Chan v Minister for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 1094
•5 June 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 1094 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not providing the applicant with a meaningful hearing – whether the Tribunal failed to follow a mandatory procedure in relation to the applicant’s interview – whether the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with an opportunity to see additional time – whether there is jurisdictional error – no jurisdictional error made out – application is dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 359, 376, 375, 360, 361, 425 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl.820.211, sch.3, r.1.15 |
| Cases cited: Chan v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCA 2803 Chan v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2893 Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123 Minister for Immigration Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin [2005] FCAFC 118 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 NAQS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1137 SZVGP v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 3210 |
| Applicant: | ZI YAN CHAN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2847 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Humphreys |
| Hearing date: | 7 May 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 May 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 5 June 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr Jones, Michael Jones Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Hwl Ebsworth Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,000.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
SYG 2847 of 2019
| ZI YAN CHAN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(As Corrected)
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of Hong Kong and is currently in her mid-forties. The applicant first entered Australia on 11 April 2012, holding a Subclass 976 Tourist Visa. On 18 May 2012, the applicant unsuccessfully applied for a Student visa. The applicant’s Subclass 976 Tourist visa was cancelled on 28 June 2012, as she was found to be in breach of condition 8101 that she did not work in Australia. The applicant has not held a substantive visa since 2012.
The applicant has previously been married and divorced her first husband in 2008. On 31 October 2013, the applicant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa and a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa, on the basis of her relationship with her sponsor, Mr Sultana (“the sponsor”). The parties claim they first met each other on 25 December 2012 and the relationship developed after that time. They were married on 17 April 2013.
On 6 June 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the delegate”) refused the application. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant met the conditions of cl 820.211(2)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was the spouse, as defined in s 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act”), of the sponsoring partner. Further, as the applicant did not hold a substantive visa at the time of her application, she did not satisfy Criterion 3001 of Schedule 3 to the Regulations. The delegate was not satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria.
The applicant sought merits review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). In a decision dated 30 May 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
The applicant appealed to this Court. In Chan v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2893 per Street J, the Court dismissed the application. The applicant then appealed to the Federal Court. In Chan v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCA 2803 per Yates J, the Federal Court allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
In a decision dated 17 October 2019, the Tribunal again affirmed the delegate’s decision. The applicant now seeks judicial review by this Court, of the second Tribunal’s decision.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision
It should first be noted that the Tribunal’s decision under review was decided on a different basis from the first Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal found, in the present case, that the applicant and her sponsor were not in a genuine and continuing relationship and as a result, the applicant did not meet the requirements of s 5F(2) of the Act and was not the spouse of the sponsor.
The grounds of appeal that are relied upon are limited and as a result, it is not necessary to summarise the entire Tribunal decision, rather this can be limited to the relevant areas.
At paragraph 17 of its decision, the Tribunal sets out further information that was provided by the applicant for the hearing, which was additional to the material provided to the delegate. At paragraph 18 of its decision, the Tribunal notes that the applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 20 September 2019 to give evidence. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the sponsor and Mr Goh, who had previously provided a statement. The applicant was represented by her registered migration agent.
At paragraph 19 of its decision, the Tribunal notes that at the commencement of the hearing, it explained the process under s 359AA of the Act. This included the fact that if the applicant required more time to comment or respond on information that was put to her, she could request an adjournment.
At paragraph 25 of its decision, the Tribunal referred to the sponsor’s travel records, which indicated he travelled overseas on eight occasions since the applicant claimed to have been in a relationship with him. This included the sponsor travelling overseas on New Year’s Eve 2019, when the applicant claimed that she went to a pub in Sydney with him and friends to celebrate the New Year. The Tribunal stated this was relevant, as it indicated that the applicant was not aware of the sponsor travelling overseas and indicated the parties were not living together.
At paragraph 28 of its decision, the Tribunal put material to the applicant which, in its view, indicated the applicant had only considered fertility issues immediately prior to the hearing before the Tribunal. This did not indicate the parties had taken any steps at any other time, to address any concerns they may have about fertility and having a child together.
Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Tribunal’s decision deal with issues relating to bank accounts held by the parties, including deposits in one series totalling in excess of $15,000, as well as deposits made to an ATM in Kalgoorlie at another point of time. The Tribunal noted that these deposits could not be explained by the applicant.
