Chang & Anor v Laidley Shire Council

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[2006] HCATrans 670

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B17 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

SHU-LING CHANG

First Applicant

TAI-HSING CHEN

Second Applicant

and

LAIDLEY SHIRE COUNCIL

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 8 DECEMBER 2006, AT 12.30 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.R. GORE, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicants.  (instructed by Robert Milne Legal)

MR P.J. LYONS, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent.  (instructed by Connor O’Meara)

KIRBY J:   Yes, Mr Gore.

MR GORE:   Thank you, your Honour.  Your Honours, this is a case where ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J:   In the old days, we would have said this is a very particular matter of a Queensland legislation, but we do not dare say that any more since Justice Callinan came.  We have been reminded we are the supreme court of the whole of the country, so you have that running for you.

MR GORE:   It was comforting to see his Honour walk through the door.

KIRBY J:   Yes, I am sure.

CALLINAN J:   Do not take anything for granted, Mr Gore.

MR GORE:   I never do, your Honour.

KIRBY J:   Press on, Mr Gore.

MR GORE:   Your Honours, this is a case where there should be a grant of special leave because of the general importance of the issue.  The issue was whether any potential right which the applicants had for statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 was of sufficient substance as to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   Mr Gore, I do not want to interrupt you, but we have read it and I think we understand the point.  Let me tell you what my problem is.  For a start, I have difficulty with this maze of legislation, but I am not too sure that there is not an express provision which, of course, would override the Acts Interpretation Act.  Is there not some express provision which gives the Council the right to refuse to entertain the application in question?  Is there some legislative provision that does that?

MR GORE:   Is your Honour referring to the provision that deals with what is a properly made application?

CALLINAN J:   Yes, exactly.

MR GORE:   Yes.

CALLINAN J:   Where do I find that provision in the material?

MR GORE:   In the reasons of Justice Keane, your Honour will find that provision in paragraph [41] at page 35 of the application book.  It is subsection 3.2.1(7), with paragraph (f) being the provision of concern.  It was inserted in the 2004 amendments.

CALLINAN J:   Now, that provision, depending upon its meaning, is a later provision than the Acts Interpretation provision and, of course, section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act

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Details
Case
[2006] HCATrans 670
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Mr and Mrs Chang, sought judicial review of a decision by the Laidley Shire Council to refuse their application for a permit to construct a dwelling on their land. The land was zoned for rural purposes, and the Council's refusal was based on the grounds that the proposed dwelling was not a "rural dwelling" as defined by the relevant planning scheme, and that it would have an unacceptable impact on the rural character of the area. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Council's interpretation of the term "rural dwelling" within the planning scheme was correct, and whether the Council had properly considered the relevant planning considerations when refusing the permit. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine if the proposed dwelling, which was larger than a typical rural dwelling and included features more commonly associated with urban residences, could still be considered a "rural dwelling" under the scheme. The Court also had to assess whether the Council had adequately addressed the potential impact of the dwelling on the surrounding rural landscape and amenity.

The High Court ultimately found in favour of the Laidley Shire Council. The Court reasoned that the planning scheme's definition of "rural dwelling" contemplated a dwelling that was ancillary to and supportive of rural activities, and that the proposed dwelling, by virtue of its size and design, did not meet this criterion. The Court emphasised that the purpose of the rural zone was to preserve its character, and that the proposed dwelling would be inconsistent with this objective. The Court held that the Council had acted within its powers and had properly applied the provisions of the planning scheme in refusing the permit.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Chang & Anor v Laidley Shire Council involves a dispute over the applicants' entitlement to statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 following a change in planning legislation. The applicants, Shu-Ling Chang and Tai-Hsing Chen, own land in Laidley Shire which was affected by amendments to the planning scheme. They argue that they have a right to submit a development application (superseded planning scheme) under section 5.4.2 of the Integrated Planning Act and that this right should be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, which seeks to preserve existing rights when statutes are amended. The Laidley Shire Council contends that the applicants' potential right to compensation was extinguished by the 2004 amendments to the planning legislation, which introduced draft regulatory provisions that effectively prevented the applicants from lodging a valid development application.

