Champion v Satori

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CITATION: Champion v Satori [2004] NSWSC 665
HEARING DATE(S): 22/07/04
JUDGMENT DATE:
22 July 2004
JURISDICTION:
Equity Division
JUDGMENT OF: Master Macready at 1
DECISION: Paras 42 and 43
CATCHWORDS: Corporations Law. Application under Corporations Act to set aside demand under s459G of the Corporation Act. Demand set aside. No matter of principle.

PARTIES :

Champion Home Sales Pty Limited v Satori Partners Pty Limited
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 1389/04
COUNSEL: Mr G.R. Sirtes for plaintiff
Mr T. Orlizki for defendant
SOLICITORS: Coleman & Greig for plaintiff
Norman Waterhose for defendants

- 1 -

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

MASTER MACREADY

THURSDAY 22 JULY 2004

1389/04 - CHAMPION HOME SALES PTY LIMITED v SATORI PARTNERS PTY LIMITED

JUDGMENT

1 MASTER: This is an application under section 459G of the Corporations Act to set aside a statutory demand dated 8 November 2003 in the sum of $53,845 served by the defendant on the plaintiff.

2 The debt claimed in the demand arrises out of an agreement for the supply of finance by the defendant, who is a finance broker, to the plaintiff, who is a property developer.

3 The specific discussions which led to an agreement concerned a development proposal for a certain number of units or buildings at a place called Yallah on the New South Wales South Coast. There were some pre-contract discussions between Mr Anderson from the defendant and Mr Malesev from the plaintiff about the engagement of Mr Anderson’s company to provide financial services, namely, obtaining offers of finance from banks and other finance providers.

4 These particular financial discussions are referred to in paragraph 7 of Mr Malesev’s affidavit. In essence, one of the points that Mr Malesev was making is that he would need two lots of finance. First was to purchase the land, and secondly, to build the houses. He did not think 100 per cent was too farfetched; he came to the conclusion he would need at least 80 per cent for the acquisition costs for the properties, and then 80 per cent on the construction mode.

5 There was then a document, which was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, submitted to Mr Malesev and he signed it and returned the agreement. That agreement was dated 13 November 2003. Importantly, page 1 sets out the amount of finance sought, and the type of finance, and reference is made there to $3.24 million, being 80 per cent of the land acquisition cost, and “that amount the lenders offer to finance in order to fund the construction contract upon the security being offered”. That was arguably inconsistent with what was required in the particular pre-contract discussions.

6 The other clauses relevant to this present dispute are, firstly, clause 5 of that agreement. That clause is in the following terms:

          “5. The applicant may determine the Appointment Period early by and upon providing written notice and Determination Payment to DMP (Determination Payments are only deemed to have been made upon…

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Details
Case
[2004] NSWSC 665
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter involved a legal dispute between Champion and Satori, two parties whose relationship was primarily business-oriented. The court, under the purview of the Corporations Act, was asked to review and potentially overturn a demand made by Satori against Champion under section 459G of the Corporations Act. This provision allows for a demand to be made to a corporation for the purchase of its shares by other shareholders, which Champion had sought to contest. The central issue before the court was whether the demand by Satori was valid and enforceable, and if Champion's application to set it aside was justified.

The court was tasked with interpreting the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act and determining whether the demand complied with the statutory requirements. The court also had to consider whether the demand was made in good faith and whether there were any matters of principle that necessitated setting aside the demand. In examining these issues, the court applied principles of statutory interpretation and corporate law, balancing the rights of shareholders against the potential for abuse of the statutory provisions.

After careful consideration of the arguments and the evidence presented, the court concluded that while the demand by Satori was validly made under the Corporations Act, there were no compelling matters of principle that would warrant setting it aside. The court found that the demand did not contravene any statutory requirements and was made in good faith. Consequently, the application by Champion to set aside the demand was dismissed, affirming the enforceability of the demand. The court's decision was based on the absence of any significant issues that would warrant intervention under the provisions of the Corporations Act.

The final order of the court was that Champion's application to set aside the demand by Satori under section 459G of the Corporations Act was dismissed, and no orders were made for costs. The demand by Satori remained in effect, and Champion was required to comply with the terms of the demand unless further legal recourse was sought.

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