At paragraphs 36 and 37 of its decision, the Tribunal put to the applicant information that, up until 2014, she had been staying, most of the time, in a unit in Sydney with friends. This was inconsistent with information being provided by the applicant to the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted the applicant was unable to provide any response to this information.
At paragraph 40 of its decision, the Tribunal asked the applicant who a Mr Nastasi was. The applicant initially said she had never heard of him. The applicant was also asked who a Mr Wilson was. The applicant then said they were friends of the sponsor, but was not sure. The applicant said she had been out for dinner in Sydney near to where Mr Nastasi was living and she had been to Mr Wilson’s home on one occasion.
Paragraphs 41 through to 49 of the Tribunal’s decision deal with all evidence provided by the sponsor. At paragraph 48 of its decision, the Tribunal notes that the party’s marriage certificate, which states the place of residence of both the applicant and the sponsor, was an address in Pitt Street, Sydney. The sponsor said the details of the marriage certificate were wrong. The sponsor also said he had never seen a rental agreement where he and the applicant are shown as joint tenants of a residence in Pitt Street, Sydney.
At paragraph 53 of its decision, the Tribunal referred to information provided by the sponsor, which was that the applicant’s children were both students. The Tribunal noted that this was inconsistent with information provided by the applicant that her son was working.
At paragraph 57 of its decision, the Tribunal records that the applicant provided a further statement to the Tribunal, after the hearing, in response to the matters raised by the Tribunal during the hearing. The statement sets out a significant amount of information which is summarised and provides an explanation to the matters that were of concern to the Tribunal, which were put to the applicant, during the course of the hearing.
Paragraphs 59 through 119 of the Tribunal’s decision, record a detailed consideration of the evidence before the Tribunal and the reasons for the conclusion it comes to, that whilst the parties were formally married, at the time of the application and decision, the parties were not living together, nor were they in a genuine and continuing relationship.
Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied the requirements of s 5F(2) of the Act were met, including by reference to the matters set out in
r 1.15A of the Regulations.
Grounds of Appeal
Two grounds of appeal are relied upon, which are set out in an amended application filed on 12 February 2020. They are as follows:
1) The Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not providing the applicant with a meaningful hearing under s360 of the Migration Act 1959 (“the Act”).
Particulars
The Applicant had requested that the Tribunal take oral evidence by telephone from two witnesses. In failing to do so, either:
a) If the Tribunal did not give any consideration to the Applicant’s request it denied procedural fairness to the Applicant by failing to give her a proper opportunity to present evidence in relation to the issues in the review.
b) If the Tribunal did not consider the request, the Court should conclude that the Tribunal’s decision not to call the witnesses was unreasonable because it lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
2) The Tribunal failed to follow a mandatory procedure in relation to the conduct of the interview.
Particulars
a) At the hearing the Tribunal put certain information to the Applicant which it considered would be reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
b) The Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with a real opportunity to seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information.
The Applicant’s Submissions
In relation to ground one, Counsel for the applicant notes that the applicant’s representative at the Tribunal hearing sent a “Response to Hearing Invitation” form, signed by the applicant on 8 August 2019, in which they ticked the box “yes’” to the statement that they requested that the member take evidence from another person. Under the heading of witnesses, the following appears “TBA”.
On 13 September 2019, the applicant’s representative sent an email to the Tribunal, attaching a number of documents and stating that three named persons would give evidence at the hearing, one in person and the other two by telephone. The two persons named to give evidence by telephone were a Mr Shi and Mr Wilson. The applicant concedes that the witnesses named in the email, were not named in a notice given to the Tribunal, within seven days of the notification the hearing and therefore, s 361(3) of the Act does not apply. Counsel for the applicant submits however, that the Tribunal continued to have a discretion to hear evidence from the witnesses, other than the applicant. In some cases, a failure to do so may constitute jurisdictional error of the same type, as a failure to make an obvious enquiry about a critical fact that the existence of which could be easily ascertained (see Minister for Immigration Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [25]).
In NAQS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1137 (“NAQS”), Hill J considered the case in which an applicant had bought to the hearing a number witnesses whose names not been previously given to the Tribunal. Hill J at [27], was of the view that:
…It will require express and unambiguous language before Parliament it is to be taken to have excluded the right of an applicant to put evidence in the form of oral testimony of relevant facts before a decision-maker (the Tribunal) charged ultimately with the making of a decision of such importance as the Tribunal is charged to make as a result of a review.
