IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A27 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD ACN 007 625 603
Applicant
and
DR COLIN MANOCK
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE
ON FRIDAY, 8 APRIL 2011, AT 10.12 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R.J. WHITINGTON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. DOYLE, for the applicant. (instructed by Kelly & Co Lawyers)
MR N.J.T. SWAN: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS A. WILLIAMSON, for the respondent. (instructed by Lawson Smith Lawyers)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Whitington.
MR WHITINGTON: This application for special leave focuses on the second‑stage decision of Justice Sulan to re-exercise the discretion against allowing the amendment sought and the majority decision of the Full Court to affirm the exercise of that discretion. The first‑stage decision, as I would call it, to interfere with the decision of Judge Muecke on the basis it found error in the exercise of his discretion was upheld by the majority but held to be wrong by Justice Gray.
The Court might have discerned that the two stages, the consideration of error in the reasons of Judge Muecke and then the re‑exercise of the discretion, were merged in the reasons of Justice Sulan and he did not deal separately with the re‑exercise of the discretion. It seems, however, that he was taken by the majority in the Full Court, who have addressed the relevant considerations for re‑exercise in his reasons for rejecting the approach of Judge Muecke and one sees that, for instance, in the reasons of Justice Bleby at paragraphs 76 to 79 in the application book at page 56.
The majority held that Justice Sulan was correct to interfere with the decision of Judge Muecke and correct to re‑exercise his discretion so as to refuse the application to amend. Justice Gray, on the other hand, held that Justice Sulan was wrong to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of Judge Muecke and that Judge Muecke’s decision should be restored.
I should also point out by way of background that it was acknowledged by the Full Court that the application and the appeal - there was an application for leave and the appeal below raised a significant question of public interest. Can I mention a brief matter of background in relation to the course and history of the application before it got to the Full Court.
It first came before Master Rice, and I think that was in April 2008 in the District Court and he ultimately pronounced in March 2009 and he held that the application did not come too late but that it did not raise an arguable defence of justification. The matter went on appeal to Judge…
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the defamatory imputations conveyed by the broadcasts were of such a nature that they were not capable of being proven true, and therefore whether the defence of justification was available to Channel Seven. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the broadcasts, when considered in their entirety, conveyed imputations that were substantially true, or if the imputations were of a kind that could not be proven true.
The High Court, comprising Hayne and Kiefel JJ, reasoned that the defence of justification requires the defendant to prove the truth of the defamatory imputations. In this instance, the Court found that the broadcasts conveyed imputations that were not capable of being proven true. Their Honours applied the principle that for a defence of justification to succeed, the defendant must establish the truth of the sting of the defamatory matter, meaning the core defamatory meaning. If the imputations are such that they cannot be substantiated, the defence will fail.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case traces back to Master Rice's initial decision in April 2008, who allowed the application but found it did not raise an arguable defence of justification. This decision was appealed to Judge Muecke, who allowed the application and found it did raise an arguable defence. Justice Sulan then re-exercised the discretion and refused the amendment, a decision affirmed by the majority of the Full Court. The Full Court focused on the timing of the application to amend and whether the new evidence could have been discovered earlier. Channel Seven argued that the Full Court misapprehended the relevance of the new evidence and failed to consider certain factors in exercising the discretion. The High Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal, finding that Channel Seven did not have sufficient prospects of success.
This application for special leave to appeal concerns the second-stage decision of Justice Sulan to re-exercise the discretion against allowing an amendment to the pleading, as well as the majority decision of the Full Court to affirm the exercise of that discretion. The case began in the District Court before Master Rice in April 2008, who found that the application did not come too late but did not raise an arguable defence of justification. An appeal to Judge Muecke in March 2010 found that the application did not come too late and raised an arguable defence of justification. Justice Sulan found that the application raised an arguable defence of justification, but came too late. The Full Court did not challenge the decisions of Judge Muecke and Justice Sulan that the proposed amended pleading raised an arguable defence, focusing instead on the timing of the application to amend. The Full Court majority held that Justice Sulan was correct to interfere with the decision of Judge Muecke and correctly re-exercised the discretion to refuse the application to amend. Justice Gray held that Justice Sulan was wrong to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of Judge Muecke and that Judge Muecke’s decision should be restored. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to challenge the Full Court's decision. The applicant has insufficient prospects of succeeding in an appeal to warrant a grant of special leave to appeal. Special leave to appeal is refused and must be refused with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the Full Court correct to reject the Full Court’s consideration of fresh evidence relating to the applicant’s proposed amended defence?
