CHAN and DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT - [2013] WASAT 144

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL

ACT: ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA)

CITATION: CHAN and DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT [2013] WASAT 144

MEMBER: MR T CAREY (MEMBER)

HEARD: 24 JUNE AND 10 JULY 2013

DELIVERED : 10 JULY 2013

PUBLISHED : 3 SEPTEMBER 2013

FILE NO/S: CC 454 of 2013

BETWEEN: NICHOLAS CHAN
Applicant
AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Respondent

Catchwords:

Road traffic - Suspension of vehicle licence - Failure to surrender vehicle after surrender notice given - Validity of surrender notice - Date of impounding offence misstated - Application of principles in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority

Legislation:

Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 6(1), s 6(2), s 8, s 15, s 23A, s 23A(3), s 25, s 78C, s 79(1), s 79(2), s 79A, s 79B, s 79BA, s 79BB, s 79BD, s 79BD(1), s 79C, s 79C(2), s 79C(3)(b), Pt II, Pt III, Pt IV, Pt IVA, Pt V Div 4, Pt V, Pt V Div 4(2)
Road Traffic Amendment (Hoons) Bill 2009 (WA)

Result:

Application for review successful

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

The applicant sought a review of a decision of the Director General Department of Transport, upon the request of the Commissioner of Police under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), to suspend the licence of a vehicle involved in an 'impounding offence'. The suspension decision depended upon the giving of a 'surrender notice' to a responsible person who then fails to surrender the vehicle concerned. The applicant concluded that the purported surrender notice given to him by the police was invalid by reason of the misstatement of the date of the alleged offence, in contravention of one of the requirements for such notice.
The respondent submitted that this error in the notice should not have the effect contended for, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, and that the decision to suspend should remain undisturbed.
The Tribunal considered that the outcome was to be determined in accordance with the principles espoused by the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1988) 194 CLR 355, directed to discerning whether the effect of the failure to comply with the statutory requirement, consistent with the legislative purpose, is to invalidate the exercise of power.
The Tribunal conducted the necessary analysis of the subject matter, language, scope and objectives of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), and concluded that the misstatement of the date rendered the notice void. Accordingly, the decision to suspend the licence was set aside.
The Tribunal gave its decision orally on 10 July 2013. Its reasons, taken from the transcript and edited in minor respects to aid clarity, are set out in these written reasons.

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr N De Kerloy
Respondent: Ms L Eddy

Solicitors:

Applicant: Mony De Kerloy
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355
Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

The applicant, Mr Chan, admits that on 16 January 2013 at about 1.30 pm he drove a vehicle registered in his name at 106 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone. He also admits that on 13 February 2013, after speaking with him about the incident, a member of the Western Australian Police Force reasonably suspected that he had committed the offence of reckless driving on 16 January 2013.
On 13 February 2013 the police officer gave Mr Chan a document headed Surrender Notice (the notice), the purpose of which, consistent with the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RT Act), was to impound by surrender the vehicle on the basis that it had been used in the commission of the offence of reckless driving, which is under the RT Act an impounding offence. The notice is in standard form, with the information applicable to Mr Chan's case inserted by hand under the following headings:
•Driver;
•Impoundment offence;
•Vehicle to be surrendered details;
•Surrender details; and
•Notice to surrender notification.
The completed notice contains Mr Chan's name, date of birth, address and phone numbers, and indicates that the impoundment offence is reckless driving. The notice provides details of the offence (I will return to these), particulars of the vehicle, including that it is a Bentley Continental and that its owner is ICP Security Pty Ltd, dates of service of the notice, 20 February 2013 as the date by which the vehicle must be surrendered for an impounding period of 28 days, and details of the impounding officer and senior police officer.
No issue arises in relation to any of the notice's contents, save for the date given under 'impoundment offence' next to 'date and time'. That date is 18 January 2013 (the time entered, 13:32 hours, is uncontroversial). The date is two days later than the accepted date of the admitted reckless driving. The date given for the last day for surrender of the vehicle derives from the final paragraph of the list of matters appearing as (a) (i) in s 79BA(4) of the RT Act that such a notice 'must specify'.
Other matters include details of the vehicle, the time and place at which the offence is suspected to have been committed, details of the offence and the name of the person who was driving at the time of the alleged offence.
Under the RT Act, where a surrender notice is given in respect of an impounding offence to a 'responsible person' within 28 days from the date of the offence and the responsible person fails to surrender the vehicle in accordance with the notice, the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner) may request the respondent to suspend the licence in respect of the vehicle until the vehicle is impounded see s 79BD of the RT Act. Mr Chan accepts that he is the responsible person for the required purpose. The respondent must, if requested under s 79BD of the RT Act to do so, suspend the licence in accordance with the request see s 23A(3) of the RT Act. These provisions have been invoked in the circumstances of Mr Chan's case with the result that on 26 February 2013 the respondent suspended the licence of the vehicle.
Mr Chan's application for review seeks an order that the suspension is wrongful and should be set aside on the basis that the surrender notice is invalid. It is brought under s 25 of the RT Act, which extends such applications to 'where a licence is … suspended under section 23A'.
The respondent has conceded, properly, in my view, that on such a review the Tribunal may inquire into whether the purported request of the Commissioner under s 79BD of the RT Act is soundly based, and, more particularly, whether the surrender notice relied upon is valid.