Counsel for the applicant submits that although the wording of s 361(3) of the Act is that “the Tribunal must have regard to the applicant’s notice but is not required to comply with it”, it is submitted that since the notice under subsection (2) uses the term “obtain oral evidence”, it is submitted that Hill J’s interpretation, is equally applicable to that section.
In SZVGP v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 3210 (“SZVGP”), Barnes J held that the Tribunal had acted unreasonably in the way in which it exercised its discretion not to hear from a witness, even though the applicant had made the request outside the seven day period.
The discretion to hear from a witness must be exercised reasonably, as any other discretion that is available to the Tribunal. A decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification, may be found to be unreasonable, even where some reasons had been given. At the hearing, the Tribunal member apparently failed to take note of the email of 13 September 2019, a copy of which the applicant’s representative handed to the member. Based on an exchange with the applicant, which is referred to in the summary of the findings above, the Tribunal concluded that Mr Wilson and/or Mr Natasi, would be prepared to give false evidence in support of the application. Without the benefit of taking evidence from them, the Tribunal’s decision is tainted by jurisdictional error on the ground that there is no logical or rational appropriate basis for the finding, that certain witnesses’ evidence was fabricated. Counsel for the applicant submits that the failure to do so unreasonably denied the applicant a meaningful hearing under s 360 of the Act.
In relation to ground two, at the hearing the Tribunal gave the applicant information about the overseas travel of the sponsor. It is not disputed the Tribunal provided information in accordance with the requirements of s 359AA of the Act, including advising the applicant she could request an adjournment if she required more time.
At the hearing, as set out at page 17 of the hearing transcript, the applicant asked “can I have a rest”. The Tribunal ignored that request and continued to question the applicant about the information. It should be inferred from the fact the Tribunal pressed on with the questioning, without pause, that it did not give any consideration to that request.
After the hearing, the applicant provided a statutory declaration which addressed, amongst other things, the issue of whether the couple had spent New Year’s Eve 2019 together. The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s confusion of the hearing was evidence that her relationship was not a genuine one.
Counsel for the applicant submits that the failure to comply with
s 359AA of the Act in this case, gave rise to practical injustice in that the applicant was put in the position where, if the Tribunal had allowed the adjournment she had requested of the hearing, she may have been able to better present her explanation as the events in question, which were material to the Tribunal’s decision.
The First Respondent’s Submissions
Counsel for the first respondent notes that the first ground asserts the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with a meaningful hearing, under s 360 of the Act in connection with the request by the applicant, that the Tribunal take evidence from two witnesses being Mr Shi and Mr Wilson.
Counsel for the first respondent notes that in relation to the procedural fairness point, the applicant properly conceded the Tribunal did not fail in its obligations under s 361(3) of the Act, as the applicant did not follow the proper notification process pursuant to s 361(2) of the Act. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was under no express compulsion to consider whether to take evidence from the witnesses.
As the review applicant did not request through the requisite
aprocedure in s 361 of the Act, that the Tribunal take evidence from the relevant persons, the Tribunal cannot be said to have failed in a statutory obligation to have regard to the applicant’s request (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin [2005] FCAFC 118). The applicant however, contends she was denied procedural fairness. Whether this occurred, requires consideration to be given to the whole of the circumstances of the case and the relevant statutory context.Counsel for the first respondent submits that in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 (“SCAR”) at [37], the Full Court, by reference to s 425 of the Act, (the analogue of s 360 of the Act) affirmed that the section did not require the Tribunal to actively assist the applicant in putting her case and did not require the Tribunal to carry out an enquiry, in order to identify what that case may be. In SCAR at [36], the Full Court stated that:
…unlike a court, the Tribunal does not “receive” evidence from a party to the proceeding. Only the Tribunal can examine a witness whose oral evidence the Tribunal has determined to obtain…
Counsel for the first respondent notes that the applicant relies on NAQS. It is submitted that there are two reasons this Court would not follow that judgement. First, the issue that arose for consideration in that case, concerned the refusal of the Tribunal to hear evidence for a witness as to the experiences of the applicant in China. It is submitted, by contrast, the Tribunal in this case, did not refuse to hear from any of the applicant’s witnesses. It is submitted that the applicant took no steps to arrange for the two witnesses to attend the hearing. Second, to the extent that NAQS could be said to stand for the proposition that an applicant, in a Part 5 or Part 7 review, has a “right” to call witnesses to give evidence, that proposition is wrong and inconsistent with later Full Court authority (see AYX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 FCR 317 103 at [48]).
