based on judgment debts, and therefore, the existence of the debts was beyond dispute. The Court noted that it was well settled that a judgment debt was beyond dispute while it stood, even in the case of a default judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff's attempt to challenge the validity of the judgments and orders of the District Court was not a genuine dispute for the purposes of s 459H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act. The Court also found that there were no other grounds for setting aside the statutory demands. The Court dismissed the applications and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs of and incidental to the application on an indemnity basis. The Court noted that the plaintiff had continued the applications after being made aware of the absence of any relevantly sustainable grounds and had a prior history of abuse of process. The Court considered the application either high-handed or oppressive.