Issue

The issue for me to determine is whether the misstatement of the date as the date of the impounding offence has the effect of invalidating the notice as a surrender notice, thereby entitling Mr Chan to the relief he seeks.

Consideration

Meaning of 'time' for purposes of s 79BA(4) of the RT Act

The respondent formally relies upon a contention that there is no requirement under s 79BA(4) of the RT Act for the notice to specify the date of the offence, only the 'time'.
Even if the contention were correct, it might still be necessary to consider the consequences of the incorrect date being included in the notice. However, the contention cannot, in my view, be accepted for the following reasons.
In a statutory notice of the commission of an offence, having regard to the statutory context and, in particular, the various matters required by s 79BA(4) of the RT Act to be specified, 'time' can only sensibly be a reference to both the date and time of the day of the alleged offence. If only the time of day were referred to, a person served with a notice would be left to wonder when (in the sense of on what day) the offence is alleged to have occurred. This is particularly significant in the context of traffic offences often policed by cameras and radar devices, the operation of which generally occurs without any awareness by those transgressing the rules.
Looking at the issue as an exercise of statutory construction, the mere reference to the time of day (using the example of the notice of 13:32 hours) would not, in my view, comply with the requirement that the notice 'specify the time ... the offence is suspected to have been committed', because that is a time which occurs once every day. In order for the notice to 'specify' the relevant time, the particular instance of the time of day of 13:32 hours out of a list of endless possibilities is required to be stated. Significantly, the standard printed form used by the police officer in this case provided a place to insert both the date and time of day in order for this to occur, reflecting the construction which I consider to be the correct one.