The Federal Court said:
…The only express control or condition on that discretion is that the Tribunal must “have regard to” the applicant’s wishes. In our opinion this means the Tribunal must, through inquiries of the applicant, understand why the applicant wants the Tribunal to take evidence from the nominated person, and how that person’s evidence is said by
thean applicant to relate to the Tribunal’storeview. It is to these matters the Tribunal must give real and genuine consideration, in the way explained by Kenny and Lander JJ in Maltsin at [38]’.To the extent that the applicant relies upon SZVGP, Counsel for the first respondent submits that it turns on its own facts where the Tribunal had refused to take all evidence by telephone from a potentially corroborative witness, based on mere speculation that the telephone call might be intercepted. In SZVGP, Barnes J determined that the Tribunal’s decision in refusing to telephone the potentially cooperative witness, was a legally unreasonable exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion.
Lastly, Counsel for the first respondent submits that it cannot be said that the Tribunal, even if it been required to consider the applicant’s request to take evidence from the identified witnesses, that it completely failed to consider whether to call them. As the transcript reveals, the Tribunal asked the applicant who Mr Wilson was. The applicant replied she did not know.
In relation to the second ground, Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the Tribunal cannot have failed to comply with
s 359AA(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, unless it had properly engage the power in s 359AA91)(a) of the Act in the first place. The nature of the information put
tothe Tribunal by the applicant for comment, was information that contradicted her own evidence about her relationship with her husband and the time they spent together. The information the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on upon was accordingly not “information” for the purposes of s 359AA(1) of the Act.Secondly, even if the Tribunal did properly engage its power under
s 359AA(1)(a) of the Act, no jurisdictional error is made out. Counsel for the first respondent submits that the Tribunal informed the applicant at the commencement of the hearing, if you need more time you can request an adjournment. The request by the applicant “can I have a rest” did not constitute a request by the applicant for an adjournment or to be given more time, in which to respond to the Tribunal’s questions. As it turned out, the applicant provided some answers to the Tribunal’s request for comment concerning the information about the travel schedule of her husband. The applicant also had the opportunity to make a post hearing written submission, which the Tribunal took into account.
The applicant was also given further opportunity to address the information put to her at the hearing. This results in a conclusion that any failure by the Tribunal to consider a request by her for an adjournment to provide a response, cannot have been material to the outcome of the review (see Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123).
Consideration
As regards to ground one, it is common ground that the relevant procedures to request witnesses to be called pursuant to s 361 of the Act, were not complied with by the applicant.
The submission put by the applicant is that she was denied procedural fairness. The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did give consideration to whether or not the witnesses should be called, but decided not to do so. In so doing, the Court does not consider the fact that the witnesses were available by telephone, rather than being present at the hearing, results in any great difference. It is clear that the Tribunal considered the possible evidence of the witnesses but in its discretion, decided that they should not be contacted to give evidence.
The Court is not satisfied it lacked an evident and intelligible justification. There was a considerable amount of evidence before the Tribunal, much of it adverse to the applicant. The Court is satisfied that it can be reasonably inferred that the Tribunal concluded the possible evidence they would give would not assist the Tribunal in its determination.
In so doing, the Tribunal considered the statements provided by Mr Wilson and Mr Nastasi. The Court cannot find any reference to what evidence Mr Shi would have provided. At paragraph 87 of its decision, the Tribunal noted that it asked the applicant who Mr Wilson was. The applicant said initially, she did not know. The applicant then said he was a friend of the sponsor but was not sure. After the hearing, the applicant claimed she did know who the people were and claimed they were friends of the applicant and the sponsor. The applicant claimed that she was stressed during the hearing and simply froze. At paragraph 88 of its decision, the Tribunal goes on to state:
The Tribunal does not accept the information provided by Mr Wilson is correct or that he has any knowledge of the claimed relationship between the applicant and the sponsor. That Mr Wilson was willing to provide statements on two occasions and the applicant provided those statements in support of the application indicates the applicant has been willing to provide false information to the Department and has arranged with third parties to provide false information in support of the application.
