Chambers, E.M. v Department of Social Security

Case

[1987] FCA 250

21 May 1987

No judgment structure available for this case.

.

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

IN THE FEDERAL COURT

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

)

DISTRICT REEISTRY

)

No. NAG 127 of 1986

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BEIWEEN:

ELSA MODANO LAMBRICHE CHAMBERS

Applicant

m:

THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

Respondent

MINUTE OF ORDER

JUDGES MAKING ORDER:

FOX, JENKINSON AND WILCOX JJ.

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 1907

WHERE MADE:

PERTH.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note:

Settlement and entry

of orders 1s dealt with in

Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

h

L -

IN THE FEDERAL COURT

OF AUSTRALIA )

GJESTERN-XJSTRALIA

i

GISTRICT REGISTRY

)

No. NAG 127 of 1986

GENERAL DIVISION

I

BETWEEN:

ELSA MODANO LAMBRICHE CHAMBERS

Applicant

m:

THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

Respondent

CORAM:

FOX, JENKINSON AND WILCOX

JJ.

D N :

21 MAY 1987

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

This

is

an appeal

against

decision

a

of

the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision

of

the

Secretary of

the Department of

Social Security on the question

whether the applicant should be reuarded,

for the purpose

of

computina social securltp payments, as a married person

or

an

unmarried person.

There was some initial confusion before the Tribunal as

to the nature

of

the benefits paid to

Mrs

Chambers, whose

computation is in issue, at the relevant time: 27 November 1984

to 1 April 1985. But it

was eventually agreed that the relevant

benefit was the unemployment benefit. Unemployment benefits are

payable under Part VI1 of

the Social Securitv Act 1947. Section

112,

which 1s

conLalned wlthln that Part. stlpulates rates of

beneflt. which rates distinuuish between married persons and

unmarried persons. At the tune taken as bemq relevant, s.112(4)

provided that, where the spouse

of a married person "is livlnq

apart from the married person in pursuance of

a

separation

agreement In writing

or of a decree, judgment or order of a court

or In such clrcumstances that

the Secretary 1s satisfied that the

separation is likely

to

be

permanent,"

the

rate

of

the

unemployment benefit should be increased t o the unmarried rate.

If the relevant time was taken as beinq that whlch followed the

amendment of sub-sectlon (4). it

is clear that there would be no

aruuable basls for the claim.

The case for the applicant. before the Tribunal, was

that she was in fact llvinq apart from her husband, so that she was entitled to the unmarried rate. Mrs Chambers conceded that she and her husband resided in the same premises durinq the

relevant perlod but she contended that they lived separate

liv s.

Evidence was given by both

Mrs Chambers and her husband, who was

called on behalf of the respondent, as to their way of life and as to various activities which they carried out together or separately. In the end the Tribunal concluded that the marital

relationshlp had not been severed, with the consequence that it

was obliued to reject the submission that

Mrs

Chambers was

"llvinu apart"

from her husband.

Three urounds were taken in the Notice of Appeal. The

flrst uround was that the Tribunal erred In hearing evidence from

Mr Chambers

because,

at

the

date

of

the

hearing,

he

"was

3 .

sufferinq from Fuaue and was experlenclnu memory

loss".

As to

this around it is enouqh to say that there was no evldence that.

at the date of hearlng.

Mr Chambers had any incapacity whlch

mqht have rendered hls evidence unreliable.

No

ob?ectlon was

taken to his ulvinu evidence generally, nor was any objection

taken m

respect of any particular part of it.

The members of

the Trlbunal 5aw and heard Mr Chambers and were in a position to evaluate hls evldence which, in any case, did not contradlct the evidence of Mrs Chambers in any material respect.

The second around of appeal was that the Tribunal

erred

in givina undue weiaht to

Mr Chamber's evidence. However, the

weight to be aiven to

the evidence was a question of fact

for the

Tribunal, not a question of law for this Court.

Finally, it was said that the Tribunal erred in law in

that It applled the wrong criteria in reachina its declsion.

In

araument before us Mrs Chambers, who

appeared in person, agreed

with each of the factual conclusions stated by

the Tribunal.

Those

conclusions

were

all made in connection with matters

relevant to the ultimate findings which the Tribunal had to make.

Some cut one way, some the other. But we

do not think that any

were irrelevant

or that the Tribunal erred in its selection of

criteria.

The ultimate determination made by the Tribunal was

one which was, upon

the evidence, clearly open to it.

Because the applicant lacked lead1 representation, we

have examined the Tribunal's decision with more than usual care.

But we are unable to detect any leyal error in the declsion.

4.

4

Indeed we would m?o further and say that, upon the facts found

by

the Trlburlal, that declsiofi was Inescapable.

' 3 c appeal sLould be dismissed.

I certify

that this and the

three ( 3 ) precedlng pages are

a true copy of the Reasons

the Court.

Appearance and Solicitor for the

applicant: In Person

Counsel for the respondent: Ms. H Riley

Solicitor for the respondent: Australian Government Solicltor

Ijate of Hearing: 18 May 1987

Gate judqment dellvcred:

21 May 1987

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