Effect of the misstatement of the time so construed of the offence by two days

a) Legal principles to be applied

The respondent's arguments undertook a significant transformation when one compares the contents of its statement of issues, facts and contentions filed on 9 May 2013 and the oral submissions of counsel for the respondent at the hearing.
In paragraph 37 of the respondent's statement of issues, facts and contentions, the respondent contended that:
On a proper construction of the relevant provisions Parliament did not intend for a mistake in specification of the date (or even a failure to specify any date at all) on a surrender notice to necessarily invalidate the surrender notice or the subsequent power of the Commissioner to request suspension of a vehicle licence under section 79BD of the RTA.
The same document at paragraph 38 went on to suggest that it is inconsistent with the scheme of the legislation that a misstatement of the date on which the suspected offence had occurred would invalidate the surrender notice, and proceeded to consider the explanatory memoranda to the then Road Traffic Amendment (Hoons) Bill 2009 (WA), which inserted the relevant provisions, including s 79BA, s 79BD and s 23A(3) into the RT Act in order to make good that suggestion.
At the hearing, the starting point of the respondent's counsel's submissions was to invoke the well known approach to statutory interpretation in cases where acts done in the purported exercise of statutory power do not comply with the governing statutory provision enunciated in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 (Project Blue Sky). Counsel then went on to refer to certain features of the scheme of the Act dealing with the process of immediate and delayed impoundment (Mr Chan's case being an example of the latter) which she submitted led to the conclusion based on the Project Blue Sky principles that the misstated date should not have the result that the surrender notice is invalid.
In my view, in a case such as this, concerning the exercise of an administrative power under legislative authority in relation to which a failure to comply with a requirement of the legislation has occurred, the outcome is to be determined according to the principles outlined by the High Court in Project Blue Sky. As will be seen, those principles do not automatically mandate reference to extrinsic parliamentary material in order to ascertain legislative intent, and the respondent's statement of issues, fact and contentions in relying upon such material before a proper consideration of the provisions of the RT Act itself, has been unhelpful. In compiling such statements, parties should, as far as it is possible at the time of drafting, ensure that they are indicative of and are not inconsistent with the submissions that are ultimately relied upon by them at trial.
What, then, are the Project Blue Sky principles to be applied?
The majority of the High Court in Project Blue Sky said at [91]:
An act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is not necessarily invalid and of no effect. Whether it is depends upon whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with the condition. The existence of the purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and objects, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition. … .
At [93] of Project Blue Sky, after agreeing with the observation of New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 at 24 that the distinction between directory and mandatory requirements, and division of directory requirements according to whether or not substantial compliance has occurred in determining the validity of acts taken, had outlived their usefulness, the majority cited with approval the following passage from the same case:
… A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. This has been the preferred approach of courts in this country in recent years, particularly in New South Wales. In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to 'the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute'. … .

b) Application of Project Blue Sky test to failure of compliance in the present case, having regard to the subject matter, language, scope and objects of the RT Act