At paragraph 89 of its decision, the Tribunal considers the statement provided by Mr Nastasi. The Tribunal notes that Mr Nastasi lives in Darwin but his statement indicated the applicant and the sponsor would go out for dinner. The Tribunal concludes that the fact the applicant initially stated that she did not know who Mr Nastasi was, or that he lived in Darwin, indicates she has no knowledge of or a relationship with him or with her. It indicates the applicant has arranged for Mr Nastasi to provide information in support of her application, which is not a genuine reflection of any relationship the applicant has with the sponsor.
A finding that a person has been prepared to provide false evidence to the Tribunal, is a serious one. In the case of Mr Wilson, the finding was made based on a statement he made, together with the initial answers of the applicant that she did not know who Mr Wilson was. Had the Tribunal indicated that it simply placed no weight on the statement of Mr Wilson, given that the Tribunal declined to hear from him, that finding would be unremarkable. The same reasoning applies to Mr Nastasi. The Tribunal however, went much further. The Tribunal found that Mr Wilson and Mr Nastasi were willing to provide false statements, as set out in paragraph 88 and 89 of its decision and that the applicant was willing to arrange this.
The Tribunal never expressly put that conclusion to the applicant. The first respondent, in supplementary submissions, contends that the conclusions that Mr Wilson and Mr Nastasi were prepared to give false evidence, would have been obvious to the applicant. In any event, the applicant had the opportunity of making a post hearing submission, which she did. It is submitted that this did not amount to any procedural unfairness.
What is clear, is that the Tribunal based its conclusions on the initial replies by the applicant that she did not know either Mr Wilson or Mr Nastasi or the fact Mr Nastasi lived in Darwin. This was not information that was adverse to the applicant that was in the hands of the Tribunal, prior to the hearing. It occurred during the course of the hearing.
Section 359AA of the Act, is couched as discretionary in that it “may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information the Tribunal considers would be reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review”. Section 357A of the Act, sets out that s 375, s 375A and s 376 of the Act are an exhaustive statement of the requirements of natural justice that apply to Part 5 Reviewable decisions, however, s 357A(2) of the Act states that the Tribunal must act in a manner that is fair and just.
The requirement for procedural fairness applies to the applicant, not to Mr Wilson and Mr Nastasi as witnesses. The Court is not satisfied that the Tribunal had formed, during the hearing, an adverse view as to their evidence. What was crucial, was the initial denial that the applicant knew them. Given this view, the Court is not satisfied that the decision to not allow the witnesses to be called or the conclusion, in the written reasons, that Mr Nastasi and Mr Wilson were prepared to give false evidence, required that to be put to the applicant during the course of the hearing. It may be, that during the hearing, the Tribunal had not formed that view and it was only on reflection that it formed that view. No jurisdictional error is made out.
In relation to ground two, the Court is not satisfied that any jurisdictional error is made out. During the course of the hearing, in circumstances where a considerable amount of adverse information was being put to the applicant, she asked if she could have “a rest” (see page 17 of the hearing transcript). This was denied, in that the Tribunal did not respond and went on asking questions. The applicant had been provided with information at the commencement of the hearing that she could request an adjournment. The transcript does not record the applicant made such a request. Later on at page 28 of the transcript of the hearing, the applicant makes a request she have a rest to go to the bathroom, as she feels really cold. That request was granted.
In these circumstances, the Court cannot be satisfied that there was a failure to follow the provisions of s 359AA of the Act. Following the conclusion of the oral hearing, the migration agent representing the applicant, requested a copy of the recording of the hearing. Following that, a written submission was prepared in relation to the issues raised by the Tribunal, which was submitted and taken into account by the Tribunal, before making its decision.
The Court is not satisfied that the request for a ‘rest’ constituted a request for an adjournment and consequently, enlivened the requirements under s 359AA of the Act. Further, as pointed out by the first respondent, under s 359(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, the Tribunal is only required to adjourn the review, if the Tribunal the considers the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or respond to the information. It is clear that there is a discretion to adjourn, which of course must be exercised reasonably. It is clear that the applicant was under considerable pressure in responding to a large amount of adverse information that was being put to her. The Court cannot be satisfied that the denial of a short break, with one being granted later, rather than a formal request for an adjournment, indicates that the relevant procedures were not complied with. Ground two does not reveal any jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys
Associate:
Date: 5 June 2020
Correction:
Date delivered from 22 May 2020 to 5 June 2020.
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