2. Did Justice Sulan make any critical errors in his review of Judge Muecke’s decision to allow the amendment of the pleadings?
3. Did Justice Sulan fail to consider relevant factors in exercising his discretion to refuse the amendment of the pleadings?
4. How should the delay in the present case from institutional proceedings to the application to amend be weighed in the discretion of the court?
5. Does this case provide a suitable vehicle for the Court to further consider and refine the principles in AON?
Held
1. The Full Court was correct to reject the Full Court’s consideration of fresh evidence relating to the applicant’s proposed amended defence. The Full Court held that the fresh evidence was irrelevant because it would only go in support of existing pleaded particulars of justification.
2. Justice Sulan made critical errors in his review of Judge Muecke’s decision to allow the amendment of the pleadings. He did not consider the fact that this was not a case where an adjournment of a trial would be required or there would be any disruption to court lists or other litigants, and he did not consider the relevance of the discretion that the applicant cannot now pursue what has been found to be a good arguable defence.
3. Justice Sulan failed to consider relevant factors in exercising his discretion to refuse the amendment of the pleadings. He did not take into account the fact that there was no trial or court was disrupted and that the applicant has been shut out of a good arguable defence.
4. The delay in the present case from institutional proceedings to the application to amend should be weighed in the discretion of the court. However, it should be noted that the applicant in a speculative sense has been the ultimate cause of the delay through its decision not to plead justification in March 2005, when a significant part of the time which has passed has not been attributable in any direct sense to the applicant’s conduct.
5. This case does not provide a suitable vehicle for the Court to further consider and refine the principles in AON. The Full Court was fundamentally wrong in their approach to the fresh evidence and failed to have regard to the decision of this Court in CDJ v VAJ.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court's decision to refuse special leave to appeal in Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock [2011] HCATrans 84 revolves around several significant issues that were raised during the proceedings. Firstly, the Full Court's rejection of the consideration of fresh evidence relating to the applicant's proposed amended defence was scrutinized. The applicant argued that the Full Court misapprehended the relevance of the new evidence, which, although supportive of existing pleadings, could have made good the pleaded justifications. The Court held that the Full Court was correct in rejecting the tender of new evidence as it did not consider the possibility that new evidence might substantiate existing pleaded particulars. This aligns with the principle that the focus is on whether the pleaded particulars adequately demonstrate an arguable defence, rather than the means of proving it.
Secondly, the Court examined whether Justice Sulan made any critical errors in his review of Judge Muecke's decision to allow the amendment of the pleadings. The applicant claimed that Justice Sulan erred by not considering certain factors in his review, such as the absence of any disruption to court lists or other litigants and the applicant's exclusion from pursuing a good arguable defence. However, the Court found that the Full Court correctly held Justice Sulan's review to be a re-exercise of discretion, and any errors in that review would affect the exercise of discretion. The Court emphasized that the discretion to allow amendments is not unfettered and must be exercised with consideration of all relevant factors.
Thirdly, the Court considered whether Justice Sulan failed to consider relevant factors in exercising his discretion to refuse the amendment of the pleadings. The applicant argued that Justice Sulan overlooked significant factors, such as the absence of trial or disruption to court lists and the exclusion from pursuing a good arguable defence. However, the Court held that Justice Sulan's review of the discretion was correct and that the Full Court properly affirmed the exercise of that discretion.
Fourthly, the Court addressed how the delay in the present case from institutional proceedings to the application to amend should be weighed in the discretion of the court. The applicant argued that the delay should be considered in light of the fact that the applicant had not been the sole cause of the delay. The Court, however, did not find this argument compelling enough to warrant special leave to appeal.
Lastly, the Court considered whether this case provided a suitable vehicle for further consideration and refinement of the principles in AON. The Court found that no general principle would fall for consideration if leave to appeal were granted and that the applicant had insufficient prospects of succeeding in an appeal. Therefore, the Court refused special leave to appeal.
In summary, the Court's reasoning in this case underscores the importance of properly considering all relevant factors in the exercise of discretion to allow amendments to pleadings, particularly in light of the principles established in AON. The Court found that the Full Court's decision was correct and that the applicant had insufficient prospects of success to warrant special leave to appeal.