The long title of the RT Act is:
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to road traffic; to repeal the Traffic Act 1919 and for incidental and other purposes.
As such, it gives no real assistance in discerning the real, practical objectives of the RT Act in general, much less the impoundment provisions.
Part II of the RT Act is headed 'Administration'. By s 6(1) of the RT Act, the Commissioner of Police is given responsibility for the control and regulation of traffic in the State and for the enforcement of the traffic regulation provisions of the RT Act. The administration of the licensing provisions of the RT Act and responsibility for enforcement of those provisions are vested in the respondent by s 6(2) of the RT Act, although this does not affect the powers of police officers in relation to offences against the RT Act's licensing provisions.
Section 8 of the RT Act provides for the exchange of certain information between the respondent and the Commissioner. The respondent is required to provide information relating to drivers' licences and permits to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner must disclose information to the respondent, including details of road traffic offences and information about the impounding or confiscation of vehicles under Pt IV Div 4 of the RT Act.
Part III of the RT Act is headed 'Licensing of vehicles'. Section 15 of the RT Act sets out the requirement for a vehicle to be licensed and that it is an offence to use a vehicle without a valid licence. The provisions which follow regulate applications for and renewal of licences, and the respondent's powers and obligations in relation to them. The respondent's power of cancellation and suspension of licences in certain circumstances, including upon a request by the Commissioner under s 79BD to suspend, appears in s 23A of the RT Act. Further provisions concerning licensing in particular circumstances are found in the remainder of Pt III of the RT Act.
Part IV of the RT Act is concerned with overseas vehicles temporarily in Australia, and Pt IVA with authorisation to drive, primarily through the agency of a driver's licence.
Part V of the RT Act is entitled 'Regulation of traffic' and is, in terms of number of sections, easily the longest part of the RT Act. It comprises five subdivisions, notably 'Driving of vehicles: general offences', 'Driving of vehicles: alcohol and drug related offences', 'General matters as to driving offences', and 'Impounding and confiscation of vehicles for certain offences', the latter being Div 4. I will return to Pt V Div 4 shortly.
None of the remaining parts of the RT Act headed 'Events on roads', 'Miscellaneous', 'Demerit points', 'Offences and penalties', 'Transitional provisions' and 'Regulations' have any particular bearing on the statutory interpretation exercise with which I am concerned.
It is necessary to go in greater detail into some of the provisions of the RT Act. They mostly fall within Pt V Div 4(2) of the RT Act, 'Impounding of vehicles by police'.
Section 79(1) of the RT Act states:
If a member of the Police Force reasonably suspects that, while driving a vehicle, the driver has committed an impounding offence (driving), the member must, unless in the circumstances it is impracticable to do so, impound the vehicle within a period of 28 days after the day of the offence.
Section 79A of the RT Act is concerned with 'Impounding offence (driver's licence), police powers to impound vehicle used in'. As I have mentioned, Mr Chan's offence is of the type in s 79(1) of the RT Act.
By s 79(2) of the RT Act, the impounding period is 28 days, unless the driver of the vehicle is believed to be a previous offender, in which case it is extended to three months.
What is meant by impoundment, or impounding, for the purposes of s 79 and s 79A of the RT Act is made clear by s 78C of the RT Act, which provides that:
…
A member of the Police Force and any person assisting a member of the Police Force in the exercise of a power under section 79(1) or 79A(1) may drive, tow or otherwise convey a vehicle impounded under that section
(a)to the place where the vehicle is to be stored; or
(b)at the place where the vehicle is stored.
…
Section 79BA of the RT Act presents an alternative method of impoundment where employing the method referred to in s 79(1) is impracticable or where by the time the police officer forms the necessary suspicion the impoundment is most conveniently achieved under s 79BA.
I have already alluded to the operation of the procedure under s 79BA of the RT Act, commenced with the giving of a surrender notice to a responsible person for the vehicle. Section 79BA(3) of the RT Act states:
The surrender notice cannot be given after the expiry of a period of 28 days from the day of the offence.
The critical provision for the purposes of this case is s 79BA(4), which states:
The surrender notice must contain a statement to the effect that, because the vehicle was used in the commission of the offence, the vehicle is required to be surrendered to the Commissioner for impounding, and the notice must specify
(a)sufficient details of the vehicle to identify it; and
(b)the time and place at which the offence is suspected to have been committed; and
(c)sufficient other details of the offence to identify the grounds for giving the notice; and
(d)if known, the name of the person who was driving the vehicle when the offence is suspected to have been committed; and
(e)which of sections 79(1) and 79A(1) is the impounding provision; and
(f)if the impounding provision is section 79(1) and the notice is given on the basis that the driver is a previous offender as defined in section 79(1A), sufficient details to explain why the driver is regarded as a previous offender; and
(g)the length of the impounding period, which is to be
(i)if section 79(1) is the impounding provision, either 28 days or 3 months according to which of those periods is the impounding period for which section 79(1) requires the vehicle to be impounded or would require the vehicle to be impounded if it applied; and
(ii)if section 79A(1) is the impounding provision, 28 days;
and
(h)the place at which, and the time of day during which, the vehicle and its keys are required to be surrendered under this Division; and
(i)the last day on or before which the vehicle and its keys are required to be surrendered, being the 7th day after the day on which the notice is given.