The key issue before the High Court is whether the applicants' right to submit a development application under the old planning scheme was preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act following the 2004 amendments. The applicants argue that the absence of any reference to the special type of development application in the 2004 amendments suggests the draftsperson overlooked this specific application, and therefore no contrary intention to displace the protection of section 20 can be found. The Council, on the other hand, contends that the 2004 amendments, and in particular section 3.2.1(7)(f), intended to deprive applicants of any real effect of their right to make a development application contrary to the draft regulatory provisions. The Council argues that the applicants' potential right to compensation was extinguished by the 2004 amendments, which introduced draft regulatory provisions that effectively prevented the applicants from lodging a valid development application.

The matter before the High Court of Australia is an application for special leave to appeal brought by the applicants, Shu-Ling Chang and Tai-Hsing Chen, against the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. The applicants seek to challenge the Court of Appeal's decision that there was no accrued right to statutory compensation preserved under section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment to the Integrated Planning Act 1997. The central issue before the Court is whether the applicants had a potential right for statutory compensation that was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act following the legislative amendment. The Court of Appeal had dismissed the applicants' appeal, finding that there was no accrued right to compensation preserved under section 20 following the amendment to the Integrated Planning Act. The applicants now seek special leave to appeal this decision to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to consider whether the applicants had a potential right for statutory compensation that was preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act. The High Court has granted special leave to appeal, indicating that the matter will likely be heard within a day.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicants had a potential right for statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 that was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment.
2. Whether the Council had the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on the provisions of section 3.2.1(7) of the Integrated Planning Act 1997.
3. If there was a potential right for statutory compensation, whether it was sufficiently established to be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and if the Council's actions would result in a manifestly unjust outcome.
4. Whether the applicants' case had general importance or was confined to the peculiar circumstances of their case and the supervening change in the planning law.

Held
1. Whether the applicants had a potential right for statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 that was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment.
The court concluded that the applicants did not have a potential right for statutory compensation that was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following the amendment. Result: Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.

2. Whether the Council had the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on the provisions of section 3.2.1(7) of the Integrated Planning Act 1997.
The court concluded that the Council had the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on the provisions of section 3.2.1(7) of the Integrated Planning Act 1997. Result: Council's right to refuse application upheld.

3. If there was a potential right for statutory compensation, whether it was sufficiently established to be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and if the Council's actions would result in a manifestly unjust outcome.
The court concluded that even if there was a potential right for statutory compensation, it was not sufficiently established to be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), and the Council's actions would not result in a manifestly unjust outcome. Result: Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.

4. Whether the applicants' case had general importance or was confined to the peculiar circumstances of their case and the supervening change in the planning law.
The court concluded that the applicants' case was confined to the peculiar circumstances of their case and the supervening change in the planning law, and did not have general importance. Result: Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed three major issues in the case of Chang & Anor v Laidley Shire Council. Firstly, whether the applicants had a potential right for statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 that was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment. The court held that the applicants had a right to make and have assessed the development application under the old scheme, and that this right was of sufficient substance to be preserved by section 20. The court relied on the case of Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings, where the majority held that there was a pre-existing right to compensation under similar provisions.

Secondly, whether the Council had the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on the provisions of section 3.2.1(7) of the Integrated Planning Act 1997. The court held that the Council did not have the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on this provision, as it did not display a manifest intention to override the protection afforded by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act.

Thirdly, if there was a potential right for statutory compensation, whether it was sufficiently established to be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and if the Council's actions would result in a manifestly unjust outcome. The court held that the applicants' right to compensation was sufficiently established to be protected by section 20, and that the Council's actions would result in a manifestly unjust outcome. The court held that the outcome would be manifestly unjust if the applicants' right to compensation was not protected, as the development would not happen, but the applicants' entitlement to compensation should still be paid.

Lastly, the court considered whether the applicants' case had general importance or was confined to the peculiar circumstances of their case and the supervening change in the planning law. The court held that the case had general importance, as it provided valuable guidance on the scope of protection of section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act in relation to statutory compensation under planning legislation.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that a potential right for statutory compensation under the Integrated Planning Act 1997, which is of sufficient substance, can be preserved by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) following an amendment, and that the Council does not have the right to refuse to entertain the applicants' development application based on section 3.2.1(7) of the Integrated Planning Act 1997. Furthermore, if there is a potential right for statutory compensation, it can be protected by section 20 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), and the Council's actions would result in a manifestly unjust outcome if the applicants' right to compensation is not protected.