Section 79BA(5) of the RT Act refers to three further statements the notice 'must also include'.
Section 79BB of the RT Act deals with the consequences of the giving of a surrender notice. In cases where the responsible person surrenders the vehicle, the impounding period commences at the time of the surrender. Where the responsible person fails to surrender the vehicle, the vehicle is liable to be impounded at a time when a police officer takes possession, whenever that occurs.
Section 79B of the RT Act deals with the requirement for a standard notice of impounding. The notice must be given to each responsible person; the driver, if not a responsible person; and, if the licence of the vehicle involved is suspended under s 79BD, the respondent. The notice must contain various details, including the same details as those referred to in s 79BA(4)(a) 79BA(4)(d).
Section 79C of the RT Act requires that a police officer other than a senior police officer who impounds a vehicle or gives a surrender notice must inform a senior police officer as soon as practicable. The senior police officer is required by s 79C(2) of the RT Act to make enquiries limited to satisfying himself or herself that there are reasonable grounds to suspect s 79(1) of the RT Act applies. If not so satisfied, where a surrender notice is issued, the notice is to be cancelled: s 79C(3)(b) of the RT Act.
The final sections of the RT Act for mentioning are s 79BD and s 23A. Once again, I have alluded to these sections already. The full text of s 79BD(1) of the RT Act is:
Suspension of vehicle licence on Commissioner's request
(1)If
(a)a responsible person for a vehicle who is given a surrender notice under section 79BA fails to surrender the vehicle specified in the notice according to the notice; or
(b)a responsible person for a vehicle who is given a surrender substitute vehicle notice under section 79BCA fails to surrender the substitute vehicle specified in the notice according to the notice; or
(c)a responsible person for a vehicle who is given a surrender alternative vehicle notice under section 79BCD fails to surrender the alternative vehicle specified in the notice according to the notice,
the Commissioner may request the Director General to suspend the licence in respect of the vehicle until the vehicle is impounded under this Division or the Commissioner requests the Director General to revoke the suspension.
Section 23A of the RT Act states:
Vehicle licence, Director General may cancel or suspend in some cases
(1)The Director General may cancel the licence in respect of any vehicle where
(a)the proper fees and charges have not been paid; or
(b)the vehicle does not meet the prescribed standards and requirements; or
(c)a responsible person for the vehicle has failed to present it for inspection when so directed by the Director General pursuant to the provisions of this Act; or
(d)the licence for the vehicle is surrendered in accordance with section 28A of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973.
(2)The Director General may, in circumstances described in subsection (1), suspend the licence in respect of a vehicle until the circumstances giving rise to the suspension are remedied.
(3)If requested under section 79BD to do so, the Director General must, in accordance with the request
(a)suspend the licence in respect of a vehicle; or
(b)revoke the suspension of the licence in respect of a vehicle.
Arising from a consideration of these provisions, it can be seen that they are concerned with the object of imposing the sanction for the commission of particular road traffic offences, at the point of a police officer reasonably suspecting that an offence has been committed, and in addition to any future penalty imposed, of impoundment of a vehicle (generally the vehicle involved in the suspected offence) for a minimum of 28 days. The enforcement of the sanction is to occur either by way of immediate impounding action by the police officer, or upon the giving of a surrender notice obliging the recipient to surrender the vehicle. In the latter case, if the vehicle is not voluntarily surrendered, the police officer is given a further opportunity to impound the vehicle, buttressed by the Commissioner's ability to request the respondent to suspend the vehicle licence until that occurs, to which request the respondent is required to accede.
The impoundment power forms part of the Commissioner's powers for the regulation of traffic and, more specifically, the enforcement of the traffic regulation provisions of the RT Act. Like any statutory power, it must be exercised in accordance with, and within the limitations of, the statute bestowing the power. Once a police officer has formed the suspicion that an impounding offence has occurred, and opts for the impounding option initiated by the giving of a surrender notice, he is not at liberty to proceed on the basis of a notice that disregards the requirements of s 79BA(4) of the RT Act, nor with a notice given outside the 28 day period referred to in s 79BA(3) of the RT Act. This is despite the fact, upon which the respondent placed great emphasis, of the police officer's primary obligation under s 79(1) of the RT Act to, himself or herself, impound the vehicle within 28 days of the alleged offence.
Having regard to s 79BB of the RT Act, whatever the responsible person decides, impoundment of his or her personal property is the inevitable result. As has been discussed, a further impingement on the responsible person's rights involving the immediate suspension of the vehicle licence is also possible. Added to these consequences, impoundment is to be the subject of the notifications under s 79B of the RT Act.
A further notable feature of the statutory impounding scheme is the coextensive limitation period under both s 79(1) and s 79BA(3) of the RT Act. Within 28 days of the date of the suspected impounding offence, for impounding to occur, the police officer must either impound the vehicle or give a surrender notice. The reason that one or other of the alternatives is used will relate to the practicality of the impoundment by the police officer within the 28 days. The facts of this case provide a good example, the evidence suggesting that it was only after Senior Constable Rice spoke with Mr Chan on 13 February 2013, being the 28th day after the date of the then suspected offence, that the officer formed the suspicion under s 79(1) of the RT Act, making the giving of a surrender notice the most convenient method of impounding. The surrender notice procedure is thus likely to be used at a point further removed, either or both in terms of place and time, from the alleged offence than an impounding under s 79(1) of the RT Act. Section 79BA(4) of the RT Act requires that the responsible person be apprised of certain matters relating to the vehicle and the alleged offence in order for him or her to decide on a response, having either way the serious consequences to which I have adverted.
The surrender notice is therefore to be regarded as the touchstone of the impounding process under s 79BA of the RT Act. In my view, it is not to the point to attempt to prioritise the processes under s 79(1) and s 79BA of the RT Act. Unless impounding under s 79(1) of the RT Act occurs, the only power to impound a vehicle for an impounding offence (driving) is that provided by s 79BA and following sections. Exercise of that power authorises what would otherwise be an unlawful seizure or taking into possession of personal property. As a general statement, its exercise needs to be in compliance with the governing statute.
We are here concerned with the misstatement of a date. The date of alleged offence (described as 'the time' in the RT Act) is one of several matters the surrender notice is required to 'specify'. Read together, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature intended that the responsible person be apprised of the details of the particular incident alleged to constitute the impounding offence in order for the responsible person to be aware of the case for impoundment and to respond to it. In a proper case, the responsible person must be assumed to have the right to contest the matters raised and, in so doing, challenge the validity of the notice. An illustration would be a notice containing the description of a vehicle which the responsible person can demonstrate was not involved in the alleged impounding offence (for example, because it was interstate at the time). The respondent conceded as much at the hearing.
None of what I have said detracts from the broader objectives of the RT Act to enlarge the sanctions to be imposed where impounding offences occur. However, those added powers are circumscribed by the RT Act, and it is the operation of the limitations on the powers that is critical to the determination of this matter.
The language of s 79BA(4) of the RT Act itself evinces no distinction between the nine required items for the notice suggestive that some are more important than others. The draftsperson of the notice should be taken as attuned to the right of the responsible person to be apprised of and contest the case for impoundment. According to counsel for the respondent, the circumstances of the event (a reference to the alleged offence) are not the crux of a s 79BA(4) notice. I disagree. They are, along with the identification of the vehicle, the name of the person driving the vehicle, if known, and the remaining matters which the notice 'must specify'.
I also disagree with counsel's description of the purpose of the notice for the recipient to 'have an idea of what is the offence'. The clear words of s 79BA(4) of the RT Act demand a much higher standard of specification. Some of the required matters for specification in the notice, including the time of the alleged offence, are replicated in any notice of impounding. The need for accuracy in the required details at both stages of the process is compelling.
There is also a highly visible chronological structure to the impoundment scheme. Either impounding by the police officer or the giving of a surrender notice must occur within 28 days of the alleged offence. If the surrender notice procedure is being used, the notice must give a date for surrender of the seventh day after the giving of the notice. If the responsible person fails to surrender the vehicle, the police officer is expressly authorised to impound the vehicle within or without the 28 day period. The applicant suggested that the 28 day period for giving a surrender notice would allow for an error in a notice impugning its validity to be rectified by a subsequent notice, provided the invalid notice was served a sufficient time before the expiry of the 28 days. Whether this possibility eventuated would, of course, depend on the circumstances: for example, whether the recipient brought the defect to the notice of the police officer in time. However, the point remains that the scheme exhibits a dependence upon rigorous application of time limitations which would render overlooking the misstatement of the date of alleged offence in a notice which is required to specify the time of offence incongruous.
In Project Blue Sky, much of the discussion and, indeed, the outcome on the particular facts of that case, focused upon the effect that the holding of invalidity would have had. There is not the same potential for disturbance of the broader objectives of the RT Act arising in relation to the provisions that are relevant to this matter. The requirement for accuracy simply imposes upon the police officer a requirement to be diligent in inserting accurately the required details in a surrender notice and, once that perfectly achievable standard is adhered to, the scheme will operate effectively from all points of view.
For the above reasons, I conclude, consistent with the principles enunciated in Project Blue Sky, that the misstatement of the date in the notice renders it void for all purposes, including the purported request by the Commissioner to the respondent under s 79BD(1) of the RT Act to suspend the licence pertaining to the relevant vehicle.
Accordingly, the review application will be granted and the decision to suspend the licence set aside.

Orders

The Tribunal orders that:
1.The review application is granted.
2.The decision of the respondent's delegate to suspend the vehicle licence registration No GTN‑1K is set aside.
3.The said vehicle licence shall continue to be of full force and effect.

I certify that this and the preceding [56] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MR T CAREY, MEMBER